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The thesis is divided into two main parts: Parts I and II. Part I includes the literature 
review besides all the theoretical, conceptual and methodological research of the 
thesis. Part II encompasses the empirical research. 
 
This thesis examines whether small state governments in the European Union (EU) 
exercise influence in decision-making legislative processes. The following questions 
are put forward as part of the thesis’s investigation: 
 
- Are EU small member state governments influential in EU decision-making 
processes? In other words, do they exercise influence in these processes? And 
if so, how and at which stage do they do this? 
  
The thrust of the thesis goes contrary to the general notion that due to their 
smallness, small EU states do not exercise influence in such processes. It therefore 
explores whether small EU state governments are not necessarily as ‘weak’ or 
‘powerless’ as literature on small states in the EU seems to portray. 
 
This thesis seeks to answer the above questions by focusing on Malta - the smallest 
state in the EU - and whether it exercises influence in ‘uploading’ its preferences in 
two distinct stages of EU legislative decision-making processes - decision-shaping 
(formation) and decision-taking (adoption). 
 
The cases selected and analyzed showcase the Maltese government’s behaviour in 
legislative negotiations in differing EU policy spheres that are extremely relevant to 
it. These are the adoption of EU directives on pyrotechnic articles (falling under the 
EU competition and consumer health and safety policy spheres) and on the extension 
of EU long-term residence to beneficiaries of international protection (falling under 
EU immigration policy). As analyzed in Part II of the thesis, Malta’s government has 
achieved varying degrees of success in its exercise of influence in these EU decision-
making processes.   
 
The thesis selects six independent variables from the literature on small states that 
may be perceived as significant agents or factors for governmental influence in EU 
decision-making processes. These have been divided between governmental 
capacities (variables 1 to 3) and strategies (variables 4 to 6). Data has been collected 
through the use of differing methodological techniques of a dual nature: qualitative 
(through process-tracing, documentary analysis and elite interviews with the main EU 
and Maltese government officials participating in the legislative negotiations 
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examined in this thesis) and quantitative (descriptive statistics with levels of 
measurement and spread). 
 
The theoretical framework of the thesis applies three main approaches. These are 
rational choice theory, new institutionalism and multi-level governance. Chapters 4 
and 11 provide an in-depth analysis of how these approaches apply to the thesis’s 
empirical framework. 
 
Given that the subject matter of this thesis is relatively underexplored, it contributes 
to the literature on this subject in a number of ways. Primarily, it furthers knowledge 
on small states in the EU particularly their behaviour in EU decision-making 
processes. It also advances knowledge on Malta in the EU, particularly its 
performance in EU legislative decision-making on which to date not much research 
has been undertaken. It therefore fills a vacuum in literature on Malta in EU 
legislative decision-making processes. 
 
Finally, the author would like to stress that while use is made of relevant existing 
conceptual/theoretical material found in Part I of the thesis, the empirical research in 
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1.1 The Focus of the thesis 
 
Academic literature often asks the direct question: do small states suffer from their 
smallness? Such potential difficulties faced by small states have been the subject of 
widespread academic discussion that has gained momentum over the last five 
decades (Robinson, 1960; Benedict, 1967; Dobozi et. al., 1982; Kaminarides et. al., 
1989; Thorhallsson, 2000; Wivel, 2005; amongst others). 
 
However, and in contrast to the established literature on small states, innovative 
literature that views smallness from the opposite spectrum is being developed. In 
fact, the thesis’s passion is in this direction arguing that small states, if opportunistic 
enough, capitalize upon their smallness precisely as a resource (Browning, 2005) to 
exercise power and influence in European Union (EU) decision-making processes.  In 
order to find out whether this is correct, it is first necessary to conduct an analysis of 
whether a small state possesses relevant ‘capacities’. Second, it requires an analysis 
whether such capacities are exploited to employ ‘strategies’ to influence EU 
legislative decision-making processes. As emphasized below, together they represent 
the centrepiece on which the empirical research of this thesis rests.  
  
There are various authors who have devoted themselves to the study of state 
influence in EU decision-making who agree that power is no longer a question of 
military capacity or necessarily of size, but of the capacity to influence the political 
agenda. They identify  power and persuasion in the EU as being based on a number 
of factors that enable policy practitioners to take advantage of the multi-actor, multi-
level governance system that characterizes the EU (Jachtenfuchs and Kohler-Koch, 
1995) and its institutions (March & Olson, 2005).  
 
This thesis empirically examines such factors on governmental capacities and 
strategies to produce findings that reveal that at times (and depending on the 
presence of these factors), small states and their governments, contrary to what one 
might assume, may exercise influence in EU decision-making processes. It therefore 
asks the following main questions: 
 
- Are EU small member state governments able to exercise influence in EU 
 legislative decision-making processes? In other words, from the evidence of the 
 Maltese cases presented in this thesis, do small states exercise influence in 
these processes? And if so, how and at which stage do they do this? 
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The empirical case studies in this thesis therefore focus on the Maltese government’s 
capacities and strategies in EU uploading processes, i.e. the formation of EU 
legislation in two distinct stages - decision-shaping and decision-taking. The reader 
must therefore bear in mind that the thesis focuses solely on EU ‘legislative’ decision-
making, i.e. Malta’s exercise or non-exercise of influence in the formation and 
approval of selected EU legislation in the Council of the EU (and partially, on its 
channels of influence in the European Parliament).  
 
The study of small state influence in the EU, particularly during the shaping phases of 
EU legislative processes, has received less attention from academic circles which have 
tended to concentrate more on the final phases of decision-taking (Peterson and 
Bomberg, 1999: 2). Besides, although the focus of this research is primarily on Malta 
as the smallest EU member state (it was not possible to select more case studies 
featuring more states and EU legislation due to a lack of time and word space), the 
thesis aims to produce findings that may go beyond a single country dimension. 
Therefore, the thesis’s findings should be applied more generally to small states and 
their influence in EU decision-making. The thrust of this argument is that if the 
smallest EU state does exercise influence in EU processes then, in principle, so should 
other small EU states with larger administrations and generally more expertise. As is 
indicated in the final paragraphs of chapter 11, the thesis therefore suggests a 
potential subject matter for future research. 
 
This thesis puts forward the hypothesis that in the EU context, ‘small state’ does not 
mean ‘weak state’ and that certain vulnerabilities related to their size can be 
overturned with appropriate capacities and strategies employed during EU decision-
making. The thesis is therefore not only concerned with which strategies are used or 
whether different strategies are more successful than others in EU decision-making, 
but equally important, whether a government maintains the necessary capacities 
which determine whether an EU government is likely to exercise influence in EU 
processes. As empirically analyzed in chapters 7 to 9, this last argument is even more 
crucial for small states than for large states in the EU. 
 
In short, governmental capacities and strategies form the backbone of this research 
in its quest to examine and measure a small state’s governmental influence in EU 
legislative processes. This by itself is an innovative way of how to look at the study of 






1.2 The originality and contribution to knowledge of the thesis  
 
There are a number of ways of how this thesis contributes to literature on this 
subject. First is the point just mentioned above about the thesis’s framework, which 
sub-divides decision-making processes into different stages. There is an overall lack 
of academic attention devoted specifically to the decision-shaping stage. This 
therefore represents one of the main driving forces behind this research, i.e. to study 
how this very crucial stage contributes and influences EU decision-taking (the stage 
which sees the adoption of EU legislation). As highlighted earlier, this discourse is 
relatively new with the thesis filling this void and contributing to academic 
knowledge. 
 
Second and as aforementioned, the thesis focuses on the smallest state of the EU, 
Malta and its government, on which not much has been written at least in so far as 
its behaviour is concerned in the uploading process of EU legislative negotiations. As 
is stated in chapter 2, since Malta is a relatively new EU member state having only 
adhered in 2004, it is therefore new to EU processes, not least to EU decision-making, 
with consequently not much research having been undertaken on. This means that 
the thesis’s empirical research contributes to literature on small states, particularly 
that on Malta in the EU, with its focus on the Maltese government’s capacities and 
strategies in recent EU legislative decision-making processes occurring between 2005 
and 2013.  
 
The empirical research furnishes an in-depth analysis on Malta’s behaviour in EU 
legislative negotiations occurring in the above cited legislative period and in the 
Council’s multi-levels, i.e. Working Group, Coreper and Council of Ministers. It also 
provides an analysis of the Maltese government’s channels of influence with the 
other main legislative EU institutions, i.e. the Commission and the EP. Therefore, this 
too fills a current void in the literature on Malta and its influence in EU decision-
making processes. 
 
Third, and linked to the previous point, the thesis does not focus solely on a small 
state’s capacities, something which a lot of literature on small states does (and which 
is reviewed in chapter 2). Rather, it also focuses on small state strategies in EU 
decision-making as a substantial part of its research focus (and which is based on the 
work of Liefferink and Skou-Andersen, 1998; Haverland, 2009; and Börzel, 2002; 
amongst others – see chapter 5). This is novel given that the question of small state 
strategies to influence EU decision-making has previously not been given the full 
attention it merits by academic research. This is emphasized by Panke (2010) who 
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reiterates that there is indeed a gap in the literature about insights on small states’ 
negotiation behaviour (see chapter 2). By focusing on the smallest EU state’s 
strategies employed in specific EU legislative negotiations, the thesis is thus 
producing innovative research in under explored territory. This may thus be 
recognised as a contribution. 
 
Fourth, the thesis collects six main variables (as part of its methodology to test a 
small state government’s capacities and strategies in EU decision-making processes) 
from existing literature on small states. This is presented in more detail in chapter 2 
(the literature review) and in chapter 6 (the research methodology). Therefore the 
contribution here lies in the fact that the thesis collects these factors, dispersed 
around the literature, into one study. Besides, and as part of its quantitative 
approach on data collection, the thesis scores these variables in a reader-friendly and 
illustrative scoreboard called ‘the decision weights and measures’. As is stated in 
chapter 11, this approach has its usefulness not only to academia willing to further 
knowledge on this topic but also to governments themselves that might see value 
added in this approach to test their capacity and strategy levels in EU decision-
making processes. 
 
Finally, the case studies of EU legislative acts and the ways in which they are applied 




EU decision-making is characterized by a multi-actor, multi-level political framework 
comprising a juxtaposition of supranational and intergovernmental institutions. As 
observed in chapter 3, EU decision-making processes themselves are also fluid with 
policy goals and goal posts constantly shifting. All these factors make EU decision-
making extremely complex and unique processes in nature. The thesis therefore 
deals with this broad setting, albeit with focus narrowed down on the Maltese 
government’s behaviour in the Council of the EU (in an intergovernmental setting) 
and on its channels of influence in two main supranational EU institutions - the 
European Commission and the European Parliament (EP).  
 
In such a framework, it is difficult to rely on a specific theoretical and conceptual 
setting capable of embracing all factors that characterize EU decision-making. 
Therefore, due to limitations of individual approaches to address the subject of the 
exercise of influence of a small EU state government in EU decision-making processes 
(as stated in chapter 4, theoretical approaches have their limitations in not being able 
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to directly address differences in ‘state size’ and in their ‘levels of capacity’ when 
engaged in an EU decision-making negotiation), it is necessary to apply a multi-
variant model consisting of three main approaches: rational choice theory, new 
institutionalism, and multi-level governance (see chapter 4). When applied together, 
these approaches become suitable theoretical lenses that offer clarification on such a 
complex phenomenon, i.e. governmental influence in EU decision-making processes. 
  
Therefore, application of differing approaches assists one to achieve more of an 
understanding on which policy players are involved in EU decision-making processes 
(the governments of the EU member states and the EU institutions as rational, 
strategically calculating players in a new institutional setting) and on how they 
function (within a system of EU governance known as multi-level governance). 
Together, they therefore form part of the same theoretical puzzle on clarifying 
governmental influence in EU decision-making. 
 
This thesis selects six independent variables from the literature on small states 
(reviewed in chapter 2) that have been divided between governmental capacities and 
strategies (see Table 6.1 and Boxes 6.1 to 6.6 in chapter 6). The research design is 
thus based on this literature promoting these independent variables as important 
agents or factors of influence capable of furnishing causal explanations about the 
manifestation of governmental influence in EU decision-making processes. 
 
As stated in chapter 6, the thesis makes use of both qualitative (case study and 
comparative designs) and quantitative approaches (descriptive statistics with levels 
of measurement and spread) complementing each other to bestow a holistic 
research design. They thus bring together different insights to provide a method of 
how to measure member state governmental influence in the EU. This is because 
although the nature of the topic is a qualitative one, the research, being interested 
with measuring governmental influence, needs to incorporate a method of 
quantification of operationalized variables. Thus a quantitative method is useful in 
assisting to quantify the qualitative. Both methods are eventually (and empirically) 
cross-checked in chapter 10 in a process known as ‘triangulation’. 
 
Data was collected primarily through process-tracing. This consisted mainly of 
documentary analysis of Council, Commission and EP working documents. Process-
tracing was complimented by interviews conducted with those members of Malta’s 
public service and the EU institutions (primarily officials from the European 
Commission and the Council’s Secretariat) who participated directly in the legislative 
negotiations examined by the thesis. Data was also collected by means of a 
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quantitative technique, referred to in subsequent chapters as the ‘decision weights 
and measures’ approach consisting of a scoreboard through which the thesis’s 
variables were scored by the interview participants. 
 
Attention must also be drawn in this sub-section to clarify why particular EU 
legislative cases were selected over others (a more detailed explanation is furnished 
in section 6.3 of chapter 6). Part II of the thesis presents the following cases:  
 
Case 1 – the EU legislative negotiations adopting Directive 2007/23/EC of 23 May 
2007 on the placing on the market of pyrotechnic articles [dealt with in section 8.1 of 
chapter 8]; 
Case 2 - the EU legislative negotiations adopting (recast) Directive 2013/29/EU of 12 
June 2013 on the making available on the market of pyrotechnic articles [dealt with 
in section 8.2 of chapter 8]; and 
Case 3 – the EU legislative negotiations adopting Directive 2011/51/EU of 11 May 
2011 on amending Council Directive 2003/109/EC on long-term residents to extend 
its scope to beneficiaries of international protection [dealt with in chapter 9]. 
 
Therefore, the empirical chapters of the thesis consist of three main core studies 
which focus on Malta’s influence in the formation and adoption of EU legislation on 
pyrotechnic articles (Cases 1 and 2) and legal migration (Case 3). 
 
There are a number of methodological reasons for the case study selection. The first 
one has to do with the actual decision-type of the EU legislative instrument, i.e. the 
three cases involve EU ‘directives’ (and not regulations for instance). Although at first 
this might seem irrelevant, the decision-type of a legislative instrument has a role to 
play in the behaviour of EU member state governments during legislative 
negotiations. During the formation stages of an EU legislative act, governments are 
aware of the implications that implementation brings to their administrations once it 
is adopted. EU governments are therefore aware that EU regulations, once adopted, 
take effect immediately unlike EU directives which allow for the transposition into 
national law to occur within a specified timeframe. This means that the selection of 
EU acts of a similar decision-type allows for uniformity in the thesis’s analysis of 
negotiation dynamics, albeit in separate decision-making processes. There is 
therefore a constant existing between the different cases. 
 
In contrast, these three cases also allow for analysis of differing factors represented 
on the one hand by Council voting and the EU legislative procedures used, and on the 
19 
 
other by different outcomes for Malta’s government in each case. Starting with 
Council voting and the legislative procedure for the three cases, Cases 1 and 2 were 
both decided upon by the Qualified Majority Voting (QMV) rule through the ordinary 
legislative procedure (the former co-decision procedure). However, as clarified in 
chapter 9, Case 3 differs from the other two cases in that its legislative process 
consisted of two phases (divided by the entry into force of the Treaty of Lisbon). The 
first phase of the negotiations were decided upon by unanimity in Council under the 
consultation legislative procedure (and thus in an intergovernmental setting as is 
stated in chapter 9). This however changed once the Treaty of Lisbon entered into 
force and re-started the process with Council voting and the legislative procedure 
shifting to QMV and the ordinary legislative procedure respectively. In the first two 
cases (Cases 1 and 2), the outcomes were positive for Malta’s government while the 
third case (Case 3) differed once again with a negative outcome for the government.  
 
Another methodological issue concerns the framework which was based on a 
multiple policy sphere rather than a single one. The advantage of this methodological 
design is that it provides a solid basis to test a small state government’s exercise (or 
non-exercise) of influence in EU legislative negotiations. Besides, the legislative 
spheres have been selected with a fundamentally important element in mind: that of 
being representative of Malta’s needs in policy spheres that are extremely relevant 
to it. They are therefore not ‘one-offs’ and ‘unusual’. 
 
This last argument contains wider implications to do with the overall methodological 
framework of the thesis. Selecting Malta as the smallest EU state allows one to 
advance the following hypothesis: if Malta’s government manages to exercise 
influence in EU decision-making then other larger EU small state governments should 
do the same. Therefore, conducting research on the smallest of the ‘EU small state’ 
category presents an opportunity to add value to the study on small states in EU 
decision-making processes. 
 
One final observation concerns selection bias or, more accurately put, the selection 
of cases to prove predetermined ideas and aims. As is stated in section 6.3 of chapter 
6, the reply to this is that the author selected cases partly on the grounds that there 
were enough reasons to suspect in advance whether Malta’s government exercised 
influence in them or not. Therefore the approach of selecting three directives (two of 
them in the same policy sphere, albeit with separate decision-making processes) in 
diverse EU policy spheres (where both influence and non-influence was exercised and 
with differing outcomes for Malta) was deliberately done. This allowed examination 
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of whether or not similar or different governmental capacities and strategies were 
used in differing policy spheres and processes to influence EU decision-making. 
 
Therefore, as seen above, the overall empirical framework consists of both common 
and differing elements which allows for the extraction of interesting findings for the 
research.  
 
1.4 Structure of the thesis 
 
The thesis is structured in eleven chapters which are divided into two parts – Part I 
consisting of the theoretical, conceptual and methodological chapters and Part II 
consisting of the empirical research.  
 
Part I consists of chapters 2 to 6. Chapter 2 presents a historical and theoretical 
review on the development of the literature on small states in the EU. Chapter 3 
presents the framework of the research by focusing on EU decision-making as a 
process made up of different stages in a policy cycle. Chapter 3 also serves to shine 
light on the main research subjects. These are the governments in the Council of the 
EU (the Maltese government in this study) placed in an EU multi-level backdrop, i.e. 
the EU decision-making process involving multi-players (the Council but also the EP 
and the Commission) and multi-stages. Therefore chapter 3 presents a framework for 
the thesis’s investigation concerned with understanding ‘whether’, ‘how’ and at 
‘which’ stages of EU decision-making processes do small state governments exercise 
influence. 
  
Whereas chapter 4 presents the main theoretical framework of the thesis by 
theorizing key concepts related to players in EU decision-making processes, chapter 5 
presents a conceptual analysis on small state governmental capacities and strategies 
revolving around the notions of power and influence in EU decision-making 
processes. Chapter 6 brings Part I of the thesis to an end by focusing on all aspects 
related to its methodology. This was briefly discussed in section 1.3 above. 
  
Part II of the thesis consists of chapters 7 to 10. Chapter 7 presents Malta’s relations 
with the EU, allowing the reader to place in context the three legislative case studies 
found in subsequent chapters. It therefore deals with Malta’s EU relations pre- and 
post-EU membership and describes the method of co-ordination of its administration 




Chapters 8 and 9 present a critical analysis of Malta’s government in the three EU 
legislative processes. Chapter 8 deals with the Maltese government’s capacities and 
strategies in two EU decision-making processes adopting EU directives on 
pyrotechnic articles, while chapter 9 focuses on the government’s behaviour in a 
differing EU policy sphere, that of EU legal migration on the adoption of an EU 
amendment directive extending EU long-term residence to beneficiaries of 
international protection. Chapter 10 then presents the empirical findings on Malta’s 
exercise or non-exercise of influence by analyzing comparatively the three cases 
presented in the preceding chapters. 
 
Finally, chapter 11 presents the thesis’s overall conclusions. Besides presenting the 
main findings and linking the conceptual and empirical parts together, it also 




It is appropriate to refer to an observation made by Neumann and Gstöhl (2006: 16) 
that: 
 
‘small states are not just “mini versions” of great powers but may 
pursue different goals and policies worth studying ... small state 
studies have several insights to offer to the broader discipline of 
International Relations’.  
 
This is in fact confirmed by Kirt and Waschkuhn (2001: 23-25) who maintain that the 
study of small states, besides being relatively young, occupy a niche in International 
Relations (IR). They maintain that such studies present opportunities for future 
research to concentrate on single small state studies as well as theoretical 
assumptions that are relevant to IR and, more specifically, to the study of the EU and 
its decision-making process.  
 
Likewise, other authors such as Veenendaal and Corbett (2015) emphasize that small 
states are particularly absent from mainstream comparative political science. They 
attribute this absence to certain size related factors, such as the small populations 
and insignificant role that small states maintain in IR. As a consequence, these 
authors argue that political science is much poorer for not seriously utilizing small 
states as case studies for larger questions (such as those found in this thesis with its 




‘our call, therefore, is for scholars of comparative politics to be more 
reflexive about their exclusion of small states and its negative 
repercussions for the subjects they study...Furthermore, if a choice is 
made to leave out small states, in our opinion, scholars should also 
explain and justify their threshold of exclusion, that is, why countries 
below a certain size are less interesting cases than those that rank 
above this cut off point’ (Veenendaal and Corbett, 2015: 543). 
 
In short, this thesis takes at heart such observations which identify studies on small 
states as being significant contributions to the discipline of political science. This is in 






















































Chapter 2 sets out and establishes the main literature on small states in the EU and 
its decision-making process. It therefore examines the role of small state 
governments in this process without delving into the EU decision-making process, 
something which is dealt with in detail in the next chapter on the research 
framework (see chapter 3). Chapter 2 is divided into five main sections.  
 
Since the research centres around small states and their governments in EU decision-
making, they thus form the basis of the discussion in section 2.1 which serves as a 
point of departure in the analysis of small state governmental influence in EU 
legislative processes. This section is divided into sub-sections on the literature 
defining small states (see 2.1.1) and on clarifying a key term used throughout the 
thesis, i.e. EU small state governments (see 2.1.2). This section thus defines and 
clarifies key concepts from the outset. 
 
Section 2.2 provides a historical and theoretical overview of the development of 
small state studies over the years. This section focuses on literature that reveals how 
small states maintain certain capacities that make up for size related burdens. 
Section 2.3 then reveals a gap in the literature on small states in relation to 
governmental strategies that may be used to influence EU decision-making 
processes.  
 
Chapter 2 also presents a literature review about key explanatory factors on small 
state governmental channels of influence in EU decision-making processes (see 
section 2.4). As stated in chapter 1, these factors are revisited in the methodology 
chapter (chapter 6) and subsequently in Part II of the thesis (chapters 8 to 10).  
 
Finally, section 2.5 provides a conclusion. 
 
2.1 Small states in the EU 
 
This section involves two main issues. First, the definition of small states according to 
the literature and second, a clarification of why this research attaches the word 
‘governments’ to the more conventional use of the term ‘small states’.1 These two 
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points thus make up the crux of the discussion on defining small states and their 
governments in the EU.  
 
2.1.1 Defining small states in the EU 
  
As stated later when discussing EU decision-making (see chapter 3), governments are 
in their own right extremely strong players when compared to other players (such as 
the Commission and the EP) in EU legislative processes. But, as in all international 
organisations, the EU (as clarified in chapter 3, it can neither be defined as an 
international organisation nor as a state) contains an element of heterogeneity in 
that the member state governments are not all the same. When referring to size, one 
observes that the EU is made up of large and small states. This factor represents the 
point of departure in this research with its focus set on the latter category, i.e. small 
state governments and their capacities and strategies to influence EU decision-
making processes. 
  
As widely accepted by the literature on small states (see hereunder and the next 
section), defining them presents a real challenge. This is because a single universal 
definition does not exist. In fact the dividing line separating large from small states is 
extremely ambiguous and unclear (see Magnette and Nicolaidis, 2005; Thorhallsson, 
2006; and Thorhallsson and Wivel, 2006). If one was to take the early 20th century as 
the starting point, this was a time which marked a rise in the number of small states 
appearing (or re-appearing) on the map. This was mainly attributed to the fall of 
many regimes and empires such as the Habsburg Empire in 1919, the British and 
French empires and other European empires as a result of decolonization in the 
1950s and 60s, as well as the Soviet Union in 1991. As a result, a myriad of states 
emerged that could not be defined as great powers. These states were thus branded 
small through a simple method of elimination which excluded states that were not 
great or large powers. As Neumann and Gstöhl (2006: 6) maintain, ‘small states are 
defined by what they are not’. Furthermore, at this time many small states were 
being wrongly defined. For instance, micro states and middle powers were 
considered small states too. 
 
Here one must notice the use of the word ‘power’ which in the 19th century linked 
this concept with the greatness and size of a state. Put simply, great powers were the 
large states capable of developing their own foreign policy and exporting it to other 
countries and regions. Today this generalization is indeed problematic giving way to 
misconceptions about power-state discussions. This is because being powerful does 
not always refer to the larger states and thus in the opposite sense, ‘weak’ does not 
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necessarily imply smallness. As Rostoks (2010: 90) maintains, ‘smallness expressed in 
terms of power becomes very problematic’. This author observes that even though 
the concept of power is rooted in neo-realist and neo-liberalist schools of thought, 
there are alternative power dimensions that emerge. He maintains that:  
 
‘the understanding that there may be subtler ways of producing 
desired outcomes has been growing’ (Rostoks, 2010). 
 
There are in fact various authors who have devoted themselves to the study of 
decision-making linking power relationships between states with a state’s influence 
in the EU. Based on literature on the notion of power (for instance, Lukes, 2005; and 
Habeeb, 1988) discussed in chapter 5, many of these authors agree that power is no 
longer a question of military capacity or necessarily of size but rather of the capacity 
to influence the political agenda. They identify  power and persuasion in the EU as 
being based on a number of factors that enable policy practitioners  to take 
advantage of the multi-actor, multi-level governance system that characterizes the 
EU (see Jachtenfuchs and Kohler-Koch, 1995) and its institutions (see March & Olson, 
2005). This is in fact what interests this research the most. For this reason such 
factors are empirically examined revealing that, as Risse (2000) claims, small states 
use a variety of persuasive strategies and tactics to achieve their goals. 
 
This should therefore strengthen a possible hypothesis that ‘weak state’ does not 
automatically mean ‘small state’ and that certain vulnerabilities related to size could 
be overturned with the right doses in the capacities held and the strategies employed 
during EU decision-making. As stated in chapter 1, this thesis empirically examines 
this theme by selecting Malta, the EU’s smallest member state, and its government’s 
channels of influence and behaviour in EU decision-making processes. The concepts 
of power and influence are conceptualized and given appropriate attention in 
chapter 5 by rooting them in the relevant literature and by linking these concepts 
with that of the research focus. 
 
This leads to a central question in the literature on small states: with regard to what 
and how much are we able to determine that a state is large or small? There is a 
divergence in the literature about this question, with authors using absolute numbers 
in terms of population size, geographic size (a state’s territory) and/or the economic 
status (mainly the gross domestic product) of a state to determine its size-related 
category (see Katzenstein, 1985; Krasner, 1981; Handel, 1981; Crowards, 2002; and 
Neumann and Gstöhl, 2006). Yet other authors use Council votes under the Qualified 
Majority Voting (QMV) rule to determine and distinguish small from large states in 
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the EU (see Panke, 2010: 15) even though it is the norm that EU decisions are taken 
by consensus rather than by voting (Hayes-Renshaw, 2006; and Wallace, 2005: 61). 
This means that there are various measures and depending on which one is used, a 
state may vary between a large and small state. For instance, as Panke (2010) 
observes, Finland would be a big state based on its territory, but a small one 
according to other criteria such as economic and financial standing, and population 
figures. 
 
Of all these different criteria about differences in state size and because of its 
common usage, this thesis uses ‘population size’ as the most relevant indicator of 
state size in EU decision-making processes. Without reducing the salience of other 
criteria in this matter, this is because the EU system in general tends to select this 
criterion as the one that is most essential, for instance in allocating Council votes to 
member states under the system of QMV (a system that before the entry into force 
of the Treaty of Lisbon was referred to as ‘weighting’; as stated in chapter 3, 
weighting is no longer used in today’s QMV rule although member states may still call 
for its use until 2017). Indeed, QMV rules demonstrate concrete and significant 
differences between member states in population figures. Put simply, differences in 
population figures are important and are the subject of immense contentious battles 
fought between the member state governments whenever an Inter Governmental 
Conference (IGC) involves a revision of institutional provisions of the EU Treaties 
(referred to as the Treaty on the Functioning of the EU (TFEU) and Treaty on the EU 
(TEU) with the entry into force of the Treaty of Lisbon on 1 December 2009).2 
 
Therefore, this research tends to agree with Neumann and Gstöhl’s (2006: 6) general 
definition, that of setting the dividing line between large and small states in the EU at 
the population size of the Netherlands (at around 16 million inhabitants). As they 
observe, this leaves ‘all European countries as being small states except for Russia, 
Germany, Turkey, France, Great Britain, Italy, Ukraine, Spain, Poland, and Romania’ 
(emphasis added in underlined text indicating the EU large member states). In fact, if 
one was to put aside the seven large EU member states, identified in Table 2.1 below, 
the remaining states all fit under the wide category of small states even though there 
are clear differences in size existing between them. Within this category, there are 
medium states (such as the Netherlands, Finland and Sweden amongst others), small 
states (Ireland and the Baltic states, amongst others) and extremely small or ‘mini’ 
states (mainly Luxembourg, Cyprus and Malta) and micro-states like San Marino, 
Monaco and others (illustrated in Table 2.1). By way of elimination, all these EU 
states amount to twenty-one small states (including the latest addition of Croatia on 
1 July 2013). Besides, most current applicant states for EU membership (whether 
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having achieved ‘candidate’ or ‘potential candidate’ status) are small countries (apart 
from Turkey). However, as aforementioned, a universal definition does not exist, 
meaning that this number could vary according to different criteria used to 
determine whether a state is large or small. As Neumann and Gstöhl (2006) point out, 
such classifications serve simply as a guide. In other words, since the demarcation 
line between these states is debatable and because a universal definition does not 
exist, such classifications can only be at best subjective and arbitrary. 
 
Table 2.1 – Classification of European states according to population size (EU member 
states, EU candidate and potential candidate states, EFTA states, and other micro states 
not affiliated to any regional group). 
- Large EU states: Germany; France; the United Kingdom; Italy; Spain; Poland; 
Romania (Turkey is  still a candidate state) 
- What is left is a cluster of medium-small-micro states which are less clear-cut and 
are generally tagged as small states: 
- 21 EU small states (Austria; Belgium; Bulgaria; Croatia; Cyprus; Czech 
Republic; Denmark; Estonia; Finland; Greece; Hungary; Ireland; Latvia; 
Lithuania; Luxembourg; Malta; the Netherlands; Portugal; Slovakia; 
Slovenia; Sweden)  
- 5 EU candidate states (Albania; Iceland*; Macedonia; Montenegro; Serbia) 
- 2 EU potential candidate states (Bosnia & Herzegovina; Kosovo)  
- 3 EFTA states (Liechtenstein**, Norway**; Switzerland) 
- 4 micro states neither being members of the EU nor having expressed a wish 
for EU or EEA/EFTA membership (Andorra; Monaco; San Marino; the 
Vatican). 
*   Iceland is also an EEA and EFTA state. At the time of writing the thesis, the EU still needs to  
reconsider its position on Iceland’s official claim (Icelandic cabinet meeting decision of 10 March  
2015) that it no longer considers itself an EU candidate country.  
**   Liechtenstein & Norway are also members of the EEA. 
    Source: Table compiled by the author. 
 
2.1.2 Clarifying the term: EU small state governments 
 
A clarification on the term used throughout the thesis, i.e. ‘small state governments’ 
as against that generally used by literature, i.e. ‘small states’, must be provided. The 
thesis defines the term ‘small state governments’ as meaning the governments of the 
small EU member states involved in EU decision-making processes. This clarification is 




First, it is necessary to avoid uncertainty and confusion about the use of this term. 
Second, it is required to denote that any other category of policy actor that may exist 
within a state other than the government itself is not part of the focus of the thesis. 
In this scenario, policy players such as domestic economic and social partners (trade 
and social unions), lobby groups, the private sector, regional or local government, 
and any other type of policy player that is active in a state and that may be involved 
in EU decision-making processes, are excluded. 
 
Indeed, this clarification is necessary since the literature on small states typically 
includes a myriad of players, and not just governments, as being involved in the 
processes of decision-shaping and decision-taking (the formation process of an EU 
decision also known as the ‘uploading’ process) at both domestic and supranational 
(the EU and its institutions) levels. Consequently, this must be made clear at this 
stage of the discussion: that what is of interest to this research is only the influence 
levels of a small EU member state government (i.e. Malta’s government as already 
observed in chapter 1) in EU decision-making processes within specific EU legislative 
policy spheres. 
 
2.2 The historical development of the literature on small state 
capacities in mainstream International Relations (IR) theory 
  
This section begins by providing in chronological order the development of the 
literature on small states both in terms of major historical trends and its place in 
mainstream International Relations (IR) theory. In relation to this last point, it is 
relevant to denote that this thesis only makes use of the IR theories explained below 
to locate them within a framework for the review of the small state literature. This 
means that alternative theoretical approaches are applied by the empirical parts of 
the thesis (see section 4.2, chapter 4).  
 
Section 2.2 illustrates some of the main contributions to the literature on small states 
and presents differing aspects emerging from them. There is in fact quite an 
extensive list of authors coming from different disciplines who have focused their 
research on small states. As observed by Neumann and Gstöhl (2006: 9), the origins 
of studies on small states may be traced as far back as the 18th and 19th centuries, 
particularly through contributions of mainly German-speaking scholars. Amstrup 
(1976: 163) gives an example of issues during that epoch attracting the attention of 
scholars who wrote about small states, such as the discussion about various small 
German states and their role in the wider issue of possible German unification of that 
time. But research on small states can be said to have begun in earnest by the turn of 
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the 20th century and particularly during the inter-war period, which happened in 
parallel with the evolution of International Relations (IR) studies. In fact, the study of 
small states is entrenched with the development of three main strands in IR theory, 
namely: realism (later neo-realism); liberalism (neoliberal institutionalism); and social 
constructivism. Table 2.2 summarises the evolution of IR theory and the study of 
small states along a specific timeframe of when these theories were mostly in use. 
 
Table 2.2 – Background to the development of small state studies in IR theory 




Summary of the theory 
 
This theoretical approach focuses on 
the ‘relative’ power of states with 
emphasis on security issues. During 
this period, studies on small states 
mainly focused on how to define such 
states. Equally important, realist 
studies on small states also focused 
on other aspects such as the 
relevance of neutrality for such states 
(of a geostrategic nature), their 
diplomatic skills (bargaining) and 
small state survival strategies (such as 
alignment policy) as important 
features to help such states make up 
for their size-related vulnerabilities. 
 
Inception period of the theory 
 
1940s - 1970s 











This approach focuses on the 
‘absolute’ power of states in terms of 
gains through mainly economic issues 
and the relevance of institutions. In 
contrast to the realist approach 
above, the size of states was no 
longer an all important factor. This 
permitted for studies on small states 
to focus on economic issues of global 
interdependence brought about by a 
gradual eradication of barriers to 
trade and also, on the importance 
that international institutions (NATO) 
and establishments, such as the EU 
and its Internal Market (IM), held for 
small states. 
1980s – (early) 1990s 
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Name of the theory 
 
3. Social Constructivism 
Summary of the theory 
 
This approach focuses on 
international norms, values, identity 
and ideas. This promoted new 
literature that focused on the study 
of small states as norm 
entrepreneurs capable of being 
actors themselves in the world stage 
or in regional integration. This era 
saw a proliferation of small state 
studies focusing on the role of small 
states in EU policy-making. 
Inception period of the theory 
 
1990s onwards 
Source: Table based on Table 1.1 in Neumann and Gstöhl, 2006: 16. 
 
This evolution broadly reveals that studies about small states began in parallel with 
developments in IR theory, but later (1990s onwards) most spilled-over to a greater 
focus on small states in specific settings - such as the EU - and more specifically to the 
role of small states in EU decision-making processes. In other words, most of today’s 
literature on small states has derived from and moved out of the IR discipline to one 
that is positioned more within a specific framework such as that of the contemporary 
EU (partly because theoretical foundations of European integration themselves 
originate from IR theory). The next paragraphs focus on the main proponents of 
current literature on small states in the EU, particularly those who have contributed 
to the literature on small EU states in EU decision-making processes. As mentioned 
above and precisely because of its amplitude, one is by consequence able to derive 
different aspects emerging from this literature thus making the subject matter an 
interesting one to research.  
 
The first major study on small states in the 20th century is to be found with the work 
of Annette Baker Fox (1959), considered by the academic community as a founder 
and critical player in the history of this sub-field (see Neumann and Gstöhl, 2006: 23). 
Her study entitled, ‘The Power of Small States’, mainly looks at wartime diplomacy 
with an emphasis on geopolitical (geostrategic) and diplomatic skills (such as 
bargaining and persuasion) as important factors for the livelihood of small states 
existing among larger and generally more powerful states. This work exposes how 
small and militarily weaker states and their governments withstand pressure from 
larger states especially during time of international crisis, i.e. World War II (WWII) in 
her work. Baker Fox sets examples of Switzerland, Ireland, Portugal, and Sweden 
(besides Spain and Turkey which are not small states but which were militarily weak 
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at the time) that all avoided being drawn into the war. Other studies published later 
(see Rothstein, 1968; Vital, 1979; Keohane, 1969; amongst others) focused on events 
unwinding in the post-WWII period. They were similarly concerned with the survival 
of small states but not in time of war. Rather, their main concern was with 
categorizing, or better, defining small states (or small ‘powers’ as was custom to use 
at that time) and on the systematic role that small states could have in the world 
order and in international organizations (see Keohane, 1969: 297). They were also 
concerned with alignment policy, i.e. small states aligning with powers capable of 
providing them with shelter from external shocks (mainly in the form of security 
issues). For instance, Neumann and Gstöhl refer to Vital’s ‘The Inequality of States’ 
(Vital, 1967) observing that: 
  
‘Vital argues that small states acting alone face high (and rising) 
costs of independence. They have the choice of three broad policies: 
a passive strategy of renunciation, an active strategy designed to 
alter the external environment in their favor (e.g., subversion), or a 
defensive strategy attempting to preserve the status quo (e.g., 
traditional diplomacy, deterrence) (Neumann and Gstöhl, 2006: 
24)’.  
 
This observation in fact leads one to the strand of literature (during the late 1970s 
and early 1980s) focusing on strategies used by small states to make up for certain 
vulnerabilities, mainly related to size. Needless to say, this literature is relevant to 
this study on small state governmental capacities and strategies to influence EU 
decision-making. The next paragraphs thus focus on this genre of research. 
  
Starting with work by Vogel (1983), he establishes a typology of different small state 
foreign policy strategies such as those used to decrease inter-dependence and high 
external dependence. For instance, the adoption of selective foreign policies which 
save small states costs allowing them to exploit the overall lack of resources. This also 
increases their possibilities for success (since more effort is invested into precise 
single issues). This theme is similarly found in more recent literature that speaks 
about the capacity to prioritise, a crucial aspect for small states in the EU’s decision-
making process (see Thorhallsson, 2000; Panke, 2010). Moreover, other concepts 
deriving from IR theory are those of neutrality and integration, important concepts 
for small state strategies on how to deter occupation by foreign forces. In sum, Vogel 
maintains that small states must pursue certain strategies if they are to minimize the 
risk of being dependent on foreign aid (even economic aid such as excessive imports 
due to scarcity of natural resources in many small states), or better, foreign 
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determination. He observes that small states should therefore adopt strategies such 
as those seeking integration (membership) in international organizations which offer 
protection from foreign occupation (with ‘safer’ conditions than those imposed by 
larger and more powerful states).  
 
However, by the mid-1970s, small state literature - in both economic and political 
respects – began to stress the importance of the physical size of a state in 
determining a state’s behaviour in international relations. For instance, economics 
dictated that the size of a state was directly related to its wealth and consequently its 
power status. The argument would follow this trail – small states generally have a 
small domestic market with no economies of scale, scarce diversification of their 
economies, very high costs of production and dependence on imports due to scarce 
natural resources. This therefore makes small states incur high costs, making them 
less wealthy and powerful than larger states with larger markets.  
 
However Handel (1981) argues differently. He maintains that small states are not 
necessarily the weaker part of the equation. For example, he gives the example of 
the OPEC group of countries in the Middle East and their embargo imposed on 
militarily stronger Western states during the oil crisis of the 1970s. Here he puts 
forward the argument that these states, although small and militarily weak, were still 
able to impose themselves on more powerful and larger states due to their 
economically strong status. Therefore the point here is that states could be militarily 
weak (the political domain) but economically strong. As Neumann and Gstöhl (2006: 
25) state about Handel, his work finds that ‘weakness’ of states is a continuum and 
must be examined against a multi-criteria definition of what constitutes a weak state, 
i.e. population, economy, military power, interests and lastly (but crucially for this 
research), influence levels in the international domain. 
 
In another study conducted by East (1973), it was found that conflictive non-verbal 
behaviour was more of a strategy which small states pursued when compared to 
their larger counterparts and that therefore economics was more of their natural ally 
than politics. Importantly, East observed that in contrast to large states, small states 
would invest more in joint actions as against unilateral ones and in targeting multiple-
actor fora in the way they perform foreign policy. This in order to minimize as much 
as possible costs deriving from such a policy. 
 
This period (mid-1970s) represented the apex of literature on small states, which 
according to Neumann and Gstöhl occurred at a time when many small states around 
the world were being decolonized. This was the time when according to IR theory, 
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the neo-realist school of thought was leading the theoretical debate, arguing that the 
physical size of a state and its relative power capabilities determined its behaviour in 
international relations.  
 
However, the next decade experienced a drop in the interest of the academic world 
to produce new research on small states. In Kramer’s (1993: 257) view this may be 
attributed to a decline of theory-driven studies on small states and also the neglect of 
scholars to consider a changing international environment. As Christmas-Møller 
(1983: 39) observes, the subject matter suffered from a genuine and ‘benign neglect’. 
During this time neoliberal institutionalism, a new dimension to IR theory, started to 
develop and challenge the previously uncontested neo-realist school. One of its 
biggest contributions was that the concept of state size was no longer as important 
as previously held. Rather, this theoretical strand promoted absolute gains, economic 
issues and international institutions as important categories on which to base the 
definition of a state. Works by Katzenstein (1985) and Krasner (1981) particularly 
stand out during this timeframe. For instance, Katzenstein’s work entitled, ‘Small 
States in World Markets’ (see also Katzenstein, 2003), examines how small states 
manage to respond to pressures of the global market and how such pressures affect 
the domestic structures of small states.   
 
The 1990s experienced a resurge in the literature on small states, in part because 
forces such as globalization and regional integration, with free trade and elimination 
of borders, were seen to benefit small states. During this decade there were a 
number of small states in Europe that were seeking membership of the EU and the 
North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). This logically redirected attention of 
academia to this subject matter. In fact, one may safely attribute the beginning of 
newer and emerging contemporary literature on small states in the EU to historical 
events occurring during this particular time (see Bauwens et. al., 1996; Goetschel, 
1998; Hanf and Soetendorp, 1998; Thorhallsson, 2000; Gaertner and Reiter, 2000). 
Moreover, a new and separate strand in IR theory, social constructivism, emerged at 
around this time. This theoretical approach has its focus on norms, identity and ideas. 
This also contributed in a renewed interest in the study of small states in certain 
aspects, such as in their role as norm entrepreneurs in international negotiations (see 
Björkdahl, 2002 and 2008; Börzel, 2002; and Ingebritsen, 2002). As Neumann and 
Gstöhl (2006: 14) observe: 
 
‘If not only relative power (neo-realism) and/or international 
institutions (neoliberal institutionalism) matter, but also ideational 
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factors (social constructivism), small states may gain new room to 
manoeuvre in their foreign policy’ (emphasis added in parentheses). 
 
This renewed enthusiasm on the part of the literature has led to modern studies on 
small states published in the new millennium. Many of these studies have focused on 
the specific issue of small states and their role in EU decision-making processes 
(something which is looked into in more detail in section 2.3). As already pointed out, 
this is partly due to the fact that the EU is made up of a majority of small states and 
that EU decision-making is complex and offers opportunities that small states can 
potentially exploit. Works by Baldur Thorhallsson (2000), Jeanne Hey (2003), Simone 
Bunse (2009), Robert Steinmetz and Anders Wivel (2010), and Diana Panke (2010) all 
deal with small EU state vulnerabilities (listed in Table 2.3) and their influence and 
behaviour in EU decision-making. The various strands making up the literature on 
small states have thus agreed with this list of vulnerabilities common among such 
states. 
 
Table 2.3 – Most common burdens and vulnerabilities faced by small states in the EU 
1. Small administrative size (big burden to cope with the vastness of the EU’s acquis 
communautaire in ‘downloading’ and ‘uploading’ processes); 
2. Lack of expertise (for instance it is more difficult for the smaller EU states to adopt 
persuasion-based strategies which need to be based on scientific data); 
3. Lack of experience (mainly relevant to newer EU member states when compared to 
older ones); 
4. Lack of votes for Council voting by QMV (even when voting does not take place, 
consensus norms in the Council does not prevent formal power formation from being 
significant (for instance, Panke 2010: 16); 
5. Disadvantage to form coalitions due to small size (for instance, lower weight in Council 
votes when compared to their larger counterparts signals a real need to form additional 
coalition partners to win an outcome); 
6. More difficult for smaller EU states to jointly form majorities and/or blocking minorities 
than for large states; 
7. Few financial and economic capacities to offer other states as trade-offs to win policy 
deals; 
8. Effect of ‘brain-drain’ felt more acutely by smaller administrations (for instance workers 
moving from public sector to EU institutions/agencies). 




It is appropriate to point out here that although the three strands of IR theory 
treated in this section are indeed relevant for an overall understanding of the 
development of small state literature and where its roots stand, other approaches 
which better and more closely explain EU decision-making processes exist (see 
chapter 4). Therefore, whilst the three IR approaches dealt with in this section are 
useful, other approaches (illustrated in chapter 4) may also be applied to the study of 
small state influence in EU decision-making.  
 
In conclusion, even though, as seen, small states have been the subject of substantial 
research over the years, there are many authors who believe that there is still a niche 
presenting itself for future research to be conducted. As mentioned earlier in chapter 
1, Neumann and Gstöhl (2006: 16) maintain that such studies could offer insights to 
the broader discipline of IR by focusing upon individual small states and on 
theoretical aspects relevant to IR. The thesis in fact draws upon this last comment.  
 
2.3 Establishing the main lacunae in the literature on small state 
governmental strategies to influence EU decision-making processes 
 
The notions of power and influence of governments in the EU, which in the case of 
smaller states are so disparate when compared with their larger counterparts, have 
not yet been fully explored. Furthermore, it is unfortunate that current literature on 
small states in the EU appears to be both diverse and fragmented. For instance, as 
already discussed there is no agreement on a universal definition for small states, on 
what similarities one would expect to find in their foreign policies, or on how they 
influence international relations (see Knudsen, 2002: 182-5; Archer and Nugent, 
2002: 2-5; and Thorhallsson and Wivel, 2006). Besides, there is hardly any research 
which links small states with their behaviour during actual legislative negotiations in 
EU decision-making processes. 
 
Indeed, small state governmental influence in the shaping and taking of EU decisions 
has been overlooked by the literature on small states. There is thus a vacuum in the 
literature on this topic and precisely on these crucial stages of the EU process that 
precede the adoption of EU legislation. By itself, this explains why this thesis fully 
concentrates on these stages of the EU decision-making process and which as 
emphasized in the next chapter represent the framework of this research. This 
discourse is relatively new which, as stated in chapter 1 (see section 1.4), contributes 
and advances knowledge about the understanding of how and why small state 
governments are able to outperform bigger players, thus overachieving and punching 
above their weight. 
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When attempting to find reasons for the lack of attention given to small states in the 
EU process, one could indicate a general attention by academic communities 
afforded to large states (see Moravcsik, 1998; Hoffmann and Keohane, 1991) to the 
detriment of smaller ones. As observed by emerging literature on this topic (for 
instance Panke, 2010), there is indeed a gap about insights on small states’ 
negotiation behaviour. As she indicates: 
 
‘We do not have a comprehensive knowledge about which small 
states are most likely and which are least likely to participate 
actively in EU negotiations to make their voices heard and under 
which conditions small states succeed in influencing European 
policies’ (Panke, 2010: 11). 
 
Small state behavioural strategies and negotiation tactics can be distinguished and 
differ from those of their larger counterparts (Thorhallsson, 2000). This may be 
because of size related disadvantages which small states face. For instance, small 
states may not be as capable as their larger counterparts to offer persuasion-based 
strategies (Kassim and Peters, 2001: 300; Raik, 2002) due in part to their small 
administrative size and a lack of expertise and resources to lobby effectively the 
Commission, the Council Presidency and other delegations involved in the EU 
legislative process (Radaelli, 1995; and Young, 1999). This situation is even more 
unsatisfactory when pointing at the shortfalls small states may face when trying to 
launch successful arguments, which as Panke states, renders effective arguing more 
difficult (Panke, 2010: 17). This is partly because small state representatives have to 
cope with various issues simultaneously. This reality differs starkly from larger 
administrations with larger number of experts. But this can also be attributed to the 
lack of votes in the Council of the EU (under Qualified Majority Voting (QMV), a 
system which as explained in chapter 3, has been modified by the entry into force of 
the Treaty of Lisbon) which is interpreted as a lack of political clout to put forward 
convincing arguments to persuade and receive support from other parties to a 
negotiation.  
 
If literature has not yet really focused on small state behaviour in EU decision-making 
processes, the situation is even more unsatisfactory for the extremely small or ‘mini’ 
states which have only been partially covered by works focusing on their role in 
international relations as opposed to that of the EU (see Duursma, 1996). The EU’s 
smallest states of Luxembourg, Cyprus and Malta (with Malta being the smallest of 
the three), particularly the latter two EU member states and their behaviour in 
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attempting to influence EU decision-making processes, have hardly been afforded 
any form of attention by existing literature.  
 
Cyprus and Malta have a number of features in common. First, they are both 
Mediterranean and small island states with similar interests and face similar 
challenges in trying to ‘upload’ their preferences into the EU’s legislative process. 
Consequently, the influence that these two countries hold in EU decision-making 
processes is often pitched at the same level. But this does not mean that their level 
of influence is in actual fact the same. There are times when their behaviour (in terms 
of how active the government is to try and influence a legislative outcome) differs 
considerably during legislative negotiations in Council. 
 
Second, they are both new EU member states which makes them different from 
Luxembourg, a similar state in terms of size and population figures but an ‘old’ and 
founding member of the EU. Luxembourg is thus a more experienced state than any 
of the other two. Furthermore and as Panke (2010: 5) observes, Luxembourg 
frequently operates as the institutional memory of the EU. According to her, this can 
be mainly attributed to the government’s policy of maintaining its diplomats in 
Brussels to serve longer periods than those of other countries. This naturally 
guarantees that Luxembourg’s diplomatic corps has an extremely high level of 
expertise and continuity in EU matters, something which as discussed empirically in 
subsequent chapters is crucial for small states. 
 
But there are also differences between these three mini states in relation to the size 
and wealth of their economies. Luxembourg is by far the ‘richest’ of the three for 
various reasons, one of which being its capability to attract foreign direct investment 
(FDI) through tax relaxation (a tax haven) and optimal rates of interest. Whereas the 
economies of Malta and Cyprus were - before the global economic, financial and debt 
crisis - comparable (mainly flourishing maritime and tourist sectors), they now differ 
starkly from each other. This is because Malta – at least at the time of writing - has 
not emerged from the crisis as a casualty like Cyprus, which has been adversely hit by 
the severe recession in Greece and its banking sector and its nearly total dependence 
on the financial services market with overly large Russian investments in it.  
 
One further difference is that politically, Malta and Luxembourg do not have the 
same problem that Cyprus has with its territory divided (and ‘accepted’ by the EU as 
a consequence of Cyprus’s EU accession) between Southern Greek Cypriots and 




With respect to Malta - since this is the small EU member state which is being 
focused upon by the thesis - there is no literature which addresses specifically Malta 
and its influence in EU decision-making processes. There is also no literature which 
links works by authors on state strategies in EU decision-making processes (see 
Liefferink and Skou-Andersen, 1998; Haverland, 2009; and Börzel, 2002 each dealt 
with in chapter 5) with Malta and its influence in such processes. As pointed out in 
section 2.4 below, this means that the thesis is path-breaking and is novel. It is 
therefore contributing to the literature since existing studies on Malta have focused 
on either its EU pre-accession stage (see Pace, 2001 and  2004), on the 
Europeanization process occurring before and after EU accession (see Harwood, 2009 
and 2014), or on wider issues such as the economic vulnerabilities of a small island 
state (see Briguglio, 1995). But as stated, not much has been written on Malta’s 
capacities and strategies to influence EU decision-making processes. 
 
One reason for this paucity of literature is that Malta is a new EU member state, 
which means that it has only started to participate fully in EU processes as from 1 
May 2004 (its date of EU accession). Another reason is that Malta is the smallest EU 
state, which could therefore run the risk of being instinctively perceived as a state 
having hardly any influence in EU decision-making processes. It may therefore be 
mistakenly perceived as a weak subject on which to test governmental influence in 
the EU. Naturally, this research believes that to the contrary, studying extremely 
small states and their ways to channel influence in EU decision-making processes 
could reveal interesting elements and findings to the literature concerned with such a 
complex phenomenon. This last point is elaborated further in chapter 6 when listing 
reasons for the selection of Malta as the main subject of this study. A case study 
about Malta and its government represents under explored territory by the small 
state literature. It allows one to shine light on the vagueness and uncertainty which is 
so easily inferred upon the extremely small EU states, i.e. on whether such states and 
their governments are indeed able to manifest influence in EU decision-making 
processes and whether they are able to achieve positive outcomes from them. In this 
thesis, influence is said to be manifest when EU outcomes (in the form of EU 
legislation) match a small state government’s preferences in the decision-shaping and 
taking stages of EU legislative processes. As Golub (2012) states: ‘we know 
surprisingly little about whether the content of European Union legislation reflects the 
preferences of some Member States more than others’. The thesis aims to contribute 




The discussion next turns to focus on literature about explanatory factors shedding 
light on a small state’s influence in the EU decision-shaping and taking of EU 
processes. 
 
2.4 Establishing explanatory factors for a small state’s channels of 
influence: governmental capacities and strategies  
 
As observed by Archer and Nugent about the expanse of explanatory factors and 
hypotheses on small states in the EU: 
 
‘...there is no shortage of hypotheses to be tested about the small 
Member States of the EU and their behaviour’ (Archer and Nugent, 
2002: 9).  
 
There are in fact many authors who agree with this point about the existence of 
various different hypotheses and factors to explain small state influence within the 
EU (due to limited word space, this paragraph will only give a few examples citing 
some authors). For instance, Arter (2000) utilises three variables to explain this 
phenomenon, in this case the success of the Finnish Northern Dimension initiative. 
But Jakobsen (2009: 81) uses another set of four variables to explain small state 
influence in the EU - in his case, the Nordic influence on the EU’s civilian European 
Security and Defence Policy (ESDP). Another author, Honkanen (2002) selects six 
factors in her research on small state influence in NATO, whereas Wallace (2005) 
adopts seven factors to explain and assess the power and influence of EU member 
states’ in EU governance and negotiation. Panke (2010: 3) develops a variety of 
possible explanations for small state influence in the EU which include the capacity of 
a government to issue timely instructions to be adopted during a negotiation; the 
duration of membership and experience levels acquired; specific and diffuse EU 
support as an incentive to engage in the EU; the administrative set-up of a 
government’s civil service that could affect the ability to work on EU matters; and 
differences in political and economic power, amongst others. Likewise, Thorhallsson 
also maintains that:  
 
‘the characteristics of the administrations of the smaller states are 
key factors in explaining how smaller states operate in the decision-
making processes...’ (Thorhallsson, 2006: 221). 
 
Another author, Simone Bunse (2009: 5) focuses on the relevance of the Council 
Presidency for small states and observes that analysing this EU institutional 
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mechanism represents in itself a key factor explaining governmental influence in the 
formation of outcomes brokered in Council. For instance, she hypothesises that 
studying the Council Presidency could offer an explanation about the equalisation of 
power differences between small and large EU states. Besides, since the Council 
Presidency is an opportunity to be exploited by every member state government (to 
shape the EU’s agenda and its policy outcomes in line with their national 
preferences), it thus offers a platform that is significant in the study of governmental 
influence in EU decision-making processes. Of paramount importance is her 
hypothesis that the Council Presidency stands as a variable that differs from those on 
state size (administrative size) since factors such as leadership and the distribution of 
preferences in the Council are able to render more in the explanation of a 
Presidency’s ability to successfully pursue its national interests.  
 
A review on the range of explanatory factors on this topic could be endless producing 
a variety of variables offering interesting explanations about small state influence in 
the EU. The gist here is that it is impossible to treat all possible explanatory factors 
existing in this field and apply them to a single piece of work. Therefore, it is 
paramount to point out that the thesis selects those variables which best suit the 
nature of this research and which seem most capable of having something significant 
to contribute to the literature of this subject matter. As with other research, its 
explanatory variables chosen here have emerged from the literature on small states 
in the EU. As is stated in chapter 6, the variables are applied both in a qualitative and 
quantitative manner in the case study chapters (see chapters 8 to 10) to validate the 
central hypothesis that small states are able to influence EU decision-making 
processes when possessing and injecting the right doses of governmental capacities 
and strategies in them. Crucially, the thesis relies on existing literature about small 
states as the only way possible to be able to make an empirical contribution to this 
subject matter.  
 
Table 2.4 below lists the most widely accepted common explanatory variables that 
have a solid contribution to make on a small state’s influence in EU decision-making. 
The variables in the table are divided between a government’s capacities and 
strategies which as pointed out in chapter 6 (see sub-section 6.2.2) form the 








Table 2.4 – Non-exhaustive list of some common explanatory factors identified by the 
literature on small state governmental influence in the EU 
 
Capacities used by a government in EU decision-making processes: 
1. Quick instructions being drafted and sent to government representatives in Brussels 
(Thorhallsson 2000; Panke 2010; amongst others); 
2. Administrative size and working system such as informality, flexibility in their decision-
making systems (at domestic level ) and a greater role of Permanent Representations 
(Thorhallsson 2000); 
3. Opportunity to exploit the Council Presidency (Panke 2010; Bunse 2009; amongst 
others);  
4. Expertise (possession of expert knowledge) of civil service (Haas 1990; Radaelli 1995; 
Young 1999; Panke 2010; amongst others);  
5. Experience of civil service in relation to duration of member state status (Panke 2010; 
amongst others). 
 
Strategies used by a government in EU decision-making processes: 
6. Strategies such as forerunner, convincing argumentation and honest-broker coalition 
building used by a government in the EU policy process (Liefferink and Skou-Andersen 
1998; Haverland 2009; Börzel 2002; Panke 2010; Browning (2005); Jakobsen (2009); 
Björkdahl (2002) (2008), Ulbert and Risse (2005), amongst others); 
7. Capacity to lobby effectively the Commission, Council Presidency, and other EU 
member state governments (Radaelli 1995; Young 1999; Kassim and Peters 2001; Raik 
2002; Thorhallsson 2000; amongst others); 
8. Diplomacy as a tool of statecraft as against military strength (Baker Fox 1959; amongst 
others); 
9. Economic strength (Panke 2010; amongst others); 
10. Representation (in numbers and level) in the various EU institutions and agencies 
(Neumann and Gstöhl 2006; amongst others). 




This chapter has provided the reader with an understanding of the development of 
small state literature. As seen, this was depicted against a theoretical setting made 
up of three main strands of thought – realism (neo-realism), liberalism (neoliberal 
institutionalism) and social constructivism.  
 
Besides the historical and theoretical aspects, chapter 2 has also reviewed the 
literature dealing with explanatory factors on small state governmental capacities 
and strategies to influence EU processes. It has also identified gaps in the literature 
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on small states in relation to their role and behaviour in EU decision-making 
processes. This chapter has therefore introduced the conceptual, theoretical and 
methodological elements of the thesis, elements which are further explored and 


























Defining key terms in relation to decision-shaping and 




By clarifying key concepts of EU decision-making, this chapter serves to set the 
background of how EU legislative decision-making processes function and who is 
involved in them. Particular focus will be given to the three main EU institutions 
which have a clear role in EU legislative processes – the European Commission, the 
Council of the EU and the European Parliament (EP). Of these three institutions, 
particular attention is afforded to the Council which represents the interests of the 
member state governments in EU legislative decision-making processes.   
 
As clarified in this chapter, EU decision-making is made up of two main stages – 
decision-shaping and taking. It is these stages which together constitute the 
framework of the thesis through which small state governmental influence is studied. 
 
Chapter 3 is divided into five main sections. Section 3.1 begins by discussing the EU as 
a regulatory arena and points out some distinctive features belonging to EU decision-
making processes. Particular focus is given to the role of the Council in the EU 
legislative process. 
 
Section 3.2 then focuses on EU decision-making as a process made up of different 
stages. It first provides a framework - that of the policy cycle - to be able to study key 
aspects about small state governmental influence in the shaping and taking of EU 
decisions (see 3.2.1). It then explains why the policy cycle model is useful to 
conceptualize decision-shaping and decision-taking dynamics as integral parts of EU 
processes (see 3.2.2).  
 
Sections 3.3 and 3.4 illustrate key concepts belonging to the stages of decision-
shaping and taking. Besides defining them, sections 3.3 and 3.4 illustrate which EU 
policy players are found in each of them. 
 





3.1 The EU as a regulatory arena: the legislative process and the 
distinctiveness of EU decision-making 
 
In order to understand how EU decision-making functions and who is involved in it, it 
is necessary to take a step backwards to comprehend fully the concept of the EU as a 
primarily regulatory arena and to clarify certain aspects about the distinctiveness and 
role of EU decision-making processes. 
 
As cited by Majone (2002: 320), the EU’s primary ‘organizing principle is not the 
separation of powers but the representation of interests’. This is an interesting point 
to depart from since it confirms that the separation of powers in the EU exists within 
a complex system of decision-making functions shared between member state 
governments and supranational EU institutions (chapter 4 presents various 
theoretical approaches theorizing this setting). Thus, all policy players involved have 
their own interests and preferences which need to be ‘uploaded’, or better, exported 
into EU legislative decision-making processes. 
 
Indeed, one of the main characteristics distinguishing the EU regulatory arena from 
other modes of governance elsewhere around the world is that it is highly complex 
and unique. Besides being made up of multi-players within a complex multi-level 
governance system comprising a juxtaposition of supranational and 
intergovernmental institutions each having their own interests, it is also a process 
which is fluid with policy goals and goal posts constantly shifting. Peterson and 
Bomberg (1999: 9) remark that ‘EU decision-making is heavily nuanced, constantly 
changing and even kaleidoscopic’. 
  
Wallace and Wallace (2000: 63) metaphorically describe the EU’s regulatory arena 
and the decision-making process as a pendulum to convey its sense of movement. 
They observe that it swings along the national political arenas of the member states 
and the EU supranational domain never finding a stationary position. EU decision-
making occurs frequently on a daily basis and in various policy/legislative spheres. 
And as Cini (2007) emphasizes, the EU is a very active regulatory establishment. 
  
All this characterizes EU decision-making processes as being constantly mobile, 
shifting between multi-levels with different competences. It also implies that such 
processes vary over time. Thus, such characteristics about the EU (and its decision-
making processes) must be kept in mind every time it is addressed. This alone 
warrants clarification of how it functions and of how it adopts legislation, something 
which is portrayed in the next paragraphs.  
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One may safely maintain that the state still remains a very powerful player in today’s 
EU legislative process, even though it is transnational in character and is partly 
entrenched in supranational institutions. Whereas the Commission and the EP are 
supranational EU institutions representing European and European party political 
interests respectively, the Council of the EU (also referred to as ‘the Council’ or ‘the 
Council of Ministers’) is where member state governments voice their concerns 
intergovernmentally at multi-levels, i.e. from technical (Working Groups and Coreper) 
to political (Coreper and Ministerial) levels (see Figures 3.1 and 3.2). Since this 
research focuses on small state governmental influence in EU decision-making 
processes, it necessarily focuses on this last EU institution without forgetting the vital 
roles played by the Commission and EP in such processes. 
 
Indeed, the Commission maintains a primary role in setting in motion EU legislative 
processes – through the so called ‘right of initiative’3 – and is able to shape EU 
decisions, albeit without the possibility of deciding them4, a state of affairs left to the 
member state governments in Council and to Members of the European Parliament 
(MEPs).5 Together the Council and the EP (the two legislative chambers of the EU) 
adopt EU legislation (mainly through the ‘ordinary legislative procedure’ - Article 294 
TFEU) in nearly all policy spheres.6 
 
Therefore, because the EU legislative process functions in this manner, EU 
governments in Council must build necessary access points (better known as ‘policy 
venues’ as clarified in chapter 4) to feed into it. The word ‘builds’ is here deliberately 
used to imply that not all policy players involved have equal access to this process. 
There are in fact varying degrees of access to the EU’s regulatory arena which 
primarily depends and has an impact on how influential policy players (such as 
governments) are in this process. Put simply, unevenness of access and influence also 
exist among EU member state governments themselves which, needless to say, has 
major ramifications in EU decision-making. Therefore, this thesis is interested to 
empirically analyze this aspect, to test whether small EU state governments are 
disadvantaged (due to the size related matters discussed at length in chapter 2; see 
Table 2.3) to exercise influence in EU legislative processes. 
 
Besides the challenge of creating access points to legislative processes, one finds that 
co-operation among EU governments in such processes is crucial and holds wide 
theoretical connotations worth indicating. Because differences in the interests and 
preferences of EU governments is an embedded feature in EU legislative processes, 
co-operation between them becomes a primary means to manage such differences 
and subsequently (if possible), as a tool for convergence. When treating European 
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integration generally, literature on theoretical foundations brings together on the 
one hand an intergovernmental form of co-operation between EU governments (see 
Hoffmann, 1966; Moravcsik, 1998; amongst others) and on the other, EU member 
state co-operation as a ‘tool’ for convergence, i.e. a federal or functional (even neo-
functional) type of co-operation where supranational institutions and not EU 
governments become the real drivers for integration (see Burgess, 2000; Mitrany, 
1966; Haas, 1968; Lindberg, 1963; Stone Sweet and Sandholtz, 1998; amongst 
others). Whichever theoretical camp is preferred over the other (it is not the thesis’s 
aim to look into this), the fact remains that co-operation and, to a larger extent 
integration in the EU, take place for mainly pragmatic reasons that in short could be 
put as follows: it is better to be in concert than alone in the system. 
 
Reasons for this become evident when one thinks functionally about an ever growing 
interdependent world. Therefore, from an EU member state governmental 
perspective, integration and co-operation in the EU should in principle take place for 
mutual gain and to provide shelter from global undesirable circumstances. As 
Wallace and Wallace (2000: 63) observe, ‘wolves in the pack may bite each other, but 
they also protect each other’. But what is even more paramount is that the EU 
process offers member state governments a platform through which to co-operate 
and from which opportunities may be derived if exploited properly.  As Wallace and 
Wallace (2000: 63) state, member state responses and participation in the EU 
political arena vary in relation to their behaviour, actions and influence in the multi-
level governance system of policy and decision-making. Thus, these particular 
features of the EU have to be taken into account as the point of departure when 
analyzing and theorizing the EU as a regulatory arena. 
 
As mentioned earlier, one main distinguishing feature of the EU is its balance and 
amalgam of two levels of governance, i.e. on the one hand, that which ‘belongs’ to 
the EU and the other, the member states. Wallace, Pollack and Young (2010: 9) 
observe that 80% of EU policy derives from the national level where one finds 
national policy-makers preoccupied with domestic concerns. In the EU, these 
concerns at the domestic level of governance are thereafter transposed to the 
supranational and intergovernmental EU levels where national representatives seek 
to influence and ‘fight’ for their government’s interests to be covered in the 
legislative outcome adopted. This is for instance typical of intergovernmental 
deliberations in the Council where shaping and taking of EU decisions is determined 
by a multitude of concerns that national policy-makers (government representatives) 
have. As a consequence and up to a certain degree, outcomes emerging from EU 
decision-making processes are characterized by levels of unpredictability precisely 
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because of variations between member state governments and also because power 
and influence is fragmented and compartmentalized in such legislative processes. To 
put it simpler, ‘there are numerous ‘black boxes’ inside the ‘black box’ of the policy 
process’ each with its own set of norms, cultures and preferences which affect policy 
outcomes in the EU (Versluis, et.al., 2011: 232). 
 
Thus, it is relevant to emphasize that EU policy processes, involving a mixture of 
supranational and intergovernmental institutions and players, do not live in a vacuum 
and that as prime players in legislative processes, EU governments occupy a 
concoction of symmetries and asymmetries in opportunities, interests, behaviour and 
above all, influence, in a multi-level system unique to the EU. 
 
As observed by Peterson and Bomberg (1999: 22):  
 
‘the EU depends fundamentally on its ability to forge consensus 
between a wide variety of decision-makers before policies may be 
‘set’. It thus requires extensive ‘pre-legislative’ bargaining over the 
shape of most proposals before they have any chance of being 
accepted’.  
 
This sums up the difficulty and complexity found in EU decision-making to produce 
outcomes from such processes. The question of how successful member state 
governments are in uploading their preferences into the EU’s agenda therefore 
emerges from this framework which is a matter of prime interest for this research.  
 
In sum, the observation by Wallace and Wallace (2000: 63) about the distinctiveness 
of the EU policy process cannot be better worded: 
  
 ‘…the EU policy process is not entirely robust and not entirely stable 
… much hangs on whether the outcomes actually deliver results that 
meet the context, the functional demands, and the purposes of 
those involved… the EU policy process has different modes of 
operating, engages countries with some persistently different 
characteristics, and is vulnerable to changing expectations and ideas 







3.2  Drawing upon stages in EU decision-making 
 
This section gives an explanation of the different stages existing in EU decision-
making processes. It thus draws upon the policy cycle as a useful framework on which 
to build. 
 
3.2.1 The policy process in relation to the ‘stages’ approach: the usefulness of the 
policy cycle framework 
 
As aforementioned, EU decision-making involves a mixture of various elements that 
together shape, form and adopt EU policies and legislation. This thesis focuses on 
those stages in the policy cycle involved with uploading processes in decision-making. 
Thus, decision-making is made up of the uploading stages of decision-shaping 
(agenda-setting and preference formation) and decision-taking. This clarification of 
what constitutes decision-making processes permits subsequent sections in this 
chapter to amplify on how the EU turns complex processes of governmental 
preferences and choices into issue formation on which decisions are taken marking 
the end of uploading processes. 
 
Although as discussed below, there is a strand in the literature that criticizes the 
policy cycle model and its categorization of the policy process in various stages, it 
nevertheless acts as an adequate test-bed providing different stages in the process in 
which a government’s influence may be tested. It thus fits neatly with the aims and 
overall approach of the thesis providing it with an ideal framework. The inspiration 
behind the image of dividing the policy-making process into separate junctures 
belongs to Harold Lasswell (1956). Farr et. al. (2006: 94-120) observe that this was an 
element of Lasswell’s early work on policy studies which he named ‘the policy 
science’. Howlett et. al. (2009: 10) define the policy cycle as ‘a set of interrelated 
stages through which policy issues and deliberations flow in a more or less sequential 
fashion from ‘inputs’ (problems) to ‘outputs’ (policies)’. Therefore, the stages are 
interlinked which is after all why it is called a cycle signifying that each stage leads to 
the next. Werner and Wegrich (2007: 43-62) simply name it the ‘policy cycle’. 
 
The policy cycle is generally sub-divided into five distinct stages (see Versluis et. al., 
2011; and Howlett et. al., 2009) in the following order: 
 
Stage 1 – Agenda setting. According to works by Brewer and Jones (1974: 239-244) 
and Princen (2009) amongst others, this represents the stage during which problems 
come to the attention of governments which are then placed on an agenda.  
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Stage 2 – Preference formation. This involves choices as to ways of solving an issue 
problem on the agenda. Policy players thus come up with and formulate proposals on 
the way forward. 
Stage 3 – Decision-taking. As its name implies, this is the phase in the policy cycle 
when decisions (or non-decisions) are taken by policy players signifying agreement or 
non-agreement on the way forward as proposed in the second stage. Therefore it 
represents the formal embracement/endorsement of the choice to the solution.  
Stage 4 – Policy implementation. This marks the enforcement of the decision on the 
way forward (this stage has to do with downloading processes unlike the previous 
three stages which is not focused upon in this thesis). 
Stage 5 – Policy evaluation. This is about verification of the performance of the policy 
action undergone (for the same reason as with the previous stage, policy evaluation 
does not feature in the thesis). 
 
As previously suggested, although agenda-setting and preference formation are both 
defined as stages belonging to decision-shaping, this research mainly focuses on the 
preference formation stage. This is because preference formation is the stage 
marking the formal start of EU legislative decision-making processes. As stated later 
in the chapter, when analyzing the EU’s legislative process, preference formation 
begins through the Commission’s approval of a legislative proposal which is sent to 
the Council and the EP for adoption. Because the thesis is about EU governments and 
their influence in such processes, it necessarily focuses on this stage of decision-
shaping without however completely omitting the agenda-setting stage. It is thus 
relevant to highlight that the relevance of the agenda-setting stage is hereby not 
being ignored and that the author is well aware of its significance and value to 
studies focusing on the shaping of public policy.  
 
EU decision-making thus has a starting point, or better, a conception stage of an issue 
problem which spans across a process whereby preferences are formed (decision-
shaping) and decisions adopted (decision-taking). 
 
Before proceeding further, an explanation about the usefulness of the policy cycle 
approach to the study of EU policy processes merits attention. A policy cycle is 
comparable to a life cycle, implying a period of time which as Schneider (1991) 
observes, is a key ingredient to baking any ‘policy cake’ – it is not simply enough to 
mix the ingredients together since only time allows it to rise. Besides the time factor, 
a subsequent section in this chapter will treat other elements that are to be included 
in this discussion on ‘inputs’ in policy-making such as those emerging from policy 
venues and policy frames. In EU decision-making, decision-shaping and taking 
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involves many ‘inputs’ (or better, ingredients) composed of policy actors, interest 
constellations, information and ideas, amongst others. They all play their part in the 
shaping and taking of EU policy output. 
 
In fact, because of its complexity, one main challenge of analyzing policy issues in EU 
decision-making processes is to determine and narrow down the focus of the 
research investigation. In this respect, the stages approach of the policy cycle 
provides a ‘helping hand’ in which specific aspects of policy issues are separated and 
analyzed allowing the researcher to ask the investigative questions of the who, when, 
how, why and eventually what about a particular issue in a policy’s life cycle. Thus, 
this compartmentalizing approach enables one to understand the logic behind 
decisions taken in the shaping and taking phases in EU decision-making processes. 
 
For instance, Versluis et. al. (2011: 20-21) observe that by ‘breaking down a complex 
process into mini-processes the task of analysis is more manageable’. They in fact 
distinguish three main positive aspects about the usefulness of the policy cycle. 
Primarily it is a fundamentally forward trajectory of logic of action which allows one 
to situate a decision within a horizontal continuum of events. Secondly, the 
framework allows one to focus on the various interactions and configurations of the 
policy actors, an aspect which is of relevance when studying EU decision-making 
which as explained earlier is a juxtaposition of various decision-shapers and takers. 
Thirdly, as they point out: 
  
‘the framework offers a simple way to try to systemize existing 
knowledge by assuming a roughly chronological series of functional, 
goal-oriented stages in which multiple actors perform multiple tasks 
in hot pursuit of their interests, and in accordance with (though not 
beyond) their own capability to act’ (Versluis et. al., 2011: 22). 
 
As already implied, many criticism about the usefulness of this model exist (see 
Jenkins-Smith and Sabatier, 1993; Howard, 2005: 3-13; Stone, 1998; Tribe, 1972: 66-
110; and Timmermans and Bleiklie, 1999). One main criticism is that it is too linear in 
structure. Consequently, deficiencies in one of the stages could eventually unravel 
the whole structure. For instance, Timmermans and Bleiklie (1999) observe that in 
reality, the stages of a policy are often compressed or skipped or may happen in a 
way not recognized by the model. 
 
Likewise, Versluis et. al. (2009) observe that in reality, policy does not always occur in 
such a neat fashion with some stage being able to overlap others. For instance, 
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Kingdon (2003: 205-206), and Salamon and Lund (1989: 22) illustrate occurrences of 
preference formation preceding agenda-setting. As they state, ‘solutions seek 
problems’ meaning that policies and legislation are at times adopted prior to the 
problem solving juncture.  
 
Other authors such as Hogwood and Gunn (1984: 23) agree that the policy process is 
in reality disjointed and therefore not that linear in nature. As they maintain, it is ‘a 
seamless web involving a bewildering mesh of interactions and ramifications’. As 
Versluis and her colleagues (2011: 23) state, it is therefore more useful to think about 
aspects of policy-making rather than of stages. Most importantly, these authors 
observe that the policy cycle offers ‘no indication of the reason for which policy 
moves from one stage to the next, or why the process speeds up or stalls’ and that 
policy may be re-steered at the end of the cycle to be amended. Another critique of 
the policy cycle is found in Sabatier’s work (1999: 7) that hypothesizes that it does 
not form the basis for a causal theory of policy-making that applies across the cycle. 
This has also been detected by Richardson (2006: 7), Young (2010: 47-48), Scharpf 
(1997: 19), and John (1998: 195), amongst others, who contend that there is no 
agreement on a grand theory of policy-making. Rather it is through the adoption of 
various analytical approaches that allows for the individual testing of each of the 
different stages in the policy cycle. 
 
In short, overall criticism about the stages approach is that it is an unrealistic model 
since the evolution of a policy cannot be simply perceived and examined as neatly cut 
into different stages. Policy cycles are hence very fluid with stages overlapping into 
each other. Indeed, there are times when agendas could be set by problems 
identified in the implementation stage (and hence the ‘downloading’ process) which 
as indicated, is the penultimate stage in the cycle. In such circumstances, a policy 
cycle’s final stages re-wind completely the whole process. 
 
However, and in defence of the stages approach, the policy cycle has one unique and 
distinct feature - that of offering a multipurpose and versatile framework which may 
be used by research to track down those crucial elements that shape and take 
decisions. In EU decision-making processes, these are the iterations between policy 
actors, interests, coalitions, and their interactions within and between EU institutions 
as decreed by institutional rules of procedure. It therefore provides a very useful 
model that allows clear analysis of different policy players (such as EU governments 




As Howard (2005: 3-13) puts it, policy analysis at each of the stages signifies problem 
solving even though EU decision-making processes are complex involving constant 
interplay between various actors at various stages and multi-levels (see McCormick, 
2006: 11-31; and Sabatier, 1999: 3-17). The stages are not represented by clear 
demarcation lines. As seen, it is extremely characteristic of the EU to have levels 
shade into each other resulting in the order of a cycle’s stages being ‘reversed, 
skipped, or (that) show(s) evidence of stalling, braking, and standstill, due to 
resistance or disagreement’ (Versluis, et. al., 2011: 236). Thus, McConnell (2010: 232) 
observes that its usefulness lies in its simplicity and that:  
 
‘its utility is limited primarily to being a means of dividing up the 
policy process into convenient ‘stages’ as a precursor to deeper 
analysis, or as an indicator of the idealized rhetoric of policy-
makers’. 
 
As best observed by Versluis et al. (2011: 236-240): 
 
‘…the ‘ping-pong’ of opinions back and forth between the EP and 
Council will largely shape the ceilings, quotas, and targets that are 
central to securing a policy’s main aims… Interests are at play at 
every stage…’. 
  
In sum and as these authors suggest, there is no single way of looking at the 
dynamics of the policy cycle in the EU. 
 
3.2.2 Identifying shaping and taking facets of EU decision-making processes 
 
There is a myriad of literature about EU decision-making which generally defines it as 
the stage in the policy cycle whereby decisions are made (see Buonanno and Nugent, 
2013; Peterson and Bomberg, 1999; Wallace, 2005; and Versluis et. al., 2011). But 
because EU decision-making is a process, this means that there is a starting and 
finishing point during which decisions are shaped and eventually taken. It therefore 
implies a course of action, a route, or even better, a progression during which 
decisions are ‘concocted’ and ‘baked’. In the EU’s multi-level system, shaping 
dynamics at technical level exist and persist until the cycle moves on to the next 
stage where decisions are taken at a political level. In fact, only once decisions are 




An issue worth clarifying here is about the thesis’s modification of the conventional 
use of the term ‘decision-making’ with ‘decision-taking’. This is done deliberately to 
mark a precise stage in the cycle of a decision-making process. Crucially, the term 
decision-taking can also be found in Allan McConnell’s words when citing Howlett et. 
al. (2009) in their definition of the different stages of the policy cycle (see McConnell, 
2010: 221) and more precisely on the third stage of the policy process previously 
illustrated. This means that authors using the policy cycle approach tend to use the 
term ‘decision-making’ more generically, leading to misconceptions about the 
terminology used about this precise stage in the policy process. It is the author’s 
conviction that in the case of EU decision-making processes, this distinction between 
the terms ‘decision-making’ and ‘decision-taking’ is necessary for two main reasons.  
 
First, there is a need to be more precise in the terminology used about decision-
taking in EU legislative processes. Therefore, if one is referring to the taking of 
decisions, this should be worded as decision-taking and not decision-making, the 
latter term involving wider connotations which also includes decision-shaping. 
Second and more generically, it is necessary to sharpen terminology when applying it 
to studies on EU processes given that, as stated before, EU decision-making is in itself 
a complex matter to analyze. Therefore, there is a need to simplify the study of how 
EU decision-making functions and what constitutes such a process through the use of 
clear terminology. Peterson and Bomberg’s (1999: 21) statement that policy-shaping 
decisions do not ‘decide’ EU policy but rather determine those options that might be 
considered therefore offers clarification on this aspect. It is exactly why EU decision-
making should be looked at as a process comprising two distinct, yet complimentary, 
stages concerned with the uploading of preferences and ultimately of the taking of 
decisions. Put simply, decision-shaping and taking fit under the wider umbrella of 
decision-making.  
 
Since, as pointed out earlier, the thesis focuses mainly (but not exclusively) on 
governmental influence in the Council of the EU, Figures 3.1 and 3.2 below illustrate 
where (at which levels) and how (through which approaches) decision-shaping and 










Figure 3.1 – The Council’s multi-level governance structure in ‘Bottom-Up’ / ‘Top-Down’ 
approaches 











                               Bottom               Down 
 Source: Figure compiled by the author. 
 
The EU legislative process in Council is launched in Working Group meetings where 
technical attachés/diplomats from a government’s Permanent Representation in 
Brussels and/or national experts from line ministries in a member state’s capital 
discuss technically EU draft legislation. They therefore shape decisions before the 
draft proposal moves up (in a ‘bottom-up’ style) to the next level in Council – the 
Committee of Permanent Representatives (better known as ‘Coreper’).  
 
Coreper may be referred to as the ‘glue’ in the middle tier. It keeps together the 
whole system in the Council. It is here that technical aspects at the decision-shaping 
stage begin to shade, or better mutate, into political compromises for the Council of 
Ministers to endorse at the next level at the decision-taking stage (see Figure 3.2 
below). 
 
It is thus the Ministers who adopt legislation terminating the EU decision-making 
process in Council. In cases where compromises are not possible, the Council of 
Ministers sends the draft legislation back to the lower levels in a ‘top-down’ fashion. 
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winding the process and clearing the way for the Council of Ministers to adopt the 
act. 
 
Figure 3.2 – The stages in the EU decision-making process applied to the Council’s multi-
level governance structure and approaches 
           Up          (end of legislative process)              Top 
     
 
   
      
      
        
                   
  
         Bottom          (start of legislative process)                       Down 
                                                           
- The decision-taking stage.   
- The decision-shaping stage.  
 
Source: Figure compiled by the author. 
 
3.3  The decision-shaping stage  
 
EU decision-shaping is made up of two preliminary stages of the policy cycle, i.e. 
agenda-setting and preference formation. As mentioned in the previous section, the 
thesis focuses on preference formation since this is the stage during which EU 
governments in Council start becoming involved in the EU’s legislative process. 
  
Decision-making is set in motion by shaping processes which interpret a policy 
problem emerging as an issue that requires addressing. The issue is then set in a 
policy agenda. Decision-shaping in Council involves discussions at Working Group and 
Coreper levels that lead to the formulation of solutions and compromises by the 
Presidency (which rotates every 6 months among the member state governments). 
These compromises are ‘baked’ by ideas and knowledge of policy actors, in this case 
government representatives of the 28 member states and Commission officials sitting 
around the negotiation table. The main role of these actors is to upload their 
 
 











preferences into the process and to get the Council Presidency and other delegations 
to accept and frame their preferred options when funnelling choice of solutions. All 
this occurs between and within the structures of the Council and the EP, the two 
legislative chambers of the EU. As authors of the new institutionalism theoretical 
approach emphasize (see Williamson, 1985; March and Olsen, 1994; and Searle, 
2005; see also chapter 4 of the thesis), while various actors in a common institution 
all have their own preferences and interests to promote and defend, they do this in 
accordance to institutional rules and norms that eventually shape outcomes and 
expectations that needless to say have ramifications on their realization. 
 
3.3.1 What is preference formation? 
 
Preference formation consists of the presentation of ideas and proposals for EU 
initiatives and legislation to be developed. This therefore represents a bridge in the 
policy cycle between those stages preoccupied with how issues become formalized 
(agenda-setting) and with what the final compromise looks like (decision-taking). 
Therefore, minimum understanding about agenda-setting and decision-taking 
dynamics is required when analyzing preference formation. 
 
One should also bear in mind that preference formation stems from policy/legislative 
choices occurring at national (domestic) levels. EU member state governments form 
their preferences on a specific draft EU legislative proposal from knowledge and 
expertise gained domestically in the sector. For instance, a member state 
government’s level of experience in a particular policy sphere might indicate that the 
government will experience difficulties on a Commission legislative proposal in that 
sphere being negotiated upon in Council. This will therefore require that government 
to pay particular attention in the legislative negotiations occurring during the 
decision-shaping and decision-taking stages of the process.  
 
Preference formation represents the second stage in the policy cycle in which 
‘problems recognized at the agenda-setting stage are identified, refined, and 
formalized’ (Howlett et. al., 2009: 110).  This stage in the process is distinct from the 
next stage of decision-taking where as stated in section 3.4, an EU legislative proposal 
is approved by the highest levels of authority at political level – the ministers of the 
EU member state governments in the Council of Ministers and MEPs in an EP plenary 
session. Put simply, preference formation is the stage in the policy process where 
alternatives are filtered and narrowed down which do not ‘make’ but rather ‘shape’ 
EU policy or legislation. It presents policy options and a course of action to issue 
problems acknowledged and raised by the agenda-setting stage. Preference 
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formation therefore involves identifying and assessing possible solutions to issues 
arising from an EU draft legislative proposal or, as Howlett and his colleagues 
observe: 
 
‘exploring the various options or alternative courses of action 
available for addressing a problem’ (ibid).  
 
Thus policy options are identified at this stage in the policy cycle. In the EU context 
and as discussed in the next sub-section, these options are negotiated among the 
governments of the EU and the Commission in Council Working Group and Coreper 
meetings (refer to Figures 3.1 and 3.2 illustrated previously). But the EU legislative 
process (described at the end of this chapter) also involves the EP, with MEPs 
discussing EU legislative proposals at technical level in committee meetings in 
Brussels (and eventually in plenary in Strasbourg where decisions are taken). 
 
Peterson and Bomberg observe that policy shaping has been largely neglected by 
academic literature in European Studies (Peterson and Bomberg, 1999: 2). This 
therefore represents one of the main driving forces behind this research, i.e. to study 
how this very crucial stage contributes and influences the policy decision path. 
 
3.3.2  Actors in EU preference formation 
 
Preference formation involves the same actors in agenda-setting, but also new ones 
as a result of the shift in policy venue. For instance, policy issues that have been dealt 
with by the Commission as the main agenda-setter will move to the Council at this 
stage where Working Groups and Coreper involve different actors (government 
representatives) at different levels. As previously observed, Working Group meetings 
consist of national experts from ministries in the Capitals and/or diplomats/technical 
attachés from the governments’ Permanent Representations in Brussels. Coreper 
meetings involve an increase in the number of delegates since they consist of the 
same government experts participating in the Working Group meetings together with 
the Ambassadors – that is the Permanent Representatives (PRs) for Coreper II 
meetings or Deputy Permanent Representatives (DPRs) for Coreper I meetings. These 
players meet and try to ‘chisel away at a proposal through various rounds of 
meetings, decisions, reviews and debates, until they end up with a ‘final product’’ 
which Versluis and her colleagues (2011: 132) term as ‘lowest common denominator’. 
This means the lowest form of a generally acceptable compromise possible at a given 




European Commission officials from Directorate-Generals 
 
Being the initiator of EU legislation, the Commission is regarded not only as the prime 
agenda-setter in the EU. It is also seen to be the nucleus in the EU legislative process 
whereby it exploits the ‘power of the pen’ (or better, its right of initiative) position. In 
fact, the Commission may be compared to the ‘hub of the spokes’ in a process that 
involves many players. As Nugent (1997: 21) observes, the Commission’s key role 
becomes apparent in a process ‘directed towards the preparation of the decision-
taking ground.’ This does not mean that it does not have its own interests to defend 
and advance. Nugent in fact observes that ‘the Commission has many opportunities 
to play roles and to exercise influence over and above its formal responsibilities’. 
Cram (1994: 213) continues on these lines defining the Commission as a ‘purposeful 
opportunist’. She has in fact published work examining how the Commission’s 
resources allow it to shape and exploit the EU process in order to expand its 
competencies, particularly during the shaping stages of agenda-setting and 
preference formation.  
 
Given that the Commission is dependent on the Council and the EP as the decision-
takers, it attempts to obtain and secure support for its legislative proposals at the 
initial stages of the policy cycle. As analyzed in the empirical parts of the thesis, this is 
a similar strategy adopted by small state governments requiring a strong role during 
the preference formation stage. Hix (2005: 74), however, maintains that although the 
Commission’s role in decision-making is limited, the significant influence which it 
enjoys in the agenda-setting and preference formation phases allows it to maintain a 
good degree of influence throughout subsequent stages of the policy cycle, decision-
taking included. As already highlighted, the Commission participates in Council 
negotiations (at every level) and is able to intervene during discussions, albeit 
without the possibility to vote (if and when voting occurs). This situation is mirrored 
in the EP’s hierarchical working structures, with a participatory role granted to the 
Commission. 
 
Nevertheless, there are times when the Commission shapes policy in a certain 
direction due to internal rivalry. Due to its compartmentalized structure (made up of 
various Directorate-Generals (DGs) responsible for specific policy spheres), the 
Commission often has difficulties speaking with one voice. It is not uncommon to 
hear about variances in a Commission position in the formulation stage of a 
legislative proposal, such as during an inter-service consultation process in the 
agenda-setting stage (a process during which the DGs may place their observations 
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on the particular piece of EU legislation being proposed, i.e. before the Commission’s 
formal adoption of a proposal). 
 
One last important feature about the Commission is its ‘cabinet’ network. Each 
Commissioner has a secretariat known as a ‘cabinet’. It is headed by a ‘chef de 
cabinet’ who meets up with other chefs in an inter-cabinet consultation meeting 
which precedes meetings of the College of Commissioners. For small states in 
particular, this network provides a fundamental resource to tap into in order to 
exercise influence very early on the shaping phase of EU legislative decision-making 
processes. As explained in chapter 6 on methodology, the thesis’s case studies look 
into this network as a factor determining a small state government’s influence in EU 
decision-making (see variable 4 on pace-setting through lobbying the Commission). 
 
EU government representatives in the Council 
 
It is in the Council that EU legislative shaping work is performed by EU governments. 
Council Working Groups and Corepers, chaired by the six monthly rotating 
Presidency, shape draft EU legislation at technical level to such an extent that it is 
generally only cosmetically altered by the Council of Ministers at political level. 
According to Hayes-Renshaw and Wallace (2006), Working Groups (at technical level) 
are even more fundamental than either Coreper or Council of Ministers levels since 
they alone account for the shaping of around 90 per cent of draft EU legislation. In 
fact, by the time that a legislative file moves upwards to the other levels in Council 
(see Figures 3.1 and 3.2) for review and final adoption (decision-taking), EU draft law 
would have generally already been informally agreed to (or at least, a general 
common position accepted) by government representatives  at Working Group level. 
The Working Group level is thus fundamental for decision-shaping in this EU 
institution. 
 
As previously highlighted, whereas Working Groups view proposals from a technical 
or expert level, Coreper is more of a political ‘animal’, cementing expertise with 
politics (it is in fact the nucleus of the Council’s multi-level system). One of the main 
reasons for this is that PRs in Coreper II meetings (or DPRs in Coreper I meetings) 
dispose of a horizontal view across various EU policy/legislative spheres falling under 
their remit unlike experts attending Working Groups which only discuss one 
particular policy sphere (and accompanying EU legislation). This makes collusion of 




In Coreper, the experts involved in the Working Group liaise directly with and sit next 
to the PRs/ DPRs. Therefore, expertise is at hand and although preparatory meetings 
are held by each delegation prior to Coreper, the PR/DPR can always turn to the 
expert for more information on a given matter. This demonstrates that Council 
decision-shaping is largely performed by the same officials meeting in different 
venues at different levels. 
 
Therefore, decision-shaping performed at Working Group level is fine-tuned by the 
PRs/DPRs in Coreper that ‘even out’ a proposal. Coreper either comes up with a 
common position (a compromise may be found by the Council Presidency) which 
then appears as a ‘I’ (or ‘A’) point in the agenda of a subsequent Council of Ministers 
meeting (this signifies the adoption of a legislative file without a discussion being 
necessary). Alternatively, Coreper shapes the draft legislation further (with the 
Presidency forming it into an acceptable compromise proposal) that nevertheless 
requires further discussion (appearing as a ‘II’ or ‘B’ point in the Council of Ministers 
agenda) before a decision may be taken by ministers.  
 
MEPs in EP committees  
 
As put by Versluis and her colleagues (2011: 141), the EP presents a challenge in ‘… 
loose and unpredictable ‘politicking’… as it may be difficult to obtain firsthand data 
about how influence and interests have been exerted or acted upon ‘behind the 
scenes’’. As Raunio (2000: 239) maintains, ‘EU deputies not only meet in the assembly 
but also as national party delegations, with national party meetings often preceding 
the meetings of the full political group’. And Mather (2001: 192) observes that ‘it is 
left to the individual representative to determine his/her stance on every issue’. These 
comments only confirm how difficult it is to understand influence dynamics in the EP. 
However, as Hix (2007) points out, party politics generally reveals much of how 
decisions about shaping policy proposals occur within the EP. 
 
Decision-shaping in the EP occurs in 22 committees in Brussels that discuss individual 
legislative proposals each presided over by a ‘rapporteur’. The groups are sectoral in 
nature, with membership divided among the 751 MEPs making up the Parliament. 
The aim and working plan of these committees is to draft a report on a Commission’s 
legislative proposal sent to it for the adoption of the act. A committee’s report thus 
reflects discussions held in the committee, with MEPs usually following their 
respective political group lines and, sometimes, the preferences of their government. 
It is thus not surprising that MEPs push for their national government’s position 
which requires an uploading in these committee meetings in a similar manner as that 
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done by government representatives in Council. Needless to say and as analyzed 
empirically in subsequent chapters, MEPs are an invaluable resource for 
governments, especially those of the smaller states, to invest in and tap into. In 
Malta’s case, with only 6 seats available in the EP, it is not surprising that a Maltese 
MEP may end up supporting the position held by the (national) political group in 
government in Malta of which the MEP is not a member. This last issue is entered 
into in more detail in the empirical case studies of the thesis. 
 
3.4 The decision-taking stage 
 
3.4.1  What is decision-taking? 
 
Decision-taking marks the end of shaping elements in EU decision-making. In the EU’s 
legislative process, it thus symbolizes the stage where decisions are taken to adopt 
new or amending EU legislation. As Howlett et. al. (2009: 139) maintain:  
 
‘it involves choosing from among a relatively small number of 
alternative policy options identified in the process of policy 
formulation in order to resolve a public problem’. 
 
In the EU, decisions are taken at the end of the EU’s legislative process, or as 
Richardson (1996) states, when the EU arrives at a ‘policy decision point’. Decision-
taking may be thus described as the consequence of formation processes leading to 
the approval of choices. Therefore, in the same manner as choices about viable 
courses of action in preference formation are made, this stage is blunter and 
presents a level of formality. In other words, once taken, an actual decision on policy 
choices (brought to it by the formulation decision-shaping stage) becomes official, 
making it irreversible and path-dependent unlike in the previous stages. The decision-
taking stage may be distinguished as being intrinsically political. It is therefore set 
apart from agenda-setting and preference formation which are technical in nature. 
  
Since policy cycles are generally fluid and because the various stages are intertwined, 
it is extremely difficult to demarcate the decision-taking stage as one commencing 
and ending at precise points in time in the process (even though decision-taking is 
clearly characterized by the taking of a decision, i.e. the adoption of EU legislation). 
Having said this, the start of decision-taking may be identified by the end of the 
shaping stage, or more precisely, when issues emanating and processed by shaping 




The problem here is that because of the disjointed nature of and manner by which 
the policy cycle functions - with EU draft legislation moving up and down the multi-
level ladder structure - this is not a simple task. As emphasized earlier through 
Wallace and Wallace’s metaphor depicting the EU policy process as a swinging 
pendulum, it is normal for EU decision-making to experience a swinging movement 
which bounces the process up and down between the stages of decision-shaping and 
decision-taking. This means that in the EU it is rare (but not impossible) to come 
across a neat systematic process in which draft legislation is sent to the decision-
taking stage for a decision to be made in one instance. There is a lot of ‘coming and 
going’ of a draft legislative proposal requiring amendment and revision before a 
decision, acceptable to most parties in the negotiations (and to all parties if voting is 
by unanimity), is possible. As stated before, this may explain the ‘lowest common 
denominator’ consensus-style of decision-taking which is so typical of the EU as a 
result of multi-level bargaining and horse-trading between member state 
governments in Council and the other relevant EU institutions. In fact, as Joerges and 
Neyer (1997: 609-625) and also Risse (2002: 601) observe, bargaining many times 
replaces ‘constructive arguing’. This means that although constructivist 
argumentative rationality is recognized to be salient at all stages of the policy process 
(in order to achieve something superior to a bargaining-type decision), the way 
decisions are taken ultimately depends on whether the players have enough political 
will to be open to persuasion and to the ‘common good’ rather than to the 
maximization of their perceived interests. This is however something which is rather 
foreign to EU decision-making. 
 
Decisions are defined by Peterson and Bomberg (1999: 4) as: 
  
‘choices or solutions that end some uncertainty or reduce 
contention… when any choice is made, the result is a decision’.   
 
As Brewer and De Leon (1983: 179) observe, once the preference formation phase 
comes up with alternatives:  
 
‘one or a select few (must be) picked and readied for use … most 
possible choices will not be realized and deciding not to take 
particular courses of action is as much a part of selection as finally 
settling on the best course’. 
 
This last quote introduces the topic of different decision-types emerging from EU 
decision-taking. ‘Positive’ decisions allow for the altering of a situation. For instance, 
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the EU could decide in favour of the establishment of new EU legislation (such as 
Directive 2007/23/EC of 23 May 2007 on the placing on the market of pyrotechnic 
articles, treated in chapter 7) in a precise policy sphere to address certain 
shortcomings in the EU’s acquis communautaire. Decisions of this sort have the 
ability to change the status quo. However, there might be other instances when 
decisions are taken to maintain the status quo (such as nondecisions). These types of 
decisions are considered as ‘negative’ since they do not alter anything. ‘Nondecisions’ 
thus form part of a category of decision which, as discussed in chapter 5, is best 
illustrated by authors such as Schattschneider (1957 and 1960) and Bachrach and 
Baratz (1970). However, one main difference between a nondecision and a negative 
decision is that the former never surfaces onto the decision-taking stage because 
nondecisions are averted by agenda-setting and preference formation processes 
which do not consider alternatives to current state of affairs. The alternatives to a 
policy problem that would lead to a negative decision taken are the result of 
deliberate decisions taken by decision-takers not to move forward with the policy 
process. In such cases, the policy cycle terminates at this stage (see Van der Eijk and 
Kok, 1975: 277-301). 
 
Moreover, further distinctions exist between decision-types which illustrate that 
some decisions are more decisive in nature than others. For instance, EU Treaty 
reforms require monumental decisions which are hard-fought and made at the 
highest level (by Prime Ministers and/or Presidents of EU member state governments 
in the European Council) at ‘super-systemic’ level (Peterson and Bomberg, 1999: 4). 
They transcend ‘ordinary’ choices about what action (or inaction) is to be taken.  Such 
decisions are also referred to as history-making decisions taken at the highest levels 
in a political system. However, as already emphasized, this thesis focuses on EU small 
state governmental influence in the EU legislative process and thus does not get into 
decision-making processes occurring in the European Council (at ‘super-systemic’ 
level). This is because as already stated, it is the Council and not the European 
Council which is, together with the EP, the main EU legislator involved in day-to-day 
EU legislative processes. The European Council is only involved only in so far as it may 
be an endorser of decisions already taken by the Council.7  
 
3.4.2  Actors in EU decision-taking 
 
Contrary to agenda-setting and preference formation, decision-taking sees a 
decrease in the number of policy actors involved. Policy decisions are in fact made by 
actors that are formally empowered and have the authority to be able to take such 
decisions.  They are therefore few and are usually ‘high’ state officials, i.e. mainly 
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politicians and/or other top ranking civil servants delegated with high levels of 
authority (such as PRs who normally replace ministers or parliamentary secretaries 
(junior ministers) in a Council if they cannot attend).  
 
This however does not mean that the other players, who are engaged in earlier 
stages of the legislative process, do not exercise influence on decisions taken. For 
instance, junior diplomats in a Permanent Representation following and participating 
in a policy negotiation at his/her level will be in a position to feed information to the 
higher levels, ministers included. Therefore, although these ‘low key’ players mainly 
involved in agenda-setting and preference formation stages do not participate 
directly in a voting exercise (in Council this is done mainly by consensus), in the final 
stages of the legislative negotiation, they do play an important role (equally crucial to 
that of voting) to influence outcomes. As Woll (2007: 57-78) observes, these players 
lobby, drive and try to persuade their superiors, at times successfully, to select a 
preferred option from another. This thesis examines, in subsequent empirical 
chapters (see chapters 8 to 10), how governmental influence in previous phases of 
the policy cycle spills over to these levels and at this stage of the policy process to 
achieve end games. 
 
In EU legislative decision-taking processes, the main actors are: government ministers 
(and to a lesser degree PRs in Coreper) in the Council in Brussels and the MEPs at EP 
plenary level in Strasbourg (the Commission is not a decision-taker although, as 
discussed earlier, it has an extremely vital role during the formation (decision-
shaping) stages). This explains why the remaining parts of this section focus on these 
two main EU decision-taking players. Therefore, similar to the preference formation 
stage, decision-taking in the EU is mainly characterized by compromises, ad-hoc 
agreements and other forms of bargaining among the member state governments in 
Council and the MEPs in the EP. The Commission is also involved in this process, for 
instance in ‘trilogues’ at third reading of an EU legislative process (this is explained 
further on). But one must bear in mind that as stated above, the Commission is not a 
decision-taker since it does not adopt EU legislation.  
 
EU government representatives in the Council 
 
Traditionally, decision-taking behaviour in the Council has been studied from the way 
Council votes are taken. This is in order to determine the bargaining influence and 
strength that member states hold in EU processes. One is able to cite studies by Hosli 
(1994) and Felsenthal and Machover (1997: 34-47), amongst others that have 
established elaborate Council voting models that showcase behaviour of member 
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states, especially when QMV applies. Since 1 November 2014, the Council’s amended 
QMV rule (through Article 16(4) TEU subject to the derogations set out in Article 
238(2) and (3) TFEU that were delayed until this date) now provides for majorities of 
actual numbers of member states in favour. It also necessitates a double, and at 
times, a triple majority, i.e. 55% of all members of Council (or 72% if Council does not 
act on a proposal from the Commission or the High Representative of the Union for 
Foreign Affairs and Security Policy) together with a minimum of 15 member states 
and the overall sizes of their populations, i.e. a minimum of 65% of the total EU 
population. The amended QMV rule does not provide any longer for weighting of 
votes (a system that will be phased out completely after 31 March 2017). But apart 
from this, majority voting in Council is only useful in so far as predicting how EU 
member state governments might act in future decision-making processes in the 
same policy sphere. Of more relevance however is the fact that member state 
governmental behaviour is never constant with changes occurring in parallel with 
domestic interests and concerns at a given point in time. As Sandholtz (1996: 404) 
observes: 
 
‘the fact that many EU decisions look like interstate bargains … tell 
us nothing about how the institutional context shapes preferences 
and EU decision-making’.  
 
Rather, work such as that by Young (2010) is valuable in proving that member state 
interests, irrespective of their voting weight, are decisive in EU decision-making. 
Indeed, Young (2010: 58) maintains that:  
 
‘…governments with preferences close to the centre  of the range of 
preferences on a given issue are more likely to be in a winning 
majority independent of their formal voting weight, while other 
governments may be ‘preference outliers’, and therefore more likely 
to be isolated in EU decision-making’. 
 
One further issue about voting in Council is that it occurs mainly by consensus, 
reflecting the practical nature by which decisions are taken by ministers. In fact, as 
Young (2010: 59), Schneider et. al. (2006: 299-316), Haynes-Renshaw and Wallace 
(2006), and Naurin and Wallace (2010), amongst others observe, the Council of 
Ministers nearly always reaches a decision by consensus. Therefore, even when QMV 
applies, consensus is always preferred whenever possible ‘so that models of 
procedures, such as minimum-winning coalitions, appear to provide a poor guide to 
understanding day-to-day practice in the Council even in those policies in which voting 
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occurs’ (Young, 2010: 59). As Schneider et. al. (2006: 304-305) suggest, bargaining 
models are more suitable to the study of EU decision-making than procedural models 
because the latter are blind to iteration. As Keohane (1969) observes, bargaining 
implies a degree of diffuse reciprocity, or better, expectations of favourable returns 
sometime in the future when for instance a member state government returns a 
favour to another state for supporting it on a given issue. Many strategic games of 
this sort are played in the Council with such strategic games not confined only to the 
decision-taking stage. 
 
The Council Presidency is another important element having a direct impact on EU 
decision-taking. The Presidency is a tool which provides the member state 
government hosting it more influence in deciding which issues should be placed on 
the EU’s agenda and also in the general manner with which deliberations at every 
level in the Council are to be steered. Thus, analyzing EU decision-making could take 
the form of a different type of study aimed at determining influence levels of a 
member state government when holding the Council Presidency role and on whether 
EU legislative outcomes are in line with its preferences (see Bunse, 2009). 
 
Nevertheless, one should not overlook the fact that in Council much of the work 
occurs through informal channels. It is true that Council voting and other institutional 
arrangements such as the Presidency are vital aspects of EU decision-taking, but it is 
also true that there are many ‘behind the scenes’ processes that are crucial in 
thrashing out differences between 28 EU governments, thus making outcomes 
possible. 
  
MEPs in EP plenary sittings  
 
As aforementioned and as indicated by studies of EP decision-making processes, 
there is a high degree of cohesion of MEPs ‘towing the line’ in the EP of the national 
political group of which they are members (see Kreppel, 2001). Hix et. al. (2007) in 
fact state that decision-shaping and taking in the EP is characterized by MEPs voting 
from a two dimensional setting. On the one hand, the national-supranational 
perspective, while on the other, the domestic and traditional left versus right 
platform. 
 
Earlier in the chapter it was observed how decision-shaping in the EP occurs in 
committee meetings in Brussels. When a report on a legislative proposal is agreed to 
by the committee’s MEPs, it is then moved to the decision-taking stage for approval 
in a plenary session in Strasbourg. In plenary, all 751 MEPs are able to discuss further 
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and/or vote for or against (or abstain on) the legislative proposal. As is observed in 
the next paragraphs describing the EU legislative process, in cases where the 
Council’s common position on draft EU legislation clashes with that of the EP at 
second reading of the legislative process, a conciliation committee (composed of an 
equal number of Council members and MEPs and presided over by the Commission) 
is established to seek a compromise at third reading that will allow the adoption of 
the legislation in question. If a compromise is indeed found, the decision-taking stage 





The next few paragraphs describe the main legislative procedure used today in the 
EU. The ‘ordinary legislative procedure’ (Article 294 TFEU), formerly known as the 
‘co-decision procedure’ is characterized by successive readings in the Council and the 
EP (of up to a maximum of three readings) which also includes a role for the 
Commission throughout this process. The procedure is triggered off with the 
Commission submitting a legislative proposal to the EP and the Council.  
 
At the first reading, the EP and the Council may adopt the Commission’s proposal 
without proposing amendments. In this case, the draft act may be adopted. The EP 
may alternatively propose changes to the proposal which are sent to the Council. If 
the Council agrees with the EP’s amendments, the draft legislation may be adopted 
at first reading. However, if the Council does not agree with the EP’s amendments or 
with the original Commission proposal, the Council will adopt its own position (with 
justifications explaining why it does not agree with the text) which will need to be 
sent back to the EP for scrutiny. The Commission is also involved in this process since 
it will need to inform the EP with its own position on the matter. Since the entry into 
force of the Treaty of Amsterdam, around 60 per cent of legislative proposals are 
agreed at first reading (see Judge and Earnshaw, 2008: 232; and Nugent, 2010: 318). 
 
At the second reading of the legislative process, the Council’s position may either be 
approved (in which case, the act is adopted) or rejected by the EP (in which case, the 
act is not adopted). Alternatively, the EP may adopt further amendments and send 
back the legislative proposal to the Council. Once again, the Commission will need to 
give its position on the matter. If the Commission’s position on the EP’s amendments 
is negative, the Council must act unanimously to be able to approve the amended 
common position. If on the other hand the Commission’s position is positive, the 
Council may adopt by QMV. Since the Treaty of Amsterdam, 30 per cent of legislative 
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proposals are agreed at this stage in the legislative process (Judge and Earnshaw, 
2008: 232; and Nugent, 2010: 318). 
 
In the case where the Council does not approve the amendments to the common 
position, the Council President, with the agreement of the EP President, must 
convene a conciliation committee to settle the differences at third reading of the 
legislative procedure. The committee has 6 weeks to come up with a joint text on the 
basis of the two positions of the EP and the Council (or 8 weeks if an extension has 
been agreed). If not, the act is not adopted. The two institutions vote separately on 
the joint text as its stands without the possibility of further amending it. If it 
succeeds, the Council and the EP may adopt the act (at third reading) by a majority 
vote. But if either fails to do so, then the act cannot be adopted and the procedure 
stops there. The procedure may only be re-started through a new Commission 
proposal. Returning to the figures given above, only the remaining 10 per cent of 
legislative proposals require a conciliation committee to be convened (Nugent, 2010: 
318). This means that a third reading in the EU legislative process is not a common 
occurrence.  
 
One must also bear in mind that reconciliation of positions of the EU institutions 
involved in the legislative procedure may be possible at any stage of the process. This 
may occur through informal interinstitutional negotiations known as ‘trilogues’. 
Trilogues are chaired by the EU legislative institution hosting the meeting (i.e. either 
the Council or the EP) with the Commission having a moderating role. In the 
trilogues, the Council and the EP put forward their main arguments and justifications 
while the Commission facilitates the reaching of an agreement between the other 
two institutions. The participants in trilogues operate on the basis of negotiating 
mandates bestowed to them by their respective institutions – the relevant 
committee group or plenary in the EP, Coreper in the Council, and by the College 
(through interinstitutional meetings by the Groupe des Relations Interinstitutionnelles 
(GRI)) in the Commission. Any agreement in trilogues is informal and ad referendum 
and has to be approved by the formal procedures applicable within each of the three 
institutions (see EP, 2014: 19).  
 
Needless to say, the EU legislative procedure (as well as trilogues) itself impacts on 
EU inter-institutional relations with continuous consultations occurring between the 
member state governments in Council, MEPs in the EP and also members of the 
Commission. However, as observed in this chapter, it is ultimately the Council and 






Chapter 3 has clarified key concepts of EU decision-making processes. It has revealed 
how the EU exists within a complex system of decision-making processes shared 
between the EU member state governments in Council and other supranational EU 
institutions, particularly the EP and the Commission. This institutional setting is 
returned to in the next chapter which provides a theoretical platform for EU decision-
making processes. 
 
Chapter 3 has also provided the thesis with a framework of how to examine EU 
decision-making as processes involving various stages. As seen, the policy cycle 
model assists to divide EU decision-making processes into sub-stages of decision-
shaping and decision-taking. As emphasized in this chapter, this allows one to focus 
on key aspects of small state governmental influence during these precise stages in 
EU legislative decision-making processes. This framework is utilized in subsequent 
empirical chapters in Part II of the thesis (see chapters 8 to 10).  
 
Besides defining these sub-stages, chapter 3 has also identified and described the 
relevant EU policy players to be found under each of them. 
 
Chapter 3 has particularly focused on the Council of the EU as the venue in which the 
EU member state governments are involved in EU legislative decision-making 
processes. As emphasized, this is because the thesis focuses on the influence of the 























There is a vast theoretical literature seeking to explain EU decision-making. The 
discussion in this chapter is not intended to be an exhaustive account of all the 
theoretical approaches on EU decision-making since others have dealt with this 
important and challenging task. Besides requiring more time and space, the thesis 
has specific research aims requiring application of only some of these main 
theoretical approaches to the empirical analysis. 
 
Rather, chapter 4 provides an overview of some of the most used and most useful 
theoretical approaches which, as stated above, are drawn from a significant and 
diverse body of literature on EU decision-making. It does this by applying them in the 
same framework provided for in the previous chapter sub-dividing decision-making 
into the sub-stages of decision-shaping and taking. Once this review is set, the 
chapter then focuses on three main theoretical approaches which in the author’s 
view are most useful for this thesis (when applied to the empirical chapters) and 
which are most significant in a study featuring the influence of small states in EU 
decision-making processes.  
 
Chapter 4 is divided into three main sections. Section 4.1 examines commonly used 
approaches and continues in the previous chapter’s footsteps by applying possible 
‘best approaches’ for each of the sub-stages of decision-shaping (sub-section 4.1.1) 
and decision-taking (sub-section 4.1.2). 
  
Section 4.2 then turns its attention to the application of the ‘most relevant’ 
theoretical approaches for Part II of the thesis. These are the rational choice, new 
institutional (NI) and multi-level governance (MLG) approaches. This section clarifies 
why these approaches are of particular use to this thesis.  
 







4.1 A review of theoretical approaches commonly used in studying 
decision-shaping and decision-taking 
 
As Nugent (2010: 440) observes: 
 
‘…the existence of differing conceptual and theoretical approaches 
in EU studies should not be viewed as being a problem. Rather, the 
existence and use of differing approaches furthers understanding by 
bringing differing perspectives to bear on and by providing differing 
insights into the European integration process and the EU’. 
  
As stated in this chapter’s introduction, the thesis is based on this premise about the 
value of using differing theoretical approaches to EU decision-making, albeit with a 
particular focus on three main theoretical approaches (dealt with subsequently in 
section 4.2). 
  
Therefore, section 4.1 provides ‘best’ approaches to each of the stages as illustrated 
in Table 4.1 below. However, it must be made clear that some of the approaches 
listed in this table shade into both stages of decision-making (as defined in chapter 
3), presenting a real challenge of how to classify and divide them under each stage. 
Therefore, although the thesis covers the approaches as being categorized in Table 
4.1, it is important to bear in mind the reasoning above. 
 
 
Table 4.1 – Much used theoretical approaches for each stage in EU decision-making 
Decision-Making Stages 
 




Main or ‘Best’ Approaches 
 
- Policy networks. 
- Policy venues. 
 
- Irrational approach/incrementalism. 
- Newer approaches: mixed scanning and 
garbage-can. 
- Modern approaches: decision-accretion and 
decision-making styles. 






4.1.1 Theorizing decision-shaping 
 
As stated in chapter 3, the EU preference formation stage is about the selection and 
fusion of interests with preferences. As Versluis and her colleagues (2011) observe, 
policy network and sociological studies provide an ideal framework to understand 
and organize better preference formation since it is made of various players which 
compete for their interests, often resulting in a collision course. Thus, the following 
pages focus on the importance of policy networks and policy venues at this stage in 
the decision-making process. 
 
Policy networks  
 
Chapter 3 has examined the relevance of the main EU institutions (the Commission, 
Council and the EP) in which decision-shaping occurs. But as Verluis et. al. (2011: 146) 
observe, the notion of ‘institutions’ should not stop at those main EU institutions but 
should also extend to cover in a more theoretical sense, informal or formal practices, 
rules and norms which are themselves intervening variables in shaping EU policy. 
Policy network analysis is useful because it goes beyond the study of the main EU 
institutions (as autonomous networks in EU decision-shaping containing their own 
administrations) to embrace the importance of other factors which also impact the 
behaviour and preferences of policy players, such as member state governments, in 
shaping EU legislation.    
 
In the EU decision-shaping process, intrastate and interinstitutional bargaining takes 
place in policy networks. As logic dictates, the bigger the networks, the more 
participation of various stakeholders able to influence policy at the shaping stage. As 
Peterson and Bomberg (1999: 23) state:  
 
‘policy networks spring up around specific EU policy sectors, 
marshalling technocratic expertise and seeking to shape policy 
options which are likely to be endorsed by political decision-makers’.  
 
As Heclo (1978) observes, policy networks capture various ‘communities’ that are 
preoccupied by precise issues present on the EU’s agenda. The crux of the matter 
here is that in contrast with national networks, the EU domain consists of complex, 
congested and volatile networks. Within such networks, the participants rotate 
around issues of particular interest to them. Hence, a small state’s government might 




Policy network literature, to be found in the works of Peterson and Rhodes amongst 
others, mainly classifies the different types of relationships between public and 
private entities into two groups. Those that are firmly embedded in ‘policy 
communities’ and others that are looser in nature and which are referred to as ‘issue 
networks’ (Peterson, 2004: 120). Authors such as Olson (1965), Lindblom (1977), 
Rhodes (2006), and Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith (1993), reveal three main types of 
actors involved in such networks - producers, epistemic communities and advocacy 
coalitions.  
 
Having said this, Young (2010) states that there are criticisms of the usefulness of the 
policy network approach that are particular to the EU. Because EU decision-making 
processes are made up of many factors converging together (such as the 
convergence of various interest constellations by a myriad of policy actors), such 
processes cannot be captured by the network concept. But more importantly, Young 
observes that because the EU policy domain is made up of different actors with 
different views of how to address a problem, it becomes impossible for groups to 
draft common positions. He therefore concludes that ‘it is relatively rare to find policy 
communities at EU level… Policy formulation is a relatively open process in the EU… ’ 
(Young, 2010: 55).  
 
However, the literature in favour of the policy network concept perceives it as a 
valuable tool to understand the process of the shaping of EU policy/legislation. In 
fact, one of its greatest assets is in its capacity to draw and advance knowledge and 
expertise in EU processes within which policy solutions are formed to solve given 
issue problems. This is because policy networks bring together ‘other’ participants in 
EU processes (other than for instance EU governments), such as ‘private actors’ 
(including ‘epistemic communities’) with specific expertise and interests involved 
particularly before the official launch of an EU legislative process, i.e. before the 
adoption of draft EU legislation by the Commission. Private actors combine and inject 
interests into the EU process that could be diverse from those held by the member 
state governments thus contributing to the legislative discussion in the long run (see 
Hawkins, 2004: 779-804).  The usefulness of such actors being involved in decision-
shaping is affirmed by Kohler-Koch (1997: 49) who asserts that governments should 
be encouraged to acknowledge private actors being drawn into policy networks 
‘because they provide necessary expertise and because effective implementation 
depends on their support’.  
 
Besides, governments take advantage of policy networks to acquire knowledge about 
specific issues that could possibly arise later in EU legislative negotiations. This 
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therefore proves to be an extremely crucial network particularly for small state 
governments. It is thus not surprising to hear that Permanent Representations of the 
member states in Brussels, for example, ‘often designate advertised access points for 
firms ‘requiring information’ or ‘advice’’ (Wallace and Young, 2003: 239-240). As 
stated, this is particularly useful for smaller administrations with few administrative 
resources and expertise.  
 
However, policy network actors themselves have only a limited impact on exercising 
influence in policy processes, with Peterson and Bomberg (1999: 29) suggesting that 
influence in EU decision-making processes is mainly held by the member state 
governments at all levels in all sectors. Therefore, ‘…most EU policy outcomes are the 
ultimate products of overtly political choices taken by Ministers or MEPs’. But having 
said this, one must not undermine the important role of policy networks during 
shaping phases of EU legislative processes. Policy networks can prove to be 
important for governments to ‘invest in’ and ‘exploit’, particularly during the 




In the same manner that policy networks are important intervening variables in EU 
decision-shaping processes, so are the venues where EU legislative discussions are 
held. As Verluis et. al. (2011: 147) observe, policy venues provide for processes of 
‘socialization’ (in the formation of EU legislation) occurring within specific venues 
afforded by the EU institutional set-up. 
 
Policy venues are not all the same. As Baumgartner and Jones (1991: 1047) observe, 
policy venues differ in terms of their ‘…decisional bias, because both participants and 
decision making routines differ’. Issue problems are perceived according to actor 
preferences and ideas. But they are also shaped according to the peculiarities to be 
found in institutional structures or venues where policy issues are discussed and 
formed. As these authors maintain ‘… committees often represent, in gross terms, 
different approaches or perspectives toward the issue: they are institutionalized 
frames’ (Baumgartner and Jones, 2002: 299) which therefore compartmentalize 
processes. This forms a protective safety net for policy players to discuss issues at 
different venues and decide independently on them, thus inhibiting a confusing state 
of affairs typical of sole venues consisting of several decision-shapers and makers. In 
fact, the multi-level structure which is so typical of the Council is a living example of 
how different policy venues, containing degrees of autonomy from each other, 
discuss, shape and eventually, decide policy issues.  
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Nevertheless, while one of the main attributes of policy venues is structure and 
predictability of policy choice and interests in EU decision-making processes, the 
reverse can apply too. As Simon (1973: 270-271) notes, when policy problems 
emerge high on the EU agenda and exhibit a certain degree of sensitivity for the 
member states, ‘parallel processing capacities become less easy to provide without 
demanding the coordination function that is a primary responsibility of these levels’. 
As a result, when issues which require reconsideration on the part of the policy 
actors shift from one policy venue to another, influence levels change dramatically 
affecting policy choices in the process. This is indeed a relevant point. As Radaelli 
(1995: 158) points out: 
  
‘EU initiatives that fail under one policy frame can become feasible 
under a different frame. The question of how the structure and flow 
of policy issues drive this process and shape the ways in which policy 
choices unfold in the EU therefore requires more systematic 
attention’. 
 
As may be inferred from the above paragraphs, the policy venue perspective is in fact 
linked to a most prominent approach in contemporary EU studies known as new 
institutionalism (NI). Since NI constitutes a relevant approach for this thesis, it is dealt 
with separately in section 4.2.  
 
4.1.2 Theorizing decision-taking 
 
The next pages examine some of the major theoretical variants that may be classified 
under this stage of the policy cycle. It must be made clear that due to word count 
restrictions and because of the very large number of existing approaches about EU 
decision-taking processes, it was impossible to cover them all here. The following 
sub-sections, though brief and concise, are designed to offer sufficient information 
for an understanding of the main approaches on decision-taking.  
 
The ‘irrational’ approach 
 
Until recently, theoretical discourse on decision-taking was ‘hijacked’ by the 
perspectives of two main approaches, the rational and irrational (or incrementalist) 
models. They were the product of studies conducted in the mid-1950s by students of 
public administration on intra-governmental bargaining and bureaucratic politics. 
Since the rational approach is one of the main approaches used by the thesis, it is 
discussed in more detail in section 4.2 and is therefore not focused upon here. 
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In contrast to the rational approach which depicts and assimilates decision-taking as 
a neat process in which every variable of a decision is calculated finely (see section 
4.2.1), another approach (largely attributed to Charles Lindblom) was developed to 
better describe the way decisions are taken in an international setting. The 
‘incremental’, or the ‘irrational’ approach, was widely recognized as being able to 
describe better decision-taking processes. Lindblom (1959: 81) and his 
contemporaries held that decisions should be arrived to by ‘… continually building 
out from the current situation, step-by-step and by small degrees’. Therefore, 
decisions that change current state of affairs should be incremental and should ‘spill-
over’ to future decisions. This in itself is similar to neo-functionalist thinking about EU 
integration more generally. 
 
Incrementalism maintains that decision-taking completely belongs to the political 
domain rather than the technical one where bargaining, negotiation and compromise 
between decision-takers is what determines outcomes rather than finite and 
knowledge-based analysis (see Thomson et. al., 2003: 5-14). As put by Howlett and 
his colleagues (2009: 147), in this model:   
 
‘decisions eventually made represent what is politically feasible 
rather than technically desirable, and what is possible or ‘optimal’ 
rather than ‘maximal’ in the rational model’s meaning of getting the 
most output for the least cost’. 
 
However, critics of this approach such as Forester (1984: 23-31), Dror (1964: 154-
157), Lustick (1980: 342-353), Weiss and Woodhouse (1992: 255-273), and others, 
maintain that incrementalism lacks in goal orientation besides encouraging short-
termism due to its antipathy towards systematic and proper analysis of the technical 
decision-shaping stage. Other criticism brands it as being an undemocratic way of 
taking decisions since it only caters for a select decision-taking group. Besides, as 
Gawthrop (1971) maintains, it is difficult to conclude what presents an actual 
improvement or increment from the decision adopted. 
 
Therefore, by the mid-1980s it became apparent that this approach did not offer a 
prototype of decision-taking processes (Howlett et. al., 2009: 149). This therefore 
made way for newer approaches that in the eye of international and EU scholars, 
presented more accurate characterizations of how decisions are taken in today’s 





Newer approaches: the ‘Mixed-Scanning’ and ‘Garbage-Can’ approaches  
 
The ‘mixed–scanning’ model can be said to have emerged as an attempt to merge 
the rational and incremental models together. This was the view of Etzioni (1967) 
whose mission was to try and salvage these models by extracting their positive 
elements into something that is more up-to-date and realistic about decision-taking 
processes. This model speaks about a search, or better as its name implies, a ‘scan’ 
through various alternatives to a problem issue. This means that a process of careful 
scrutiny of the alternatives takes place which, as previously discussed in this chapter, 
merges the shaping phases of agenda-setting and preference formation (which 
identify, assess and frame a problem) with the decision-taking phase. At the end of 
this process, the potentially viable alternative is chosen. This ‘theoretical 
compromise’ allows for ‘more innovation than permitted by the incremental model, 
without imposing the unrealistic demands prescribed by the rational model’ (Howlett 
et. al., 2009: 150).  
 
However, although this model was commended by public policy academics, it was 
quickly set aside for other models that were considered closer in their approach to 
the realistic nature of decision-making processes (See Walker and Marchau, 2004: 1-
4). One such approach is the so called ‘garbage-can’ process which mainly believes in 
a degree of improvisation on the part of policy actors in the decision-taking stage of 
the policy process. Contrary to the rational view, proponents of this model (March 
and Olsen, 1979; and Cohen, 1972) held that when political problems or issues 
emerge, there is not enough time for mature reflection and calculation of one’s ideas 
and interests. In fact, many times new issues cannot be linked with pre-existing 
interests. As already stated, this requires decision-takers to improvise. Decisions are 
thus taken on an ad-hoc basis and are too random to be rational or incremental. 
Peterson (2001: 305) maintains that: 
 
 ‘it is frequently impossible for actors to stockpile all necessary 
information, process it in real time, and accurately calculate the 
probabilities for different likely outcomes in a process … that is often 
highly unpredictable’.  
 
Cohen, March and Olsen (1972: 1-25) compare decision-taking processes with: 
 
‘a garbage can into which various problems and solutions are 
dumped by participants. The mix of garbage in a single can depends 
partly on the labels attached to the alternative cans; but it also 
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depends on what garbage is being produced at the moment, on the 
mix of cans available, and on the speed with which garbage is 
collected and removed from the scene’.  
 
This approach had been praised as a bold model to illustrate that there is nothing 
scientific about decision-taking as such, something that earlier models implied, and 
that decision-takers more often than not enter negotiations without any end-goals 
set:  
 
‘actors simply define goals and choose means as they go along in a 
policy process that is necessarily contingent and unpredictable’. 
(Howlett et. al., 2009: 152)  
 
The thesis, although agreeing with this statement up to a certain degree, maintains 
that member state governments bargain over issues through pre-set preferences 
which, during the shaping phase of EU decision-making, start to perceive possible 
positive end games for themselves (to be achieved during decision-taking). It is a 
credible hypothesis that EU governments with such aptitude and propensity should 
be in a better position to influence EU decision-making uploading pre-set preferences 
into EU processes. This last argument might be good news for the administrations of 
the smaller member states which, due to a lack of resources, generally require more 
time than their larger counterparts to evaluate the impact of legislative shifts in EU 
negotiations. 
  
Modern Approaches: ‘decision accretion’ and ‘decision-making styles’ 
 
As stated, the EU is a very complex venue of how decisions are shaped and made and 
it is thus extremely difficult to come across a single approach that heuristically 
illustrates decision-making in the EU. However, the ‘decision accretion’ model offers 
another very close-to-real depiction of decision-making processes in the EU.  
 
The strong point of this model is to be found mainly in its reliance on the nature of 
the decision itself and on the institutional set-up in which decisions are made. That is, 
contrary to other models already referred to, it rests lightly on bargaining theory 
which as seen occurs to the detriment of constructive arguing. Weiss (1980) observes 
that decisions are mainly the fruit of unclear processes which do not occur 
simultaneously in the same venue. In the manner a pearl is formed in an oyster, i.e. 
through various layers being accrued and deposited over a certain period of time, the 
same could be said about decision-taking in the EU. As already argued in chapter 3, 
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decision-making in the EU encompasses several policy players at multi-levels and in 
multiple venues, each having interests which comply or conflict with those held by 
others and which ultimately need to decide over a policy/legislative issue (see 
Scharpf, 1997; Naurin and Wallace, 2010; and Hooghe and Marks, 2001). This is also 
known as multi-level governance which is focused upon in section 4.2 below. 
 
As Wallace and Young (2003: 239-240) observe: 
 
 ‘iteration of policy-making between levels and phases is typical in 
the EU making it difficult at times to visualize a clear cut-off point 
between the explicitly more pluralist forms of participation, evident 
in the shaping of agendas and in pre-negotiation in and around the 
Commission, and the more exclusivist predominance of mandated 
national representatives in the Council, in an ‘intergovernmental’ 
phase of negotiation and decision. Instead the two phases shade 
into each other, with persistent variations in participation and 
activity by a range of actors, and with opportunities recurring to 
shape and to reshape the definition and resolution of issues’.8  
 
Besides, Weiss (1980: 399) maintains that very often, due to the complexity of the 
issue and the amount of decision-makers involved, individuals do not even 
apprehend when decisions are actually taken. She states that:  
 
‘many people in many offices have a say, and when the outcomes of 
a course of action are uncertain, many participants have 
opportunities to propose, plan, confer, deliberate, advise, argue, 
forward policy statements, reject, revise, veto, and re-write’. 
 
This means that in the realm of EU decision-making, there are many opportunities for 
players to influence and strategize ways of pulling a decision towards their 
preferences. 
  
Forester’s ‘decision-making styles’ is another approach that can be seen to have 
moved beyond the traditional approaches discussed earlier. According to this model, 
‘what is rational for administrators to do depends on the situations in which they 
work’. Forester (1984: 23-31) observed that there are five types of decision-making 
styles which he named as follows: optimization, satisfycing, search, bargaining and 
organizational. According to him, only once all of these distinct styles of decision-
making are met is a decision rational. 
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Nevertheless, while Weiss’s and Forester’s work marked key innovations, they were 
only a primary move away from earlier models of decision-making. In fact as March 
(1994), Beach and Mitchell (1978), and Bendor and Hammond (1992), amongst 
others observe, it is the complexity of the policy subsystem, made up of various 
policy players in various policy venues, that affects the manner decisions are made. 
This means that decision-shaping and taking stages are intrinsically linked in a 
decision-making process as defined earlier in chapter 3. Indeed, the decision-taking 
stage is thus impacted by various aspects emerging from the preference formation 
stage which are rolled-over to decision-taking. But it is also affected by other 
complexities with which decision-takers operate. Forester (1984: 23) maintains that 
decision-takers depend: 
  
‘on the situations in which they work…what is reasonable to do 
depends on the context one is in, in ordinary life no less than in 
public administration’.  
  
4.2 Three main theoretical approaches used in the thesis 
 
As previously stated, the thesis is based on the premise about the value of applying 
differing theoretical approaches to the study of EU decision-making - this has in fact 
been the basis of the examination of differing approaches in section 4.1. 
Nevertheless, the thesis puts forward the argument that there are three approaches 
of utmost importance when applied to the study of EU decision-making and the 
influence of EU member state governments within it. These are the following:  
 
- Rational choice theory 
- New institutionalism (NI) 
- Multi-level governance (MLG) 
 
The following sub-sections deal specifically with these approaches clarifying that, 
although competing with each other (since each model has its own theoretical belief 
about which independent variable is most relevant in EU decision-making), when 
applied together, they seem to maintain more explanatory value about EU decision-
making (and all that it entails) than other models. The thesis therefore perceives 
these approaches as ideal theoretical pieces for the EU decision-making puzzle, 






4.2.1 Rational choice theory 
 
The rational model depicts and assimilates decision-taking in political processes to 
that found in a market. As Howlett et. al. (2009: 144) state, decision-taking in the 
policy process may be compared to the market economy where the behaviour of 
producers and consumers depends on minimizing costs and maximizing benefits. This 
model sees decision-making as a process whereby problems are identified, solutions 
and various alternatives found and listed, and predictions of each alternative and 
their probable consequences approximated. This means that for the rational model, 
decision-making is a sequential and neat process in which every variable of a decision 
is to be calculated finely. Therefore, EU policy players such as member state 
governments want to be certain about the maximization of the results that their 
choice will bring with outcomes reflecting an exact and rational course of action. 
They will thus follow their objectives guiding them in the manner on how to behave 
when making choices and taking decisions. At the end of this process, the alternative 
with the highest probability of achieving their calculated goal is to be selected.  
 
For the rational approach, the decision taken reflects an exact and rational course of 
action. As maintained by Edwards (1954: 380-417), the rational model dictates that in 
choosing one alternative from another, decision-takers want to be certain about the 
maximization of the results that their choice will bring.  
 
Since the thesis focuses on EU member state governmental influence in EU decision-
making processes, it is relevant to indicate Liberal Intergovernmentalism (LI) as one of 
the rational model’s derivatives. This is because LI perceives national governments as 
important players (in their own right) within EU decision-making processes. 
According to Moravcsik and Nicolaidis (1999: 60), LI is made up of three components: 
  
- Issue-specific interdependence that explains national preferences;  
- bargaining based on assymetrical interdependence (the core of mainstream 
 bargaining theory); and  
- institutional choice based on the need for credible commitments.  
 
As Moravcsik (1998) observes, these components by themselves do not constitute a 
general or grand theory of European integration. However, when applied together, LI 
constitutes an important theoretical tool to the study of national interest formation 
during international negotiations, or as in the case of the thesis, during 




According to Moravcsik and Nicolaidis (1999: 83), a rationalist theoretical account of 
interstate bargaining and institutional choice rests on the hypotheses that: 
 
‘… states develop preferences based on issue-specific concerns 
about policy externalities; bargain to achieve substantive outcomes 
on the basis of asymmetrical interdependence, with little role for 
supranational entrepreneurs; and choose to delegate sovereignty to 
international institutions where necessary to enhance the credibility 
of commitments’. 
 
Therefore, there is no room for institutional impacts to occur in a process in which 
governments are by far the main important variables in EU decision-making. 
  
The main problem with such a rational approach is that it may be perceived as being 
unrealistic and not fitting the way decisions are truly taken in a multi-level, complex 
system as that found in the EU. Scholars such as Herbert Simon and others 
maintained that in decision-making it is impossible to achieve full rationality because 
of various factors such as the lack of organization in negotiations made up of differing 
policy players, a lack of time to properly evaluate a given situation, and other 
elements. As issues emerge suddenly in a negotiation, they have to be acted upon 
quickly implying a degree of improvisation from the part of decision-shapers and 
takers alike (which is in line with the garbage-can approach discussed earlier). In fact, 
many times and contrary to what the rationalist view maintains, new issues cannot 
be linked with pre-existing interests. 
  
Furthermore, other approaches such as social constructivism criticize rational 
approaches as being too bluntly rational (and hence logical) in the way they try to 
explain certain processes. This is mainly because rational explanations do not give 
due importance to values and norms of anything being studied. Hence, in EU 
decision-making processes, social constructivism gives weight to individuals bringing 
with them certain norms, ideas and culture that impact on the way decisions are 
shaped and eventually taken. According to these kind of sociological approaches, it is 
therefore not enough to base raw cost/benefit calculations of what decisions to take 
and of what is desirable and not. 
 
Nevertheless, when applied to the thesis’s subject matter, a rational model does 
provide an account of how actors, such as EU member state governments in Council, 
act rationally to further and achieve their own political interests. EU governments are 
thus perceived as self-minded policy players who take part in EU legislative 
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negotiations with the sole objective of prevailing in uploading their interests into the 
EU process. This very much sums up the daily workings of governments involved in 
legislative negotiations in the Council at multi-levels, i.e. Working Group, Coreper and 
Council of Ministers (already discussed at length in chapter 3). 
 
Therefore, a rationalist account of interstate bargaining (such as negotiations 
between the EU member states in Council) places EU member state governments as 
the central pieces of EU decision-making with little, or no scope (and influence), for 
other policy players (such as the EU institutions) in such processes. As previously 
emphasized, there is thus no room for institutional impacts to occur to a process in 
which governments are by far the main variables in EU decision-making.  
 
As is observed in the next sub-section, rational choice theory is in important respects 
very different to what the new institutional approach has to say about influence in 
EU decision-making and of how decisions are shaped and taken in the EU. 
 
4.2.2 New institutionalism 
 
As previously discussed in chapter 3, processes of EU decision-shaping and decision-
taking occur in precise institutional settings (the Council and the EP). It is thus 
necessary to conceptualize the important role that EU institutions have as venues in 
which legislative negotiations take place.  
 
New institutionalism has emerged as a relevant theoretical approach in 
contemporary mainstream European studies to understand institutional effects on 
EU decision-making (see, for example, Stone Sweet and Sandholtz, 1998: 1-26). For 
instance, Armstrong and Bulmer (1998) state that it offers powerful diagnostic tools 
for understanding systemic level EU decision-making while Peterson and Bomberg 
(1999: 17) believe that it ‘shed(s) light on bitterly fought battles for institutional 
advantage between the Council, EP and the Commission’. Of relevance, they assert 
that: 
  
‘…above all, a new institutionalist analysis of the EU reveals that the 
Union’s common institutions are often more than mere arbiters in 
the decision-making process, and have become key players in their 
own right’.  
 
In fact, EU member state governments, aware of this, lobby the EU institutions as 
much as they do each other, something which is empirically examined in subsequent 
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chapters of the thesis. This last point is particularly important for smaller state 
governments that recognize the importance of lobbying EU institutions, such as the 
Commission and the EP, to gain more influence in decision-making processes in 
Council. As is stated in the next chapter (when examining issue-specific power and 
policy frames), EU institutions provide governments with opportunities to widen 
legislative discussions, particularly in the formation stages. 
 
As Aspinwall and Schneider (2011) note, institutions involve the use of rules, norms 
and practices that influence the behaviour of policy players in EU decision-making 
processes. In the EU, this may be illustrated clearly through examination of the 
Council’s QMV decision-making rule (explained in chapter 3). Member state 
governments must build coalitions under such a voting mechanism if their interests 
are to prevail in a legislative process. This means that the Council’s QMV regime ‘has 
turned out to have a profound impact on the strategic behaviour of national 
governments in EU policy shaping’ (Versluis et. al., 2011: 146). Pollack (2003: 85) also 
states that under QMV, a Commission’s legislative proposal is easier to adopt than to 
amend (although in reality, it is extremely rare if not fictitious to think of the Council 
and the EP adopting a Commission proposal without any changes having been made 
first), unlike with unanimous voting where member state governments can veto and 
block the adoption of a legislative act. The gist here is that EU governments in Council 
are, of course, aware of such institutional rules which have a direct impact on their 
strategic behaviour during negotiations.   
 
The new institutional approach has undergone various forms of mutations. In fact, 
theoretical study of institutions now comes in various strands which, according to 
Versluis et. al. (2011: 93) include the following: 
  
- Historical institutionalism (see Pierson, 1996), 
- Rational choice institutionalism (of which a main derivative is the ‘principal-
 agent’ approach; see Farrell and Héritier, 2005),  
- Social constructivist institutionalism (see Checkel and Moravcsik, 2001; Zürn 
and Checkel, 2005), and  
- Actor-centered institutionalism (see Scharpf, 1997).  
 
Due to the thesis’s prime interest in examining governmental influence in EU 
decision-making, there are some of the above listed strands of new institutionalism 
which are more valuable than others. Most particularly, the principal-agent model 
(which is a strand of rational choice institutionalism – see Versluis et. al., 2011: 146-
147) may be applied to the Council to understand the emergence and development 
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of Coreper as a politically delegated body to prepare legislative negotiations for the 
ministers. This process lead to an inevitable loss of power or control of EU member 
state governments (at political level) to an irreversible process that they themselves 
instilled. This is better known as ‘institutional drift’ or ‘path dependency’ which 
means that once decisions are made at EU-level, it is very difficult to back-track. 
Hence, path dependency gets locked in. This latter concept may also be applied to 
the manner by which the EU itself developed. Principal-agent models thus derive 
from institutional norms and practices which therefore, also impact the decision-
shaping and taking of EU legislative outcomes. 
 
Another strand of new institutionalism (of relevance to the thesis) is the social 
constructivist variant, which focuses on the sociological perspectives of institutions. 
Versluis and her colleagues (2011: 147) provide an example of this strand of thought 
through the general commitment of Council members towards consensus. In Council, 
formal voting is hardly ever used except in those cases where consensus cannot be 
reached, which is rare. As these authors state, government representatives in Council 
‘assign more weight to arguments put forward by colleagues enjoying considerable 
expertise in the subject at hand, and comparatively less to those whose arguments 
might be reinforced by a perceived political weight (and therefore a rationalist 
explanation)’. As they state, this represents ‘good news for experts from the smaller 
member states’ during the formation stages in a legislative decision–making process. 
 
Checkel (2001) notes the usefulness of social values, observing that institutions which 
play a decisive role in EU decision-making encapsulate a process of socialization 
which is determined by the type of institutional venue in which policy players meet. 
Such venues, such as Council Working Groups, allow member state government 
representatives to meet regularly, permitting the sharing of policy information and 
the exchange of national positions. This occurs in the midst of consensus building 
which makes formal voting in Council unnecessary and superfluous. Moreover, 
institutions instill certain norms in decision-making processes since institutions 
themselves maintain their own rules (for instance, one is able to cite the Council’s 
rules of procedure - Council Decision 2006/683/EC, OJ L 285 Final). Therefore, 
institutional venues too have an impact on preference formation and, in the long run, 
on decision-taking too. 
 
Therefore, examining the EU decision-making process without any weight given to 
the relevance of the EU institutions cannot be complete. One must always bear in 
mind institutional dynamics existing in EU legislative negotiations, whether in an 
intergovernmental or supranational setting. The new institutional approach 
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addresses this last point. As seen, it provides for certain institutional dynamics such 
as interinstitutional co-operation occurring at EU level, the informality existing in EU 
decision-making processes (such as voting procedures used in the Council), amongst 
others, which set the pace for compromises to be reached in the EU. This thus helps 
depict a true picture of how EU legislative negotiations occur in the Council (and the 
EP). Consequently, institutions of various sorts - and not only one-sided, self 
interested governments - also matter and must be factored-in in a study examining 
EU small state governmental influence in EU decision-making processes. 
 
4.2.3 Multi-level governance 
 
As previously emphasized in chapter 3, the EU’s mode of governance is rather unique 
in the world order. Proponents such as Hooghe and Marks (2001) perceived the EU as 
a new domestic polity consisting not only of multi-players but, more importantly, of a 
mode of governance at different or multi-levels. Therefore, for those in favour of this 
approach, EU decision-making processes function in a complex web of 
interconnected institutions at the supranational, national, and subnational levels of 
government.  
 
As Stephenson (2013: 817) observes about multi-level governance (MLG), ‘its most 
vital feature is the linkage that connect levels’. MLG has in fact gained importance in 
modern European political studies as a concept offering ‘a palatable, easily digestible 
paradigm for grasping how the EU works in practice’ (ibid). This last citation explains 
why MLG is also perceived as a ‘perspective’ besides (or rather than) being an 
‘approach’ that opens the EU to a wide variety of theories of politics (for instance, 
see Jachtenfuchs, 2001: 245-264). In short, MLG has now become part of the 
'mainstream' of conceptual/theoretical work on the EU. 
 
Contrary to state-centrist approaches, MLG accepts national governments as relevant 
participants in EU policy-making without however recognizing their absolute control 
over the shaping and taking of decisions at EU (supranational) level especially in 
those policy spheres that have been ‘Communitarized’ (a process by which policy 
spheres are shifted away from national to EU competence – see Title I of the TFEU on 
categories and areas of Union competence). Proponents of the MLG approach (see 
Hooghe and Marks, 2001; Pagoulatos and Tsoukalis, 2012: 62-75; and Stephenson, 
2013: 817-837; amongst others) in fact observe that control has slipped away from 
national governments in Council at EU level towards other legislative players such as 
the supranational EU institutions of the Commission and the EP. According to this 
approach, the loss of EU member state control over legislative processes in the EU 
88 
 
cannot be more pronounced than the shift in voting in Council from unanimity to 
QMV (which has occurred in most EU policy spheres with the consequence that 
member state government’s have lost the power to veto a legislative proposal) and 
the increase in legislative power of the EP as an equal co-legislator (with the Council).  
 
State-centrists such as Moravcsik however counter that majoritarianism in the 
Council ‘camouflages, rather than undermines state sovereignty’ (Hooghe and Marks, 
2001: 5). For instance, the fact that governments may invoke the Luxembourg 
compromise whenever they are outvoted in Council by QMV on matters of 
fundamental importance to them is testimony of the control that governments 
maintain over the process. However, as Hooghe and Marks emphasize, the 
Luxembourg compromise is ‘a relatively blunt weapon’ which is available under 
limited conditions and in so far as the other governments in Council are willing to 
accept it. Besides, it is hardly used and if it is, its rate of success may vary 
considerably. As Nugent (1999: 169) observes, the Luxembourg compromise is ‘… 
subject only to occasional and largely ineffective awakenings’.  
 
National governments have also lost ‘some form of authoritative control over 
individuals in their respective territories’ (Hooghe and Marks, 2001: 2) where the 
bridge linking the sub-national and supranational levels has now been built with the 
result that the national level may by-passed. As Pagoulatos and Tsoukalis explain, 
sub-national actors ‘have established their own channels of communication, such as 
an autonomous Brussels representation or collaboration with pan-European lobbying 
groups’ (2012: 62). This means that such actors can no longer be easily ‘controlled’ by 
national governments ’assuming a life of their own in order to promote interests and 
preferences often diverging from those of national governments’ (ibid: 62-63). In 
short, the MLG approach suggests that national governments can no longer 
automatically decide for themselves but may be bypassed by subgroups (local 
governments and interest groups for instance) and executive bureaucracies (see 
Hooghe and Marks, 2001). 
 
Therefore, and of vital importance to the thesis’s subject matter on small state 
governmental influence in EU decision-making, the MLG approach opens the door for 
public and private interests (and therefore more players than perceived by the 
rational choice and new institutional approaches) to enter EU decision-making 
processes. The crux of the matter here is that even though the thesis focuses on 
small EU state governments in EU legislative decision-making processes, one must 
bear in mind that other players having their own agendas may also attempt to 
influence such processes. Therefore, in a similar manner to what was stated above, 
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policy players (other than governments and the EU institutions themselves) in the 
sub-national level of EU governance also matter and must be borne in mind when 
examining EU decision-making.  
 
However, as previously emphasized (see chapter 2, sub-section 2.1.2), the thesis is 
fully focused on examining the influence of one type of policy player, i.e. 
governments, and more precisely, that of Malta’s government in specific EU decision-
making processes. As the empirical research reveals, the thesis focuses very much on 
EU decision-making processes at the EU (supranational) level, i.e. in the Council of 
the EU (and in the EP), and less on the national and sub-national levels. Besides, as 
Hooghe and Marks (2001: 24) observe, ‘Multi-level governance is prominent in the 
implementation stage’ of the policy cycle, i.e. the stage dealing with ‘downloading’ 
processes which as previously stated in chapter 3 (see sub-section 3.2.1) is not being 
dealt with by the thesis.  
 
It is therefore relevant to keep in mind that although the MLG approach is applied in 
the empirical chapters of the thesis, it is applied only partially and in so far as the 
empirical case studies are pitched at the supranational level. For this reason it will 
not assume as much importance in the thesis as the other two approaches dealt with 
previously.  
 
Having said this, MLG still represents another relevant approach for the thesis to 
explain how EU decision-making truly functions in the EU. In short, not only one-
sided, self interested governments matter. Supranational EU institutions such as the 
Commission and the EP which function in a multi-level governance style must also be 





It is worth underlining, in a similar way that Panke (2010) does, limitations of all the 
theoretical approaches presented in this chapter to individually address directly the 
thesis’s main area of study, i.e. small state governments and their exercise of 
influence in EU decision-making processes.  
 
This has already been partly covered in chapter 2 which laid the theoretical 
background for the emergence of small state studies and how this has developed 
over the years (see section 2.2). It highlighted how the study of small states is 
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entrenched in three main strands in IR theory, namely realism (later neo-realism), 
liberalism (neoliberal institutionalism), and social constructivism. 
 
As observed by Panke (2010: 11), there is indeed a gap about insights on small states’ 
negotiation behaviour in the EU: 
 
 ‘We do not have a comprehensive knowledge about which small 
states are most likely and which are least likely to participate 
actively in EU negotiations to make their voices heard and under 
which conditions small states succeed in influencing European 
policies’. 
  
Because of this, Panke relies generally on IR theory in her study on small state 
influence in the EU as the best possible approach providing building blocks for her 
research to build upon. As repeatedly stressed throughout this chapter and as Panke 
maintains, it is difficult to attribute a single approach to the understanding of such a 
complex process. Rather, it is more adept to try and understand this process through 
the use of various approaches each having something important to say about it.  
 
Other authors with similar thoughts are Nugent, Hix, and Sandholtz amongst others. 
Nugent (2010: 443) observes that: 
 
‘There may be no one body of work that has been able to capture and 
explain all aspects of European integration and the EU reality, but 
that is only to be expected’. 
 
While Hix (1998: 46) maintains that ‘there is no general theory of American or 
German government, so why should there be one of the EU?’. And lastly, Sandholtz 
(1996: 426) affirms that ‘different kinds of theories are appropriate for different 
pieces of the EU puzzle’. 
 
Therefore, when applied separately, approaches such as those illustrated in previous 
sections in this chapter have their limitations in not being able to directly address 
differences in ‘levels of capacity’ of the member states engaged in an EU decision-
making negotiation. They simply do not delve deep enough to bestow an accurate 
and vivid picture about differences in member state influence in EU decision-making.  
 
Indeed, the thesis follows this line of thought. Thus, different theoretical approaches 
should be looked at as complimentary to one another, as it were assisting each other 
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to come to terms with highly demanding and complex aspects such as those present 
in EU decision-making processes.  
 
As previously indicated in this chapter, this thesis relies particularly on three main 
theoretical approaches: rational choice theory, new institutionalism, and multi-level 
governance. When applied together, they become suitable theoretical lenses or tools 
needed to explain and clarify such a complex political phenomenon. They in fact 
bestow a precise perspective of how decision-making truly occurs in the EU, i.e. of 
which policy players are involved (the governments of the EU member states and the 
EU institutions as rational players in a new institutional setting) and on how it 
functions (a system of governance known as multi-level governance). Together, they 
therefore form part of the same theoretical puzzle on clarifying governmental 
influence in EU decision-making.  
 
In short, both a rationalist account about different governmental representatives 
depicted as self-interested, strategically calculating actors in Council and in a multi-
level EU decision-making process and a new institutional approach (once again in a 
MLG setting) depict a clear and true picture of what EU decision-making processes 
involve and of how they function. 
 
One last issue to be borne in mind is that these three main theoretical approaches 
are returned to in the thesis’s concluding chapter (see chapter 11) when tying 












Chapter 5  
Conceptualizing notions of power and influence in the EU 




This chapter provides a conceptualization of governmental power and influence in EU 
legislative decision-making processes. It therefore focuses on the central theme of 
the thesis, i.e. governmental capacities and strategies in EU processes. Chapter 5 is 
divided into four main sections.  
 
Section 5.1 follows on from chapter 2 which drew attention to notions of power, 
influence and governmental capacities of states in mainstream International 
Relations (IR) theory. Chapter 2 has in fact already provided a theoretical setting for 
the manner by which the study of small states developed - it presented a theoretical 
framework to explain the review of the evolution of small state literature in line with 
the three approaches of realism, liberalism and constructivism (see section 2.2). 
Section 5.1 continues this discussion further by clarifying key terms in relation to 
governmental ‘capacities’. It does this by focusing on two main strands of thought, 
i.e. pluralism and Marxism/capitalism. Work such as that by Lukes (2005) forms the 
backbone to this discussion. 
 
While section 5.2 provides a theoretical conceptualization of the EU as a political 
space dimension centering on the importance of interests, ideas and issues in EU 
processes, section 5.3 focuses on small state governmental ‘strategies’. It presents a 
typology of governmental strategies as tools to influence EU legislative negotiations. 
These strategies are returned to and examined empirically in Part II of the thesis. 
Finally, section 5.4 provides a conclusion. 
 
5.1 Governmental capacities: pluralism versus power inequality 
 
Before moving the discussion forward, it is necessary to air preliminary views on 
notions of power and influence that involve clarifying questions such as: what makes 
states powerful and influential in the international community? More precisely, what 
makes EU member state governments powerful to influence EU decision-making 
processes? And how do they influence these processes and what strategies do they 
adopt in attempting to do this?  
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Michael Hill (1997: 41) asserts that if one is to understand what occurs in a policy 
process, it must first be linked to the power structure of a society within a state. He 
claims that: 
  
‘policy is the product of the exercise of political influence, 
determining what the state does and setting limits to what it does’.  
 
But how is one to define a government’s exercise of political influence in the context 
of a policy process involving more than one government? Therefore, knowledge on 
different views about what is meant by this and about defining and investigating 
power exercised by governments in decision-making processes is necessary to obtain 
an understanding about notions of power and influence in the EU. 
 
Like many political scientists and sociologists interested in this topic, Lukes (2005) 
discusses the controversy about power in society and maps out the classical debate 
between two main strands of thought on this topic, i.e. pluralism versus other 
theories about structured power inequalities, such as ‘capitalism’ (finding its roots in 
Karl Marx’s ideology about power) and ‘elitism’. Lukes defines this debate as 
pertaining to two main power dimensions with a third view emerging about power 
relations between actors. As Lukes (2005: 16) observes, the third view:  
 
‘allows one to give a deeper and more satisfactory analysis of power 
relations than either of the other two dimensions’.  
 
The next sub-sections discuss separately these three dimensions. 
 
5.1.1 Pluralism as a ‘one-dimensional view’ of power 
 
An analysis of power finds its proper roots in Weber’s ideology. For Dahl and other 
political scientists mainly active in the 1960s and 70s, such as Polsby (1963), 
Wolfinger (1971a, 1971b) and Merelman (1968a, 1968b), this ideology represented a 
starting block in their views about power – an approach which is labeled pluralist. 
Since most of these pluralists were studying the US system, for them power was to 
be distributed pluralistically in the US political system as a whole. Lukes identifies 
their approach as ‘the one-dimensional view’ which defines power as involving ‘a 
focus on behaviour in the making of decisions on issues over which there is an 
observable conflict of (subjective) interests, seen as express policy preferences, 
revealed by political participation’ (Lukes, 2005: 19). 
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In this sense, Dahl (1957) came up with a power conception defining power as 
follows: 
  
‘A has power over B to the extent that he can get B to do something 
that B would not otherwise do’ (Dahl, 1957 in Bell et. al., 1969: 80).  
 
This is a zero-sum conception, i.e. if one policy player gains power, the other loses it 
(see Hooghe and Marks, 2001: 5). However, in the same article, Dahl re-defines 
power as:  
 
‘… to involve a successful attempt by A to get a to do something he 
would not otherwise do’ (emphasis added in underlined text). 
 
The difference between the two power conceptions/dimensions is that in the latter 
case, Dahl refers to power as the result to be achieved, i.e. a successful one. Lukes 
(2005: 17) differentiates the two by referring to the first definition as capacity bound 
while the other as being actual rather than potential.  
 
Of interest to this thesis is Dahl’s method of classifying participants’ successes or 
defeats in a policy process which enables one to determine governmental influence 
(Dahl, 1967: 336). This approach is being applied today by various contemporary 
authors. For instance Bunse (2009) adopts this approach to classify the overall 
performance of small state Council Presidencies. As is illustrated in chapter 6, this 
quantitative method of scoring/classifying participants’ successes or defeats is similar 
to the one adopted by this thesis (the ‘decision weights and measures’ approach – 
see sub-section 6.5.2). 
 
Further examination of the pluralists vision on power leads one to portray it as an 
attempt: 
 
‘…to study specific outcomes in order to determine who actually 
prevails in community decision-making’ (Polsby 1963: 113).  
 
Polsby (1963: 121) specifies that one:  
 
‘should study actual behavior, either at first hand or by reconstructing 
behavior from documents, informants, newspapers, and other 




Therefore the emphasis here is clearly not on potential behaviour but more on actual 
and observable behaviour by successful policy players in decision-making processes. 
Merelman (1968a: 451) sums it up best when he states that pluralists: 
 
 ‘studied actual behavior, stressed operational definitions, and turned 
up evidence… it seemed to produce reliable conclusions which met 
the canons of science’. 
 
Hence, pluralists conceive power as intentional and active, their main research 
questions being: how much power do the relevant actors have with respect to 
selected key issues in a particular setting, key issues being those that affect large 
numbers of citizens? And who prevails in decision-making situations? Therefore, 
pluralism is interested in:  
 
‘the frequency of who wins and loses in respect of such issues, that 
is, who prevails in decision-making situations. Those situations are 
situations of conflict between interests, where interests are 
conceived as overt preferences, revealed in the political arena by 
political actors taking policy stands or by lobbying groups, and the 
exercise of power consists in overcoming opposition, that is, 
defeating contrary preferences.’ (Lukes, 2005: 5) 
    
The pluralist ideology thus maintains that conflicts exist over issues and that these 
conflicts are the result of differing policy preferences between actors. In sum, 
without conflicts, it is therefore extremely difficult to measure power and influence.  
 
5.1.2 Criticism of pluralism - a ‘second-dimensional view’ of power 
 
Parallel to the development of pluralism, another ideology emerged from the 1960s 
that criticized pluralism as being too simple, superficial, restrictive and complacent. 
For authors such as Walker (1966), Morriss (1972) and Domhoff (1978), pluralist 
thinking was too simplistic and unrealistic. They all maintained reservations on its 
descriptive accuracy. Hill (1997: 41) clarifies that:  
 
‘pluralism was in the first place an adaption of nineteenth-
century individualist thinking, which had to be modified to 
recognize that in a complex society citizens relate to the state 




Two of the main proponents of this view, Bachrach and Baratz (1962, 1970), labelled 
the pluralist approach as ‘restrictive’, maintaining that power has another dimension 
to it. Although agreeing that power and influence is about, and reflected in, concrete 
decisions as well as in shaping dynamics influencing the taking of those decisions, 
these authors re-visit and add on to the power theorem discussed above. They claim 
that decision-making power is also about the limiting of the process, i.e. that 
influence is also manifest in the limiting of scope ‘of the political process to public 
consideration of only those issues which are comparatively innocuous to A’. Lukes 
(2005: 6) illustrates their second face of power as follows: 
  
‘power was not solely reflected in concrete decisions… some person 
or association could limit decision-making to relatively non-
controversial matters, by influencing community values and political 
procedures and rituals, notwithstanding that there are in the 
community serious but latent power conflicts.’ 
 
According to this second face of power, possessing power and influence signifies also 
a capacity to pacify policy conflicts and not just to prevail as a winner in decision-
making processes (as mainly held by the pluralists). As Bachrach and Baratz (1970: 8) 
state: 
 
‘to the extent that a person or group – consciously or unconsciously 
– creates or reinforces barriers to the public airing of policy conflicts, 
that person or group has power’. 
  
Their ideology is in line with Schattschneider’s (1960: 71) hypothesis about policy 
preferences in a wider power debate that: 
  
‘All forms of political organization have a bias in favor of the 
exploitation of some kinds of conflict and the suppression of others 
because organization is the mobilization of bias. Some issues are 
organized into politics while others are organized out’.  
 
And as Schattschneider (1957: 937) observes: 
 
‘the definition of the alternatives is the supreme instrument of 
power… because the definition of the alternatives is the choice of 




As stated in chapter 3, this has to do with the decision-shaping stages (i.e. agenda-
setting and preference formation) in a policy process, with agenda-setting leading to 
preference formation focused upon by pluralist ideology.  
 
As Lukes points out, Bachrach and Baratz merge two distinct features within their 
neo-elitist conceptualization of power. First, it refers to all forms of successful control 
by A over B. Second, it secures compliance through the threat of sanctions. 
Therefore, their ideology about power and influence has to do with various sub-
forms such as coercion, authority, force and manipulation (Lukes 2009: 21). Influence 
is thus defined as being manifest when: 
 
‘[A], without resorting to either a tacit or an overt threat of severe 
deprivation, causes [B] to change his course of action’ (Bachrach and 
Baratz, 1970: 30). 
  
As Lukes (2005: 22) points out, the central difference between their definition and 
that of the pluralists’ is that the latter overly emphasize ‘the importance of initiating, 
deciding, and vetoing’ and ‘takes no account of the fact that power may be … 
exercised by confining the scope of decision-making to relatively “safe” issues’. 
Therefore, one will see that the second face of power introduces the element of non-
behaviour, or as the proponents themselves maintain, of nondecision-making. In 
sum, the second-dimensional view of power recognizes both worlds of decision-
taking and nondecision-taking (Lukes, 2005: 22) and defines a decision as ‘a choice 
among alternative modes of action’ and a nondecision as one that ‘suppresses or 
thwarts a latent or manifest challenge to the values or interests of the decision-
maker’ (Bachrach and Baratz, 1970: 39-44).  
 
Similar to the pluralists’ view about power in decision-making, neo-elitists such as 
Bachrach and Baratz suggest that power in nondecision-making can only emerge 
when there is conflict occurring. Therefore, like the pluralists (discussed in the 
previous sub-section), neo-elitists also adopt a behavioural approach. However, neo-
elitists go one step further than pluralists by also including in their analysis 
behavioural preferences of those not only assumed to be in a political process, but 
also those ‘outside’ it.  
 
5.1.3 Multivariate approaches - a ‘third-dimensional view’ of power 
 
The main contribution by the third dimension is in its recognition of different forms 
of behaviour other than those prescribed by the first two views. In fact, this view 
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refers to a third type of conflict, or better, a latent conflict, other than overt and 
covert types of conflicts mentioned previously. According to Lukes (2005: 28), a 
latent conflict consists in: 
 
‘… a contradiction between the interests of those exercising power 
and the real interests of those they exclude. These latter may not 
express or even be conscious of their interests…’. 
 
Therefore, in a latent conflict, the players exercising power will manage to thwart the 
real interests of those weaker players by excluding them from the political or 
decision-making process. Chapter 2 has already discussed how small states, for 
reasons mainly related to their size, face certain vulnerabilities which might put them 
at such risks.  
 
The main gist here is about the bias of a system that can be activated in ways that are 
not self-evident or consciously selected by all (or some) of the policy players involved 
in for instance EU legislative processes. This differs from the second view of power 
which is more concerned with:  
 
‘… not whether the defenders of the status quo use their power 
consciously, but rather if and how they exercise it and what effects it 
has on the political process and other actors within the system’ 
(emphasis underlined) (Bachrach and Baratz, 1970: 35). 
 
The third face of power thus completes the basic power theorem as follows: 
 
‘A may exercise power over B by getting him to do what he does not 
want to do, but he also exercises power over him by influencing, 





This sub-section explored theoretical conceptions about how power and influence in 
politics may be defined. From the thesis’s perspective, it is thus interesting to 
conceptualize the power theorems highlighted above to the question of small and 





The indentation below illustrates how large and small EU states are generally 
perceived when applying the power theorems (discussed above) to them, i.e. in the 
context of their influence in EU legislative decision-making processes:  
 
 the ‘A’ variable = ‘large states’ or ‘EU institutions’;  
 the ‘B’ variable = ‘small states’. 
 
What is of interest here is whether, in precise EU legislative spheres, the exercise of 
influence in EU decision-making processes may also be held by small state 
governments thus transforming them into an ‘A’ variable too, i.e. the variable holding 
power.  
 
Through this application, the thesis contributes to and links the wider debate about 
notions of power and influence to small states in EU decision-making processes. 
 
5.2 The EU as a policy venue and political space dimension: the power 
of interests, ideas and issues 
 
Since, as stated in chapters 3 and 4, EU decision-making processes involve multi-
players at multi-levels, the EU’s regulatory arena is rather unique, embracing a 
mixture of policy players having their own interests, ideas, and issues. Together they 
explain why policy actors behave ‘in a given way in a given time’ in shaping EU 
policy/legislation. The EU decision-making process may therefore be said to consist of 
a political space dimension for the interests, ideas and issues of policy players to be 
discussed. 
 
As stated earlier in chapter 3, EU decision-making is a process in which patterns of 
coalitions among member states and the institutions are always shifting. This 
emerges from studies on the EU as a conflict space. For instance, one could cite 
works by Steunenberg (2000) and Selck (2004) who confirm the opaqueness, or 
better, the hopelessness in attempts to generalize about likely political outcomes in 
the EU. For instance, Steunenberg (2000: 369) observes that current findings 
emerging from studies about EU political outcomes ‘… are still conjectures, which 
might not be empirically true’. Literature focusing on the EU process as a political 
space dimension is in fact divided between two main exponents. One of these 
exponents looks at the EU as being made up solely of a supranational political space, 
and therefore, a one-dimensional view. For instance, Steunenberg (1994: 641-670) 
and Crombez (1997: 97-119) argue in favour of this view. Others such as Thomson et. 
al. (2004: 237-261) and Tsebelis and Garrett (2001) criticize it in favour of a wider EU 
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political space, or rather a second-dimensional view. However, one must bear in 
mind that there are also other authors, such as Zimmer et. al. (2005: 405) that 
maintain that ‘no unifying political space within the European Union exists’. 
 
Instead, there is empirical research that points to a traditional view of the EU 
decision-making process as encompassing shifting patterns of coalitions (Nugent, 
2010). In order to observe actor preferences and interests at the EU level, Ringe 
(2005) believes that it is the specific elements of legislative proposals that form the 
nucleus behind the perceptions of the EU political actors. Therefore, it is not grand 
coalitions (as found in the one-dimensional view) or traditional left-right political 
cleavages (found in the two-dimensional view) that should be studied but rather 
specific aspects of a legislative proposal that should hold deep explanatory value 
about shifting patterns of coalitions and interest constellations and conflicts. This 
argument put forward by Ringe (amongst others) is in fact followed closely by the 
thesis’s empirical framework with focus being given to specific elements in the 
legislative cases (examined in chapters 8 and 9) such as the relevance of interests, 
ideas and issues as factors holding explanatory value about a government’s capacity 
to influence EU legislative decision-making processes. This framework helps to study 
the behaviour of the EU member state governments in the decision-shaping and 
taking of EU legislative negotiations. 
 
5.2.1 Interests and ideas 
 
Taken together, ‘interests’ and ‘ideas’ represent key elements that clarify why policy 
actors in the EU behave in a given way during the shaping and taking of decisions. For 
instance, theoretical approaches such as rational choice theory (previously examined 
in chapter 4) affirm that policy actors behave purposefully, rationally and strategically 
(Scharpf, 1997). Rational players have:  
 
‘… fixed, exogenously determined preferences, and act 
systematically to maximize those preferences within the constraints 
of the EU’s international system’ (Wallace et. al., 2010: 27).  
 
In simpler words, EU actors use their objectives to guide them in the manner as to 
how to behave when making choices and taking decisions. 
  
As already stated in chapter 3, the EU’s primary ‘organizing principle is not the 
separation of powers but the representation of interests’ (Majone, 2002: 320). 
Therefore, the examination of governmental behaviour is linked to how they 
101 
 
promote and safeguard their interests in decision-making processes. According to 
Majone (2002: 326), each party:  
 
‘is the bearer of a particular interest which it thrives to protect and 
promote and that the nature of the prevailing interest determines 
the structure of decision-making’. 
 
Interests can be defined as being part of the equation of a series of characteristics 
such as the calculation of possible outcomes (the costs and benefits of a particular 
action), the calculation of risk, and a degree of calculated reasoning as to policy 
predicaments. For instance, Nugent (2010: 440) observes that:  
 
‘rationalist approaches are based on the assumption that policy 
actors are motivated by self-interest to maximize utility… wholly 
rationalist actors thus establish their goals on the basis of what 
serves their (largely exogenously determined and primarily 
materially based) interests’.  
 
However, Wallace and Wallace (2000: 58) maintain that although interests define 
some purposes and preferences, they ‘are not enough to explain why EU policies 
have emerged in some domains, but not others’. According to these authors, the 
emphasis on interests implies that the latter can be considered and calculated.  
 
Like ‘interests’, ‘ideas’ too play an extremely important role in EU processes. For 
instance, EU environmental policy may be influenced by particular views about 
ecological factors, scientific knowledge and so forth which form points for discussion 
in EU legislative negotiations, thus making decision-taking clearer. As stated earlier in 
chapter 4, social constructivism is a theoretical approach which promotes the 
relevance of identity, norms, values and ideas as strong factors affecting decision-
making processes and which thus challenges other approaches, including rationalist 
explanations just mentioned above. 
 
However, like ‘interests’ it is erratic to think about ‘ideas’ as the sole determinant of 
an issue being placed on the EU’s agenda. Why the place of one issue on the EU 
agenda might be influenced by ideas and that of another by specific interests 






5.2.2 Issue-specific power and the relevance of policy frames 
 
As Daviter (2011) observes, it is ‘issues’ that policy actors have to respond to. To put 
it directly, issues drive the EU policy process. Daviter (2011: 35) hits the nail on its 
head by asserting that: 
 
‘the flow and structure of policy issues affect the political alignment 
of actors and the conflict and consolidation of interests in the policy 
process’.  
 
Thus, the emergence of policy issues on the agenda play a part on the way political 
ideas, interests and demands are processed which, as logic implies, affects actors’ 
expression in policy choices. 
 
As mentioned in previous chapters, the EU’s institutional architecture presents policy 
actors with various policy venues and points of access in which to channel issue 
problems. In order to be heard, access to EU processes is not only necessary but 
critical. Therefore, any existing imbalances in actors’ access to such processes might 
signify differences in their influence to shape and take decisions. 
  
Research about EU policy processes exhibits policy issues as key elements for 
theoretical and empirical explanations of such processes. As Daviter (2011: 32) 
observes: 
 
‘the way in which issues are perceived, packaged and processed 
systematically affects how policy conflicts form around the issues, 
how interests mobilize and restructure at the supranational level, 
and which of the conflicting organizational and representational 
logics of EU decision making shape the lines of both intra- and inter-
institutional competition’. 
 
Issue-specific power mainly has to do with the setting in motion of a government’s 
resources and commitment towards a particular issue within a policy sphere. 
Therefore, it has to do with a government’s behaviour which, as seen earlier, is very 
similar to pluralist thinking about the possession of power and influence as being 
intentional and active. As observed, pluralists ask: how much power do the relevant 
actors have with respect to selected key issues in this time and place? In EU decision-
making processes, issue-specific power may be said to be manifest when a 
government’s preferences over a specific issue prevails in the negotiations thus 
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affecting the outcome.  As put by Tallberg (2008: 692), issue-specific power also 
‘helps to explain paradoxes of power, such as when structurally disadvantaged states 
nevertheless prevail in negotiations with structurally advantaged states’.  
 
In an EU legislative negotiation, the manner by which member state governments 
present their preferences on a legislative issue has to do with policy framing. 
Governments in an EU legislative process will want their preferences to be supported 
by other parties to the negotiations requiring the framing of their preferences in a 
way that looks familiar and advantageous to the others. In simpler words, the degree 
of how successful a government is to upload its preferences into the process depends 
on how arguments are framed and how other parties look at them. As Price (2003) 
amongst others observes, being successful in negotiations is about linking issues with 
existing widely held norms or concerns in a given political community. More 
specifically in the Council of the EU, it is the ability of a government to frame its 
position on certain draft legislative provisions in line with those of other delegations 
enabling the adoption of a common position. This is the realm of Council Working 
Groups (and partially Coreper) at technical level during the decision-shaping phase. 
 
Literature on policy frames presents factors explaining political choices. As Jones 
(1994), and Baumgartner and Jones (1991: 1044-1074) point out, policy framing 
research must also account for influences beyond the individual level of decision-
making. In fact, institutional structures and dynamics of policy-making systems have 
their own effects on how political problems are perceived and how issues are 
processed. This last point has already been dealt with under the new institutional 
theoretical approach in chapter 4. Daviter (2011: 34) observes that:  
 
‘If the reframing of policy issues gives rise to turf battles between 
competing institutional arenas of government, for example, the 
results must be expected to transform policy conflicts and generate 
contestation to entirely new levels of the political system’. 
 
All this comes to show that in decision-shaping, an exclusive definition of a problem 
issue does not exist. It is in fact something which policy players such as governments 
in the Council actively try to influence from the lens of suiting their national interests. 
At this formative and technical stage in the policy cycle, many turf battles revolve 
around precisely this aspect of how an issue ought to be defined. As with policy 
networks (see chapter 4), it also involves a government’s search for other parties to 
the negotiations (with similar and/or dissimilar interests) to accept a common 
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definition of an issue problem in line with its preferences. Howlett, Ramesh and Perl 
(2009: 98) refer to this as a ‘clash of frames’ and affirm that:  
 
‘the discursive frames from which actors define policy challenges … 
are not always … held by all policy actors, meaning that the agenda-
setting (and preference formation) process very often features a 
clash of frames and a struggle among policy actors over the 
‘naming’ of problems, the ‘blaming’ of conditions and actors for 
their existence, and the ‘claiming’ of specific vantage points or 
perspectives for their resolution’ (emphasis added in parenthesis).   
 
In Edelman’s (1988) metaphor of the ‘political spectacle’, policy players battle 
amongst themselves and are involved in a clash of frames over whose interests will 
prevail in a political drama which is written as the spectacle is underway. 
 
Policy framing also includes the possibility of ‘policy monopolies’ held by some 
players in a process to influence and leverage outside influences. According to 
Baumgartner and Jones (1991), policy monopolies attempt to deny alternative ideas 
and proposals by other ‘weaker’ players to penetrate the agenda. By doing so, policy 
monopolies construct a seemingly hegemonic image of problem issues thus allowing 
influential actors to focus on them only. However, such monopolies may be 
countered and annulled through shifts in policy venues or institutional arrangements.  
 
If one had to illustrate this last point by taking the Council as an example, certain 
member state governments at the technical/expert decision-shaping stage in a 
legislative process might not be satisfied with outcomes emerging from the 
negotiations occurring in a Working Group. They therefore try and widen the scope 
of the discussion as much as possible and probably lobby the Commission and 
Council Presidency. If successful, other member state governments (that would have 
previously held a policy monopoly) would then need to reconsider their position and 
discuss other (new) issues for adoption during decision-taking.  
 
In a nutshell, this is what is known as the re-framing of issues within the sub-system. 
The crux of the matter here is put by Riker (1986) who affirms that frames are 
themselves subject to political play, in the sense that, policy players advocate 
competing frames strategically to restructure the political playing field and sway 




Finally, issue-specific power is also about a government’s capacity to deploy 
effectively its resources to deal with specific issues. Thus, as discussed in chapter 6 
(see variables 1 to 3), the capacities of entering early into an EU process, maintaining 
expertise and knowledge on a specific issue, and prioritizing, are crucial ‘ingredients’ 
for a government aspiring to exercise influence in EU legislative processes. As 
Tallberg (2008: 692-693) maintains:  
 
‘States that care deeply about an issue will be more willing to 
devote resources, negotiate with greater care, stay longer at the 
negotiation table and have higher aspirations, than states that are 
less committed… European Council participants further testify to 
specific small state influence on issues where these countries 
present strong ambitions, extensive knowledge and national policies 
that may be exported to the European level, for instance, the Nordic 
states on employment policy and environmental policy.’ 
 
5.3 Governmental strategies: ways to exercise power and influence in 
EU decision-making processes  
 
As previously discussed, many authors have devoted themselves to the study of 
decision-making, power relationships and member state influence in the EU. These 
authors (such as Jachtenfuchs and Kohler-Koch, 1995; and March and Olson, 2005) 
agree that power in the EU is no longer a question of only military capacity or 
necessarily of size, but of the capacity to influence the EU political agenda and take 
advantage of the multi-actor, multi-level governance system that characterizes the 
EU.  
 
Nevertheless, relatively little research has been conducted on which strategies EU 
member state governments adopt to impact on EU policy, especially in the decision-
shaping stages of EU legislative processes in Council. As stated earlier in chapters 1 
and 2, the thesis thus fills this lacuna.  
 
Strategies can be said to be the by-product of a member state government’s 
preferences mixed with its capacity to act. Therefore, logic follows that depending on 
its preferences and administrative size and expertise, a government selects its 
strategy/ies in a decision-making process accordingly. However in the EU, given the 
heterogeneity of governments’ preferences and capacities to influence this process, 




‘…not only do Member State governments pursue diverging and 
often competing policy preferences. They also differ in their capacity 
to engage successfully in the European policy contest’. 
 
Since all EU member state governments formulate their own policy preferences over 
specific legislative issues, it is the capacity of these governments to adopt successful 
strategies to influence EU decision-making which is of relevance here. The gist is that 
capacities and strategies are intrinsically linked with each other. As seen in chapter 2, 
small states are usually not advantaged on this front due to certain vulnerabilities 
which are mainly related to their small size. This issue is tested empirically in Part II of 
the thesis to test whether a lack of small state capacity impacts negatively on 
strategies that could be used to influence EU decision-making processes. 
 
Literature on state strategies point at a common factor - that countries differ in their 
strategy/ies to influence EU decision-making. For instance, Börzel (2002: 194) 
maintains that: 
 
‘what kind of strategy a Member State is likely to adopt depends 
mainly on its level of economic development, which largely 
influences the degree of domestic regulation and the action 
capacities of a Member State, particularly in the area of regulatory 
policy’.  
 
This is indeed of particular interest to the thesis’s empirical chapters which examine 
‘whether’ and ‘how’ a small EU member state government adopts strategies (and if 
so, ‘which’ strategies) to achieve its goals from EU processes. 
 
The next paragraphs draw attention to a small body of existing literature by authors 
such as Haverland (2009), Heritier (1996), Liefferink and Skou-Andersen (1998b), and 
Börzel (2002) who have identified and developed different typologies of state-
strategy. Three main types of strategies are identified, i.e. the ‘pace-setting’, ‘foot-
dragging’ and ‘fence-sitting’ strategies. 
 
Table 5.1 below provides the reader with an overview of the three strategies dealt 
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               2. First-mover or  










B. Indirect/Forerunner pace 
setting strategies: 
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Possible governmental behaviour 





A.1 & A.2 = If during decision-shaping, 
a government forecasts that the 
decision-taking stage is going to be 
positive for it (i.e. the adoption of EU 
legislation in line with its preferences), 
it will continue to pace-set the 
decision-shaping stage. It will do this 
by being constructive and will push 
the Council Presidency (in particular) 
for a decision to be taken as soon as 
possible. It will thus call for a quick 





B.1 = If during decision-shaping, a 
government forecasts that the 
decision-taking stage is going to be a 
negative one for it (i.e. the adoption of 
EU legislation not in line with its 
preferences), it will need to pace-set 
the decision-shaping stage. In 
particular, it will lobby and try and 
convince the Council Presidency, but 
also MEPs in the EP, for its preferences 
to be included in the institutions’ 
common positions. A government will 
therefore push for a different outcome 
to be shaped and adopted, thus 
defending its preferences. 
 
B.2 = If B.1 is not possible, the 
government will then seek concessions 



















Different types of strategies 
 
 














2. Overall negative +  
blocking approach 
 
Possible governmental behaviour 




C.1 = Being certain of the negative 
outcome to be achieved in a process, a 
government adopts a foot-dragging 
strategy throughout the decision-
making process. It will therefore act as 
a ‘keeper’ to ‘brake and break’ the 
system. Particularly, a government will 
be non-constructive towards the 
Council Presidency during decision-
shaping that will be pushing for a 
compromise to be found.  
 
C.2 = If a negative outcome is foreseen 
during the decision-taking stage and 
nothing may be done any longer to 
block the adoption of a draft 
legislation not in line with its 
preferences, a government will 
generally behave in this manner 
during decision-taking: 
- Form a blocking minority in Council 
under QMV rules; 
- Request for compensation and 
concessions; 




















  D.    ‘Wait and see’ approach 
 


















D.1 = Uncertain of how the discussion 
is proceeding, a government will 
either remain neutral or constantly 
shift coalitions during decision-
shaping. It thus neither sets the pace 
nor breaks the legislative process. This 
is generally either because: 
- The draft legislation is not 
salient to it; 
- Other EU governments which 
are more active than it in the 
negotiations share similar 
preferences;  
- A miscalculation of compliance 
costs; 

























3. Shift to pace-setting 
and/or foot-dragging 
 
Possible governmental behaviour 
during decision-shaping and taking 
 
experience in the policy 
sphere being discussed. 
 
D.2 = A government simply benefits 
from this situation aware that a 
positive outcome will be achieved 
from the process. In this situation, a 
government suddenly becomes more 
constructive in a similar manner as 
described under A.1 and A.2 above. 
 
D.3 = A government becomes aware 
that a negative outcome will be 
achieved during decision-taking. It 
therefore shifts to a pace-setting 
strategy (defensive forerunner) with 
the scenarios in B.1 & B.2 unfolding. If 
unsuccessful, it will shift strategy to 
foot-drag the process (with the 
scenarios in C.2 unfolding). 
Source: Table compiled by the author. 
 
5.3.1 The ‘pace-setting’ strategy 
 
An especially promising strategy to influence EU decision‐making processes is the 
‘first mover strategy’ (Heritier, 1996: 149-167). It is also referred to as ‘pace setting’ 
(Börzel 2002: 193-214) or ‘constructive pusher’ (Liefferink and Andersen 1998b: 254-
270). According to Haverland and Liefferink (2012); Benson (1975: 229-249); and 
Pfeffer and Salancik (2003), the availability of EU governments’ resources, such as 
money, personnel and expertise used to pursue this strategy ‘is partly conditioned by 
Member States’ domestic institutions, the formal and informal rules that structure the 
relationship between domestic actors’ (Haverland and Liefferink, 2012: 2). Haverland 
and Liefferink particularly argue that ‘domestic institutions shape the availability of 
resources utilized to ‘sell’ a Member State’s position in the policy process in Brussels’ 
(ibid: 2). As stated further on, their study on the revision of the Regulation on EU 
chemical policy (REACH) demonstrated that: 
 
‘the differential effect of the Dutch strategy was shaped not only by 
the dynamics of the political process in Brussels as such but also by 
the character of the resources available to the Dutch government 
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during the process… (which) were in turn determined by the nature 
of domestic institutions’ (ibid: 2).  
 
The pace-setting strategy is about a government’s ability to push and transpose 
national policies and preferences into the policy game in Brussels, which, as 
explained in chapter 3, is part and parcel of the ‘uploading’ process. Since member 
states have different constitutional and administrative systems, they compete at EU 
level for outcomes that conform to their own policies and interests. If successful, this 
has the beneficial effect of reducing and ironing out implementation costs once EU 
legislation is enacted. Thus, the successful uploading of national interests into EU 
legislative processes guarantees reduced costs of adaptation in downloading 
processes.  
 
But there are other rewards deriving from pace-setting strategies. As Börzel (2002: 
196) observes, ‘uploading prevents competitive disadvantages for domestic industry’. 
This means that through for instance standardization of legislation at EU level, all EU 
member states are able to compete on an equal footing at the domestic level. For 
instance, in the EU, the ‘green’ or high-regulating environmental member state 
governments (mainly Nordic EU states) share a common interest to see 
harmonization of environmental standards set at an acceptable EU level (i.e. not 
unacceptably low). Therefore, these governments pace-set legislative negotiations in 
this sphere, aware that once EU environmental legislation is adopted all 28 member 
state governments are obliged to enforce it in their respective national legislation. 
Thus, EU governments that adopt this strategy and take the lead in the shaping of 
draft EU law (of salience to them) stand to benefit.  
 
Börzel (2002: 199-200) maintains that: 
  
‘pace-setting not only presupposes established domestic policies but 
also the capacity to push them through the European negotiation 
process, very often against the opposition of other Member States 
with diverging policy preferences’.  
 
As she points out, this therefore does not only have to do with how powerful a 
government is in relation to voting in Council under the QMV system. Rather, pace-
setting is a strategy for all governments (big and small states alike) willing to be 




Leadership may be seen through the lens of how expert-based a government’s 
administration is (one of the ‘capacity variables’ - variable 2 - of the thesis as 
explained in chapter 6) and active a government is in EU negotiations such as its 
lobbying efforts with EU institutions and other EU governments. Haverland (2009: 1) 
observes that it is the ‘mobilisation of government officials and related experts who 
possess a high level of content expertise to advance leader states’ interest in EU 
policy-making’ that matters in leadership strategies. In this study, Haverland 
illustrates how a single leader state, the Netherlands - a medium to small state by 
definition (see chapter 2) but nevertheless, a leader state in the EU environment and 
chemicals policy – adopted a pace-setting, expert-based strategy in the revision of 
the EU Regulation on Registration, Evaluation, Authorisation and Restriction of 
Chemicals (REACH), starting from the pre-legislative stage of agenda-setting in 1997 
up to its adoption (decision-taking) in 2006.9 Significantly, Haverland came up with 
findings demonstrating the effectiveness of the expert capacity and pace-setting 
strategy used by the Dutch in these particular EU legislative negotiations.  
 
Another study focusing on the same REACH Regulation by Selin reveals that a pro-
REACH group made up of the Commission (DG Environment), the EP’s environmental 
committee, NGOs and the ‘green’ EU member state governments of Denmark, 
Finland, Sweden, the Netherlands, Germany and the UK (all small states except for 
the latter two), were so successful in the legislative process that they ‘effectively 
strengthened EU chemical policy’ (2007: 87). Thus, both studies point to the utility 
and application of expertise in successful pace-setting strategies. 
 
Besides expertise and the art of lobbying, another relevant factor in relation to pace-
setting, has to do with ‘norm advocacy’, or to a government’s ability to persuade 
other parties to the negotiations through the delivery of convincing arguments and 
the use of diplomatic leverage.10 Therefore it is about the power of values, norms and 
ideas, which fits with social constructivist ideology. Norm advocacy is described by 
Annika Björkdahl (2007: 135-154) ‘as a potent addition to traditional strategies of 
gaining influence in the Union’. Checkel (2005: 801-826) defines it as ‘persuasive 
argumentation that may be used in order to raise moral consciousness about what 
constitutes ‘the right thing to do’’. The gist here is that by producing normative 
convictions of what is right from wrong during negotiations, EU governments aim to 
alter precise issue-areas within a draft legislative proposal rather than seek changes 
with more wide-ranging effects. Thus, EU member states seek to convince others of 
their own normative convictions. In this way, governments stand more of a chance to 




Having said this, pace-setting strategies cannot by themselves guarantee success in 
EU decision-making. This is because, as stated in chapter 3, EU decision-making is a 
fluid process changing rapidly between multi-levels and players. Governments thus 
cannot ‘control’ the negotiation dynamics although they can adopt relevant 
strategies throughout. 
  
Of key interest to the thesis is Liefferink and Skou-Andersen’s (1997; 1998b) sub-
division of pace-setting strategies into four main strategies divided between direct 
and indirect forms of pace-setting. This sub-division is presented in Box 5.1 below. 
 
Box 5.1 – A sub-division of pace-setting strategies 




Indirect/forerunner pace-setting strategies 
 
3. Defensive forerunner 
4. Opt-outer 
Source: Box compiled by the author and based on Liefferink and Skou-Andersen’s research (1997; 
1998b). 
 
Setting the pace directly has to do with EU member states using push pace-setting 
strategies that encourage, for instance, standardization of EU legislation. Such 
strategies are referred to as “constructive” and “pushing-by-example” types. EU 
governments employ such pace-setting strategies to push for the adoption of EU 
legislation, being aware that unilateral action at member state (domestic) level will 
not achieve the desired horizontal results. A “constructive pusher” strategy is 
oriented towards seeking a compromise that, however, might see lower standards 
set at EU level than unilaterally at the domestic level. On the other hand, a “pusher-
by-example” strategy is used by those EU member states that look at the national 
arena ‘as a tool to encourage European initiatives’ (Börzel, 2002: 203). Here, 
domestic legislation serves as a form of general experiment to generate innovation at 
EU level in a given policy sphere. If successful, such EU governments push for 
legislation to be set at EU level. They are thus usually best allied with the Commission 
(which initiates the legislative process) and the Council Presidency to seek a 
compromise.  
 
Indirect pushing has to do with forerunner pace-setting strategies deployed by 
‘leader’ states in a particular policy sphere that focus on improving their national 
policy, albeit leaving the door open to the harmonization at EU level of standards in 
this sphere. Forerunner governments however normally disagree with EU legislation 
that sets lower ceilings than those set domestically. Therefore, if such a case arises, 
such governments will usually want to remain autonomous in being able to set their 
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own standards and will indirectly put pressure on the Commission (in the beginning) 
and later the Council Presidency to find a compromise in line with their preferences. 
This tactic is referred to as a “defensive forerunner” pace-setting strategy used by 
governments that are ‘more concerned with protecting its (their) own environment, 
rather than that of the EU as a whole’ (Liefferink and Skou-Andersen, 1997, 1998b). 
The other type of forerunner strategy is the “opt outer”. This strategy may be 
deployed because of the impact that will be caused through the adoption of an EU act 
which, according to the government requesting an opt-out, will have major negative 
repercussions on national policy/legislation. Thus, national measures might 
unexpectedly turn out to be ‘out of tune’ with EU legislation forcing a government to 
opt-out. 
 
5.3.2 The ‘foot-dragging’ strategy 
 
Contrary to pace-setting, foot-dragging strategies are used by member state 
governments that disagree with the way draft EU legislation is being shaped in 
Council. Such governments are aware that a negative outcome awaits them at the 
end of the process (in the decision-taking stage) if they do not change the draft EU 
law during the decision-shaping stages. If these governments for some reason cannot 
alter the draft proposal in line with their preferences they will have an interest to 
slow down the process and play for time, even blocking a decision from being taken 
(either by vetoing if Council voting is held by unanimity or by achieving a blocking 
minority under QMV Council rules). Such member states are referred to as the 
‘laggards’ or ‘keepers’ in the negotiations.  
 
However, foot-dragging is also used by governments which try to manipulate 
legislative negotiations to win compensation in other legislative spheres. As put by 
Börzel (2002: 205): 
 
‘…Foot-draggers tend to show a poor level of compliance with 
Community law… They are reluctant to accept more stringent 
measures and hardly ever advance proposals of their own’. 
  
There are a number of reasons for an EU government to adopt this strategy. For 
instance, smaller and newer (having joined the EU fairly recently) EU states might find 
it more difficult to pace-set legislative negotiations than their larger counterparts. In 
such situations, these states adopt a foot-dragging strategy to break the process 
which would have otherwise led to negative outcomes for them. They therefore 
revert to strategies that either block or delay decisions ‘hoping at least to gain 
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temporary exemptions (derogations), financial compensation (side-payments) or 
concessions in other issue areas (package deals)’ (Börzel, 2002: 205).  
 
In sum, a low capacity to upload preferences into the process during formation of EU 
legislation leaves such governments with a daunting situation to download and 
comply with the EU’s acquis once the decision-making process ends and the policy 
cycle moves forward to the next stages. They therefore either try and block a decision 
or request for compensation as stated above and as illustrated in Table 5.1. 
 
5.3.3 The ‘fence-sitting’ strategy 
 
This strategy is best defined as the wait-and-see approach adopted by governments 
that are ‘neutrals’ in a negotiation and that neither ‘set the pace nor put the brake on 
EU policies’ (Börzel, 2002: 206). Depending on the policy issue being discussed, fence-
sitters are likely to constantly change their coalitions between pace-setters and foot-
draggers since they are aware that their prospects of affecting a policy outcome are 
remote. This situation may be caused by their low capacity to influence particular EU 
decision-making processes or because of their lack of interest in the policy sphere 
being discussed in Council (for instance, Malta’s government in EU legislative 
negotiations on railway transport given that there is none in Malta). Such 
governments adopt a laissez faire approach during the decision-shaping stage of the 
process, only engaging in the latter phase of the process when it is time for decisions 
to be taken.  
 
Börzel (2002: 206-208) identifies a few instances in which fence-sitting strategies are 
employed during decision-making. First, during the decision-shaping stage of a 
legislative negotiation, fence-sitting strategies are primarily used by member state 
governments that are indifferent to the fact that other more active governments, 
with preferences that are similar to theirs, are injecting these preferences into the EU 
policy process. Second, fence-sitting may be also used by governments that do not 
have enough expertise and experience in the particular legislative sphere being 
discussed in Council. Such governments might mistakenly fence-sit a legislative 
process, having miscalculated compliance costs that still need to be faced once EU 
law is enacted. This usually only occurs with EU member states that are new to EU 
decision-making processes.  
 
In a worst case scenario, if a government realizes late in the process that its 
preferences are not included in a Council compromise (emerging at that stage in the 
process), it will need to switch to a foot-dragging strategy to block a decision being 
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taken (see D.3 in Table 5.1). This scenario is an integral part of the case study analysis 
in chapter 9 of the thesis. Such a government will then ‘scapegoat’ Brussels to escape 
being labeled as having failed in the EU legislative negotiations (and with the 





Chapter 5 has moved the discussion forward from theorizing the EU decision-making 
process (in chapter 4) to conceptualizing notions of power and influence found in this 
process. It has done this by focusing on the following questions: 
- What makes states powerful and influential in the international community?  
- What makes EU member state governments sufficiently powerful to influence 
EU decision-making processes?  
- How do EU member state governments influence these processes and what 
 strategies do they adopt in attempting to do this?  
 
Besides focusing on three power dimensions (i.e. the discussion about pluralism 
versus power inequality) in relation to governmental capacities (dealt with in section 
5.1), chapter 5 has also conceptualized the EU as a particular policy venue offering a 
unique political space dimension for the power of interests, ideas and issues to 
emerge strongly as relevant variables in EU legislative negotiations (see section 5.2). 
 
Finally, chapter 5 ended with an illustration of three possible strategies which 
governments may utilize in EU legislative decision-making negotiations - pace-setting, 
foot-dragging and fence-sitting. 
  
The importance of this chapter is to be found in the way that the conceptualization of 
power and influence, in respect to governmental capacities and strategies in EU 
decision-making, is used by the empirical research in Part II of the thesis. This is 
















Chapter 6 describes the methodology used in this thesis. It is divided into six main 
sections. 
 
While section 6.1 deals with ontological and epistemological assumptions of this 
research, section 6.2 describes the thesis’s research design. Section 6.3 then explains 
why Malta has been selected as the small EU state government and gives reasons for 
the selected framework of the empirical research made up of three EU legislative 
decision-making negotiations on the formation and adoption of three EU directives. 
Section 6.4 covers ethical assumptions deriving from the study. Section 6.5 discusses 
different methods of data collection and is sub-divided into five sub-sections. Sub-
sections 6.5.1 and 6.5.2 respectively deal with the qualitative and quantitative 
techniques used whereas sub-sections 6.5.3 to 6.5.5 offer clarification on the sources 
used, the difficulties encountered and positive aspects deriving from this research. 
Finally, section 6.6 provides a brief conclusion. 
 
6.1 Understanding governmental influence - ontological and 
epistemological assumptions of this research 
 
In a recent study on understanding policy success, McConnell (2010: 54) argues that 
success can be said to have been reached when a government achieves what it 
originally sets out to achieve. But depending on the lens used:  
 
‘the contestability of success means that not everyone will agree, 
depending on whether they support government goals and the means 
used to achieve them’(ibid).  
 
The same is true about governmental influence in EU decision-making processes. An 
EU outcome, such as an EU directive on a particular subject matter, may be positive 
for some EU member state governments but negative for others. But what is of 
essence in McConnell’s definition of success is that it is tied to a set of initial 
governmental preferences. Whether the outcome corresponds to them or not will 
determine how successful or not that government was in the process. This definition 
of policy success is extremely similar to the way this thesis interprets the 
manifestation of influence by EU governments in EU decision-making processes, i.e. 
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whether an EU outcome corresponds with that of a particular government’s position 
in an EU process. The common denominator here is that success may be said to have 
been reached when a government achieves what it sets out to achieve from the 
process. This may be looked at as a benchmark about influence and success. 
  
Ways of how to define and conceptualize governmental influence and power have 
already been discussed in the preceding chapter. However, this is worth briefly 
revisiting since the thesis’s focus is now being directed towards those deeper 
questions that impinge on its very existence (ontology as a theory of ‘being’) and on 
acquiring knowledge about it (epistemology as a theory of ‘knowledge’). Indeed 
fundamental questions arise as to the very meaning of what influence is all about - 
‘what is it’ that is being discussed here and ‘what can one know or learn’ about it? 
Such questions decree clarification (this is however brief due to word count 
restrictions).  
 
Marsh and Furlong (2010: 185) speak clearly about such issues and define ontology 
as dealing ‘with the very nature of ‘being’’ while epistemology is more about the 
views on the nature of being. Depending on the ontology of the research, i.e. 
whether it is foundationalist or anti-foundationalist, these authors argue that a 
different set of epistemological assumptions arise. Anti-foundationalist ontology is 
about interpretation as opposed to realism because it does not believe in a ‘real’ 
world, while foundationalist ontology speaks about a ‘real’ and ‘objective’ state of 
affairs. As Mc Connell (2010: 32) states, there is little one can do regardless of one’s 
cultural beliefs and interpretations when there is ‘an objective state of affairs that 
constitutes policy success’, i.e. that it is ‘outcomes-based’ with success viewed as a 
‘fact’. Crucially, McConnell puts forward the important question whether policies can 
still be said to be successful when they achieve the desired outcome but which might 
however be ‘opposed by some’. As stated in previous chapters, there are always 
winners and losers in EU decision-making processes with governments influencing 
outcomes at the expense of others. Therefore, foundationalists would nevertheless 
reply positively to the question of whether a policy outcome can still be said to be 
successful even if not all parties to a negotiation supported it. In their view, success 
derives from the fact that ‘policy-makers did what they set out to do’. Therefore 
there is a crude reality about foundationalism which contrasts with a more 
‘interpretivist’ anti-foundationalist ontology. 
 
Marsh and Furlong (2010: 186) rightly point out that one’s epistemological 
assumptions have clear implications on ones method. They broadly distinguish 
between positivists as preferring quantitative methods, interpretivists opting for 
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qualitative methods and realists preferring a mixture of both quantitative and 
qualitative methods. Even though this may be true, it is extremely difficult to neatly 
assign the epistemology of this thesis to fit accurately in one of the three main 
epistemologies aforementioned. Having said this and since it contains both 
qualitative and quantitative elements, the thesis’s epistemology may be perceived as 
being rooted in the realist school.  
 
The difficulty stems from the complexity of the nature of the main focus area – 
governmental influence. It is indeed an extremely complex phenomenon. Besides, 
this thesis is studying it in an equally complex setting, i.e. the EU and its decision-
making processes. 
 
6.2 Research design 
 
6.2.1 Establishing the hypothesis and research questions 
 
The main objective of research design is to provide the research with a plan, 
structure and strategy(ies) of the investigation to test and validate hypothesis(es). 
This is maintained by various authors (see Bryman, 2001; Hakim, 2000), who observe 
that research design sets out a framework in which data is collected and analyzed to 
provide answers to the priorities of the research.  
 
This research on small state governmental influence in the EU has one main set of 
research questions: 
  
- Are EU small member state governments influential in EU decision-making 
 processes? In other words, do they exercise influence in these processes? And 
if so, how and at which stage do they do this? 
  
As observed in chapters 1 and 2, the thesis advances the hypothesis that ‘small state’ 
does not mean ‘weak state’. But because of potential size-related difficulties 
common among small states, the main thrust of the thesis’s hypothesis is that such 
states need to possess certain capacities and employ certain strategies in order to 
exercise influence in EU decision-making processes. 
 
The thesis is thus not only concerned with which strategies are used or whether 
different strategies are more successful than others in EU decision-making, but 
equally important, whether a government contains the necessary capacities (i.e. 
appropriate core domestic characteristics). Together these determine whether an EU 
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government is likely to exercise influence in such processes. As empirically analyzed 
in chapters 8 to 10, this last argument is crucial for small state governments in the 
EU. 
 
6.2.2 Establishing the independent variables for small state governmental influence  
 
The thesis contains an element of ‘causality’ instilled in it with causal explanations for 
EU small state governmental influence in EU decision-making processes. In fact, 
causes of small state governmental influence are to be found in the very nature of 
the independent variables selected by this research. As shown below, these variables 
are divided between governmental capacities and strategies.  
 
When linking these variables to the thesis’s research questions (described in the 
preceding sub-section) on whether small state governments are able to influence EU 
processes, the manifestation of influence does not only depend on a small state’s 
capacities to enter early in EU processes with proper levels of expertise in its 
administrative structures (i.e. on how to co-ordinate and form national preferences) 
and on its capacity to prioritize. It also depends on a government’s strategies, i.e. its 
behaviour during EU decision-making processes. For instance, a small state 
government may pace-set and thus lobby for its interests and/or employ other 
strategies (such as foot-dragging and/or fence-sitting according to circumstances 
present in EU legislative negotiations) which might be more effective than those used 
by other small state governments in the EU process. 
 
Drawing upon the discussion in chapters 2 (see section 2.4) and 5 (see sections 5.1 
and 5.3), this thesis selects six independent variables from the literature on small 
states reviewed in those chapters. The thesis sets them into two distinct groups.  
 
The first three variables deal with a government’s capacities (referred to as 
‘indicative-type’ variables – see sub-section 6.5.2 for clarification on this term) about 
a government’s core domestic characteristics. The second group of variables deal 
with a government’s strategies and behaviour in EU legislative decision-making 
processes (referred to as ‘action–type’ variables – see sub-section 6.5.2 for 









Variable 1: The capacity to enter early into EU decision-making processes (see Box 6.1) 
Variable 2: The expert and administrative capacity (see Box 6.2) 
Variable 3: The capacity to prioritize (see Box 6.3) 
 
Governmental Strategies: 
Variable 4: The pace-setting strategy (see Box 6.4) 
Variable 5: The foot-dragging strategy (see Box 6.5) 
Variable 6: The fence-sitting strategy (see Box 6.6) 
 
As may be inferred from the thesis’s title, the variables on governmental ‘capacities’ 
and ‘strategies’ together form the backbone of the thesis’s research design.  
 
The six independent variables are presented in a table format in Table 6.1 below. 
They are then explained separately and in more detail in boxes which cover the next 
few pages (see Boxes 6.1 to 6.6 below).  
 
 







Variable 1: the capacity to enter the 
decision-making process early 
 Sub-variable 1.1 - the capacity to 
participate effectively in the decision-
shaping stages; 
 Sub-variable 1.2 - the capacity to adopt 




Variable 2: the expert & administrative 
capacity  
 Sub-variable 2.1 – the expert capacity: 
training, work experience and technical 
knowledge in an EU policy sphere; 
 Sub-variable 2.2 – the administrative 
capacity: size of the government’s 
administration in the Capital and at the  
Permanent Representation in Brussels. 
 





In order to participate effectively in an EU legislative 
process, a government must establish its 
preferences early. It must therefore co-ordinate 
efficiently and interpret correctly draft EU legislation 






A government must be knowledgeable about 
particular issues in a given legislative sphere. A 
government needs to maintain expertise on a given 
issue throughout EU legislative negotiations which 
depends on how trained, qualified and experienced 
its civil service is in EU matters. A government must 
also have enough human resources to play an 







Variable 3: The capacity to prioritize 
 Sub-variable 3.1 – the salience of the 











Variable 4: The pace-setting strategy 
 Sub-variable 4.1 – Pace-setting through 
lobbying. 
 Sub-variable 4.2 – Pace-setting through 
norm advocacy & effective intervention 
in Council deliberations. 
 
 
Variable 5: The foot-dragging strategy 
 Sub-variable 5.1 – Foot-dragging through 
delaying tactics. 
 Sub-variable 5.2 – Foot-dragging by 
requesting for compensation. 
 Sub-variable 5.3 - Foot-dragging due to 




Variable 6: The fence-sitting strategy 
 Sub-variable 6.1 – Fence-sitting by  
altering coalitions. 
 Sub-variable 6.2 – Fence-sitting due to 
similar national positions. 
 Sub-variable 6.3 – Fence-sitting due to a 
miscalculation of EU outcomes. 
 Sub-variable 6.4 – Fence-sitting due to a 
lack of benchmarks during 
implementation. 
Explaining the Variables 
 
The salience of a policy sphere is a relevant indicator 
about a government’s behaviour in an EU decision-
making process. Therefore, the higher the salience, 
the higher the policy sphere is placed on a 
government’s agenda. The capacity to prioritize is 
thus particularly relevant for small state 
governments with a general lack of resources and 
which need to participate effectively in an EU 





Pace-setting is a strategy about lobbying and 
engaging effectively with other players in EU 
decision-making processes. It is also about how a 
government persuades other players, for instance 
through moral convictions and diplomatic leverage 
allowing it to intervene effectively in the Council of 
the EU. 
 
Foot-dragging is a strategy on delaying the approval 
of EU outcomes - a tactic which a government might 
use to influence the slowing down of an EU process. 
In such circumstances, a government needs to 
ensure that it forms part of a majority or blocking 
minority in Council. If outvoted, a government will 
then request for temporary exemptions, financial 
compensation or concessions in other EU policy 
spheres.  
 
Better known as the ‘wait and see’ approach, this 
strategy is used by a government which needs to 
‘buy time’ in a negotiation to evaluate properly the 
situation emerging before being able to intervene. 
For instance, a government might decide to alter its 
coalitions (as compromises shift during the course 
of a negotiation) in its attempt to influence EU 
legislative negotiations.  
 
Note: The above variables are operationalized into measurable indicators in Boxes 6.1 to 6.6. 






Boxes 6.1 to 6.6 build on Table 6.1 by providing more detail on each variable. Indeed, 
the boxes provide a systematic analysis of each variable. The boxes also provide an 
understanding of how each variable may be operationalized into sub-variables and 
measurable indicators. These variables are empirically applied to the case studies in 
Part II of the thesis. The method of weighting and scoring these variables carried out 
in the empirical chapters is explained in more detail in the next sub-section (6.2.3) 
and also in section 6.5 on methods of data collection (see sub-section 6.5.2).  
 
 


































In order to participate effectively in the decision-shaping stages of an EU legislative process, 
a government must establish its preferences early in the process. Therefore, it must possess 
the capacity to interpret correctly EU legislative proposals (i.e. the consequences that the 
draft act will have on the national level once it is adopted) and be able to co-ordinate a 
national position as early as possible.  
 
This variable is divided into two sub-variables (1.1 and 1.2) each containing a weighting of 
5% (a score of ‘0’ to ‘5’ in the quantitative method used to score variables in the empirical 
chapters – see sub-sections 6.2.3 and 6.5.2 on the ‘decision weights and measures’ 
approach):  
 
Sub-Variable 1.1 – A government's capacity to participate effectively in EU decision-
shaping 
Measurable Indicator 1.1.1: The capacity to co-ordinate swiftly its preferences 
This indicator concerns a government’s capacity to swiftly co-ordinate a national position 
among various ministries and/or departments. The quicker a government does this, the 
earlier it would be able to participate effectively during decision-shaping. 
 
Sub-Variable 1.2 – The capacity to adopt an effective national position early in the process  
Measurable Indicator 1.2.1: The capacity to interpret draft EU legislation 
This indicator is about a government’s capacity to fully understand, as early as possible, the 
subtleties existing in draft EU legislation. This allows a government to adopt an effective 
national position during the crucial early stages of an EU legislative process. 
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Source: Box compiled by the author. 
 
Box 6.3 on Variable 3 - The capacity to prioritize 
Due to their small administrative size, small states need to select some policy spheres over 
others. The main question is on how relevant a policy sphere is for a government when 
compared with other EU spheres. This leads a government to rank EU policy/legislative 
spheres with the most relevant being placed on top of a government’s priority list. 
 
This variable is sub-divided into only one sub-variable with a measurable indicator of 5% (a 
score of ‘0’ to ‘5’ - see sub-sections 6.2.3 and 6.5.2): 
 
Sub-Variable 3.1 – Salience of a policy sphere  
Measurable Indicator 3.1.1:  The importance given to a particular policy sphere by the 
administration 
This indicator reveals whether an EU policy sphere is relevant to a government. One will 
therefore expect a government to be active in an EU legislative negotiation of relevance to it. 
Source: Box compiled by the author. 
Literature on small states (reviewed in chapter 2) maintains that a government’s expertise 
and administrative capacity is synonymous with whether it is able to influence EU decision-
making processes. This variable therefore warrants closer examination. Variable 2 is divided 
into two sub-variables (2.1 and 2.2). As in Variable 1, the sub-variables each have a weighting 
of 5% (a score of ‘0’ to ‘5’ - see sub-sections 6.2.3 and 6.5.2). They are divided as follows: 
 
Sub-Variable 2.1 – The expert capacity  
Measurable Indicator 2.1.1:  The expertise of a government’s administration 
This indicator concerns the training, work experience and technical knowledge of a 
government’s administration in EU matters. It is relevant to find out whether a government’s 
administration is knowledgeable, has relevant experience in a particular EU policy sphere and 
whether training (if required) is conducted on a constant basis. One should ask: Is it possible 
to expect positive or negative scores (scores of ‘0’ to ‘5’ in the quantitative method used to 
score variables – see sub-section 6.5.2) about a government’s expertise in a given EU 
policy/legislative sphere? 
 
Sub-Variable 2.2 - The administrative capacity 
Measurable Indicator 2.2.1:  The size of a government’s administration in the Capital  
This indicator concerns the number of ministerial officials involved in forming a government’s 
position. A small state has a lack of human resources to do this. It is therefore relevant to find 
out whether with such deficiencies, small states are still able to exercise influence in EU 
processes. 
 
Measurable Indicator 2.2.2:  The size of a government’s administration at the Permanent 
Representation  
This indicator concerns the number of governmental officials employed at the Permanent 
Representation in Brussels. Small states consist of smaller representations with less attachés 
and/or diplomats (than larger representations) to cope with entire EU policy spheres. It is 
relevant to find out whether in such circumstances, one is able to furnish positive or negative 
scores for a small state government in a given EU legislative sphere. 
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Box 6.4 on Variable 4 – The pace-setting strategy 
As discussed in chapter 5, pace-setting strategies are used by governments that take the lead 
in the shaping of EU legislative proposals of relevance (and priority) to them. Variable 4 is 
divided into 2 sub-variables.  
 
Lobbying is one facet (sub-variable 4.1) of pace-setting and is divided into 4 measurable 
indicators (with 8 respective sub-indicators all marked in alphabetical upper case letters, i.e. 
A to D) on a government’s lobbying efforts with EU institutions and other member state 
governments. It is logical to presume that effective lobbying does matter and does impact a 
government’s success rate in EU legislative decision-making. Therefore, the higher the 
success rate of a government’s lobbying efforts, the higher is its probability to exercise 
influence in EU decision-making. 
 
Governments also pace-set through norm advocacy and through interventions in the Council 
of the EU (at every level as explained in chapter 3). This is sub-variable 4.2. A government will 
therefore intervene during Council negotiations whenever necessary and in order to ‘sway’ 
the discussions over a legislative proposal in line with its national position.  
 
As explained in sub-section 6.2.3 in this chapter, all of the measurable indicators and sub-
indicators have a weighting of 5% (a score of ‘0’ to ‘5’ in the quantitative method used to 
score variables in the empirical chapters). This means that 10 measurable indicators and sub-
indicators at 5% each consist of an overall weight of 50%. Variable 4 is sub-divided as follows: 
  
Sub-Variable 4.1 - Pace-setting through lobbying 
Measurable Indicator 4.1.1: Lobbying the Council 
This indicator examines whether a small state government lobbied the Council Presidency 
(A) and the Secretariat (B) and if so, at which stage of an EU legislative decision-making 
process. It is interested to find out whether lobbying the Council was crucial for a small state 
to be successful in a given EU legislative process. 
 
Measurable Indicator 4.1.2: Lobbying the European Commission 
As in 4.1.1, this indicator reveals whether a small state government lobbied the Commission 
and if so, where (in terms of which DG) and at which stage of the process. Since the 
Commission generally holds a lot of influence in EU legislative processes, it is logical to expect 
governments to lobby the Commission at various stages of the processes:  
A - Whether a government used ‘its’ Commissioner network (mainly his/her cabinet) and 
how often did it do so (during decision-shaping or taking or both); 
B - Whether a government ‘uploaded’ successfully its national position (preferences) onto 
the relevant Commission Directorate Generals (during the decision-shaping stage only – this 
is not applicable to the decision-taking stage); 
C - Whether a government ‘used’ seconded national experts (SNEs) to the Commission to 
spread argumentation (uploading of its preferences) within this vital EU institution (during 
decision-shaping or taking or both). 
D - Whether contact was made through bilateral meetings with the European Commissioner 
- the political level - to overcome any differences which could not be resolved by the experts 







































Source: Box compiled by the author. 
 
Box 6.5 on Variable 5 – The foot-dragging strategy 
Foot-dragging refers to a government’s delaying tactics to slow down an EU decision-making 
process. This strategy is used by governments that realize that they will lose out from the 
process (through a negative outcome not matching their preferences). This variable is broken 
down into 3 sub-variables: 
 
Sub-Variable 5.1: Foot-dragging through delaying tactics;  
Sub-Variable 5.2: Foot-dragging by requesting for compensation; and  
Sub-Variable 5.3: Foot-dragging due to low levels of compliance.  
 
Unlike sub-variables 5.1 and 5.3, sub-variable 5.2 is the only one with 3 sub-indicators 
(marked in alphabetical upper case letters). All the sub-variables have a weighting of 5% (a 
score of ‘0’ to ‘5’ – see sub-sections 6.2.3 and 6.5.2) which amount to an overall weight of 
30% (3 measurable indicators + 3 sub-indicators x 5% = 30%). 
 
Sub-Variable 5.1 – Foot-dragging through delaying tactics 
Measurable indicator 5.1.1: Failure to advance own proposals due to similarity of preferences 
Measurable Indicator 4.1.3: Lobbying large state governments (a heterogeneous relationship) 
This indicator examines a heterogeneous type of relationship, i.e. small states lobbying their 
larger counterparts with similar interests in EU legislative negotiations. This type of 
relationship is based on similarities that are ‘issue-specific’. 
 
Measurable Indicator 4.1.4: Lobbying small state governments (a homogeneous relationship)  
This indicator is similar to 4.1.3, albeit with an examination on a homogeneous type of 
relationship, i.e. the lobbying between states of a similar size sharing similar interests in an 
EU process.  
 
Sub-Variable 4.2 – Pace-setting through norm advocacy & effective intervention in Council 
deliberations 
Measurable Indicator 4.2.1: A Government’s capacity to persuade through moral convictions 
Governments also try to pace-set by convincing other parties to the negotiations through 
moral convictions. As already stated in chapter 5, norm advocacy is about persuasive 
argumentation to raise moral consciousness about what is ‘right’ from ‘wrong’ (see Checkel, 
2005) or ‘fair’ from ‘less fair’ during the shaping of draft EU legislation. 
 
Measurable Indicator 4.2.2: A Government’s diplomatic leverage and capacity to engage 
effectively 
A government may influence negotiations through the effective use of language and style as 
a tool to attract and win support for its arguments. For instance, clear and effective 
interventions that link issues together and that are singled out when compared with those of 
other governments in Council negotiations. A government might also intervene numerous 
times to persuade other delegations that a particular issue is of crucial importance to it (and 
that it will therefore not be flexible on any compromise which does not include its 
preferences). Such issues represent a matter of survival for small state governments which 
tend to have a smaller list of preferences than those of larger states. As observed in chapter 
2, small states mainly focus on only some policy spheres (that are extremely crucial to them) 
unlike the larger states. 
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with other active delegations  
This indicator denotes a government’s lack of initiative (‘laggard’ as stated in chapter 5) in EU 
legislative negotiations because its preferences reflect (mirror) those of other delegations 
which are active in attempting to delay a legislative outcome. Therefore, by simply supporting 
these delegations (and by not advancing its own proposals directly in Council), a government 
is aware that its interests are being covered by other delegations in the negotiations. In such 
circumstances and if need be, this government would support other governments holding 
similar interests to it in Council negotiations. This government may also try to block decisions 
being taken either by placing a veto (under unanimous voting in Council) or by joining a 
blocking minority under QMV voting in Council.  
 
Measurable indicator 5.1.2: Delaying and/or circumvention of an outcome through 
argumentation and voting  
This indicator depicts a government which is knowledgeable about a future legislative 
outcome with negative implications for it. It therefore attempts to derail an outcome from 
being taken in Council by persuading other delegations either to block a decision from being 
taken (vetoing under unanimity voting or voting against under QMV) or to amend the EU 
legislative proposal in line with its preferences. Like in pace-setting, this will involve lobbying 
other delegations to form a blocking minority or to amend the proposal in line with its 
preferences. For this to happen, a government must exert considerable effort and play for 
time – something which a Council Presidency will not support given that it will push for a 
compromise to be reached to close the process in Council. This last point exacerbates the 
position of those member states that are not in line with the Council’s common position 
during negotiations (and especially towards the end of the decision-taking stage when 
decisions need to be taken). 
 
Sub-Variable 5.2 – Foot-dragging by requesting for compensation  
Measurable Indicator 5.2.1: Making compensatory-type requests 
A government that foot-drags the decision-shaping stage is aware that it will request for 
compensation if a negative outcome is obtained during the decision-taking stage of the 
negotiations. Such a government will request the following:   
A -            Temporary exemption(s)/derogation(s) – If granted, the approved EU legislation 
will not apply to the member state in question. Permanent derogations are 
extremely hard to achieve and this is not common EU practice. 
B -             Financial compensation – Governments that ‘lose out’ from the process will 
request for compensatory measures in the form of side payments or financial ‘top-
ups’ (for instance, this occurs every time the Council adopts the EU’s financial 
perspectives). 
C -            Concessions in other issue areas – Governments that ‘lose out’ from the process 
will request for a ‘trade-off’ in another EU policy sphere. 
 
Sub-Variable 5.3 – Foot-dragging due to low levels of compliance 
Measurable Indicator 5.3.1: Evaluating adaptation costs 
As stated by the literature on this strategy (see Börzel, 2002), foot-draggers tend to show a 
poor level of compliance with EU law, i.e. during the ‘downloading’ processes of 
implementing and enforcing EU law. High costs of adaptation together with a low capacity to 
implement EU law could therefore cause a government to adopt a delaying strategy during 
negotiations to maintain the status quo (i.e. the non-adoption of an EU act). 
Source: Box compiled by the author. 
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Box 6.6 on Variable 6 – The fence-sitting strategy 
A government fence-sits during most of the process constantly altering its coalitions between 
pace-setters and foot-draggers according to shifts in Council negotiation dynamics. 
  
It is vital to point out that unlike the variables on pace-setting and foot-dragging (which are 
mutually exclusive) fence-sitting could complement either of the previous two strategies. This is 
because a government might start participating more actively in Council negotiations at a later 
stage, at first only studying the situation by listening to other delegations’ interventions. Once 
enough information is achieved a government might then decide to switch to a more pro-active 
strategy. This is usually the case with the smaller states that do not manage to evaluate at first 
all the subtleties in an EU legislative proposal (i.e. once the Commission sends the proposal to 
the Council in the early stages of a legislative process). However, a government might decide to 
fence-sit a whole decision-making process (therefore both decision-shaping and taking). 
Therefore, depending on the salience of the draft EU legislation being discussed, a government 
may adopt a fence-sitting strategy (as a stand-alone strategy) without the need to either pace-
set or foot-drag at some point in the process. This variable is divided into 4 sub-variables with 
an overall weighting of 20% (4 indicators at 5% - see sub-sections 6.2.3 and 6.5.2 on the scoring 
method used in the ‘decision weights and measures’ approach). 
 
Sub-Variable 6.1 – Altering coalitions  
Measurable Indicator 6.1.1:  Frequency of coalition shifting  
This indicator shows a government fence-sitting negotiations and altering coalitions between 
pace-setters and foot-draggers depending on the issues at stake. 
 
Sub-Variable 6.2 – Similar national positions 
Measurable Indicator 6.2.1: Preferences of other governments matching their own 
This indicator is similar to a previous indicator (5.1.1) whereby governments are aware that 
their preferences are being injected into an EU legislative negotiation by other governments 
sharing similar interests. A government adopting this strategy will therefore wait and see how 
negotiations develop. It will only intervene if the situation changes, for instance, if it becomes 
marginalized and cannot accept any longer the amended proposal. In such circumstances, this 
government will need to intervene directly. 
 
Sub-Variable 6.3 – Miscalculating EU outcomes   
Measurable Indicator 6.3.1: Miscalculation of compliance costs   
A government that fence-sits a negotiation might have genuinely miscalculated the compliance 
costs associated with the enforcement of the legislative proposal being negotiated.  
 
Sub-Variable 6.4 – Lack of benchmarks during implementation  
Measurable indicator 6.4.1: New member states with no compliance to base evaluation on 
A government may be new to the EU decision-making process and to the EU generally. It 
therefore lacks experience and/or expertise in EU legislative negotiations. For instance, such a 
government will not have EU legislative compliance benchmarks on which to base its 
arguments. Governments with experience and efficient levels of implementation are more 
likely to understand fully the complexity/ies of an EU legislative proposal being negotiated. This 
is because EU negotiations on draft EU law are highly based on a government’s previous 
experience implementing EU legislation. 




The thesis hypothesizes that the higher the levels of each of the six variables 
manifesting themselves for an EU member state government, the higher the 
probability that it will exercise influence in EU legislative negotiations. As may be 
observed in Table 6.1 and Boxes 6.1 to 6.6, the thesis’s research design is based on 
the literature (already reviewed in chapters 2 and 5) which promote these 
explanatory variables as important agents or factors of influence. They are perceived 
as strong, causal variables capable of furnishing causal explanations about the 
manifestation of small state governmental influence in EU decision-making 
processes. 
 
6.2.3. Qualitative and quantitative approaches: a holistic research design 
 
As Burnham and his colleagues (2008) observe when discussing the meaning of 
research design, a key question is about the research method used to provide the 
best evidence to test the research hypothesis and answer the research questions. 
This forms the basis of the discussion in this sub-section presenting two main 
methodological approaches - a qualitative and quantitative one - to empirically 
examine, test and eventually determine whether Malta’s government manifested 
influence in the selected EU legislative decision-making processes.  
 
Together, qualitative and quantitative approaches complement each other to bestow 
a holistic research design. They bring together different insights to provide a method 
of how to measure member state governmental influence in the EU. This is because 
although the nature of the topic is a qualitative one, the research, being interested 
with measuring governmental influence, needs to incorporate a method of 
quantification of operationalized variables (see Boxes 6.1 to 6.6). Thus a quantitative 
method is useful in assisting to quantify the qualitative. Both methods are eventually 
and empirically cross-checked in chapter 10 in a process known as ‘triangulation’ (see 
Burnham et. al., 2008: 40).  
 
Since the thesis makes use of a mixture of qualitative and quantitative methods, this 
sub-section is divided into two main parts: Parts A and B presenting the qualitative 
and quantitative designs respectively.  
 
Part A: A qualitative approach - the usefulness of the case study design 
 
The thesis uses different qualitative techniques, notably process-tracing and 
documentary analysis besides case studies. The techniques are discussed in more 
detail in section 6.5 on the methods used to collect data. The next paragraphs 
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provide a discussion on the usefulness and validity of the case study design and 
draws upon the relevant literature about this subject matter.  
 
Generally, qualitative techniques are used to understand behaviour of policy actors in 
a process. They are therefore appropriate to study and investigate the ‘why’ and 
‘how’ of decisions made and to gather data in ‘word’ format from participants and 
policy players involved in a process. 
 
In this thesis, the key merit of the qualitative approach is that it facilitates the 
production of information specific to the selected cases. But, as is common with 
qualitative techniques, any more general conclusions deriving from such techniques 
are normally in the form of propositions. This thus warrants the use of a mixed-
method approach (also known as ‘eclectic’ approaches) which combines qualitative 
and quantitative methods. As Diriwächter and Valsiner (2006) observe, by also using 
quantitative methods one is able to give precise and testable expression to 
qualitative ideas. As stated in Part B below, the quantitative approach is thus used to 
complement and seek empirical support for propositions (or better, research 
hypotheses) produced by qualitative methods. Hence they complement rather than 
oppose each other. 
 
Referring to the research question posed earlier, Yin (2009: 4) observes that the more 
a question seeks to explain the ‘how’ factor of how some social phenomenon works - 
in this case, how small state governments influence negotiations - the more that the 
case study method becomes relevant. Simons (2009: 21) defines the case study as 
one that involves an:  
 
‘in-depth exploration from multiple perspectives of the complexity 
and uniqueness of a particular project, policy, institution, 
programme or system in a ‘real life’ context’ (ibid).  
 
She observes that the case study design is research based involving various methods 
and is evidence-led with the aim of obtaining a solid understanding of whatever is 
being researched. 
   
But what makes the case study approach a relevant design for research of this kind? 
According to various authors (see Shavelson and Townes, 2002: 99-106; Cook and 
Payne, 2002: 150-178), one of the case study’s main assets is to remedy and ease the 
fundamental problem of causal inference, or better the impossibility of controlling 
the research environment as is natural to do in a science laboratory. Robert Yin 
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(2009: 15-16) in fact observes that there have been traditional prejudices against the 
case study method arising from its alleged impossibility to capture causal 
relationships (as Yin states, ‘whether a particular “treatment” has been efficacious in 
producing a particular “effect”’) as in a ‘true experiment’.  These authors (and Yin in 
particular) however maintain that to the contrary, case studies may be utilized to 
provide valuable explanations of whatever is being investigated. In fact Yin speaks 
strongly about the value of the case study design when compared with for instance 
the experimental one: 
 
‘experiments, though establishing the efficacy of a treatment (or 
intervention), are limited in their ability to explain “how” or “why” 
the treatment necessarily worked, whereas case studies could 
investigate such issues’ (Yin, 2009: 16). 
 
One very important aspect of a good case study is in the proper selection of the cases 
to be examined. Similar to that found in the comparative design, Burnham et. al. 
(2008: 73) observe that:  
 
‘the most important aspect of formulating either a ’most similar’ or 
a ‘most different’ research design is to select cases that make it 
possible to conclude something interesting about one’s research 
question’.  
 
In a similar vein, Peters (1998: 31) establishes three main criteria for case study 
selection: the maximization of experimental variance, the necessity of reducing as 
much as possible error variance, and to control extraneous variance. What this means 
is that through experimental variance, the effect of certain factors producing an 
outcome is isolated for analysis. This can only be done if one maintains the possibility 
of error variance (which according to Burnham et. al., 2008: 73, entails a careful 
selection of cases that ‘are representative and not one-off or unusual’) at a bare 
minimum. Besides, careful case study selection also involves curtailing undesired 
variance, or better the effect/s of extraneous (any other) factors. 
 
As discussed in the subsequent section justifying the case study selection, this thesis 
features a case study on Malta’s government and its level of influence in three 
specific EU legislative decision-making processes encompassing different legislative 
spheres. The case studies are thus based on carefully selected multiple policy spheres 
as opposed to a single case in a single policy sphere. The advantage of this design is 
that it provides more of a basis to test a small state government’s exercise (or non-
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exercise) of influence in EU legislative negotiations. Besides, the legislative spheres 
have been selected with a fundamentally important element in mind: that of being 
representative of Malta’s needs in extremely relevant policy spheres to it. They are 
therefore not ‘one-offs’ and ‘unusual’: they thus fit Peters criteria on case study 
selection mentioned above. 
 
Indeed, the main justification for the use and selection of the case study approach in 
this thesis draws upon observations made earlier by aforementioned authors. This 
design allows the thesis to study the relationship between the variables and to 
present causal explanations for a government’s degree of influence in EU legislative 
negotiations. By so doing, it provides a wealth of information specific to Malta in EU 
decision-making. 
 
Naturally, concentrating on Malta’s case has eliminated several policy players 
representing other governments that could have featured in this research. However, 
let it be clear that every effort has been made by the author to reconcile this 
‘deficiency’ by being rigorous in the selection of vital official EU and government 
documents and in the selection and manner by which government and EU officials 
were approached and eventually interviewed. 
 
Besides, the thesis also incorporates the comparative design to complement that of 
the case study. In fact, chapter 10 empirically compares the case studies presented in 
chapters 8 and 9 to extract similarities and/or differences between them in the 
findings being produced by the thesis.  
 
Nevertheless, it must be stressed that this research is country and case-specific, 
meaning that different conclusions could have emerged if amplified to a wider range 
of EU member state governments and across other EU legislative decision-making 
processes. But besides having caused problems in adhering to strict timeframes and 
word restrictions, the title of the thesis is clear in that this is a case study of Malta. 
 
Part B: A quantitative approach - the usefulness of constructing a performance matrix 
design 
 
The next paragraphs discuss the merits of using the quantitative approach. In a 
similar vein to Part A, it draws upon the literature on this matter – mainly the 
usefulness of descriptive statistics and levels of measurement and spread for the 




As Howlett et. al. (2009: 7) maintain, the study of public policy is complex and as such 
should not solely involve a qualitative approach such as accessing official records of 
an EU decision-making process (for instance, draft legislative working documents or 
reports). As they state: 
 
‘Although these are a vital source of information, public policies extend 
beyond the record of formal investigation and official decisions to 
encompass the realm of potential choices, or choices not made. The 
analysis of such choices necessarily involves considering the array of 
state and societal actors involved in decision-making processes and 
their capacities for influence and action. Policy decisions do not reflect 
the unencumbered will of government decision-makers so much as the 
evidence of how that will interact with the constraints generated by 
actors, structure, and ideas present at a given political and social 
conjuncture’. 
 
This means that quantitative techniques provide a fundamental connection between 
empirical observation of data collected and data in a mathematical expression in 
numerical form such as statistics. Thus, as already stressed, quantitative analysis 
should be viewed as complimentary and not contradictory to qualitative methods 
such as those used in this thesis – mainly the process-tracing technique involving 
documentary analysis accompanied by elite interviews. Merits of using quantitative 
techniques could point at its utility in collecting a sample of numerical data from 
participants to answer specific questions. This thesis in fact collects data through a 
questionnaire used during interviews, with participants’ replies tabulated in a 
performance scoreboard (this process is being called the ‘decision weights and 
measures’ approach). In short, quantitative techniques are used to act as a layer on 
top of data gathered through qualitative means. 
 
The quantitative elements of this research are based on a particular technique known 
as ‘descriptive statistics’ with ‘levels of measurement and spread’. Descriptive 
statistics is a technique made up of a range of basic statistical tools which, as its 
name implies, describe data. In this study, it is used to describe and determine 
whether Maltese governmental influence existed in certain EU decision-making 
processes. As put by Burnham et. al. (2008: 138), the usefulness and main ‘appeal’ of 




‘a powerful and economical way of measuring, analyzing and 
presenting political phenomena such as voting behaviour, political 
participation, and social and political attitudes generally.’ 
 
As put by Lijphart (1971: 684), another reason for its worth is that there is added 
value in employing this technique when the experimental method is not possible. The 
statistical method and descriptive statistics: 
 
‘entails the conceptual (mathematical) manipulation of empirically 
observed data – which cannot be manipulated situationally as in 
experimental design – in order to discover controlled relationships 
among variables’. 
 
Therefore, making sense of the ‘weighting’ part of the ‘decision weights and 
measures’ approach requires clarification and understanding of which techniques are 
used to arithmetically quantify the variables.  
 
This study spreads out three main categories of weights ranging from ‘High’ to 
‘Medium’ to ‘Low’. Next to each category, one will see the corresponding arithmetic 
scale with a ratio from 0:5. It looks like this: 
 
High =     5 
Medium =   2.5  
Low =    0 
 
However, the level of measurement has to allow for a more accurate spread since 
there might be cases whereby scoring might fall in between the above listed scale. 
Therefore, it is necessary to establish a sharper and more precise spread of 0:5 by 
including middle categories as follows: 
 
Extremely High =  5  
High =    4  
 Medium to High =  3 
 [Medium =   2.5]   
 Low to Medium =  2   
 Low =    1  




In this case, the categories are arithmetically equidistant with the common median 
set at ‘1’. This scale contains a meaningful ‘0’ which according to Burnham et. al. 
(2008: 143) signifies that ratio data is present. But what are levels of measurement 
and ratio data exactly?  
 
The level of measurement, a basic component of descriptive statistics, is labelled by 
literature on descriptive statistics as that of interval-level measurements. Burnham 
and his colleagues (2008: 142) observe that interval-level measurements have one 
distinguishing feature, that of ordered categories and equidistant intervals. But, the 
decision-weights and measures approach used by this thesis goes one step further 
than simply identifying the level of measurement. In fact, the scope behind weighting 
is to make out something meaningful from each variable (or measure) to be able to 
rank their importance in relation to Malta’s government’s influence levels in EU 
decision-making processes. For instance, the government’s intensity levels to pace-
set discussions by lobbying the Commission. Only in this way will one be able to 
actually measure a government’s influence in a process. Therefore, it is necessary to 
make use of another special subset of this technique (levels of measurement and 
spread) referred to as ‘ratio data’. Burnham and his colleagues maintain that: 
 
‘Ratio data meets the general criteria of interval data and in addition 
ratio data has a meaningful zero point… If a variable has no meaningful 
zero then it does not belong to this subject of interval variables ’ 
(Burnham et. al. 2008: 142).  
 
In other words, if one were to take the same indicator of ‘lobbying the European 
Commission’, what these authors suggest is that for those governments that do not 
lobby (a ‘0’ weighting), this means quite simply not being able to possess and 
exercise influence in the process, which is indeed a significant statement. 
 
Such techniques may be considered useful tools to identify levels of measurement for 
each variable and their respective indicators (see Boxes 6.1 to 6.6 above), thus 
proving to be extremely beneficial to determine EU governmental influence during 
legislative decision-making processes. 
  
These techniques are returned to in sub-section 6.5.2 that clarifies the method used 






6.3 Justification for the case study selection 
 
This section clarifies the selection of the case studies presented in Part II of the 
thesis. Section 6.3 first focuses on justifying why Malta is being selected as the small 
EU state government. It then justifies the selection of three specific EU directives.  
 
6.3.1 Malta as the small EU state government 
 
One of the main justifications for selecting Malta over other small EU states is that 
the author is Maltese and holds a genuine interest in this topic. Besides, the author 
has previously worked for Malta’s government as a member of its diplomatic corps. 
He was previously employed as a First Secretary at the Permanent Representation of 
Malta to the EU in Brussels for a number of years. During this tenure, he held a 
number of posts whereby he represented and defended Malta’s interests in various 
policy spheres, such as in the Council negotiations adopting EU legislation on the EU 
structural and cohesion funds (EU cohesion policy) and the EU’s financial 
perspectives for 2007-2013. The author was also a member of the Permanent 
Representative’s secretariat (cabinet) and was appointed to the prestigious position 
of MERTENS. EU member states each have a MERTENS, i.e. a position held by a senior 
diplomat in Brussels who has horizontal responsibility in a government’s structures 
for all Coreper I related issues. The MERTENS must also assist and replace directly the 
deputy permanent representative if unavailable, such as during Coreper I and/or 
ministerial meetings in the Council of Ministers. 
 
Throughout this time, the author has thus participated directly in EU decision-making 
gaining ‘inside’ knowledge on how it functions. In so doing, he developed a keen 
interest to transform his work experience into research. PhD research has provided a 
wonderful opportunity to do this. Furthermore and without being presumptuous, it is 
not often to come across academics (he today lectures European studies at the 
University of Malta) who write about this subject with ‘hands on’ work experience in 
EU processes in the EU institutions. In fact, this has facilitated access to data (such as 
the setting-up of interviews through contacts with former government colleagues 
and other EU member state and EU institution officials built over the years) that 
‘ordinary students’ and more experienced academics would not normally have. The 
author’s experience of EU processes has helped to make the research novel, by 
illustrating accurately what occurs ‘behind the scenes’ in Council negotiations (at 
every level), something which, as stated in chapter 3, is quite secretive due to the 
nature of this particular EU institution. This has facilitated in hopefully making the 
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thesis’s empirical chapters more precise than what is generally found in studies on 
this subject. 
 
Another reason for the selection of Malta is its position as the smallest member state 
in the EU (Malta’s status is discussed in more detail in chapter 7). Previous chapters 
observed that ‘smallness’ is associated with ‘weakness’ in wide discussions about 
power notions of states in mainstream IR theory. As stated, small states are depicted 
as weak players (similar to pawns in a chess game) in the international system or in 
decision-making processes such as those of the EU. The crux here is that logic should 
then follow that Malta, being the smallest EU member state, should be the weakest 
state in EU processes. But as discussed in chapters 2 and 5, this generalization or 
better, conceptualization, is indeed problematic leading to misconceptions about 
power-state debates. As stated in previous chapters, being powerful does not always 
refer to the larger states and to the contrary, weakness does not necessarily imply 
smallness (see Rostoks, 2010: 90). Therefore, this conceptualization linking smallness 
to being weak is examined in Part II of the thesis. 
 
This last reason contains wider implications to do with the overall framework of the 
thesis. Selecting Malta as the smallest EU state allows one to advance the following 
hypothesis: that if Malta’s government manages to exercise influence in EU decision-
making then other larger EU small state governments should be able to do the same. 
Therefore, conducting research on the smallest of the ‘EU small state’ category 
presents an opportunity to add value to the study on small states in EU decision-
making processes.  
 
6.3.2 Selecting three EU directives for empirical analysis 
 
Subsequent empirical chapters (chapters 8 to 10) examine the Maltese government’s 
behaviour during the adoption of three directives – two on the placing of pyrotechnic 
articles on the EU market and another on the extension of long-term EU residency for 
third-country nationals (TCNs) who are beneficiaries of international protection. In 
list format, the cases are the following: 
 
Case 1 – the EU legislative negotiations adopting Directive 2007/23/EC of 23 May 
2007 on the placing on the market of pyrotechnic articles [dealt with in section 8.1 of 
chapter 8]; 
Case 2 - the EU legislative negotiations adopting (recast) Directive 2013/29/EU of 12 
June 2013 on the making available on the market of pyrotechnic articles [dealt with 
in section 8.2 of chapter 8]; and 
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Case 3 – the EU legislative negotiations adopting Directive 2011/51/EU of 11 May 
2011 on amending Council Directive 2003/109/EC on long-term residents to extend 
its scope to beneficiaries of international protection [dealt with in chapter 9]. 
 
These cases are comparatively analysed in chapter 10. 
 
As already observed in chapter 1, there are a number of methodological issues to 
bring up in justifying their selection. The first one has to do with the decision-type of 
the EU legislative instrument, i.e. that the three cases are ‘directives’. This is an 
important aspect requiring clarification since different EU decision-making dynamics 
exist in legislative negotiations adopting different types of EU legislative instruments. 
One might ask why and for what reason? The reply is that during the formation 
stages of an EU legislative act, governments are aware of the implications that the 
implementation of the act will bring to their administrations once it is adopted. For 
instance, EU governments are aware that EU regulations, once adopted, take effect 
immediately whereas EU directives do not. Directives in fact require transposition 
into national law during a specified timeframe. Thus, the analysis of the same type of 
EU instrument presents the thesis with a uniform framework and negotiation 
dynamic (albeit in separate decision-making processes). There is therefore a constant 
existing between the different cases. 
 
These three cases also allow for analysis of differing factors represented on the one 
hand by Council voting and the EU legislative procedures used during the legislative 
negotiations on these EU directives, and on the other, by differing outcomes 
obtained by Malta’s government in each case. Starting with Council voting and the 
legislative procedure for the three cases, Cases 1 and 2 were both decided upon in 
Council by the QMV rule and through the ordinary legislative procedure (the former 
co-decision procedure). However, Case 3 differs in that it was first decided upon by 
unanimity in Council under the consultation legislative procedure (and thus in an 
intergovernmental setting as is stated in chapter 9 without much of a decisive role for 
the EP). This however changed once the Treaty of Lisbon entered into force (on 1 
December 2009) which shifted Council voting and the legislative procedure to QMV 
and the ordinary legislative procedure respectively. In the first two cases, the 
outcomes were both positive for Malta unlike that in the third case where it achieved 
a negative outcome. 
 
This approach thus enables one to determine factors about a small state’s capacities 
and strategies in EU decision-making processes – and hence its exercise or non-
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exercise of influence in these processes - containing analytical value about resulting 
differences in the legislative outcomes for it.  
 
One last factor worth mentioning concerns selection bias, i.e. selecting cases in order 
to prove predetermined ideas and aims. The reply to this is that the author selected 
cases partly on the grounds that there were enough reasons to suspect in advance 
whether Malta’s government exercised influence in them or not. Therefore the 
approach of selecting three directives in more than one EU policy sphere with 
differing outcomes for Malta was deliberately done. This allowed examination of 
whether or not similar or different policy process techniques (governmental 
capacities and strategies) were used in differing policy spheres and processes (all of 
high relevance to the government) to influence decision-making. This framework thus 
permits the extraction of interesting findings for the thesis. 
 
6.4 Ethical assumptions 
 
This thesis follows the Manchester Metropolitan University’s (MMU) policy aim of 
‘behaving professionally and ethically in all its activities’ (MMU, Academic Ethical 
Framework, 2011: 3.1). Thus, the author is aware of the ethical implications that the 
thesis may generate which is why research was conducted in a disciplined manner 
within legal and other regulated constraints and with minimal impact on and 
detriment to others (as stipulated in the MMU’s ethical framework guidelines). The 
thesis has thus undergone an ethical review as part of the acceptance application 
process.  
 
Ethical issues arising in this thesis concern mainly research participants who were the 
main players in the legislative negotiations examined in the thesis and who were 
interviewed as part of the data collection process. In order to maintain and ensure 
their integrity and confidentiality, the interview participants requested to be kept 
anonymous (see 6.5.1). The list of interview participants is however available and 
may be provided to the examiners upon request. Besides asking for their consent, 
participants were informed about the true nature and purpose of the research and 
were told that they could withdraw themselves and their data at any time during the 
interview. This therefore demonstrates that the research conducted is in line with 







6.5 Methods of data collection 
 
This section indicates the methods used as part of the data collection process of this 
thesis.  
 
Two main methods were used to examine Malta’s governmental influence in EU 
legislative negotiations. First, a qualitative approach encompassing the process-
tracing technique by means of documentary analysis accompanied by elite 
interviews. Second, a quantitative method consisting in the aforementioned ‘decision 
weights and measures’ approach (as stated, this technique is known as descriptive 
statistics with levels of measurement and spread). Here, data was collected through a 
questionnaire (a sample of which is provided in Annex 1) conducted with research 
participants during interviews. Thus, data collection was in line with the research 
design discussed earlier encompassing both qualitative and quantitative elements. 
 
6.5.1 The process-tracing technique through documentary analysis and interviews: 
a qualitative approach 
 
Process-tracing is a valuable method to make confident within-case inferences about 
mechanisms (see Beach and Pedersen, 2013: 2) existing in EU decision-making 
processes. By tracing the causal process from the independent to the dependent 
variables, the process-tracing method enables one to eliminate other potentially 
intervening variables, for instance in imperfectly matched cases, allowing for more 
confident arguments attributing causal significance to the remaining independent 
variables. George and Bennett (2005: 206-207) define process-tracing as:  
 
‘attempts to identify the intervening causal process – the causal 
chain and causal mechanism – between an independent variable (or 
variables) and the outcome of the dependent variable’. 
 
Beach and Pedersen (2013: 1-2) strongly maintain that ‘process-tracing methods are 
arguably the only method that allows us to study causal mechanisms’ since it enables 
the researcher to make strong within-case inferences about the causal process from 
which outcomes are produced. As they observe, this facilitates and strengthens the 
confidence a researcher may hold in the validity of a theorized causal mechanism. 
They emphasize that it is: 
 
‘an ‘ordinary’ social science method... with comparative strengths and 
weaknesses. It is not a panacea, but when applied in appropriate 
140 
 
research situations, it can enable us to make strong within-case causal 
inferences about causal mechanisms based on in-depth single-case 
studies that are arguably not possible with other social science 
methods’ (ibid). 
 
Of relevance to this thesis is that these authors observe that there are different 
variants to this technique, one of which is ‘explaining-outcome’ which has 
ramifications on the thesis’s ontological and epistemological foundations, i.e. the use 
of mixed-methods. They maintain that: 
 
‘explaining-outcome process-tracing attempts to craft a minimally 
sufficient  explanation of a puzzling outcome in a specific historical 
case. Here the aim is not to build or test more general theories but to 
craft a (minimally) sufficient explanation of the outcome of the case 
where the ambitions are more case-centric than theory-oriented... 
Accounting for the outcome of a case usually requires an eclectic 
combination of different mechanisms, some of them case-
specific/nonsystematic’ (Beach and Pedersen, 2013: 3). 
 
Crucially, Beach and Pedersen emphasize that the process-tracing technique has 
more value added than other techniques, such as comparative cross-case methods, 
to gather a strong understanding about the nature of causal relationships existing 
within a system or process and which are case-specific. This is because while 
congruence investigates correlations between independent variables, the process-
tracing technique investigates the ‘workings of the mechanism(s) that contribute to 
producing an outcome’ (ibid: 5). The gist here is that process-tracing goes beyond 
correlations to trace the theoretical causal mechanism(s) linking such variables.  
 
This technique is used by the thesis to verify whether Malta’s preferences form part 
of the selected and adopted EU directives. This means that the government’s position 
is traced in Council Working Group documents and eventually, as discussions 
progress in the Council, to documents at the political level, i.e. Coreper and the 
Council of Ministers. But it must be stated clearly that such documents only form a 
sample of all the Council documents issued during a specific legislative negotiation. 
This is mainly because it is impossible to access all Council working documents 
pertaining to a legislative file due to their sensitivity and inaccessibility to the public. 
There are thus constraints present. Having said this, the author was able to access 
those Council and Commission documents of most relevance to this study to 
comprehend Malta’s behaviour in the EU processes selected for analysis. Use was 
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mainly made of the footnotes in Council working documents that record EU member 
state interventions during legislative negotiations over every legislative article. This 
technique was therefore useful to trace and capture Malta’s position (besides that of 
other delegations) throughout all the stages of the negotiations. 
 
As previously stated, this has a bearing on the testing of the government’s influence 
exposing its strategies - whether any changes in Malta’s actions may be traced as a 
result of an emerging situation occurring in Council. As a result, process-tracing 
allows one to better understand the dynamics occurring during legislative 
negotiations and in this thesis, to take account of Malta’s exercise (or not) of 
influence in Council discussions.  
 
Therefore, the process-tracing technique does not only reveal any changes in for 
instance  wording of the draft legislative proposals of those Council and/or 
Commission documents relevant to the legislative cases (reviewed in the empirical 
chapters). It also determines shifts in governmental actions and strategies as a 
response to such changes. However, in order to be able to validate propositions 
emerging from the documentary analysis, process-tracing in this thesis is beefed-up 
with interviews held with research participants. 
    
On this last point about interviews, there are a number of arising issues. First, as 
already stated under the previous section on ethical assumptions, the thesis ensures 
the anonymity of participants during and after research conducted (the list of the 
interview participants may however be presented to the examiners upon request). 
Since EU decision-making processes involve sensitive data (even if the selected 
processes involved past cases, i.e. the adoption of EU directives which have already 
occurred (in recent years) and which were not ongoing during the research), the 
disclosure of information by Maltese and EU officials required a level of protection 
being afforded by anonymous participation. Second, it is relevant to point out that in 
addition to interviews that were conducted in Malta, the author held a study trip in 
Brussels in January 2014 to interview the main EU officials having participated 
directly in the legislative negotiations examined by the thesis. As stated in section 
6.3, this was relevant to stir away from possible bias which could have been created 
by sole participation in the research of the main Maltese government officials. In 
other words, it was necessary to collect data about Malta’s behaviour in EU processes 
from relevant sources independent from the government and who were also parties 
to those EU legislative negotiations analyzed in chapters 8 and 9. Third, the necessity 
for interviews to be conducted was dictated by the quantitative approach (described 
in more detail in the next sub-section) to score the thesis’s variables.  
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6.5.2 The ‘decision weights and measures’ – a quantitative approach 
 
The ‘decision weights and measures’ is an approach made up of three steps and 
consists of a performance matrix to score the six variables presented earlier on 
governmental capacities and strategies. 
 
Step-one of the approach incorporates the ‘indicative-type’ variables, i.e. variables 1 
to 3 on governmental capacities (see Table 6.1 and Boxes 6.1 to 6.3 presented 
earlier). These variables have the task of only ‘indicating’ (hence the name-type of 
these variables) and not ‘identifying’ whether a government exercised influence in 
Council legislative negotiations. Therefore not actual influence - and whether this has 
been exercised or not in a negotiation - but rather the capacity to influence. As 
emphasized in chapter 2, this has in fact marked the way in which smallness has been 
previously studied in IR, i.e. in terms of capabilities, whereby assumptions of having 
capacities implies pending action (see Morgenthau, 1972: 129-30). For instance, Walt 
(1987) examined how the capabilities of large states brought alliances while other 
authors like Wivel (2000) have studied how and why small states would want (or not) 
to join them. In short, the task of determining whether a government actually 
exercised influence or not is left for other variables (referred to as ‘action-type’ 
variables below) found in the second step of the approach. Each indicator for 
variables 1 to 3 (see Boxes 6.1 to 6.3 presented earlier in the chapter) are scored 
according to a positive or negative mark – a range of 0 to 5 with a 0 to 2.5 equivalent 
to a negative rating and a 2.5 to 5 equivalent to a positive one as explained before in 
section 6.2 - that presents the research with something valid about a government’s 
capacity of possessing appropriate tools to exercise influence. In brief, the scoring of 
variables 1 to 3 on a government’s core domestic characteristics thus furnishes a 
preliminary ‘indication’ about its influence.  
 
Step-two of the approach consists in scoring ‘action-type’ variables (variables 4 to 6) 
on governmental strategies. Unlike in the first-step, step-two evaluates how 
governments behave during negotiations (linking the first set of variables with the 
second in the process - this is because if one was to take the same example 
illustrated above about alliances in Wivel’s study (2000), one should be more 
interested in trying to understand how and why small states would join alliances and 
thus, governmental strategies to do this). These variables are also scored using the 
same 0 to 5 scale. It is relevant to note that the first two steps of the approach are 
empirically conducted in chapters 8 and 9 of the thesis with data presented in tables 




Once the first two steps are completed, step-three (which is empirically conducted in 
chapter 10) adds up the data collected (see Tables 10.1 to 10.3 in chapter 10). 
Therefore, step-three of the approach cross-checks the total ratings of steps-one and 
two and determines an overall positive or negative rating for the Maltese 
government’s level of influence in each of the legislative cases analyzed in chapters 8 
and 9. For instance, if the total average score for step-one is ‘3’ (and thus, a positive 
rating according to the previously illustrated 0 to 5 scale) and that for step-two is ‘4’ 
(another positive rating), then the overall result arrived at in step-three is positive 
(having achieved a ‘3.5’ average). In this example, the separate results for steps-one 
(3 out of 5) and two (4 out of 5) correspond with each other being both positive.  
 
The logic behind this is that negative or positive categories indicated for variables 1 
to 3 in step-one usually lead to similar scores (signifying a low or high degree of 
governmental influence) for variables 4 to 6 in step-two (although it must be said 
that there could be cases when this does not occur). Therefore, step-three indicates a 
government’s level of influence and whether it was exercised during EU legislative 
negotiations. In this thesis, it thus determines quantitatively whether Malta, the 
smallest EU member state government, exercises influence to punch beyond its 
weight and possibly over-achieve in those EU legislative decision-making processes 
presented in chapters 8 and 9. 
 
In brief, the approach may be illustrated as follows: 
Step-1: Indicating indicative governmental influence capacity levels 
 +  
Step-2: Indicating actual governmental influence levels in EU negotiations 
---------------------------------- 
Step-3: Determining influence or no influence [weighting total averages + comparing 
results of steps-1 and 2] 
 
Thus the motive behind this approach is that in order to validate and justify the 
hypothesis -  that small state governments in the EU can influence EU decision-
making even if they are hampered by certain vulnerabilities - and be able to answer 
the research questions about whether an EU small state government did or did not 
exert influence in the decision-shaping and taking stages of EU legislative 
negotiations and if in the affirmative, how and at which stage it did so, this must 
involve a series of steps that will eventually lead to a conclusion about a 




The ‘decision weights and measures’ approach is being advanced by this research 
because of the inadequacies of existing approaches that do not provide an ideal ‘test-
bed approach’ for this kind of analysis. This said and as explained earlier, the 
approach finds inspiration from elements present in other models, with its main 
strength being that of allowing explanations about governmental influence in EU 
decision-making. As aforementioned, EU decision-making processes involve a myriad 
of policy actors with preferences to defend and upload into such processes. Besides, 
EU decision-making itself is a slippery process with policy goal-posts continuously 
shifting. Therefore, it is extremely difficult to extract findings from such a process 
about a specific government’s influence and relate it to a positive or negative 
outcome being achieved by the government. To this end, the ‘decision weights and 
measures’ approach proves to be appropriate and useful, besides being a rigorous 
and accurate tool to achieve findings of this sort in this study. 
 
In practical terms, this method of measuring influence could also prove useful to EU 
small state administrations to predict which strategies ought to be adopted prior to 
the start of legislative negotiations in the Council and the EP. As re-emphasized in 
chapter 10, there is no doubt that this factor will definitely equip small states address 
and make amends for major deficiencies related to their size.  
 
6.5.3 Sources for the empirical research 
 
Whereas the reference section at the end of the thesis lists all the sources used for 
this research, this sub-section only focuses on the sources used in researching the 
empirical chapters: that is, the case studies. 
 
These sources are mainly working documents issued by Malta’s government and by 
the EU institutions, particularly those of the Council, Commission and the EP. Some of 
these documents were available and downloadable from the EU’s official portal 
(http://www.europa.eu). For instance, the EUR-Lex portal provided access to EU 
legislation and other related documents as well as to the EU’s Official Journal and 
legislative procedures, amongst others.  
 
The primary sources mainly referred to in the empirical research are Council Working 
Group and Coreper documents. The research also made use of Council conclusions 
and their respective press releases, EP committee and plenary reports and 
Commission working papers such as Commission impact assessment reports and 
draft legislative proposals. Many of these documents are not in the public domain, 
but were made available to the author during interviews with officials from Malta’s 
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government and the EU institutions. It is relevant to point out that these officials 
participated directly in the EU legislative negotiations examined by this thesis and 
therefore represent the main players that could have been interviewed by the 
author. The interviews themselves thus constituted a primary source of information 
during which the participants were asked to complete a questionnaire and respond 
to questions produced by the author (see Annexes 1 to 3). Other primary sources 
used were the Maltese government’s official portal (www.gov.mt) - which provided 
information about amongst others, the government’s structures and contact persons 
- and newspaper articles (both local and foreign).  
 
For the empirical chapters, use was also made of various secondary sources (mainly 
books and academic journals) of which the complete list (for all the chapters in the 
thesis) is found in the thesis’s reference section.  
 
6.5.4 Difficulties met by this research  
 
As evidenced by a multitude of methodological literature, political science is faced 
with major stumbling blocks when testing and experimenting cases. This is because 
the discipline is unable to control the research environment in the same manner as 
the natural sciences in a laboratory. 
 
Burnham et. al. (2008: 71) observe that:  
 
‘the experimental method normally has a better ability to generate 
this type of explanation than the statistic and comparative methods. 
However, in political science such explanations are rare because the 
research environment is impossible to control fully’.  
 
Literature calls this situation (see King, Keohane and Verba, 1994) the ‘fundamental 
problem of causal inference’. Burnham et. al. (2008: 71) note that:  
 
‘it is a very fundamental problem because without experimental 
control it is impossible to say with complete certainty that one’s 
conclusions are correct’.  
 
Even though the design of this research does not incorporate the experimental 
method, it is still relevant to note that the author is well aware of certain kind of 
deficiencies common to qualitative research of this sort. Indeed, the mixture in the 
design of both qualitative and quantitative methods was selected to make up for 
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such difficulties in a way that best suits this type of research. In fact, the thesis 
adopts methodology techniques widely used by literature on this subject matter. 
 
Besides the difficulty of how to test and determine the exercise of governmental 
influence, there were another couple of intricacies in relation to the ‘decision weights 
and measures’ approach described earlier. In the empirical chapters, the scoring of 
indicators for the first three variables on a government’s capacities was necessarily 
performed by Maltese government officials and not those of other EU governments 
or EU institutions. This was because it is Maltese public officers that have certain 
knowledge of how the country and its administration work. But indicators for 
variables 4 to 6 were scored by both Maltese and EU officials who participated 
directly in the legislative negotiations examined in the empirical chapters. The gist 
here is that there might be criticism levelled to a certain degree of ‘unevenness’ in 
the method used to weight the variables present in steps-one and two of this 
method. But in reply it would have been extremely difficult to escape the obvious 
bias-trap which would have been created had all the six variables about the Maltese 
government’s capacities and strategies been weighted by officials from that 
government. Thus, as the method stands, government and EU officials are involved. 
 
A different issue has to do with the actual ratio data, or more precisely, the weighting 
(or scoring) consisting of a 0 to 5 scale (explained previously in sub-section 6.2.3) to 
show different intensity levels for each of the independent variables. Possible 
criticism could point towards the vulnerability of adopting such a thorough scoring 
mechanism to quantify aspects (governmental influence) belonging to the socio-
political world. One might argue that a simpler scoring device such as an approximate 
‘high’ to ‘low’ indicator without ratio data could have constituted a better or 
preferred option. In other words, the thesis could have settled for a simpler 
mechanism without the need to distinguish between different scores – for instance, 
one might ask why has an indicator scored ‘3’ not ‘4’ and another ‘2.3’ instead of 
‘2.5’? Indeed, the author is aware about the risky business that small differences in 
these values could impact the overall conclusions. This argument could be countered 
by first pointing at the literature, dealt with previously, arguing in favour for using 
such techniques (such as ratio data in descriptive statistics). Second, asking 
government and EU officials to score the variables during interviews conducted with 
them permitted the data collected to be accurate (this having been derived from 
reliable sources holding relevant and expert knowledge on the subject). Besides, 
there has been a great effort at all times and as best as possible to keep at bay the 




One last difficulty related with this last argument has to do with the subjectivity of 
scoring itself. The scores themselves may vary among different individuals (officials), 
even if representing the same institution or government. In simpler words, one 
person may value the weights differently from another. Moreover, the method of 
assessing or weighing up influence requires one to make do with the judgements and 
choices of officials who might have built preconceived ideas about factors to influence 
EU decision-making. This means that research of this kind could be seen by critics as 
running the risk of being value-driven making the whole exercise in identifying and 
measuring influence obscure and extremely difficult to pronounce confidently. One of 
the best ways to counter this is to refer to relevant literature (see Hogwood and 
Gunn, 1984; Bovens and ‘t Hart, 1996; Marsh and McConnell, 2010a and 2010b) faced 
with this problem and that reacts in this manner:  
 
‘any credible framework for policy success (or influence) needs to 
recognize the realities and difficulties of studying complex 
phenomena. To do otherwise would be a disservice to political 
analysis, and would gloss over crucial issues of power and politics’ 
(emphasis added in parenthesis) (McConnell, 2010: 81). 
 
In its own way, this research tries to respond to the above drawback by analyzing 
each of the scores of each interviewee against the nature of the question being asked, 
thus ensuring that scores are truthful to the question posed. Besides, scores were 
tested and compared with those of other participants. As previously stated, scores 
were eventually given averages avoiding any unnecessary and excessive imbalances in 
each of the replies, thus minimizing value variance. 
 
As aforementioned, such difficulties outlined above are very common among 
research and literature of this type. McConnell, in his study on identifying and 
measuring success, sheds light on how complex and problematic this can be. He 
comes up with a list of problems which he calls ‘complicating factors’ and states that: 
 
‘identifying success is bedevilled by assessing phenomena, such as 
partial achievement of objectives, contradictory objectives and 
unintended consequences’, and that ‘success for one actor/group 
might be failure for another’(McConnell, 2010: 7).  
 
Like previous authors mentioned earlier (such as King, Keohane and Verba, 1994) 
preoccupied with the fundamental problem of causal inference, McConnell also 
points to the difficulty of isolating policy outcomes from other societal factors that 
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might have had an impact on the outcomes, as well as problems related to time and 
spatial context. To his credit, he suggests ways of how research can confront and 
navigate through such issues (a ten-point framework consisting of ten questions and 
answers to guide researchers on how to study policy success – see McConnell, 2010: 
96-101). McConnell’s framework is extremely helpful and was followed closely during 
the development of the thesis’s overall methodological design on how to study such a 
complex phenomenon of the influence of a small state in EU decision-making 
processes. 
 
In a similar vein to the scope behind this chapter – that of establishing 
methodological assumptions with methods to measure governmental influence in EU 
decision-making processes - McConnell also attempts to confront such seemingly 
daunting methodological difficulties in weighing up the relative importance of 
differing combinations of successes and failures in his research framework. Most 
importantly, he states that ‘judgements are inescapable’ when stirring ones research 
through the complexities found in a topic. 
 
As a final note, it is also worth indicating difficulties encountered by the qualitative 
method in this thesis. The key issue here was whether to opt for a single country case 
study as against a multivariate one. Mainly due to time and space constraints and the 
difficulty in obtaining first-hand and sensitive information about other states, the 
research adopted a single case study framework. Justification for this choice has 
already been indicated earlier. Consequently, there might be some form of criticism 
pointing at the inadequacy of generalizing findings that are valid to a particular small 
state being applied to EU small states generally. Although there is a valid point here, 
one must bear in mind that an element of comparative analysis with other member 
states exists as ‘passing passages’ throughout the empirical research, particularly in 
chapter 10, which counters in part this criticism. Furthermore, sections 6.2 and 6.3 
have in fact already justified the usefulness and selection of a case study design 
emphasizing that Malta’s exercise (or non-exercise) of influence is examined 
empirically in multiple legislative settings (i.e. multiple spheres in multiple processes). 
 
6.5.5 Positive aspects deriving from this research 
 
As already pointed out and in relation with the thesis’s quantitative design, a 
questionnaire to score the ‘decision-weights and measures’ scoreboard was used 
during interviews with various government and EU officials (see Annex 1). They have 
all reacted positively to it and have recognized in it a practical way of determining 
governmental influence in the decision-making process – as already emphasized, by 
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no means an easy task. This thus adds value to the justifications for the 
questionnaire’s use (already established in sub-section 6.2.3). Particularly, Maltese 
government officials have been recorded as stating that it is a practical method that 
could be employed by the government and by other EU states (particularly the small 
states) in EU decision-making processes. 
 
Another positive aspect worth indicating here concerns the thesis’s qualitative 
design. The thesis has brought together a number of factors that up to now have 
been dealt with separately by literature on decision-making and governmental 
influence in the EU. What is meant here is that governmental strategies are featuring 
prominently together with core facets of governments’ capacities to influence 
decision-shaping and taking. The research thus links directly different strands of 
literature (reviewed in previous chapters) that are normally dealt with separately in 
studies of this kind.  
 
Most importantly, the thesis links different methods and techniques, in this case 
qualitative and quantitative methods - the process-tracing technique through 
documentary analysis and interviews with the ‘decision weights and measures’ 
approach - to test and analyze the Maltese government’s influence in EU decision-
making processes. It therefore relies on different methods to provide the research 




Chapter 6 has focused on all the methodological aspects of the thesis. It has returned 
to the literature reviewed earlier in chapters 2 and 5 on factors of small state 
capacities and strategies and clarified how the independent variables are used by the 
empirical research in Part II of the thesis. 
 
This chapter has explained the methodological design of the thesis, made up of both 
qualitative and quantitative approaches, linking it with the main research questions 
and hypothesis. Besides, chapter 6 has produced justification for the selection of 
Malta as the smallest EU member state and for the three legislative cases that are 
examined in the following chapters. It has also dealt with issues such as ethical 



































Chapter 7 describes Malta’s relations with the EU, with the intention of allowing the 
reader to place in context the three legislative case studies found in chapters 8 and 9.  
 
Section 7.1 begins with a brief overview of Malta’s key geographical, economic and 
political characteristics. It also gives key dates in Malta’s EU membership process and 
its first few years of EU membership.  
 
Section 7.2 deals with Malta’s post-EU membership reality. It examines the 
government’s modus operandi when preparing and co-ordinating a national position 
for uploading processes in EU decision-making. In short, it highlights the 
government’s administrative machinery, i.e. the role played by various governmental 
ministries and departments and in their co-ordination to cope with the vastness and 
complexity of EU legislative decision-making processes.    
 
Finally, section 7.3 provides a brief conclusion. 
 
This chapter is necessary to enable the reader to fully grasp how Malta’s government 
functions internally when dealing with EU matters. It thus constitutes a necessary 
background to the case studies presented in the next chapters.  
 
7.1 An overview of Malta in its historical path towards EU membership 




With a population of around 425,384 inhabitants (see Malta National Statistics Office 
(NSO), 2014 figures: vii) with density levels at 1,346 persons per km2 and a surface 
area of 316 km2 (122 square miles), Malta is the smallest (followed by Luxembourg 
with a population of 550,999 inhabitants as of April 2015 – see 
http://countrymeters.info/en/Luxembourg) and most dense (after the Netherlands) 




Table 7.1 – A profile of Malta’s geography 
Area:                                                                    316 km2 (122 square miles)  
Shoreline Malta:                                                  200.0 km  
Shoreline Gozo and Comino:                               71.2 km 
Situated:                                                                       Central Mediterranean at 93 km south     
of Sicily and 290 km north of Libya  
Capital City:                                                          Valletta                                                                      




Malta’s economy has developed from the mid-1960s from one that was tailor-made 
to the needs of the British colonial administration to an open market-driven 
economy. Today, emphasis is given to higher value added economic activities in 
services, above all financial, aviation and information technology services, tourism 
and the gaming and pharmaceuticals sectors. Its economy is also linked to its 
maritime status, notably the ship building and repair industry as well as fishing. The 
main challenges to Malta’s economy are linked to its small size (a relatively small 
domestic market) and to the fact that it is an open economy, meaning that it is prone 
to external shocks. Other disadvantages, such as transport costs, manifest 
themselves due to it being an island and its insular location on the periphery of the 
EU. Malta’s main assets are its pleasant and attractive climate, an optimal regulatory 
regime and a qualified, skilled and hard-working labour force (NSO, 2014: iii). Since 
achieving EU membership, Malta’s GDP growth rate for the years 2010 to 2013 
(latest year with available statistics) stood at 7.5%, 4.5%, 4.1% and 4.6% respectively 
(NSO, 2014: 21). Malta has the fourth lowest rate of unemployment in the EU and 
has also reduced its deficit below 3% of GDP which led the Commission to withdraw 
its official excessive deficit procedure against Malta (CIA World Factbook, 2013). 
 
Table 7.2 – A profile of Malta’s economy in US $ (2015 estimates) 
Monetary Unit:                                                            Euro (€) (since 2008) 
GDP:                                                                             $11bn (PPP) 
Real GDP growth:                                                        2.2% 
GDP per capita:                                                            32, 977 International Dollars 
Inflation (CPI):                                                              1.2% 
Unemployment:                                                           6.1% 
Total exports:                                                               $5.105bn (2013 estimate) 
Total imports:                                                              $7.436bn (2013 estimate)                               
Public debt:                                                                  71.3% of GDP 
Credit rating:                                                                  Standard & Poor’s: BBB+; outlook: stable 
                                                                                    Moody’s: A3; outlook: stable 




7.1.3 The political system 
 
Malta’s political system is based on a parliamentary representative democracy with 
the President of Malta as the constitutional head of state. Executive authority is held 
by the President but with the general direction and leadership of the government 
and cabinet held by the Prime Minister. 
 
Legislative authority is vested in the Parliament of Malta consisting of the President 
and the unicameral House of Representatives with a speaker presiding over it. 
Parliament is elected by universal suffrage through a single transferable vote system 
(a variant of the proportional representation electoral system) for a five year 
mandate. In normal circumstances, sixty-five parliamentary seats are filled by 
members of parliament (MPs) elected from thirteen multi-seat constituencies each 
returning five MPs. 
 
Judicial power rests with the Chief Justice and the Judiciary of Malta.  
 
Over the years, Malta has been dominated by two major political parties, namely the 
Nationalist Party (NP) - a Christian democratic and conservative party - and the 
Labour Party (LP) - a social democratic party. Third parties, such as the Democratic 
Alternative Party (AD) (the Greens) have failed to ever be elected to parliament. The 
last general election held in Malta to date took place on 9 March 2013. The LP won 
this election by over 35,000 votes (representing 55% of the votes) which represented 
the biggest electoral victory ever experienced by a political party in Malta. However, 
if one were to take the total number of general elections held in Malta since gaining 
independence in 1964 – that is eleven general elections - the NP won six of them11 (it 
also achieved an absolute majority of the votes cast in the 1981 general election 
despite not obtaining a parliamentary majority) and thus is the party that has served 














Table 7.3 – A profile of the 9 March 2013 general election result in Malta 




Seats +/- (from previous 
editions) 





















































Total 309,600 100.0 /  69 0 
Source: Government of Malta: 
http://www.gov.mt/en/Government/Government%20of%20Malta/Election%20Results/Pages/General
-Election-2013-Results.aspx (accessed on 31 October 2013). 
 
7.1.4 The pre-EU membership scenario 
 
Starting from Malta’s most recent political history, it gained independence from the 
UK on 21 September 1964 and joined the United Nations (UN) that same year. A year 
later it joined the Council of Europe (CoE). Its relationship with the EU (at the time 
the EEC) began with the signing of an Association Agreement in 1970 which was the 
third agreement of this type to be negotiated between the EU and non-EU 
countries.12 Malta applied for EU membership for the first time in 1990. 
 
This last issue stole the local political agenda for more than a decade, with the main 
two political parties at loggerheads over it - with the LP opposing EU membership 
and preferring a free trade area agreement as an alternative and the NP in favour of 
EU membership. Domestic events that followed in 1996 did not help Malta’s EU 
membership bid with a return of the LP in government and a reassessment of its 
foreign policy with the EU. The LP government in fact decided to ‘freeze’ Malta’s 
membership application shortly after returning to power (besides suspending Malta’s 
participation in NATO’s Partnership for Peace (PfP)). 
 
However, Malta was back on track for membership when in 1998 the NP was 
returned to government (due to an early election as a result of the LP losing a vote of 
confidence in parliament that same year). The NP government re-activated Malta’s 
EU membership application which was accepted by the Vienna European Council of 




‘The European Council welcomes Malta's decision to reactivate its 
application for European Union membership and takes note of the 
intention of the Commission to present at the beginning of next year 
an updating of its favourable opinion of 1993’ (European Council 
Conclusions (1998): point 61) 
 
During the Finnish Presidency in December 1999, the Helsinki Summit confirmed the 
EU’s commitment to start pre-accession negotiations with Malta in February 2000. 
  
In 2002 Malta finalized pre-accession negotiations with the Commission and held a 
national referendum on 8 March 2003 with 53.6% of the electorate in favour of EU 
membership and the remaining 46.4% against (with a turnout of 91%). Of the nine 
referenda occurring in acceding countries at that time, Malta’s referendum resulted 
in both the highest turnout and the tightest result (The Today Public Policy Institute, 
2014: 21). Since the LP refused to accept the referendum result, this issue dominated 
the general election held only a month later in April of that year with the electorate 
reconfirming the NP to power hence paving the way to EU membership.  Malta 
signed the Accession Treaty in Athens on 16 April 2003 and joined the EU on 1 May 
2004. Malta eventually joined the Euro zone on 1 January 2008. 
 
7.2 The co-ordination of EU affairs post-EU membership 
 
7.2.1 The post-EU membership scenario  
 
Following EU membership, successive NP governments focused on turning Malta’s EU 
membership accomplishment into a success. Following in the NP’s footsteps, the 
current LP government has openly declared that it intends accomplishing excellence 
in the EU. It did in fact reverse its position on the EU soon after the 2008 marginal 
general election defeat and managed to secure the majority of EP seats in two of 
three European elections held in Malta since 2004.13 
 
Just over a decade since Malta became an EU member, it is still coming to terms and 
adapting itself to cope with the immense pressures EU membership brings - such as 
coping with the vast EU agendas and participation in as many EU decision-making 
processes as possible. Malta has had many challenges to face so far and it has also 
achieved positive results.  
 
For instance, adopting the euro as a national currency in 2008 was a major challenge. 
However, it has enabled Malta, as the smallest EU member state, to lock itself to one 
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of the strongest currencies in the world and attract investors through security 
guarantees and risk reduction. This has proved priceless in both the financial and 
economic crisis and in the ensuing economic recession that Europe has recently 
faced. Contrary to other small EU and euro member states (such as Ireland, Greece 
and Cyprus), Malta emerged unscathed from this situation. As maintained by Malta’s 
former Prime Minister, Lawrence Gonzi, it managed to weather the storm: 
 
‘We’ve weathered the storm so far, but I keep saying, no 
complacency, the trouble is still there, all our major markets are 
having to implement some severe austerity. If they suffer we suffer 
and it’s important to remain nimble, fast and responsive to what is 
happening around us’ (interview held by Global with Malta’s former 
Prime Minister, Lawrence Gonzi, in 2011). 
 
This can be largely attributed to certain unique characteristics of Malta. In particular, 
its insular and lower bank exposure to the sovereign debt of peripheral European 
countries (CIA World Factbook, 2013). This situation may also be attributed to 
successive Maltese governments which in the past took difficult decisions such as 
those on austerity measures to make the country less vulnerable to financial shocks. 
 
The following is a shortlist by Richard Cachia Caruana, the former Permanent 
Representative of Malta to the EU (in a speech he gave in Valletta in 2012 
commemorating eight years of Malta’s EU membership), of some positive results for 
Malta accruing to EU membership:  
 
- changes to EU budget legislation which previously had existed for years but 
 which worked against Malta as the most densely populated country in the EU; 
-    the re-shaping of the EU's policy on illegal immigration ensuring that the need 
 for solidarity due to the great burden placed on Malta by illegal immigration 
 became not just part of the EU vocabulary but also part of EU policy;  
-    adjustments to the EU’s development policy to channel further funds to the 
 countries of origin of irregular migrants; 
-    the hosting in Malta of an EU agency, the European Asylum Support Office; 
-    ensuring that the Regulation on the Registration, Evaluation and Authorization 
 of Chemicals (REACH) had an SME focus; and  




In his speech, Malta’s former Permanent Representative also noted something of 
extreme importance and magnitude about Malta’s socio-cultural changes brought 
about by EU membership:  
 
‘EU membership has changed the way both government and the 
private sector do business and how they take decisions. There is a 
greater focus on the longer term. There is a greater emphasis on 
managing the realities before us and on husbanding our resources as 
against the amateurish wishful thinking of the past’ (Permanent 
Representation of Malta to the EU, 2012). 
 
7.2.2 Co-ordination of EU affairs 
 
As a result of EU membership, Malta has had to adapt its administration and co-
ordination to deal with two new processes. First, its right to fully participate in EU 
decision-making uploading processes. More specifically, Malta’s co-ordination 
process was devised to ensure that the government has ‘clout’ in the EU decision-
making process and that, whenever possible, it punches above its weight – especially 
in the Council of the EU. For Malta’s government, the co-ordination and changes 
needed in its structures to be able to effectively upload its preferences into EU 
decision-making processes was a new reality in the immediate pre-post-membership 
period.14 Second, its obligation as a member state to comply with, implement and 
enforce EU legislation - a process better known as the downloading process. 
  
These necessary changes were devised before 2004, on the basis of careful studies of 
other EU member state national systems being undertaken to provide Malta with a 
model it could learn lessons from. In fact, Finland’s co-ordination system was seen as 
most suitable since it was believed that it ‘mirrored the domestic needs of the 
administration in Malta (those of the Netherlands and the UK were considered 
possible but necessitated substantial structural changes)’ (Harwood, 2009: 132). 
 
Partly due to its British legacy and because it already adopted this approach post-
independence (1964 onwards), Malta maintained a highly centralized co-ordination 
system, albeit with new structures created as a direct result of EU membership. This 
ensured an efficient and proper degree of legislative scrutiny by various levels in the 
government’s hierarchical structure.  
 




- The Permanent Representation of Malta to the European Union in Brussels; 
- the EU Secretariat within the Office of the Prime Minister (now within the 
 Ministry for European Affairs and Implementation of the Electoral Manifesto 
 (MEAIEM), an adjustment brought about by a change in government in March 
 2013); 
- an Inter-Ministerial Committee; 
- EU Directorates within each of the line ministries; 
- a Standing Committee at the House of Representatives: the Standing 
Committee on Foreign and European Union Affairs (SCEFA) – established on 8 
October 2003  (see Parlament Malti, 2003, motion 67); and 
- the Forum Malta fl-Ewropa within the Ministry of Foreign Affairs - later 
replaced by the Malta EU Steering and Action Committee (MEUSAC) 
responsible for ensuring strong involvement of stakeholders and social partners 
and informing  the public about EU affairs generally. 
 
As a result of a change in government in March 2013, a new ministry for European 
Affairs – the Ministry for European Affairs and Implementation of the Electoral 
Manifesto (MEAIEM) was established. Previously to this, EU affairs fell under the 
remit of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. However, as stated further on, this change in 
ministerial responsibility for EU affairs in the government’s structures did not impact 
significantly on its co-ordination system, which has been left largely unchanged since 
it was fist devised and implemented.  
 
The Permanent Representation of Malta to the European Union 
 
The Permanent Representation of Malta to the EU represents Malta at official level in 
all EU negotiations taking place in EU structures, notably the Commission, European 
Council, Council and the EP (although proceedings occurring in other EU institutions 
and bodies are also monitored).  The Representation is headed by a Permanent 
Representative (PR) (and Deputy Permanent Representative (DPR) with remit over 
Coreper I issues) who ensures ‘an informed and coordinated advancement of Malta’s 
position in all EU discussions’ (DOI, Press Release 2012/07) and who takes part mainly 
in Coreper II meetings but also in Ministerial Councils and European Council meetings 
(EU governmental summits at head of state and/or government level). The 
Permanent Representation of Malta is made up of a total of 46 officials (divided 
between diplomats and technical attachés – this number is currently increasing 
drastically as part of Malta’s preparations for its Council Presidency in 2017) which 
includes the PR and the DPR (organigram of the Permanent Representation accessed 
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on 4 October 2013). This number is exceptionally large for a small state the size of 
Malta.  
 
Besides representing government in these fora - mainly in the Council’s multi-levels, 
i.e. in Working Groups, Coreper and Council of Ministers; and in Commission 
committee meetings - the Permanent Representation has the crucial role of reporting 
(within a 36 hour internal deadline from the end of proceedings) to the capital about 
the current state of play of legislative EU decision-making discussions with 
policy/legislative implications for Malta. Reporting in a timely manner is essential for 
governmental ministries to prepare for the next Council Working Group or Coreper 
meeting (on average they take place once to twice a week). Once reporting takes 
place, the ministries are able to draft a national position (better known as instruction 
notes) which first need to be scrutinized and approved (as explained further on in this 
chapter and as illustrated in Figure 7.1) by other entities in the system before being 
able to be used by the government’s representatives in uploading processes in 
Council. 
 
The EU Secretariat 
 
The EU Secretariat is an integral part of the co-ordination system. It is in fact 
considered as the heart of the co-ordination system. This is because the EU 
Secretariat, which now falls under the new Ministry for European Affairs (previously 
it fell under the remit of the Office of the Prime Minister (OPM)), channels the 
government’s position on an EU legislative proposal (being discussed in Council in 
Brussels) to and from the Permanent Representation and the various EU directorates 
in the various ministries. Importantly, the EU Secretariat co-ordinates the preparation 
of the government’s position ensuring that ‘draft memoranda’ (i.e. the government’s 
position on EU legislative proposal/s drawn up by the ministries) get clearance as 
quickly as possible from the Inter-Ministerial Committee (IMC) – dealt with in the 
next sub-section - before being sent to the ministerial cabinet and eventually 
parliament. The memoranda will subsequently need to be sent to the government’s 
representatives in Brussels in time for the next Working Group, Coreper or Council 
meeting. 
 
Similar to the Permanent Representation, the EU Secretariat consists of policy 
officers each responsible for a particular EU policy sphere. As just stated, it is these 
officers that are in constant contact with their counterparts at the Permanent 




Harwood (2009: 136) sums up in list form the EU Secretariat’s key functions (which 
go beyond co-ordination of EU uploading processes) as follows: 
 
- ensuring the development of a timely and co-ordinated position through the 
 Permanent Representation; 
- receiving, examining and distributing EU documentation to the relevant 
 ministries as well as co-ordinating the formation of internal documentation to 
be used at national and EU level; 
- monitoring the implementation of adopted EU legislation; and 
- referring proceedings and decisions of the Court of Justice of the EU to the 
 Attorney General’s Office and the Court Registrar. 
 
The Inter-Ministerial Committee (IMC) for EU Affairs 
 
Until 2012, Malta’s PR was directly linked with, and played the central role of 
chairperson, of the IMC.15 Today the IMC is chaired by the Head of the EU Secretariat. 
In a similar vein to that of the EU Secretariat, this committee also has a central role in 
Malta’s co-ordination system and, as explained in subsequent paragraphs, serves as 
an advisory and mediatory body in the system. As Nugent (2010: 264) points out, it is 
mainly made up of senior civil servants, i.e. Permanent Secretaries heading their 
respective ministries at administrative and technical level. It is also made up of the 
Heads of the Secretariats of the Prime Minister, Foreign Affairs Minister and 
European Affairs Minister, as well as a policy officer and senior legal officer from the 
EU External Affairs Directorate, and a representative of MEUSAC (Harwood, 2009: 
134).  
 
How does Malta’s system of co-ordination function? 
 
Once the Commission adopts a proposal, Malta’s line ministry drafts an ‘explanatory 
memorandum’. The memorandum defines the main contractual, legal, economic and 
political aspects of the Commission’s draft legislative proposal and includes a relevant 
preliminary governmental position (Times of Malta, 24 March 2011). This is discussed 
within the IMC that also ensures that national stakeholder interests in the sector (i.e. 
non governmental entities) are included. Based on the explanatory memorandum, 
Malta's interests and preferences are discussed in depth and therefore it is at this 
stage that Malta's position is truly formed. Once approved by the IMC, the draft 
memorandum is sent to Cabinet which, after agreeing to it, forwards the 
memorandum for scrutiny and final approval to Parliament’s Standing Committee on 
Foreign and European Union Affairs. The Standing Committee is made up of an equal 
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number of members of parliament of both sides of the house (with the Minister of 
Foreign Affairs chairing). After this stage, the memorandum is converted into an 
‘Instruction Note’ which is sent by the EU Secretariat to Malta’s Permanent 
Representation in Brussels. 
 
The other key administrative structure not mentioned in the preceding paragraph is 
MEUSAC. It first started off as a decentralized stream in the internal consultation 
process. MEUSAC in fact represents the interface with civil society in general (in the 
form of interest groups). It did have its own problems since it was criticized as 
maintaining a very low level of consultation and was replaced by Forum Malta fl-
Ewropa (Forum Malta in Europe) falling under the remit of the Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs. However, in 2008 the government decided to place MEUSAC under the 
OPM’s remit and thus within a reinforced centralized process. Since the change in 
government in March 2013, it is today part of the Ministry for Social Dialogue, 
Consumer Affairs and Civil Liberties. But this was in fact a cosmetic change which did 
not in any way adjust its role from within the co-ordination system as explained 
above and as illustrated in Figure 7.1 below. 
 
In sum, the system of co-ordination described above is still used by today’s 
government, albeit with minor adjustments made since 2013 because of the change 
in administration. Although the co-ordination system as previously described has 
largely remained intact, Malta’s current government decided to modify it slightly (as 
already indicated earlier) so as to prepare and adjust the system in light of the 
country’s upcoming Council Presidency. In fact, it was felt that the EU Secretariat 
(undoubtedly, the hub of the system) be placed within a new Ministry – the MEAIEM 
- which will have overall responsibility of Malta’s Council Presidency during the first 
half of 2017.  
 
One of the main reasons for pointing out these subtle changes has to do with the 
timeline of the EU decision-making processes of two (of the three) case studies 
forming part of the empirical research of this thesis. In fact, these cases concern EU 
legislative acts adopted before the government change in Malta in March 2013. 
However, it must be said that although a third case on a recast EU directive on 
pyrotechnic articles (see  section 8.2 of chapter 8) was adopted by the Council and 
the EP in June 2013 and hence after Malta’s change in government, the outcome of 
this decision-making process was largely a result of the formation stages occurring 





Figure 7.1 – Co-ordination of EU Affairs in Malta 
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Source: Government of Malta internal document, ‘Malta as a Member of the EU: Structures and 





Chapter 7 has served to establish a context behind Malta as the country of study of 
this thesis. Knowledge of the co-ordination system explained in the chapter is 



























Committee for EU 
Affairs 
Foreign 
Affairs (CFSP) Ministries prepare national 
positions (explanatory 
memoranda) 




Malta’s government in the legislative decision-making 
processes of two directives on the placing on the market of 




It is appropriate to start this chapter by asking why pyrotechnic articles (the words 
‘pyrotechnic articles’ and ‘fireworks’ are used interchangeably throughout this 
chapter) and their production is such an eminent matter for some countries in the 
EU, particularly for Malta. It is because fireworks in Malta are not only important in 
economic terms but also have socio-cultural, traditional and religious connotations. 
These connotations find their origin in a centuries-old legacy brought about by the 
Order of the Knights of St. John, in the period when Malta was administered by the 
Order between the 16th and 18th centuries.16 
  
Indeed, these centuries old pyrotechnic articles have lived through history and are 
still very popular in Malta. Today, they are widely used in religious and cultural village 
feasts mainly during the summer period.17 This means that pyrotechnic articles enjoy 
considerable popularity across the entire national socio-political stratum and, hence, 
the Maltese community in general. Thus this aspect must be kept in mind to 
understand the Maltese government’s position in the EU legislative negotiations 
presented in this chapter. 
  
This chapter focuses on two legislative cases concerning the placing on the EU market 
of pyrotechnic articles. The first case examines the decision-making process which led 
to the adoption of EC Directive 2007/23/EC on 23 May 2007 (Case 1) while the other 
examines the legislative process leading to the adoption of EU Directive 2013/29/EU 
(recast) on 12 June 2013 (Case 2).18 The aim of this chapter is to focus on the Maltese 
government’s capacities and strategies adopted to exert influence in these legislative 
processes. 
 
Case 1 is treated in section 8.1. Sub-section 8.1.1 sets the background to this EU 
decision-making process, highlighting that this was the first time that the EU adopted 
legislation to harmonize and regulate the pyrotechnic industries of its member states. 
Sub-section 8.1.2 focuses on the Maltese government’s position in this legislative 
sphere and offers a background to its preferences requiring an ‘uploading’ into the 
EU’s process. The strategies used by the government to do this are analyzed in sub-
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section 8.1.3 which deals with the decision-shaping stage of these EU legislative 
negotiations in the Council and the EP. Finally, sub-section 8.1.4 focuses on the 
decision-taking stage of the negotiations.  
 
Case 2 is presented in section 8.2. The sub-sections found in this section follow 
precisely the same structure for section 8.1. 
 
Finally, section 8.3 concludes this chapter by providing an overall assessment of 
whether Malta’s government was successful in these EU legislative decision-making 
processes. It thus offers an initial cross-analysis of the main factors highlighted in the 
legislative cases, something which is further elaborated upon in chapter 10.  
 
One last point worth mentioning here is about the overall focus of this chapter. The 
chapter focuses mainly on the EU negotiations leading to the 2007 Directive (Case 1) 
since they represented the first opportunity for Malta’s government, after attaining 
EU membership in 2004, to intervene directly in this legislative sphere. But of equal 
importance, there was also a real need to ensure that this research includes a study 
on the most recent EU decision-making process in this EU legislative sphere on the 
placing on the market of pyrotechnic articles. Therefore there was a need to focus 
also on Council and EP negotiations leading to the EU legislation currently in force, 
i.e. Case 2 on the Directive 2013/29/EU of 12 June 2013 which superseded EC 
Directive 2007/23/EC.  
 
Case study 2 is more concise since most of the legislative negotiation dynamic and 
policy players are explained in detail and comparable to case study 1. It has also had 
to respect word count restrictions. But nevertheless, it identifies the main events that 
materialized in this negotiation of relevance to the Maltese government. 
 
8.1  Malta’s government in the 2005-2007 EU legislative negotiations 
adopting Directive 2007/23/EC on the placing on the market of 
pyrotechnic articles: Case Study 1 
 
8.1.1  Background 
 
This sub-section presents the background to why the EU, particularly the European 
Commission, decided to propose legislation in this precise policy sphere. 
 
Therefore, before delving into analyzing the subtleties of the negotiations on 
Directive 2007/23/EC and its successor (Directive 2013/29/EU (recast)), it is vital to 
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take a step backwards to understand the rationale behind these EU legislative acts, 
particularly the Commission’s thinking and aims for the necessity of such directives.19 
  
It must be said that the Commission made its intentions clear about its ambitions to 
regularise and harmonize the market of such articles as far back as 1993 when a 
Council Directive (93/15/EEC of 5 April 1993) on explosives was adopted. In that 
instance, the Commission pushed for the inclusion of pyrotechnic articles to be 
incorporated in that directive which would have effectively meant the regularisation 
of the EU pyrotechnic industry as early as that date. This did not happen and 
therefore the Commission was adamant that future legislation should cover such 
products. As is explained in sub-section 8.1.3 of this chapter, this process was 
launched in 2003 when the Commission started preliminary talks and consultation 
meetings with the relevant stakeholders in this industry.  
 
The aims behind the Commission’s adopted legislative proposals (COM (2005) 457 of 
11.10.2005 and COM (2011) 764 of 21.11.2011) were mainly twofold. It first wanted 
to ensure that pyrotechnic articles, i.e. the market in fireworks20 and also that of the 
automotive industry21, move freely in the EU’s Internal Market (IM) as established 
under competition and internal market rules, notably the ‘four freedoms’. 
 
But it also wanted to ensure that besides the trade aspect being respected, there was 
a new body of minimum standards22 set to safeguard the health and safety of 
consumers and professional end-users alike, thus reducing the frequent number of 
accidents occurring in the EU. New legislation was therefore necessary to regulate 
not only the production of fireworks but also their use. One must bear in mind that 
fireworks are not only let-off during shows or festivals. They are also used for 
theatrical purposes of entertainment and on-stage use, and for the labeling of 
automotive pyrotechnic articles (as mentioned above) which includes the 
circumstance of sales being made to professional users. 
 
Indeed, the overall aim was to establish a single market for pyrotechnic articles 
(through the enactment of a single directive harmonizing safety requirements) thus 
replacing the complex legal and administrative framework which at the time 
consisted of 25 parallel national approval procedures (and with future EU accessions 
about to materialize increasing this number). Needless to say, the lack of 
harmonization existing before the adoption of the 2007 directive was also proving to 
be detrimental to the EU producers of such articles themselves. Having to trade and 
adhere to different requirements set by each EU member state was extremely 
burdensome and costly. For instance, prior to the adoption of the 2007 directive it 
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was very often necessary to test these products - which was estimated at €25, 000 
per approval (EP Report, 19.9.2006: 44). Therefore, most EU member states and their 
respective industries (Malta included) indicated that they supported a Commission 
proposal for a directive on pyrotechnics during consultation talks which the 
Commission held with them before its adoption of the draft proposal. Only the 
authorities of the UK and Sweden believed that harmonized rules were not needed 
(interview held with a Commission official on 13 January 2014 in Brussels – this 
information is confirmed in an internal Commission background note for a bilateral 
meeting between the Commissioner and Malta’s Minister of Foreign Affairs held in 
Brussels on 30 January 2006). 
 
The words of the then European Commissioner for Health and Consumer Policy, 
Markos Kyprianou, during an EP plenary session held on 29 November 2006, best 
illustrate this situation: 
 
‘The directive will create an internal market and thus uniform and 
better framework conditions for pyrotechnic articles, which comprise 
fireworks but also airbags and seatbelt pretensioners... It does not 
make sense for 27 Member States to prescribe different technical 
regulations for pyrotechnic articles, while their citizens within a 
Europe of open borders can easily shop for fireworks in neighbouring 
countries. The protection of consumers will therefore be decisively 
improved because pyrotechnic articles sold to consumers anywhere 
in the European Union must in the future fulfil the essential safety 
requirements of the directive and will be subject to conformity 
assessment.’ 
 
In short, there were two main sector-based aspects involved in the Commission’s 
legislative proposals, one being trade and the other consumer health and safety. 
 
As stated in the chapter’s introduction, section 8.1 examines the EU decision-making 
process on the adoption of Directive 2007/23/EC. In its first reaction to the 
Commission’s adopted proposal of 11 October 2005, the EP observed that it included 
a number of controversial issues in the proposal that were linked with the market in 
fireworks, such as a definition of a minimum age for handlers, individual member 
states’ freedom to set rules and, of crucial importance for Malta, specific marketing 
processes arising from cultural or religious traditions, amongst others (EP Report, 
19.9.2006: 37). Malta’s main concern in this negotiation was highlighted by this 
report which observed that according to the Commission’s legislative proposal, 
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certain fireworks created for personal use (in Malta’s case, to satisfy certain cultural, 
traditional and religious festivities) would be caught under this law, precisely under 
draft Article 2(2) which defined what is meant by ‘the placing on the market’ for the 
application of this directive (COM (2005) 457: 12). 
 
The next sub-sections of the chapter (8.1.2 to 8.1.4) deal specifically with the Maltese 
government’s requirements and priorities during the 2005-2007 legislative 
negotiations and how the government set about to upload its interests in this 
decision-making process. Figure 8.1 below illustrates the timeframe of these 
negotiations with the main key dates and events being indicated. This figure also 
distinguishes, by means of colour shades, between the two stages of decision-
shaping and taking. It therefore displays the decision-shaping stage, starting from the 
Commission’s adopted proposal on 11 October 2005 to the decision-taking stage 
culminating in the adoption (by QMV and at first reading of the co-decision legislative 
procedure - as it was called at the time of these negotiations, i.e. before the entry 
into force of the Treaty of Lisbon on 1 December 2009 which renamed it the ‘ordinary 
legislative procedure’) of Directive 2007/23/EC on 23 May 2007 by the Council and 
the EP. 
 
Figure 8.1 – Key dates in the 2005-2007 EU legislative negotiations to adopt Directive 
2007/23/EC 
  End of the EU decision-making process  
 - 23 May 2007 [Signature by the EP & Council] 
 - 16 April 2007 [During the Agriculture and Fisheries Council of Ministers meeting in  
 Luxembourg, Council approves the Directive (as an ‘A’ item on the agenda, i.e. points 
 without discussion) at first reading, following negotiations with the EP (PE-CONS 
 3671/06)] 
  - 30 November 2006 [EP opinion at 1st reading: approval with amendments] + [CION 
 agreement with EP amendments] 
 - 17 May 2006 [EESC opinion on CION’s proposal]  
     - 11 October 2005 [CION adopts its legislative proposal and transmits it to Council & EP]                                                                                 
 Start of the EU decision-making process: Pre-Treaty of Lisbon provisions [Co-decision  
                      procedure & voting in Council by QMV] 
CION
23
: European Commission                                  - the decision-taking stage  
EP:    European Parliament  
Council: Council of the European Union                         - the decision-shaping stage 
EESC:  European Economic and Social Committee  
 
Source: Figure based on the PreLex database on interinstitutional procedures: 





Complementing Figure 8.1 is Table 8.1 which lists the Council Presidencies with the 
main events occurring in these negotiations.  
 
Table 8.1 – EU Council Presidencies and events in this process 
Timeline & Stages  EU member state Events 
July – December 2005  United Kingdom European Commission Proposal on 
11.10.2005. 
January – June 2006  Austria None. 
July – December 2006 
[decision-shaping] 
 Finland   - 4 & 10 July 2006: the start of    
discussions   in   the Council at 
working group level; 
-  EP opinion (1st reading) on 30.11.06. 
 
January – June 2007 
[decision-taking] 
 Germany    - Council of Ministers approval (1st  
reading) on 16.04.07; 
- Adoption of legislative act on 
23.05.07. 
Source: Table compiled by the author. 
 
8.1.2 Malta's objectives 
 
From the outset, the Maltese government’s objective for the negotiations on the 
placing on the market of pyrotechnic articles was that of achieving an exemption for 
local pyrotechnic manufacturers - by no means a simple feat to achieve in the EU - 
from falling within the scope of the proposed directive. 
 
As is explained in sub-section 8.1.3, the Maltese government had problems with the 
Commission’s proposal in the early stages of the decision-making process, i.e. the 
decision-shaping stage, since it enforced restrictive requirements in relation to the 
manufacture of pyrotechnic articles in the local market. Since, unlike other member 
states, Malta had longstanding national legislation in force (Chapter 33 of the Laws of 
Malta, ‘Explosives Ordinance’ of 15 July 1904 as successively amended through 
various Legal Notices) that regularized the local pyrotechnic industry, the 
government had to ensure that the Commission’s proposal for a new directive in this 
matter would not dilute national legislation. Besides and of paramount importance, 
the government had to avoid the imposition of any EU legislation with the effect of 
creating new approval registration procedures and an increase in production costs 




It must be stated from the outset that had EC Directive 2007/23/EC been adopted as 
initially proposed by the Commission, the Maltese pyrotechnic industry, made up of 
artisans who produce fireworks as part of the country’s cultural and religious 
tradition and not for commercial purposes,24 would have been badly affected, 
primarily due to added costs related to the imposition of health and safety 
requirements. Ultimately, this would have made fireworks production too costly for 
the few local manufacturers to sustain.25 Thus local producers were rightly concerned 
that the conformity assessment procedures as proposed by the Commission would 
have resulted in large costs making firework production a problem in the short-term 
and unsustainable in the medium-to-long term. This would have effectively marked 
the death of the local industry (interview with government official, Valletta, 13 
November 2013). 
 
Thus, although agreeing with the noble aims of the directive (as stated, Malta’s 
industry was already regulated under national law), the Maltese government 
disagreed with the Commission over the principle of linking the process of 
manufacture of pyrotechnic articles with their actual use. It was therefore imperative 
for the government to cut any link that existed in the Commission’s proposed Article 
2 on ‘definitions’ about the term ‘manufacturer’ and about the ‘use’ of such articles 
by the same manufacturer. In Council, the government thus intended to press for an 
amendment to the legislative text to delete the wording: ‘for his own professional or 
private use’ from draft Article 2(5) of the Commission’s proposal (COM (2005) 457: 
12). This would have had the effect of excluding local fireworks producers 
manufacturing such products for their own use (such as in festivals or village feasts) 
from being caught within the directive’s scope. In other words, and as asserted in the 
next section of this chapter, the government argued that this directive should not go 
beyond its scope, which was simply that of regulating the placing of such articles on 
the market and not on their use, the safety of which was already provided for in 
domestic legislation.  
 
In short, the manufacture of fireworks play a dominant role in Malta and its slow 
death due to a rise in production costs would have been problematic for Malta’s 
government to explain and justify to its electorate. The government therefore had to 
ensure that this situation would not materialize and that the imposition of uniform 
Europe-wide testing and licensing procedures for pyrotechnics had to be prevented. 
It therefore set out immediately to influence legislative negotiations in the Council 





8.1.3 The decision-shaping stage 
 
A. Malta's capacities and strategies in the Council of the European Union 
 
  - Malta’s capacities (variables 1 to 3): 
 
The Maltese government’s administrative capacity was quite weak in quantitative 
terms, i.e. the number of public officials working on the dossier. In fact there were 
only three main players involved in the technical legislative negotiations during the 
decision-shaping stage, i.e. at Council Working Group level (besides the deputy 
Permanent Representative (DPR) who was also involved in the decision-shaping stage 
in Coreper I – see chapter 3). These were the following: 
 
- the technical attaché at the Permanent Representation of Malta to the EU in 
Brussels; 
- the policy officer at the EU Secretariat (at the time within the Office of the 
Prime Minister); 
- the national expert from the Malta Standards Authority (MSA). 
       
As already explained in chapter 3, a technical attaché is a government official who 
follows the dossier and represents the government mainly at Council Working Group 
level in Brussels. The attaché’s prime responsibility is to report back to the capital 
and to lobby within the Council’s structures and also with other EU institutions such 
as the Commission and the EP. With direct reference to the Council’s hierarchical 
structure (see chapter 3), technical attachés in Council are not only involved in 
Working Groups but also in Coreper meetings to assist PRs (or DPRs depending on 
the legislative sphere – for instance, the pyrotechnic dossier falls under the EU policy 
spheres of consumer and health and the internal market which are both Coreper I 
issues and therefore under the remit of DPRs). Technical attachés also form part of 
governmental delegations participating in the Council of Ministers.  
 
As observed in chapter 7, policy officers within the EU Secretariat only have a co-
ordinating role in the government’s ‘uploading’ process in EU decision-making. This is 
to ensure that communication between the capital and Brussels takes place and that 
the national position is approved by the relevant domestic administrative and 
political structures before government intervenes in Council (see chapter 7 for a full 
view on Malta’s co-ordination process).26 In this particular dossier, the EU secretariat 
official had to ensure that the relevant information was being sent from the MSA to 
the government’s line ministry – at the time, the Ministry for Competitiveness and 
Communications (MCMP) - and eventually to the attaché at the Permanent 
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Representation in Brussels. Once Council meetings end, the EU secretariat ensures 
that a report on the proceedings of the meeting attended is sent rapidly to the 
relevant ministry. This ensures rapid communication and early preparation for the 
next Council meeting. 
 
Whereas other EU member state governments benefited from larger teams of 
experts,27 Malta’s government only had one national expert from the MSA. However, 
as explained further on in this section and contrary to what one might have expected 
due to the government’s small administrative capacity when compared to other 
delegations, Malta’s government  was technically coherent and was able to ‘speak’ 
with one voice in these negotiations. As illustrated by this case, the small 
administrative structure in Malta may be said to constitute a strength rather than a 
weakness. This may be explained through certain characteristics found in the 
government’s structures such as direct access and communication between the 
technical and political levels in the government’s structures. In this case, the national 
expert had direct access not only to the technical attaché and the deputy permanent 
representative in Brussels but also to the minister himself. Thus, the channels of 
communication were characterized by a direct, and rather informal, way of working 
together that helped the government’s coherence and overall performance in these 
negotiations.  
 
Even though in this case, Malta’s government had a minimum number of policy 
players involved, it did not lack expertise. As stated, this EU policy/legislative sphere 
represents an area of salience to the government which is demonstrated in Figure 8.2 
below. As may be observed (the methodology of which has already been discussed at 
length in chapter 6 - see section 6.2), Figure 8.2 indicates positive or negative ratings 
(according to a 0 to 5 ratio with 0 to 2.5 representing a negative rating and 2.5 to 5 
representing a positive one) for the government’s capacities to influence EU decision-
making processes which the thesis classifies into three main variables28: 
  
- Variable 1: the capacity to enter the EU legislative process as early as possible; 
- Variable 2: the expert and administrative capacity; 
- Variable 3: the capacity to prioritize. 
 
Figure 8.2 below indicates positive ratings for all these variables (they are all above 
the 2.5 mean and therefore are rated as positive) except for sub-variable 2.2 on the 
government’s administrative capacity in relation to  its very small administrative base 
(sub-variable 2.2 is below the 2.5 mean having scored 1). As stated in chapter 6, this 
data (which is also found in ‘Step 1’ of Table 10.1 in chapter 10) has been collected 
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through interviews held with the relevant government officials (having worked on 
Malta’s interests in these EU legislative negotiations) and represents an overall 
average of the data gathered. 
 
Figure 8.2 illustrating data on Step 1 variables of the ‘decision weights and measures’ 




Source: Figure compiled by the author with data collected from interviews with Maltese government 
officials. 
 
- Malta’s strategies (variables 4 to 6): 
 
The start of Malta’s response to the Commission’s intentions to propose legislation in 
this policy sphere may be identified in a letter sent to the Commission by Malta’s 
Permanent Representative on 3 May 2005 – this letter represents the start of the 
formation process of the government’s national position on this subject matter. The 
letter was a response to the Commission’s consultation process with stakeholders 
(the agenda-setting stage as explained in chapter 3) that took place mainly during 
2003 as part of its internal preparations to adopt a legislative proposal, something 







Variable 1 - Capacity 
to enter  early into 
the EU process 
Variable 2 - Expert 
& Administrative 
Capacity 
Variable 3 - Capacity 
to Prioritise 
1.1 - A government's capacity to 
participate effectively in the 
decision-shaping stage (swift 
co-ordination) 
1.2 - The capacity to adopt an 
effective national position early 
in the process (capacity to 
interpret properly draft EU law 
and form a national position) 
2.1 - The expert capacity 
(training, work experience & 
technical knowledge in the 
particular policy sphere) 
2.2 - The administrative 
capacity (the size of a 
government's administration: in 
the Capital & at the Permanent 
Representation in Brussels) 
3.1 - Salience of the policy 
sphere for the government 
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having participated in the consultation process, was still on time to put forward any 
‘problems’ it may have foreseen in the Commission’s draft text.30 A Maltese 
government official (interview conducted in Valletta on 13 November 2013) who 
participated in these negotiations confirmed  that the government’s review on the 
Commission’s consultation process occurred truly by coincidence and as soon as the 
government, having achieved EU membership on 1 May 2004 (and hence after the 
Commission’s adoption of the legislative proposal), was able to access an internal 
online directory giving access to the complete list of planned forthcoming EU 
legislative proposals (referred to as pipeline acquis communautaire). Thus Malta was 
about to miss the crucial and fundamental stage of agenda-setting where its 
preferences could begin being uploaded early in the process.  
 
Malta’s letter of 3 May 2005 thus had the effect of precisely doing this – that of 
highlighting the government’s main issues and preferences to the Commission, 
making it aware of its concerns prior to the adoption of the proposal (which occurred 
in October 2005). These concerns were reflected in a Commission Impact Assessment 
issued by the Commission’s Chemicals unit (within the Enterprise and Industry 
Directorate-General) on the same day as the adoption of its legislative proposal 
(these documents are presented together to the Council and the EP).  On page 11 of 
the impact assessment, one is able to find Malta’s concerns: 
 
‘Malta in principle supports the Directive, but has requested 
exemptions for handmade fireworks used at religious festivals and 
which are not sold on to consumers. The Commission should be 
prepared to discuss this issue during the meetings in the Council 
working group following the adoption of the draft proposal’ 
(European Commission Impact Assessment, 2005: 11).  
 
This paragraph is crucial for Malta’s government because it demonstrates that the 
Commission was made aware of Malta’s concerns and that it was ready to discuss 
this issue further. It also sent a signal to the Council Presidency and other EU member 
state governments that they should expect a proper discussion to emerge on this 
issue once Council negotiations begin at Working Group level and hence, at technical 
level. This therefore eased the way for the government to be able to introduce its 
arguments by uploading them into the EU’s agenda before the start of legislative 
negotiations in Council.31 
 
The above argument about Malta’s government having uploaded its concerns before 
the start of legislative negotiations in Council may be confirmed by referring to recital 
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(7) of the Commission’s adopted proposal (COM (2005), 457 final, recital 7, p. 10). 
The wording of the draft legislative text is more or less extracted from the wording of 
the impact assessment cited above. Both paragraphs (found in the separate 
documents) therefore very closely match each other, albeit without the legislative 
proposal explicitly mentioning Malta:  
 
‘The use of pyrotechnics and in particular the use of fireworks, is 
subject to markedly different cultural customs and traditions in 
different Member States. This makes it necessary to allow Member 
States to take national measures to limit the use or sale of certain 
categories of fireworks to the general public for public security or 
safety reasons’.  
 
This recital demonstrates how crucial the government’s strategy of feeding its 
position to the Commission before the adoption of the proposal was and how it 
managed to sow seeds for success in the negotiation to follow. Recital (7) of the 
Commission proposal was eventually amended during the course of the negotiations 
in Council and the EP with the gist of Malta’s position (emphasis added in bold text 
below) featuring under recital (8) of the adopted legislative act:  
 
‘According to the principles set out in the Council Resolution ... In 
view of religious, cultural and traditional festivities in the Member 
States, fireworks built by the manufacturer for his own use and 
which have been approved by a Member State for use on its 
territory should not be considered as having been placed on the 
market and should not therefore need to comply with this 
Directive’ (Directive 2007/23/EC, pp. 1-2). 
 
Having said this, the government was not satisfied with the recital’s broad wording 
on the use of fireworks which is subject to differing customs and traditions among EU 
member states. Thus, while pushing the Finnish Council Presidency (as shown above) 
for its amendments to the recital to be taken on board, it simultaneously tabled new 
amendments to be effected to the body’s text and hence to specific legislative 
articles of the proposed directive. This was done to ensure that Maltese 
manufacturers would not be caught by the scope of this law.  
 
Malta’s government thus aimed for amendments in line with its position to be 
effected to the legislative article on ‘exclusions’, i.e. Article 1(4) of the Commission’s 
proposal. The government’s interventions in the Council Working Group ran parallel 
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to its recommendations in the aforementioned letter to the Commission. Thus, 
Malta’s main preference was to amend Article 1(4) of the draft legislation by 
inserting a new clause half way through the article’s list (a new point (c), emphasized 
hereunder in underlined text) that would practically exclude all local fireworks 
manufacturers:  
 
‘4. This Directive shall not apply to: 
(a) Pyrotechnic articles intended ... the police or fire departments; 
(b) Equipment falling ... Directive 96/98/EC; 
(c) Fireworks manufactured by ‘registered/licensed’ artisans in a 
traditional way, intended to replicate original and historical 
pyrotechnic articles, built predominantly with the original 
materials and labelled as such by the manufacturer, and 
intended for own use, provided that they are not subsequently 
placed on the Community market during a period of ‘X’ (to be 
established) years; 
(d) Pyrotechnic articles ... industry; 
(e) Percussion caps ... safety of toys; 
(f) Explosives falling ... Directive 93/15/EC; 
(g) Ammunition ... guns and artillery.’  
 
Even though the government made its position extremely clear on this point from the 
very start of the process, i.e. in the agenda-setting consultation stage, it however 
failed to convince the Commission enough for this to be included in Article 1(4) of its 
adopted proposal (i.e. Malta’s point (c) is not to be found in the Commission’s 
proposal of 11 October 2005). So the government had to insist on this point once 
discussions began in the Council’s Working Group on 4 July 2006 and request the 
Finnish Council Presidency to insert a new sub-point to paragraph 4 (as illustrated 
above). The government’s justification for this was that its situation was indeed 
unique in the EU and that the exclusion of its extremely small number of fireworks 
manufacturers from the directive was not going to affect in any way the declared 
Commission’s objective of creating a single market in pyrotechnic articles with a high 
level of consumer protection. 
 
Malta’s government therefore had to take a proactive role throughout the 
negotiations for this to occur. It therefore adopted a pace-setting strategy (variable 4 
as explained in chapter 6) to engage proactively with other parties to the 
negotiations. Therefore, the government lobbied the Commission and the relevant 
Directorate General, i.e. DG Enterprise and Industry (sub-variable 4.1). A senior 
government official emphasized (interview conducted in Valletta on 13 November 
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2013) that Malta used all resources at its disposal to try and convince primarily the 
Commission - which was singled out as the main opposing camp in these negotiations  
as illustrated in Table 8.2 below - since most other EU governments in Council were 
sympathetic with Malta’s position (even though they did not share exactly the same 
concerns or, in the case of other Mediterranean states sharing similar firework 
traditions with Malta, were not aware of the potential benefits that the Malta 
amendments, explained later on, would have on their industries).  
 
Table 8.2 – Overview of delegations’ positions in relation to Malta’s amendments in 
Council  













































3.1 The Commission. 
Status 


























1.1 The Commission was 
against Malta’s request to 
add a new point (c) to this 
draft article. It was 
against extending the 
scope of the article on 
exclusions.  
 
2.1 The Commission 
could live with Malta’s 
amendment on Article 2 
on definitions since the 
safety of pyrotechnic 
production would 
continue to be regulated 
by the national provisions 
of the member states.  
 
3.1 Same as 2.1 above. 
Source: Table compiled by the author with data collected during interviews with Maltese government 
and EU officials. 
Note: Other delegations do not feature in this table since they did not pronounce themselves 
(intervene) in Council on these specific paragraphs of the draft legislative articles.  
 
Malta’s lobbying efforts can be demonstrated quantitatively in Table 8.3 and Graph 
8.1 below (see also ‘Step 2’ in Table 10.1 of chapter 10) – the decision weights and 
measures scoreboard (discussed in chapter 6) - which includes data revealing 
extremely high intensity levels on the part of the Maltese government lobbying the 
Commission and its services (except for seconded national experts (SNEs) working in 
177 
 
the Commission) and low to medium levels for the lobbying of the Council Presidency 
and the Secretariat. The extremely low levels (‘0’ out of ‘5’) for the lobbying of other 
member states may explain why other governments, unaware of the potential 
benefits that Malta’s amendments to Articles 1(4), 2(2) and 2(6) would have had on 
their respective pyrotechnic industries, did not intervene in Council Working Group 
meetings to support Malta’s position on these articles. As explained in the 
conclusion, other Mediterranean states like Spain, Portugal, Italy, Greece and Cyprus 
could have been potential allies to Malta’s cause in these negotiations since they too 
share a similar cultural heritage as that of Malta. Therefore the Commission’s 
proposal was also going to affect their pyrotechnic industries negatively. As 
emphasized by a Commission official:  
 
‘the support of other Mediterranean states with similar traditions 
would have made life easier for Malta during the negotiations’ 
(interview held in Brussels on 13 January 2014). 
 
Table 8.3 - Independent Variable 4: Sub-variable 4.1 on the pace-setting strategy32 
Sub-variable 4.1 – Pace-setting through lobbying  
Scale: [5=successful/+ve; 2.5=medium; 0=not successful/-ve] 
5 = Yes, at extremely high levels of intensity; 
4 = Yes, at high levels of intensity; 
3 = Yes, but at medium-to-high levels of intensity; 
2 = Yes, but at low-to-medium levels of intensity; 
1 = Yes, but at extremely low levels; 
0 = None. 
 
Measurable indicator 4.1.1:  Lobbying the Council 
 4.1.1.A – Lobbying the Council Presidency                             [0]   [1]   [2]   [ ]   [4]   [5] 
 4.1.1.B – Lobbying the Council Secretariat                             [0]   [1]   [ ]   [3]   [4]   [5] 
 
Measurable indicator 4.1.2: Lobbying the European Commission 
 4.1.2.A - Lobbying the Commissioner network                     [0]   [1]   [2]   [3]   [ ]   [5] 
 4.1.2.B - Lobbying the Commission Directorate-Generals  [0]   [1]   [2]   [3]   [4]   [ ] 
 4.1.2.C - Lobbying SNEs in the Commission                           [ ]   [1]   [2]   [3]   [4]   [5] 
 4.1.2.D - Lobbying the Commissioner responsible for the  
dossier                                                                                          [0]   [1]   [2]   [3]   [4]   [ ] 
 
Measurable indicator 4.1.3: Lobbying large state governments       [ ]   [1]   [2]   [3]   [4]   [5] 
 
Measurable indicator 4.1.4: Lobbying small state governments       [ ]   [1]   [2]   [3]   [4]   [5] 
Source: Table compiled by the author. 
 




Graph 8.1 – Columns indicating the scores for Sub-variable 4.1  
 
Source: Graph compiled by the author. 
 
However, even though the Commission was lobbied quite strongly on this issue with 
bilateral meetings taking place at both political33 and technical34 levels, the 
Commission was a ‘hard nut to crack’. A Maltese government official (interviewed in 
Valletta on 13 November 2013) observed that the Commission was viewing this issue 
through a totally different lens from Malta. The Commission wanted to regularize and 
diminish the rate of fireworks related accidents occurring in the EU, many of which 
were fatal: 
 
‘... the Commission official even brought along with him a very thick 
file of fatal and serious accidents that happened in Malta over the 
years to ask whether the government was in favour of reducing and 
terminating such pitiful situations happening. They therefore made 
their research very well and were trying to mix this issue up with the 
placing on the market of these articles. This is the policy line Malta 
stressed ‘ad nauseam’ at all times ... that even though Malta wishes 
to mitigate as much as is technically feasible and through all possible 
sorts of measures the frequency of incidents occurring during 
fireworks production, this should not be confused with their placing 
on the market… they are completely separate issues... The 
Commission was therefore moving out of the remit of the proposed 
directive...’. 
 
Malta’s government was in fact interpreting the Commission’s proposal as one solely 
introducing minimum safety requirements to protect both the general public and 
professionals while eliminating or avoiding any barriers to trade and preventing 
distortion of EU competition rules due to differing national regulatory systems. The 
focus was therefore on the protection of users while improving conditions for the 
well functioning of the EU’s internal market. The government therefore argued that 
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addresses accidents involving fireworks, especially those occurring during the process 
of their manufacture. 
 
To this end and as is illustrated in Table 8.4 (and Graph 8.2) below, the government 
adopted another pace-setting strategy besides the one on lobbying, i.e. pace-setting 
through norm advocacy and effective intervention in Council deliberations (sub-
variable 4.2 as discussed in chapters 5 and 6). The government therefore used its 
diplomatic capacity, such as in the use of clear and effective language and style as a 
tool to attract and win support for its arguments in Council negotiations. As is 
illustrated in Table 8.4, the Maltese government’s strategy to pace-set by engaging 
effectively with other parties to these negotiations scored 4 out of 5 (see measurable 
indicator 4.2.2 in Table 8.4 below). It also used its diplomatic capacity to put forward 
moral arguments to persuade other delegations that the issues at stake were of 
fundamental importance to it. In this latter case, Malta’s government scored 3 out of 
5 (see measurable indicator 4.2.1 in Table 8.4). In fact, as soon as the government 
comprehended that the Commission was not ready to accept its amendments to 
Article 1(4) of the proposal, the government increased its persuasiveness in Council 
Working Group meetings about the genuine nature of its request, primarily that 
fireworks manufacturers producing fireworks for their own use should be excluded 
from falling within the scope of the proposed directive.  
 
Therefore, since the negotiations were still at the decision-shaping stage (with many 
amendments also being requested for by other governments to other draft articles of 
the legislative proposal), the Maltese government likewise put forward its requests. 
However, unlike before, the government requested for amendments to be effected 
no longer to Article 1(4) on ‘exclusions’ but to Article 2 on ‘definitions’. 
 
As just stated, Article 2 of the Commission’s proposal dealt with the directive’s 
‘definitions’ with one of its paragraphs defining the term ‘manufacturer’. The 
government thus put forward the argument that the definition of ‘manufacturer’ 
found in Article 2(5) of the proposal was unclear and not in line with the principles of 
the ‘New Approach’ on European standardization found in the Commission’s (blue) 
‘Guide’.35 The government therefore suggested omitting the following words 
(indicated as strikethrough text) from Article 2(5) of the legislative proposal: 
 
‘‘Manufacturer’ means the natural or legal person who designs 
and/or manufactures a product covered by this Directive or who has 
such a product designed and manufactured, with a view to its 
placing on the market or for his own professional or private use 
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under his own name or trademark; or places a product covered by 
this Directive on the market under his own name or trademark’. 
 
This amendment on its own would have had the effect of safeguarding all fireworks 
factories in Malta from being caught within the scope of this directive that 
manufacture and display their own pyrotechnic articles. This would have been 
irrespective of whether the ‘traditional fireworks’ exclusion clause put forward by 
Malta to Article 1(4) of the Commission’s proposal was to be accepted in Council at a 
later stage in the negotiations (as stated further on, this did not materialize). 
Therefore, this amendment effectively excluded all fireworks factories in Malta from 
falling under the Commission’s definition and thus as not placing such products on 
the market.36  
 
The Commission signalled in Council that it could live with Malta’s suggested 
amendments to paragraph 5 of this article since it meant that this kind of activity 
would still be regulated by means of relevant national legislation. A Commission 
official observed that this point was already made clear to the Maltese delegation 
during the bilateral meeting between Malta’s Foreign Affairs Minister and the 
Commissioner (mentioned earlier) before the start of Working Group meetings in 
Council. The Commission was also reacting to Malta’s request on this point which it 
first received in the government’s letter of 3 May 2005 (interview held in Brussels on 
13 January 2014).  
 
As observed by a Commission official who participated directly in these Council 
negotiations, the Maltese government intervened effectively in Council which 
confirm the high scores obtained in Table 8.4 below: 
 
‘Malta managed to put forward justifiable arguments with which 
the Commission could live’ (interview held in Brussels on 13 January 
2014).  
 
This definition on manufacturers was eventually moved by the Council Presidency to 
another paragraph in the same legislative article, i.e. Article 2(6) in the adopted act 
with only very minor amendments effected to Malta’s proposed clauses. In the quote 
below, one may observe that the wording on ‘for own or professional use’ by 
fireworks producers, in line with Malta’s interests, vanished from the text (these 




 ‘‘Manufacturer’ means the a natural or legal person who designs 
and/or manufactures a product covered by this Directive pyrotechnic 
article, or who has such a product causes such an article to be 
designed and manufactured, with a view to placing it on the market 
under his own name or trademark ; or places a product covered by 
this Directive on the market under his own name or trademark’. 
 
Besides these amendments to paragraph 5 of the Commission’s adopted proposal, 
the Maltese government continued to persuade the Presidency, the Commission and 
a majority of governments through interventions in Council Working Group meetings, 
to add wording to paragraph 2 of the same article on definitions (Article 2). 
Interestingly one may see that this wording (cited hereunder) is in line with the 
previously illustrated Malta wording to Article 1(4) of the proposal: 
 
‘‘Placing on the market’ means the first ... Fireworks built by the 
manufacturer for own use in the territory where they are produced 
are not considered as being placed on the market’ (emphasis added 
in bold). 
 
This wording was agreed to (once again with minor changes - illustrated hereunder in 
underlined text whereas the deletion of some of Malta’s wording is illustrated in 
strikethrough text) at Working Group stage and therefore at the decision-shaping and 
technical stages of the process which eased the way for the government during 
decision-taking. The adopted text on Article 2(2) of Directive 2007/23/EC of 23 May 
2007 (OJ L 154, 14.6.2007, p. 4) reads as follows: 
 
‘‘Placing on the market’ means the first ... Fireworks built by the a 
manufacturer for his own use in the territory where they are 
produced and which have been approved by a Member State for use 
on its territory are not to be considered as being having been placed 
on the market’. 
 
An interviewed Commission official who followed closely these negotiations observed 
that these two paragraphs of Article 2 (i.e. paras (2) and (6)) are in fact still known 
today among EU circles as the ‘Malta clauses’. When asked what made the 
Commission live with Article 2(2) when it previously disagreed and opposed similar 
suggested wording by Malta to Article 1(4) on exemptions, the official observed that 
Malta’s request made much more sense in an article covering definitions and that, 
generally, the Commission would always ‘frown’ upon delegations that directly 
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request derogations or exemptions from EU legislation, however genuine they may 
be. In other words, it is very difficult to convince the Commission of the need for 
exemptions from the applicability of EU legislation. 
 
As observed by the Commission official, this was a very diplomatic and effective 
manoeuvre on Malta’s part to put forward arguments about the omission of 
Commission wording on manufacturers’ use of their own products (in this case, 
fireworks) that was not in line with its blue guide (previously mentioned). Besides and 
of paramount importance, the government’s suggested text did not disrupt or hinder 
the double proclaimed Commission objective of introducing minimum safety 
requirements protecting the general public and professionals alike while creating a 
single market in pyrotechnical articles:  
 
‘The gist of Malta’s argument was that this legislation was about 
protection afforded to users and should not get into the matter of 
manufacturers using such articles for their own professional or 
private use. Thus, the legislation should not trespass the dividing line 
between placing such articles on the market and on their use by the 
same manufacturers’ (interview held in Brussels on 13 January 
2014). 
 
As observed earlier, the following table and graph (see also ‘Step 2’ in Table 10.1 of 
chapter 10) illustrate Malta’s medium to high intensity levels of pace-setting through 
norm advocacy and effective intervention in Council deliberations (sub-variable 4.2). 
 
Table 8.4 – Independent Variable 4: Sub-variable 4.2 on the pace-setting strategy37 
Sub-variable 4.2 – Pace-setting through norm advocacy & effective intervention in Council 
deliberations  
Scale: [5=successful/+ve; 2.5=medium; 0=not successful/-ve] 
5 = Yes, at extremely high levels of intensity; 
4 = Yes, at high levels of intensity; 
3 = Yes, but at medium-to-high levels of intensity; 
2 = Yes, but at low-to-medium levels of intensity; 
1 = Yes, but at extremely low levels; 
0 = None.  
 
Measurable indicator 4.2.1:  
 A government’s capacity to persuade through moral convictions  [0]   [1]   [2]   [ ]   [4]   [5] 
 
Measurable indicator 4.2.2:  
 A government’s diplomatic leverage & capacity to engage  
effectively                                                                                                    [0]  [1]   [2]   [3]   [ ]   [5] 




Graph 8.2 – Columns indicating the scores for Sub-variable 4.2 
 
Source: Graph compiled by the author. 
 
B. Malta's capacities and strategies in the European Parliament 
Before focusing on the more recent negotiations on the recast directive of 12 June 
2013, one must look at discussions being held in the EP at the same time that Council 
negotiations were taking place (as discussed in chapter 3, both these EU institutions 
represent the legislative chambers of the EU with interinstitutional negotiations 
defined by Article 294 (TFEU) on the ‘ordinary legislative procedure’). Besides 
employing pace-setting strategies in Council, the Maltese government also lobbied 
the EP through Maltese MEPs in relevant EP committee groups (as observed in 
chapter 7, Malta today has a total number of six seats in the EP. But during these 
legislative negotiations, Malta had a total allocation of five seats under the pre-Treaty 
of Lisbon arrangements).  
 
The EP committee having the lead responsibility over this legislative file was the 
Committee on the Internal Market and Consumer Protection (IMCO). The 
committee’s rapporteur on this legislative file was Jose Hasse Ferreira, a Portuguese 
MEP from the PSE (the party of European Socialists which was renamed ‘the 
progressive alliance of socialists and democrats’ (S&D) on the 23 June 2009). 
Needless to say, this fact alone helped the Maltese cause, due to similarities existing 
between the two countries sharing similar traditions in relation to pyrotechnic 
displays. The other EP committee which examined this proposal (by delivering an 
opinion only) was the Industry, Research and Energy Committee (ITRE).    
 
IMCO’s report of 19 September 2006 (the IMCO committee adopted this report on 14 
September 2006 with 31 votes in favour and none against) included the Maltese 
government’s position on the amendments (previously outlined) being requested for 







Measurable indicator 4.2.1 Measurable indicator 4.2.2 
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to the Commission’s recital about religious, cultural and traditional festivities in 
member states that make use of pyrotechnic articles: 
 
‘... In view of religious, cultural and traditional festivities in the 
Member States, fireworks built by the manufacturer for his or her 
own use in the territory where they are produced are not considered 
as being placed on the market and do not therefore need to comply 
with this Directive’. 
 
Besides the amendment on the recital, the IMCO committee (EP report, 2006: 14 on 
amendment 22)  also called for amendments to be effected to Article 2(2) and (5) in 
line with Malta’s preferences: 
 
‘‘Placing on the market’ means the first ... Fireworks built by the 
manufacturer for own use in the territory where they are produced 
are not considered as being placed on the market’ (emphasis added 
in bold).  
 
IMCO’s amendment (number 25) to Article 2(5) of the Commission proposal read as 
follows: 
 
‘‘Manufacturer’ means the natural or legal person who designs 
and/or manufactures a product covered by this Directive or who has 
such a product designed and manufactured, with a view to its 
placing on the market under his own name or trademark’ (EP report, 
2006: 15). 
 
As observed by a Maltese government official and by the IMCO report (2006: 15) itself 
about the EP’s justification for this last amendment, it first brought the text in line 
with the definition on ‘placing on the market’ found in paragraph 2, i.e. with Malta’s 
suggestion about products built for own use not to be considered as being placed on 
the market. Second, the suggested wording provided a clearer definition in light of 
the principles of the ‘New Approach’ on European standards found in the 
Commission’s blue guide (mentioned earlier) – this too echoed Maltese justifications 
for this preferred wording in Working Group and Coreper interventions in Council.  
 
Interestingly, this report did not suggest the Maltese amendments to Article 1(4) on 
exemptions (previously illustrated). This is because by the time IMCO started to 
discuss this draft legislation, the government had already learnt in Working Group 
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meetings (the decision-shaping stage) that the Commission was not in favour of such 
amendments to this article (for reasons mentioned earlier). It was also not supported 
by other delegations (even though this was tacit). Thus by this time, the government 
‘fed’ MEPs, not least ‘its’ (i.e. Maltese) MEPs that were directly involved in these 
discussions, with this information. 
 
The names of the Maltese MEPs are to be found at the end of the IMCO report 
highlighting the procedure. For instance, John Attard-Montalto (PES), was involved in 
the ITRE committee’s work (which as aforementioned provided solely an opinion to 
IMCO about the Commission’s proposal) and was present for a vote taken by this 
committee on 30 May 2006. Joseph Muscat (PES) who was also present for the final 
IMCO vote, as a substitute member38 (vote taken on 14 September 2006), was also 
directly involved in uploading and defending Malta’s position in these legislative 
discussions (he has since become the LP’s leader and Prime Minister of Malta). 
Interestingly, these two MEPs belonged to the LP (see chapter 7) which was in the 
opposition in Malta’s Parliament. They, however, still towed the government line 
putting the national interest before party politics. Therefore, the government here 
had individuals who were ‘national champions’ in a powerful EU institution and who 
were defending Malta’s interests during technical and political discussions both at 
committee level and during the plenary session held in Strasbourg on 29 November 
2006. In this latter instance, Muscat intervened as follows: 
 
‘... the amendments unanimously agreed on in the Committee on 
Internal Market and Consumer Protection acknowledge that there is 
a market for fireworks that are not sold directly to consumers but 
that are manufactured for use in licensed activities covered by 
insurance. These activities include the traditional festivals held 
mostly in the Mediterranean, including Malta... The original 
procedures would not have led to any changes in the way work is 
carried out, but would have brought about an increase in costs. In 
Malta’s case, these would have been borne by the voluntary bodies 
that organize these festivals’ (EP Debates, 29 November 2006, p. 4). 
 
Interestingly, besides Maltese MEPs, Malta’s government also managed to lobby a 
German MEP, Anja Weisgerber, hailing from the same political affiliation (the 
European People’s Party (EPP)) as Malta’s NP (see chapter 7) which was in 
government at the time and who like MEP Muscat, was also a substitute member of 
the IMCO committee group. In two IMCO committee meetings held on 2 May and 11 
July 2006, she intervened in line with the Maltese government’s position on one of 
186 
 
the recitals and on Article 2(2) of the Commission’s proposal. MEP Weisgerber’s 
interventions are recorded in two separate EP documents displaying the proceedings 
of these meetings (PE 371.984v01-00 of 17 May 2006 and PE 371.984v02-00 of 19 
July 2006). In both cases, Weisgerber’s justifications for amendments to be made to 
recital 5b and Article 2(2) are the same and read as follows: 
 
‘Amendment by Anja Weisgerber 
Amendment 43 
Recital 5 b (new) 
(5b) In view of religious, cultural and traditional festivities in the 
Member States, it is possible for manufacturers that are also 
authorized to use fireworks to produce fireworks for own use and 
use them on the same territory. 
 
Justification 
In Malta handmade fireworks are produced for commercial use on 
religious holidays. Manufacturers are afraid that the conformity 
assessment procedures will result in large costs, making production 
impossible in the long term. Only manufacturers that are authorized 
to set fireworks off may use them. However, the circumvention of 
uniform Europe-wide test procedures must be prevented.’ 
 
Amendment 51 
Article 2, paragraph 2 
2. ‘Placing on the market’ means the first making available on the 
Community market of an individual product, with a view to 
distribution and/or use, whether in return of payment or free of 
charge. 
Fireworks are not considered ‘placed on the market’ when they 
are produced for own use by a manufacturer also authorized to 
use them and used on the same territory. 
Justification 
In Malta handmade fireworks … the circumvention of uniform 




The Commission, observing that the EP was strongly pushing for the Maltese clauses 
to be adopted in the draft text, was at this stage ready to accept this wording to the 
recital and to Article 2(2) and (5) of its proposal. This is confirmed in a short briefing 
note of three pages used in a bilateral meeting Gunther Verheugen, the then 
Commissioner for Enterprise and Industry, had with members of the IMCO 
committee on 14 September 2006, i.e. on the same day that the MEPs voted in 
favour of the report. Of paramount importance to Malta’s interests at the time, one 
is able to refer to page 3 of the Commission’s briefing note which singled out Malta’s 
case: 
  
‘The proposal will be detrimental to cultural activities (festas) in 
Malta. 
The amendment proposed by the Parliament’s rapporteur offers a 
suitable solution to allow the local and limited use of self-made 
fireworks by the manufacturer’ (Commission briefing note, 2006: 3) 
 
8.1.4 The decision-taking stage 
 
Continuing from the last quote by the Commission, one is able to decipher the 
latter’s willingness to accept the Malta clauses as put forward by the government in 
Council and, as also discussed in depth in the previous sub-section, as proposed by 
the EP and its IMCO committee. This was in fact the Commission’s position in the EP 
plenary session in Strasbourg a few months later, i.e. 29 November 2006. Markos 
Kyprianou’s (a European Commissioner at that time who replaced Commissioner 
Verheugen in that plenary session) words confirm that by this time and during this 
stage in the process (the political stage and therefore the start of decision-taking), 
the Commission accepted Malta’s preferences on the issue of the production and use 
of fireworks by manufacturers for their own use and on the same territory. 
Kyprianou’s words confirm that the EP was pushing for the same cause as that of the 
Maltese government, i.e. that differences across the EU on traditional, cultural and 
religious festivities should not be penalized through the entry into force of EU 
legislation that would make adherence costs about conformity to safety 
requirements exorbitantly high. The quote below from Kyprianou, confirms that the 
EP was ‘pushing the same boat’ as that of the Maltese on this issue: 
 
‘The Commission is well aware that the use of fireworks is subject to 
different traditions and customs in the Member States. Therefore we 
can agree to the amendment proposed by Parliament that creation 
188 
 
fireworks do not fall under the directive if they are produced by 
manufacturers for their own use’(EP debates, 2006: 1).  
 
Indeed, all this demonstrates that Malta’s government managed to exercise influence 
in these legislative negotiations primarily because it used its channels of influence 
well and effectively. That is, appropriate networks were used to influence the EU 
decision-making process. For instance, the previous sub-section has thrown light on 
how the Maltese government lobbied the EP so as to add more weight to its position 
in Council. As previously emphasized, the EP is a co-legislator and has an equal right 
to adopt or refuse EU legislation as much as the EU governments in Council. 
Therefore, it represents a crucial channel of influence for small state governments 
like Malta to tap into. 
 
One is able to track the start of the decision-taking stage in these negotiations with 
the EP’s decision on 30 November 2006 approving the draft legislative act at first 
reading, i.e. just a day after discussing the Commission’s proposal as analyzed in sub-
section 8.1.3. This was followed by the European Commission’s agreement to the 
EP’s amendments on the same day. In Council, when it was clear that the German 
Presidency had reached a general compromise with a majority of the delegations 
being able to vote in favour of the draft legislative text as amended by the EP (which 
meant that a QMV was achievable) a decision approving the draft proposal was taken 
at first reading on 16 April 2007. The draft legislative act was formally decided upon 
by Agriculture and Fisheries Ministers as an ‘A’ item (i.e. an item not discussed in the 
Council meeting of 16 April 2007) according to the Council’s multi-level hierarchical 
structure discussed in chapter 3.  
 
Thus, the EU decision-making process on this legislative file came to an end with the 
EP’s and Council’s signature officially adopting Directive 2007/23/EC on 23 May 2007.  
 
8.2 Malta’s government in the 2011-2013 EU legislative negotiations 
adopting recast Directive 2013/29/EU on the making available on 




Soon after Directive 2007/23/EC was adopted, the EU decided to harmonize and 
establish a common framework for the marketing of products (pyrotechnic articles 
included). This framework, which was part of the so-called New Legislative 
Framework (NLF), was adopted on 9 July 2008 in a decision of the EP and the Council 
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(Decision 768/2008/EC, p. 82) laying down common principles and reference 
provisions intended to apply across sectoral legislation (to nine product safety 
directives) to provide a coherent basis for revision or recasts of that legislation. 
 
This therefore laid the path for legislative techniques to be adopted by the 
Commission to align sectoral legislation - such as the one on the placing on the 
market of pyrotechnic articles – in conformity with an Interinstitutional Agreement 
(IIA) adopted by the EP, the Council and the Commission in 2001. This IIA laid down 
rules on the recast legislative technique, in particular on its procedural and 
presentational aspects. As a consequence, Directive 2007/23/EC required adaptation 
in line with the NLF and the IIA of 2001. The Commission thus decided that Directive 
2007/23/EC should be reset, or better, recast into a new directive.  
 
The recast legislative technique is used to repeal and replace a previously adopted 
act (in this case Directive 2007/23/EC) with a new one which may include any new 
amendments made to it during the recasting process.39 This technique differs from 
others such as codification which is also used to amend previous acts albeit without 
any substantive changes. Therefore, in this particular recast negotiation on the 
placing on the market of pyrotechnic articles, it could be anticipated that the 
legislative discussions in Council and the EP would re-open some of the substantial 
issues already discussed and agreed to during the recently closed decision-making 
process adopting Directive 2007/23/EC.  
 
Having said this, it was nevertheless the general view of the time (not least within the 
Commission - see the quote below) that this legislative text would not require a 
lengthy decision-making process. In fact, the aim was to maintain most of the 
substantive elements of the 2007 directive. Naturally, this last point was open for 
discussion since, as explained above, the recast technique does allow for substantive 
changes to be made. But as just stated, it was felt that this was not going to be 
necessary. A reason for this was that Directive 2007/23/EC had only been adopted 
just over a year before the decision on the adoption of the aforementioned NLF in 
2008. Hence, re-opening discussions on substantive issues was considered as 
undesirable and as being a waste of resources.  
 
Thus, the underlying aim behind recasting Directive 2007/23/EC was to align this act 
with a decision to establish a common EU framework for the marketing of products, 
albeit leaving enough freedom for amendments to be produced if necessary. In an 
interview held with a member of the European Commission (Brussels, 13 January 
2014), this view was confirmed:  
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‘the recast directive was to leave Directive 2007/23/EC largely intact, 
with only minor changes being necessary. The aim was definitely not 
to re-open a legislative discussion one year after its adoption but 
simply to align it with a decision about a common framework for the 
marketing of products in the EU.’ 
  
However, the start of Council and EP discussions took place under a typical recast 
legislative framework, i.e. requests for a number of substantive changes to be made 
to the 2007 directive. One just needs to refer to the recitals of the adopted recast 
directive (precisely, to the first recital of Directive 2013/29/EU, p. 27) to understand 
that substantive changes to the previous act were in fact made: 
 
‘Directive 2007/23/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council 
of 23 May 2007 on the placing on the market of pyrotechnic articles 
has been substantially amended. Since further amendments are to 
be made, that Directive should be recast in the interests of clarity’. 
 
The following paragraphs thus give a brief overview of the Maltese government’s 
behaviour in these legislative negotiations in its quest to achieve once again a 
desirable outcome from this process. The focus is therefore placed on the Malta 
clauses as found in Directive 2007/23/EC (as aforementioned, these are to be found 
in Article 2(2)(6) and recital (8)) and whether the text on these provisions were in any 
way amended in the discussions leading to the new recast directive, i.e. Directive 
2013/29/EU. 
 
In a similar vein to Figure 8.1, Figure 8.3 indicates the main key dates and events that 
occurred in these EU legislative negotiations. It also distinguishes between the 
decision-shaping stage, starting from the Commission’s adopted proposal on 21 
November 2011, and the decision-taking stage with the adoption by the Council and 














Figure 8.3 – Key dates in the 2011-2013 EU legislative negotiations to adopt recast Directive 
2013/29/EU 
End of the EU decision-making process 
  - 12 June 2013 [Signature by the EP & Council] 
  - 6 June 2013 [During the Transport, Telecommunications and Energy Council of 
Ministers meeting in  Luxembourg, Council approves the Directive (as an ‘A’ item on 
the agenda, i.e. points without discussion) at first reading, following negotiations 
with the EP (PE-CONS 3671/06)] 
   - 22 May 2013 [EP opinion at 1st reading: approval with amendments] + [CION 
agreement with EP amendments] 
    - 28 March 2012 [EESC opinion on CION’s proposal]  
    - 21 November 2011 [CION adopts its legislative proposal and transmits it to Council 
&   EP] 
   Start of the EU decision-making process: Post-Treaty of Lisbon provisions [Ordinary  
      Legislative procedure and voting in Council by 
      QMV] 
CION: European Commission                                  - the decision-taking stage   
EP: European Parliament 
Council: Council of the European Union                - the decision-shaping stage  
EESC: European Economic and Social Committee 
Source: Figure based on the PreLex database on interinstitutional procedures: 
http://ec.europa.eu/prelex/apcnet.cfm?CL=en (accessed on 13.02.2014). 
 
The Council Presidencies involved in the 2011-2013 EU legislative negotiations are set 
out in Table 8.5 below. 
Table 8.5 – EU Council Presidencies involved in this process 
Timeline & Stages  EU member state  Events 
July – December 2011  Poland  European Commission proposal on 
21.11.2011. 
January – June 2012 
[decision-shaping] 
 
 Denmark  The start of discussions in Council at 
WG level. 
July – December 2012 
[decision-shaping] 
 






Timeline & Stages 
 
January – June 2013 
[decision-taking] 









- Council Presidency compromise 
reached on 18.01.13;  
- EP (1st reading) approval (with 
amendments) on 22.05.13; 
- Council of Ministers approval (1st 
reading) on 06.06.13 [appearing as an 
‘A’ Item on the Transport, 
Telecommunications and Energy 
Council agenda]; 
- Adoption of legislative act on 
12.06.13 [signature of the Council and 
the EP]. 
Source: Table compiled by the author. 
 
8.2.2 Malta's objectives 
 
From the outset, it must be said that the Commission’s adopted proposal of 21 
November 2011 included most of the text of the 2007 directive. Thus, the Malta 
clauses previously discussed in section 8.1 formed part of this legislative proposal.  
 
However, as already implied in sub-section 8.1.3 and as illustrated in Table 8.6 below, 
France was not supportive of these articles, particularly the wording of Article 2(2) of 
the adopted 2007 directive. Because there was an opportunity brought about by 
‘recasting’ the 2007 directive, the French delegation was determined to request that 
the wording of the Malta legislative article in relation to Article 2(2) on definitions (of 
the 2007 directive) be removed from the Commission’s proposal for a recast 
directive.  
 
Besides disagreeing with the Maltese requests to exclude from the scope of the 
directive any fireworks produced by manufacturers for their own use on the same 
territory, France also put forward a technical argument. It emphasized that the 
Commission’s proposal was changing the scope of the legislative article dealing with 
‘exclusions’ and that it was therefore going beyond the aim of the alignment exercise 
which the recast legislative technique was meant to be accomplishing. This had to do 
with Article 2(2)(g) of the Commission’s proposal for a recast directive which read as 
follows: 
 
‘fireworks built by a manufacturer for his own use and which have 
been approved by a Member State for use on its territory’ (COM 
(2011) 764 final, p. 23). 
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Article 2(2)(g) of the Commission’s proposal is in fact one of the Malta clauses found 
under Article 2(2) of Directive 2007/23/EC treated earlier.40   
 
The difference between the “old” Article 2(2) dealing with ‘definitions’ and the “new” 
proposed Article 2(2)(g) was that the latter was being shifted by the Commission (in 
its proposal) to an altogether new category-type article dealing with ‘scope’. The 
‘scope’ article of the Commission’s new recast proposal (Article 2) was the former 
article (in Directive 2007/23/EC) dealing with ‘exemptions’ in the second paragraph. 
As illustrated previously (see sub-section 8.1.3), this was the preferred option for the 
Maltese government, having requested and intervened in Council to include this type 
of wording under the exemptions list (Article 1(4) of the 2007 directive on 
‘exemptions’) during the 2003-2007 negotiations. But as explained in the previous 
section, this did not materialize with the Maltese government having to upload its 
preferences elsewhere, albeit successfully, in Article 2 (2) and (6) on ‘definitions’. 
 
In this sense, the Commission’s new legislative proposal was optimal for the Maltese 
government given that the new Article 2 matched its preferred option of directly 
exempting all its local fireworks producers from being caught under this directive. It 
therefore viewed this as a success in itself (i.e. as a continual success from that 
achieved in the previous negotiations adopting Directive 2007/23/EC) before Council 
and EP discussions had even commenced. Therefore, the government entered the 
new negotiations advantaged by this fact alone, aware that this time round it had to 
‘defend’ its preferences already uploaded into the process. It was thus necessary to 
defend the Commission’s text: which, of course, made the Commission an important 
ally in this decision-making process. 
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deleting Article 3(9). 
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fireworks sector. Spain 
was therefore interested 
to defend the wording of 
the Malta clauses on the 
manufacture of fireworks 
for own use and on the 
same territory as their 
production.  
1.3 Same as Spain. When 
Cyprus held the Council 
Presidency, it facilitated 
maintaining the Malta 
clauses (found in the 
2007 directive) in the 
recast directive.  
1.4 France was against 
changing the scope of the 
2007 directive as found in 
Article 2(2)(g) arguing 
that this went beyond the 
recast alignment exercise. 
France therefore 
requested that point (g) 
be deleted.  
 
2.1 The wording of Article 
3(9) was only marginally 
improved with the gist of 
the wording of the Malta 
clause (found in Article 
2(6) in the 2007 directive) 
remaining intact in the 
new recast directive.    
Source: Table based on data collected during interviews with Maltese government and EU officials and 
from data found in Council Working Group documents. 
Note: Other delegations do not feature in this table since they did not pronounce themselves 
(intervene) on the specific paragraphs of these legislative articles in the Council and are therefore not 





8.2.3 The decision-shaping stage 
 
A. Malta's capacities and strategies in the Council of the European Union 
 
Due to the short time span between the adoption of Directive 2007/23/EC and the 
beginning of the new legislative negotiations in 2011, Malta’s governmental 
capacities (variables 1 to 3) remained unaltered except for minor changes mainly 
related to the government’s internal structures (i.e. a reduction in the number of line 
ministries) as a result of the election of a new government in March 2008.41 In 2011, 
the DPR and technical attaché in Brussels and the national expert (who like his 
predecessor also derived from the MSA) were all new representatives in these 
legislative negotiations.42 That said, the data found in Figure 8.2 of this chapter is still 
representative of the government’s capacity in this legislative case on the recast 
directive. 
 
Discussions in the Council’s Working Group began during the Danish Council 
Presidency in June 2012. As emphasized earlier, France immediately voiced its 
disagreement on a point of principle with the Commission’s proposed shift of 
enlarging the ‘scope’ article (to a new point (g) under Article 2(2)). Therefore, 
France’s main reserve on this point was against substantive changes being made to 
the previously adopted ‘scope’ article of the 2007 directive. Footnote 25 of a Council 
Working Group document (9450/1/12 REV 1 of 22 June 2012, p. 24) indicates the 
French government’s justification for its request to delete point (g) of the proposed 
Article 2(2): 
 
‘FR: Delete (g). Such a change of scope would go beyond alignment exercise.’ 
 
In reply to the French request, Malta and the Commission intervened during the next 
Council Working Group meeting (now under the Cypriot Presidency) against the 
French request to delete this point. Footnote 29 of another Council document 
(12372/12 of 11 July 2012, p. 24) indicates this situation: 
 
‘FR: Delete (g). Such a change of scope would go beyond alignment 
exercise. ES: Scrutiny reservation. Cion/MT: Against deletion of 
(g)…’ (emphasis added in bold text).  
 
One should also note that besides Malta and the Commission, Spain was also 
supportive of the idea to expand the ‘scope’ article in the manner proposed by the 
Commission. As indicated in Table 8.6 above, Spain was another player that was 
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pitching itself against the French request to delete point (g). As one may observe, 
Spain placed a scrutiny reservation in the footnote reproduced above - which is a 
tactic used by EU governments during the process to delay and/or signal 
disagreement with the text being proposed and has the effect of blocking a 
Presidency compromise on the article concerned. Although Spain was not an active 
player during the previous negotiations (as re-emphasized in sub-section 10.2.1 in 
chapter 10, Spain became aware of the potential that the adopted Malta clauses hold 
for some of its southern regions only once the 2005-2007 negotiations were over), it 
intervened in line with Malta’s position and was more proactive in the recast 
negotiations. 
 
Such government positions on the new Article 2(2)(g) continued to be placed in other 
Working Group documents emerging from ensuing meetings. The following 
paragraphs illustrate in chronological order the Maltese government’s interventions 
(besides those of delegations disagreeing and/or supporting it) recorded in the 
footnotes of these documents. This methodology allows one to process-trace 
technical discussions taking place in the Council. It is relevant to point out that 
underlined, strikethrough and/or bold text, unless denoted, is being reproduced as 
found in these Council documents. 
 
Having previously mentioned the first two Council documents, the next recorded 
intervention by the Maltese government is to be found in footnote 32 of one of the 
aforementioned documents (12372/12 of 11 July 2012, p. 24):  
 
‘FR: Delete (g). Such a change of scope would go beyond alignment 
exercise. MT: Use wording: “Fireworks which have been approved 
by a Member State for use on its territory during specific religious, 
cultural and traditional festivities’’ ES: Insert also an indent (ga): 
“Pyrotechnic articles, which have been authorized by a Member 
State, for exclusive use on its territory, and limited to the conclusion 
of specific cultural traditions.”  Cion: Against deletion of (g)…’ 
(emphasis added in bold text only). 
 
In footnote 33 of Council document 12372/1/12 REV 1 of 31 October 2012, the 
situation remained at a gridlock with the wording of this footnote mirroring that of 
footnote 32 of the previous Council document 12372/12. Therefore there were no 
changes in the wording to footnote 33. Things did change slightly however on page 
25 of Council document 5151/13 of 10 January 2013 (during the Irish Presidency). 
More precisely, footnote 32 of this document states the following: 
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‘FR: Delete (g) or add something such as “and used on its territory”. 
MT/ES: Use wording: “Fireworks which have been approved by a 
Member State for use on its territory during specific religious, 
cultural and traditional festivities’’ Cion: Against deletion of (g) and 
against MT/ES wording…’ (emphasis added in bold text only). 
 
In this last footnote one observes that France began to take stock of the situation by 
conceding a little. It put forward an alternative to its specific request to delete this 
point, thus beginning to accept the Commission’s proposal to shifting text found in 
the 2007 directive to a different category-type article. As stated further on, one of 
the main reasons for this is that France did not manage to exercise influence in the 
other decision-making EU institution, i.e. the EP.  
 
Another point worth mentioning is the Commission’s disagreement with Malta’s (and 
Spain’s) suggested wording for this new point. The Commission, besides supporting 
Malta (and Spain) to maintain point (g), was mainly pushing for its own preferences, 
i.e. maintaining the text as originally proposed in its proposal. It therefore did not 
favour Maltese and Spanish suggested wording with specific references to religious, 
cultural and traditional festivities and preferred maintaining wording that was less 
categorical. This was also the Commission’s view in changes it proposed to the 
previous recital 8 of the approved 2007 directive with any references to such 
traditional activities being left out from its new proposal (i.e. recital (10) - this recital 
was renumbered (11) in the adopted recast directive). However, the Commission’s 
preferences on the wording for the new Article 2(2)(g) and recital (10) did not affect 
the Maltese government negatively (since in substance, they did not go against the 
gist of the government’s position).  
 
The next Council document is dated 31 January 2013 (5151/1/13 REV 1). On page 26 
of this document, footnote 32 notes that a Presidency compromise was achieved on 
18 January 2013 and that point (g) of Article 2(2) was thus being agreed to as follows 
(the changes effected to the preceding document (5151/13 of 10 January 2013) are 
hereby indicated in bold and underlined text whereas deletions are in strikethrough 
text): 
 
‘fireworks which are built by a manufacturer for his own use and 
which have been approved  for use exclusively on its territory by a 
Member State for use on its territory in which the manufacturer is 




Concerning the new recital (10) being proposed, footnote 11 of Council document 
5151/2/13 REV 2 likewise indicates that the Presidency compromise had been 
achieved on 18 January 2013 (the changes to document 12372/1/12 REV 1 of 31 
October 2012 are indicated in bold and underlined text whereas deletions are in 
strikethrough text): 
 
‘… In view of religious, cultural and traditional festivities in the 
Member States, f Fireworks which are built by the a manufacturer 
for his own use and which have been approved for use exclusively on 
its territory by a the Member State in which the manufacturer is 
established, and which remain on the territory of that Member 
State for use on its territory should not be considered as having been 
made available on the market and should therefore not therefore 
need to comply with this Directive.’  
 
This text also reflects Malta’s position, even though as stated earlier (and as seen in 
this quote), references to specific types of activities/festivities have been removed 
and do not feature any longer in the recital of the new legislative act. Apart from this, 
the wording of the recital has in substance remained intact and continues to call for 
the exemption from the directive of the local manufacture of fireworks approved by 
a member state for use exclusively on its territory. 
 
Therefore, to sum up, the Maltese government entered the 2011-2013 recast 
negotiations differently than those of the 2005-2007 negotiations where it applied 
pace-setting strategies from the very start of the process. In the case of the more 
recent recast negotiations, Malta adopted a ‘defensive’ strategy. As analyzed, this 
was adopted to defend the ‘Malta clauses’ already approved and found in the 2007 
directive thus ensuring that they would be maintained in the adoption of the new 
recast directive. Indeed, as confirmed by Commission, Council Secretariat and 
Maltese government officials, Malta set its pace slowly in the beginning of the latest 
negotiations on pyrotechnic articles (interviews held in Malta in November 2013 and 
in Brussels between 12-17 January 2014). This can be tracked in the first Council 
document cited earlier (9450/1/12 REV 1 of 22 June 2012) where one is able to refer 
solely to the French request for a deletion of Article 2(2)(g) without any other 
delegation opposing it. Partly this may be explained because the French request was 
raised during the course of the Working Group meeting with the Maltese 
representatives having no instructions yet to intervene against the French position. 
However, Malta and the Commission did respond quickly enough in the Working 




Therefore, as confirmed through the above cited interviews, the government 
switched from a ‘defensive’ strategy to a pace-setting one which was similar to that 
deployed in the 2005-2007 negotiations. 
 
Tables 8.7 (pace-setting through lobbying) and 8.8 (pace-setting through norm 
advocacy and effective intervention in Council deliberations) together with their 
accompanying graphs (Graphs 8.3 and 8.4) demonstrate this (see also ‘Step 2’ of 
Table 10.2 in chapter 10). 
 
Table 8.7 - Independent Variable 4: Sub-variable 4.1 on the pace-setting strategy43 
Sub-variable 4.1 – Pace-setting through lobbying  
Scale: [5=successful/+ve; 2.5=medium; 0=not successful/-ve] 
5 = Yes, at extremely high levels of intensity; 
4 = Yes, at high levels of intensity; 
3 = Yes, but at medium-to-high levels of intensity; 
2 = Yes, but at low-to-medium levels of intensity; 
1 = Yes, but at extremely low levels; 
0 = None. 
 
Measurable indicator 4.1.1:  Lobbying the Council 
 4.1.1.A – Lobbying the Council Presidency                                  [0]   [1]   [2]   [3]   [ ]   [5] 
 4.1.1.B – Lobbying the Council Secretariat                                  [0]   [1]   [2]   [3]   [ ]   [5] 
 
Measurable indicator 4.1.2: Lobbying the European Commission 
 4.1.2.A - Lobbying the Commissioner network                          [0]   [1]   [2]   [ ]   [4]   [5] 
 4.1.2.B - Lobbying the Commission Directorate-Generals       [0]   [1]   [2]   [ ]   [4]   [5] 
 4.1.2.C - Lobbying SNEs in the Commission                                [ ]   [1]   [2]   [3]   [4]   [5] 
 4.1.2.D - Lobbying the Commissioner responsible for the  
dossier                                                                                               [0]   [1]   [2]   [ ]   [4]   [5] 
 
Measurable indicator 4.1.3: Lobbying large state governments            [0]   [1]   [ ]   [3]   [4]   [5] 
 
Measurable indicator 4.1.4: Lobbying small state governments            [0]   [1]   [ ]   [3]   [4]   [5] 
Source: Table compiled by the author. 
 
Graph 8.3 – Columns indicating the scores for Sub-variable 4.1 
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When compared to data found in Table 8.3 and Graph 8.1 for the 2005-2007 
negotiations (see section 8.1), Table 8.7 and Graph 8.3 indicate that in the recast 
negotiations, Malta lobbied the Commission less (since as discussed, Malta’s 
preferences were similar to those held by the Commission in these negotiations) but 
intensified its lobbying efforts with the Council (the Presidency and the Secretariat). 
Table 8.7 also reveals that Malta slightly increased its lobbying of other member state 
governments when compared with the previous round of negotiations. As indicated 
in Table 8.6, this lobbying was directed particularly towards Spain and Cyprus (with 
the latter holding the Council Presidency during a crucial stage in the negotiations): 
both countries sharing similar interests with Malta over local fireworks production. 
Malta managed to convince these delegations of the negative effects the French 
suggestion (of deleting Article 2(2)(g) from the Commission’s proposal) would have 
on their pyrotechnic industries if adopted. 
 
However, Table 8.8 and Graph 8.4 below indicate similar levels (compared with data 
in Table 8.4 and Graph 8.2) in the government’s other pace-setting capabilities (i.e. 
norm advocacy and interventions in Council deliberations) for both sets of Council 
negotiations. Therefore, in order to suppress the French amendments requested in 
Council, Malta needed to maintain the same pace-setting levels as those displayed in 
the previous round of negotiations on this legislative file.  
 
Table 8.8 - Independent Variable 4: Sub-variable 4.2 on the pace-setting strategy44 
Sub-variable 4.2 – Pace-setting through norm advocacy & effective intervention in Council 
deliberations  
Scale: [5=successful/+ve; 2.5=medium; 0=not successful/-ve] 
5 = Yes, at extremely high levels of intensity; 
4 = Yes, at high levels of intensity; 
3 = Yes, but at medium-to-high levels of intensity; 
2 = Yes, but at low-to-medium levels of intensity; 
1 = Yes, but at extremely low levels; 
0 = None.  
 
Measurable indicator 4.2.1:  
 A government’s capacity to persuade through moral convictions   [0]   [1]   [2]   [ ]   [4]   [5] 
 
Measurable indicator 4.2.2:  
 A government’s diplomatic leverage & capacity to engage  
effectively                                                                                                      [0]   [1]   [2]   [3]   [ ]   [5] 
 






Graph 8.4 – Columns indicating the scores for Sub-variable 4.2 
 
Source: Graph compiled by the author. 
 
One must also keep in mind that during the recast negotiations, there were other 
factors in favour of the Maltese case which were not present in the previous 
discussion round. As previously observed, one such factor was the Presidency being 
held by Cyprus during a crucial stage of the Council discussions (see Table 8.5). It is a 
given among EU circles that Cyprus is Malta’s natural ally – a sort of ‘brother like’ 
relationship - both islands sharing many factors in common (see also chapter 2). As 
observed by a senior Council secretariat official: 
 
‘these two countries support each other repeatedly and in most of 
the EU decision-making processes across various policy spheres’ 
(interview held in Brussels on 16 January 2014).  
 
Thus, in this case the Cypriot and Irish Presidencies were sympathetic towards 
Malta’s interests (since as already stated, Cyprus too shares similar traditions in the 
pyrotechnic industry with Malta while Ireland is another small state) which 
contributed to maintaining the 2007 text on the ‘Malta clauses’ in the Presidency’s 
compromise of 18 January 2013. Small state Presidencies thus represented another 
factor to Malta’s successful exercise of influence in this process. 
 
B. Malta's capacities and strategies in the European Parliament 
 
Before concluding, one must also examine the EP’s legislative discussions on the 
Commission’s proposal for a recast directive. As previously illustrated (in sub-section 
8.1.3) in the run up to the adoption of the 2007 directive, the Maltese government’s 
position was supported and taken up by the EP’s Committee on the Internal Market 







Measurable indicator 4.2.1 Measurable indicator 4.2.2 
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Malta’s government channeled its influence once again in this EP committee 
(primarily via the Maltese MEPs). 
 
One of the Maltese MEPs involved, Louis Grech (S&D), hails from Malta’s Labour 
Party, which at the time was still in the opposition in Malta (he is now Malta’s deputy 
PM and Minister for European Affairs). Grech, who at the time was a member and 
vice-chair of IMCO,45 intervened directly in this committee’s meetings to counter 
French MEPs attempts to delete the wording of the Malta clause from the 
Commission’s proposal. Thus, similarly to what materialized in the previous 
negotiations round, party politics was set aside in favour of the national position and 
hence MEP Grech towed the government’s line.  
 
The French request to delete the wording of the text on the Malta clause (i.e. the 
wording of Article 2(2)(g) of the Commission’s recast proposal) came from MEP 
Bernardette Vergnaud (who was also a member of IMCO during the 2005-2007 
legislative discussions in the EP) who like MEP Grech hailed from the S&D political 
affiliation. Significantly, she was also a vice-chair of the IMCO committee. MEP 
Vergnaud followed the French government’s position and requested that Article 
2(2)(g) be deleted on exactly the same grounds as those aired by the French 
government in Council – that apart from the new text representing a change of scope 
going beyond the alignment exercise, it was also confusing and unnecessary. This 
however did not find the backing of the majority of MEPs, who pitched themselves 
against Vergnaud’s amendment. Besides, the Commission made it clear that it was 
adamant about maintaining the text of its new proposal as proposed. It is interesting 
to note how in this case, two MEPs from the same political affiliation in the EP (the 
S&D), who were both vice-chairs of IMCO, contrasted each other in favour of the 
positions held by their respective national governments (which at the time were both 
conservative right wing governments and hence of a different political affiliation to 
those of  these MEPs political parties).46 This is very instructive of the power held by 
governments (as extremely strong players when compared to others) in EU decision-
making processes. 
 
8.2.4 The decision-taking stage 
 
All the factors discussed at length in the previous sections contributed to maintaining 
the Malta clauses – albeit with minor changes to the wording of the 2007 directive - 
in the new EU recast directive. At the end, the Commission, Council and the EP 
reached a compromise - the EP approving the text (with amendments) at first reading 
in a plenary session on 22 May 2013; the Commission agreeing with the EP’s position 
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on the same day as the EP’s approval; and the Council adopting the text as an ‘A’ 
item (point not requiring a discussion) at the Transport, Telecommunications and 
Energy Council of Ministers on 6 June 2013. As shown before in Table 8.5, the Irish 
Presidency reached a compromise on 18 January 2013, with a majority of member 
states agreeing to the text by QMV. 
 
As for the adopted wording of Article 2(2)(g) focused upon in the previous sections 
(as stated earlier, this is known as one of the ‘Malta clauses’), the text is as follows 
(the new additions are denoted in underlined text whereas the deletion of text from 
the former Article 2(2) of the 2007 directive are denoted in strikethrough text): 
 
‘Article 2 – Definitions Scope 
2. This Directive shall not apply to: 
2.(g) Ffireworks which are built by a manufacturer for his own use 
and which have been approved by a Member State for use 
exclusively on its territory are not to be considered as having been 
placed on the market by the Member State in which the 
manufacturer is established, and which remain on the territory of 
that Member State’ (Directive 2013/29/EU; OJ L  178, 28.6.2013, p. 
32). 
 
With regard to the other legislative article of key importance to the Maltese 
government, Article 3(9) on page 33 of Directive 2013/29/EU (the former Article 2(6) 
of Directive 2007/23/EC also known as a ‘Malta clause’), the text of the adopted 
directive is as follows (the new minor amendments are denoted in underlined text 
whereas the deletion of text from the former Article 2(6) of the 2007 directive are 
denoted in strikethrough text): 
 
‘Article 2 Article 3 – Definitions 
For the purpose of this Directive, the following definitions shall 
apply: 
6.(9) ‘Mmanufacturer’ means a natural or legal person who designs 
and/or manufactures a pyrotechnic article, or who causes has such 
an article to be designed and or manufactured, with a view to 
placing it on the market and markets that pyrotechnic article under 
his own name or trademark.’ 
 
Finally, it is also appropriate to indicate the text of the new recital of direct interest 
to the Maltese government, i.e. recital (11) on page 28 of Directive 2013/29/EU. 
Once again, the new additions are denoted in underlined text whereas the deletion 
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of text from the former recital (8) of the 2007 directive are denoted in strikethrough 
text: 
 
(8)(11) ‘In view of religious, cultural and traditional festivities in the 
Member States, f Fireworks which are built by the a manufacturer 
for his own use and which have been approved by a Member State 
for use exclusively on its territory by the Member State in which the 
manufacturer is established, and which remain on the territory of 
that Member State, should not be considered as having been placed 
made available on the market and should not therefore not need to 
comply with this Directive’.   
 
The legal articles and recital cited above (which were adopted by the Council and the 
EP on 12 June 2013) demonstrate that the positive outcome achieved by Malta’s 
government in the adoption of Directive 2007/23/EC was also extended to the 
outcome of the new Directive with the Maltese government’s prime and 
fundamental interests having been achieved. 
 
8.3 Conclusion – An assessment of the outcomes for Malta in case 
studies 1 and 2 
 
This chapter has shown the salience of pyrotechnics for the Maltese government as 
well as the preferences and strategies used by the government during the two 
legislative EU decision-making processes. Chapter 8 has revealed that in both cases 
the Maltese government achieved successful outcomes with the adopted legislative 
acts matching its preferences. This suggests that the government exercised 
significant influence in these legislative processes.  
 
Therefore, the main research questions posed by this thesis (presented in chapters 1 
and 6) of whether a small EU state such as Malta may influence EU decision-making 
and how this was accomplished, have been answered and represents the key on 
which the case study analyses in this chapter have been built. 
 
In order to reiterate clearly the findings emerging from this chapter, the cases 
represent positive ones for Malta’s government. The bare fact that there are clauses 
in these directives known as ‘Malta clauses’ is by itself testimony of the government’s 
exercise of influence in the EU legislative decision-making processes. As revealed in 
this chapter, this is by no means a simple feat when considering the complexity of 
Council and EP legislative negotiations. 
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Malta’s government was thus successful in ‘fighting’ for its interests as a self-
interested and strategically calculating actor, or better as a rational player (as 
discussed previously in chapter 4) in these EU processes. However, the fact that it 
managed to achieve successful outcomes cannot be solely attributed to its capacity 
to act as a rational player. Reasons for its success must also point at its capacity to 
exploit opportunities (to channel influence) deriving from the EU institutional 
framework of the Commission, the Council (where it voiced its concerns directly) and 
the EP (through Maltese MEPs mainly). In both cases, one is able to notice how 
Malta’s government was capable of striking a balance between the pushing forward 
of its interests and correct interpretation of negotiation dynamics (and hence 
opportunities emerging from them) set by the EU’s institutional framework. This is 
even more remarkable when considering Malta’s extremely small size. As discussed 
in more detail in chapter 11, one may thus conclude that Malta’s success in these 
legislative case studies on the placing on the market of pyrotechnic articles may be 
explained both from rationalist and institutionalist perspectives. 
 
One last observation worth making concerns the chapter’s analysis of the factors 
explaining the Maltese government’s successes in these specific EU decision-making 
processes. Sub-sections 8.1.3 and 8.2.3 outlined several factors (or more precisely, 
independent variables) divided between governmental capacities (variables 1 to 3) 
and strategy(ies) (variable 4) in line with the thesis’s methodology presented in 
chapter 6. These factors (together with those found in chapter 9 in relation to the 
















Malta’s government in the legislative decision-making process 
of the extension of an EU directive on long-term residence to 




EU legal migration, irregular migration and asylum policy fall within the ambit of the 
EU Justice and Home Affairs (JHA) policy domain. These three ‘sub-policy’ spheres 
together with their respective legal framework, particularly that of legal migration, 
form the focus of this chapter.  
 
However, one must bear in mind that the EU’s JHA policy sphere also includes other 
sub-spheres (notably those on border controls, visas, civil co-operation, criminal law, 
policing and security) which this chapter does not delve into given that they have 
been the focus of work by other authors producing research on this very challenging 
and complex topic (for instance, see Peers, 2011; Geddes, 2000; Boswell, 2003; 
amongst others). Rather, the chapter builds on such work and focuses on a particular 
aspect of the EU’s immigration policy, that of long-term residency for legal migrants 
in the EU. More specifically, this chapter examines the EU legislative negotiations on 
amending Council Directive 2003/109/EC (of 25 November 2003 known as the ‘Long-
Term Residents’ (LTR) directive) and the Maltese government’s behaviour in these 
negotiations leading to the adoption of Directive 2011/51/EU. As stated in 
subsequent sections, the rationale behind the amendment directive is to extend 
long-term residency to third-country nationals (TCNs) who are beneficiaries of 
international protection. Therefore, in a similar manner as found in chapter 8, 
chapter 9 examines whether Malta’s government was successful in exercising 
influence during this particular EU legislative decision-making process. 
 
Section 9.1 places EU migration and asylum policy in context. It provides a brief 
overview of the development of the EU’s legal framework for legal migration bringing 
it up to date with the current post-Treaty of Lisbon era. It also sets out a clear 
compartmentalization of the existing EU legal framework for the interlinked sub-
policy spheres of asylum and legal and irregular migration. Akin with the rest of the 
chapter, this section focuses on the EU’s rules and legal framework on the granting of 
residence permits to TCNs as defined by Article 79 TFEU, particularly point 2(a) of this 
Treaty article. 
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Section 9.2 presents Malta’s national position (that is, the government’s objectives) 
adopted in these negotiations on amending the 2003 LTR directive. This section 
highlights the salience presented by EU legal migration law, particularly EU legislation 
on long-term residence, for the Maltese government and its interests in this policy 
sphere. As shall be observed in section 9.2, the issue of granting long-term residence 
permits was (and still is) a very sensitive issue for those EU member states (and their 
governments) geographically placed on the EU’s external border. This section 
emphasizes how EU states such as Malta are negatively affected by large numbers of 
irregular migrants (commonly referred to as ‘boat people’) arriving on their shores 
(and by consequence, the ‘EU border’) seeking refugee status and/or international 
protection (also referred to as ‘subsidiary’ protection). This situation has a direct 
impact on the issue of long-term residency in the EU. 
 
Section 9.3 moves the discussion forward and in a similar vein as that found in 
chapter 8 describes and explains the Maltese government’s capacities and strategies 
employed during the legislative negotiations in the Council and the EP in this case. 
Finally, section 9.4 concludes this chapter by providing a brief overall assessment of 
Malta’s performance throughout these negotiations to determine whether the 
outcome for Malta was positive. 
 
It must be emphasized that this chapter deals solely with the EU legislative 
negotiations occurring between 2007 and 2011 to amend the 2003 LTR Council 
directive. In other words, it does not cover the process adopting the initial directive 
of 2003.  The main reason for this is that at the time Malta was not yet an EU 
member state and could not participate in those legislative negotiations. Therefore, 
since the thesis is about Malta’s behaviour in EU legislative decision-making 
processes, it did not make much sense to examine the earlier negotiations. 
Therefore, unlike the case studies presented in chapter 8, this chapter deals solely 
with one set of negotiations, albeit occurring in two distinct phases separated by the 
entry into force of the Treaty of Lisbon on 1 December 2009 (this last point is 
illustrated in Figure 9.1 on key dates in the negotiations). 
 
9.1 An overview and background of the EU’s policy on legal migration 
 
As stated above, the aim of this section is not to give an in-depth view of the EU’s 
asylum and immigration policy, but rather to provide a context and starting point for 




As also observed in the chapter’s introduction, the EU’s JHA legislation on the 
granting of long-term residence permits to TCNs falls under the EU legal migration 
domain. However, as Peers (2011: 382-383) points out, EU rules on legal migration 
are intrinsically linked with other sub-policy spheres found in the EU’s JHA policy 
area, including irregular migration and asylum. The complexity of the EU’s rules on 
legal migration and asylum is illustrated in the fact that the rules on granting refugee 
status, residence permits and employment to TCNs are linked with those of family 
reunion and long-term residence permits for refugees and persons granted subsidiary 
or international protection.  But as Peers (2011: 383) rightly observes, ‘the grant of a 
residence permit or a long-stay visa or the admission of family members can also 
trigger the EU’s rules on responsibility for asylum applications’, the so-called ‘Dublin 
III’ Regulation (EU Regulation 604/2013 of 26 June 2013 - the successor of the Dublin 
II Regulation, Council Regulation (EC) No 343/2003 of 18 February 2003) which as 
stated further on, is a thorny issue for the Maltese government. 
 
The point here is that the domains of EU asylum and migration (legal and irregular) 
and their respective legal framework are intermeshed, with one complementing the 
other. Table 9.1  compartmentalizes these JHA sub-policy spheres to put some order 
to this extremely wide EU policy domain (although it should also be borne in mind 
that the JHA policy sphere overlaps and gets caught in the remit of other EU policies 
such as the EU’s internal market and its four freedoms –  particularly the free 
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8 ECHR. 
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protected by Article 
14 ECHR. 
 
  Primary migration 
- The Blue Card 
Directive for highly- 
skilled workers 
(Council Directive 
2009/50/EC of 25 
May 2009). 
- The Single Permit 
Directive (Directive 
2011/98/EU of 13 
December 2011). 
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 Human rights 
- The European Convention on 
Human Rights (ECHR). 
 
 Prevention of irregular migration 
- Council Directive 2001/51/EC 
of 28 June 2001 
supplementing the provisions 
of Article 26 of the 
Convention implementing the 
Schengen Agreement of 14 
June 1985. 
- Council Directive 2004/82/EC 
of 29 April 2004 on the 
obligation of carriers to 
communicate passenger data. 
- Council Directive 2002/90/EC 
of 28 November 2002 defining 
the facilitation of 
unauthorized entry, transit 
and residence. 
- Council framework Decision 
2002/946 of 28 November 
2002 on the strengthening of 
the penal framework to 
prevent the facilitation of 
unauthorized entry, transit 
and residence. 
- Council Directive 2004/81/EC 
of 29 April 2004 on the 
residence permit issued to 
third-country nationals who 
are victims of trafficking in 
human beings. 
- Regulation (EU) No 493/2011 
of 5 April 2011 on the 
creation of an immigration 
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on social security  
for EU citizens to 
third-country 
nationals who move 
within the EU. 
 
 Residence Permits & 
Long Stay Visas 







 Treatment of irregular migrants 
- Directive 2009/52/EC of 18 
June 2009 providing for 
minimum standards on 
sanctions and measures 
against employers of illegally 
staying third-country 
nationals. 
- Council Directive 2004/81/EC 
of 29 April 2004 on the 
residence permit issued to 
third-country nationals who 
are victims of trafficking in 
human beings or who have 
been the subjects of an action 
to facilitate illegal 
immigration, who cooperate 
with the competent 
authorities. 
 
 Expulsion measures 
- The Returns Directive 
(Directive 2008/115/EC of 
16/12/2008). 
- Directive 2001/40/EC of 
28/05/2001 on the mutual 
recognition of decisions on 
the expulsion of TCNs. 
- Directive 2003/110/EC of 25 
November 2003 on assistance 
in cases of transit for the 
purposes of removal by air. 
- Council Decision 2004/573/EC 
of 29 April 2004 on joint 
expulsion flights. 
Source: Table compiled by the author based on the structure of chapters 5 to 7 in Peers (2011). 
 
Immigration is a highly complex and controversial subject in the EU and among its 
member state governments. This is mainly because of the general conception (or 
misconception, depending on one’s views on this topic) held by EU governments 
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about migration in the EU as one causing ‘havoc’ to national economies while at the 
same time destabilizing social and cultural harmony (see Peers, 2011: 382).  
 
Given that EU states have different views about this subject, EU immigration policy 
(particularly the EU’s legal framework for legal migration) has experienced a slow and 
complex development. For instance, in the central Mediterranean, Malta and Italy 
are firm believers of the view just expressed above since they are being faced by the 
immediate challenge of hosting continuous influxes of irregular migrants arriving 
(most of which request for refugee or international protection upon arrival) thus 
causing extreme burdens on their administrations. In the particular case of Malta 
(due to its extremely small size in terms of land mass), the large numbers of migrant 
arrivals also negatively affect its natural resource and infrastructural base. These 
views contrast with for instance the more centrally placed EU states that do not form 
part of the EU’s periphery (this is explained by a process known as ‘distalization’ dealt 
with in more detail in sub-section 9.1.2).   
 
Therefore, such factors explain why in the EU, a considerable amount of discretion in 
this sphere has been left in the hands of the member states and their respective 
national jurisdictions. But they also explain why EU decision-making in this policy 
sphere is characterized by contrasting views held by the EU states which makes 
decision-taking extremely difficult.  
 
The next section describes the development of EU legal migration, policy and law, 
with the aim of enabling the reader to gain the relevant background prior to the 
analysis of the negotiations of the 2011 EU amendment directive (Directive 
2011/51/EU). 
 
9.1.1 The development of the EU’s JHA institutional framework for legal migration 
 
The development of the EU’s legal migration framework may be said to have 
occurred roughly in six stages (at least until the time of writing of this thesis). These 










Table 9.2 on the different stages in the development of the EU’s institutional framework on 




















Source: Table compiled by the author. 
 
The first stage was established with the Council’s adoption of an intergovernmental 
Joint Action Plan on a uniform residence permit in 1996 (OJ L 7/1, 1996). Since the 
Council adopted a package of EU legislation on EU migration subsequent to the 
Maastricht Treaty’s ‘third pillar’ provisions on JHA, the Joint Action Plan was 
necessary in order to achieve some form of harmonization in the immigration field. 
As Peers (2011: 384) points out, this EU legislative package included legislation on: 
family reunion; the admission of workers, the self-employed and students; long-term 
residence status; and marriages of convenience. The idea was to place this package 
under a migration law Convention proposed by the Commission in 1997 (COM (97) 
387 of 30 July 1997; OJ C 337/9) which was however not adopted by the Council. 
Thus, the Joint Action represented the only ‘hard law’ that the EU had at its disposal 
prior to the entry into force of the Amsterdam Treaty. 
 
The second stage of the development of this EU policy area occurred when the Treaty 
of Amsterdam (Article 63(3) and (4) TEC) ‘Communitarized’ migration law (in 
particular for the purposes of this chapter, those provisions on the issuing of long-
term visas and residence permits under Article 63(3)(a) TEC). However, it was clear 
that this would not preclude member state action from occurring when necessary. In 
fact, the final provisions of Article 63 TEC stated that: 
 
‘Measures adopted by the Council pursuant to points 3 and 4 shall 
not prevent any Member State from maintaining or introducing in 
Stage 1:  The Joint Action Plan on a uniform residence permit adopted by Council in 1996. 
Stage 2: The Treaty of Amsterdam (1997) – conferral of Community competence over 
migration law, Article 63(3) and (4) TEC. 
Stage 3: The Tampere European Council, October 1999 - rules established about the fair 
treatment of third-country nationals leading the Commission to propose legislation. 
Stage 4:  The Hague Programme of November 2004 - outlined the future of the EU’s JHA policy 
and shifted Council voting to QMV besides changing the legislative procedure to co-
decision (as it was called at the time) for all immigration related topics except that of 
legal migration. 
Stage 5: The European Pact on Immigration and Asylum of 2008 - a commitment on the part 
of the EU governments to organize legal immigration to take account of the 
priorities, needs and reception capacities determined by each member state. 
Stage 6: The Treaty of Lisbon (2009) – Article 79 TFEU gave more competence to the EU 
(besides modifying Council voting to QMV and establishing the ordinary legislative 
procedure for legal migration thus bringing it in line with all other immigration 
related topics) justifying more action on its part in immigration policy. 
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the areas concerned national provisions which are compatible with 
this Treaty and with international agreements’. 
 
The third stage was the Tampere European Council of October 1999, which 
established rules about the ‘fair treatment’ of TCNs to be upheld by EC migration law. 
Of particular relevance to this chapter was point 21 of the European Council 
Conclusions: 
 
‘21. The legal status of third country nationals should be 
approximated to that of Member States’ nationals. A person, who 
has resided legally in a Member State for a period of time to be 
determined and who holds a long-term residence permit, should be 
granted in that Member State a set of uniform rights which are as 
near as possible to those enjoyed by EU citizens; e.g. the right to 
reside, receive education, and work as an employee or self-
employed person...’ (the underlined text is emphasized here since 
this point represents the crux of the Maltese government’s position 
during the legislative negotiations treated further on in this 
chapter).  
 
The Tampere Conclusions led the Commission to propose legislation under legal 
migration, including a first-time proposal in 2001 for a directive on the status of long-
term residents (COM (2001) 127 of 13 March 2001). These proposals were met with 
mixed reactions by the EU governments in the Council and consequently only some 
of them were adopted. There were two Council regulations adopted in 2002 on 
migration law, one of which ‘Communitarized’ and replaced the previously 
mentioned intergovernmental Joint Action Plan (Council Regulation 1030/2002/EC of 
13 June 2002). This regulation was later amended in 2008 to introduce fingerprinting 
and photographs in the process for the application of residence permits, thus 
ensuring more document security. Besides these regulations, there were another two 
Council directives adopted in 2003: Council Directive 2003/86/EC on family reunion 
and Council Directive 2003/109/EC on long-term residence. Both are a watered-down 
version of the draft legislation originally proposed by the Commission. Due to this 
fact (emphasized in the next section), the Commission introduced a new legislative 
proposal in 2007 to amend Council Directive 2003/109/EC extending its scope to 
beneficiaries of international protection.47 
  
The fourth stage in the development of EU legal migration was the Hague 
Programme of November 2004, which outlined the future of the EU’s JHA policy. This 
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marked an important development for all the sub-fields of this EU policy area, with 
the exception of legal migration (in this sense it was a non-development). In other 
words, unlike all other EU immigration related policy spheres that by this stage were 
‘Communitarized’ and were thus supranational in nature (with the Commission being 
able to start the legislative process and the Council and the EP having to adopt or 
reject EU legislation), legal migration was the only one which maintained an 
intergovernmental structure in its decision-making process.48 This meant that legal 
migration was still subject to unanimous voting in the Council with only a minimalist 
role for the EP through the consultation legislative procedure (under this procedure 
the views of the EP can be overlooked by the Council). This scenario unfolded as from 
1 January 2005 and lasted until the entry into force of the Treaty of Lisbon on 1 
December 2009 which remedied this anomalous situation. As discussed in section 
9.3, these procedural changes impacted heavily on the outcome of the legislative 
negotiations focused upon by this chapter. 
   
The Hague Programme, although failing to outline any future substantial programme 
for EU legal migration law (unlike the aforementioned Tampere European Council 
Conclusions), invited the Commission (albeit rather superficially) to come up with a 
new policy plan on legal migration by the end of 2005. Of paramount importance to 
this chapter, it identified some measures to be taken in this sub-policy domain, 
including an amendment directive to extend the scope of Council Directive 
2003/109/EC to beneficiaries of international protection (i.e. refugees and/or those 
granted subsidiary/international protection), amongst others. In June 2007, the 
Commission took up this invitation and sent the Council a draft legislative proposal 
on this topic (COM (2007) 298 final, 6 June 2007). As discussed in the next sections of 
this chapter, the Council was however unable to agree on this amendment directive 
and the situation was only resolved through the entry into force of the Treaty of 
Lisbon (which as aforementioned moved Council voting from unanimity to QMV and 
established the ordinary legislative procedure – which gave the EP same powers as 
the Council to adopt or reject this legislation).49 
 
The next stage in the development of EU legal migration was the 2008 European Pact 
on Immigration and Asylum. As Peers shows, it was a commitment on the part of the 
EU governments ‘to organise legal immigration to take account of the priorities, 
needs and reception capacities determined by each Member State’ (Peers 2011: 388). 
The so-called Dublin Regulations (mentioned earlier) on responsibility for asylum 
applications stirred quite a lot of controversy among many of the EU governments, 
not least Malta’s government. Malta is currently still in favour of revising them to 
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bring them in line with the European Pact of 2008 and with the EU Treaty principles 
on solidarity and fair-sharing enshrined in Article 80 TFEU: 
 
‘The policies of the Union set out in this Chapter and their 
implementation shall be governed by the principle of solidarity and 
fair sharing of responsibility, including its financial implications, 
between the Member States. Whenever necessary, the Union acts 
adopted pursuant to this Chapter shall contain appropriate 
measures to give effect to this principle.’ 
 
However after having said the above, the Pact did not produce any tangible reference 
to any EU legislation on any of the legal migration issues. 
 
The sixth stage in the EU’s legal migration development is represented by the post-
Treaty of Lisbon period. Here the focus is placed on Article 79 (TFEU) falling under 
‘Chapter 2’ (Policies on Border Checks, Asylum and Immigration) of Title V (Area of 
Freedom, Security and Justice) of the Treaty (this Treaty article is quoted in the next 
sub-section). It begins by committing the Union and its member states to develop a 
common immigration policy (Article 79(1) TFEU). For the purposes of this chapter on 
long-term residence permits, Article 79(2) TFEU is significant for two main reasons. 
First, this Treaty article confirms that the EU legal framework for legal migration shall 
be formed by the EP and the Council acting in accordance with the ordinary 
legislative procedure. Second, it requests these two EU decision-making institutions 
to adopt measures in some areas, such as adopting standards on the issuing of long-
term visas and residence permits by the EU member states. 
   
All this means that the EU’s remit in this policy sphere has become more powerful, 
with it now being obliged to adopt a common immigration policy. At the same time, 
the Treaty of Lisbon provisions have diminished the EU member states’ rights to 
intervene in this sphere. In fact, the entry into force of the Treaty of Lisbon has made 
it more difficult for EU member state initiatives to maintain or introduce national 
provisions alongside EU legislation (and which is contrary to the provisions of the 
former Article 63 TEC brought about in the second stage of the policy’s 
development). EU governments have thus lost some form of sovereignty on issues of 
legal migration in the process.50 However, this is partly made up for through Article 
79(5) TFEU which still allows EU member states to determine the volume of 
admission of migrants entering their borders seeking employment. Besides, Article 
79(1) TFEU, unlike the former Article 63 TEC, broadened the wording of the text 
adding a new dimension to the Treaty. As Peers (2011: 389) observes, Article 79(1) 
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TFEU speaks about ‘efficient’ management, ‘fair treatment’ of legal residents, and so 
forth: features that are novel to this policy sphere. 
  
In brief, the Treaty of Lisbon brought about important changes to the EU’s legal 
framework for legal migration, the most significant of which were the introduction of 
QMV in Council voting provisions and the application of the ordinary legislative 
procedure where the Council and the EP are equally involved in the EU’s legislative 
decision-making process. As already emphasized, and as discussed in the following 
sections, these changes had an impact on the EU legislative negotiations adopting 
Directive 2011/51/EU. 
  
In order to sum up, Peers (2011: 393) hits the nail on its head when he maintains 
that: 
 
‘Following the entry into force of the Treaty of Lisbon, immigration 
still remains a shared competence of the EU and its Member States. 
However, the wording of the new provisions suggests that it is now 
easier to justify more intensive EU action pursuant to the principles 
of proportionality and subsidiarity, and harder to argue that any 
particular area of immigration law is outside EU competence’. 
 
9.1.2 Background to the EU legislative case on the negotiations of Directive 
2011/51/EU 
 
As stated in the previous sub-section on the development of the EU’s legal migration 
policy and legislation, the Tampere European Council of October 1999 established 
rules about the ‘fair treatment’ of non-EU nationals (or TCNs) that encouraged the 
Commission to come up with draft legislative proposals, such as the one in 2001 on 
the status of long-term residents for TCNs. This proposal also included the possibility 
for refugees to qualify for long-term EU residence. 
 
The need to streamline and harmonize EU legal migration legislation 
  
As previously observed, the Commission’s 2001 legislative proposal for TCNs to be 
recognized as long-term residents in the EU (the LTR directive) was not popular 
among the EU governments of the time and, as a result, the adopted Council 
directive (of 25 November 2003) watered-down the Commission’s original proposal. 
During those negotiations, the EU governments in Council also agreed to exclude 
refugees from the scope of the directive. However, they did (together with the  
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Commission) come up with a Joint Statement (adopted during the Justice and Home 
Affairs Council of Ministers meeting of 8 May 2003) that affirmed that in the short-
term the rights of long-term EU residence should be extended to TCNs who were 
refugees or under some form of protection.  
 
This was mainly because the Commission realized that the entry into force of the 
2003 LTR directive, which was applicable only to TCNs who were not refugees or 
beneficiaries of international protection, would in reality produce inconsistencies 
with other EU legislation in this policy sphere already in force. For instance, the 
Qualification Directive (Council Directive 2004/83/EC of 29 April 2004) already 
recognized the status of stateless persons needing international protection, unlike 
the 2003 LTR directive (see Recital (1) of Directive 2011/51/EU of 11 May 2011, p. 1). 
Therefore, the Commission needed to streamline and harmonize EU law. As depicted 
in Figure 9.1 and as examined in the next sections of this chapter, the Commission 
adopted its proposal for a revision directive amending the 2003 LTR directive in June 
2007. 
  
The intergovernmental and supranational nature of the negotiations adopting 
Directive 2011/51/EU 
 
As emphasized further on in this chapter and also in chapter 11, the 2007-2011 EU 
legislative negotiations on the amendment directive began in a purely 
intergovernmental setting. This, however, lasted only until the entry into force of the 
Treaty of Lisbon which shifted and ‘Communitarized’ all remaining aspects of EU 
immigration policy. Here it is relevant to point out a Communication from the 
Commission to the EP and the Council about the consequences of the entry into force 
of the Treaty of Lisbon on ongoing interinstitutional decision-making processes.51 This 
mainly had to do with changes effected to the legal base of ongoing processes in 
accordance with the new Article 79(2)(a)(b) TFEU. This legislative file was in fact one 
of these EU legislative processes affected with a change in its legal base from Article 
63(3)(a) and (4) TEC to Article 79(2)(a) and (b) TFEU: 
 
‘Article 79 
(ex Article 63, points 3 and 4, TEC) 
1. The Union shall develop a common immigration policy aimed at 
ensuring, at all stages, the efficient management of migration flows, 
fair treatment of third-country nationals residing legally in Member 
States, and the prevention of, and enhanced measures to combat, 
illegal immigration and trafficking in human beings. 
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2. For the purposes of paragraph 1, the European Parliament and 
the Council, acting in accordance with the ordinary legislative 
procedure, shall adopt measures in the following areas: 
(a) the conditions of entry and residence, and standards on the issue 
by Member States of long-term visas and residence permits, 
including those for the purpose of family reunification; 
(b) the definition of the rights of third-country nationals residing 
legally in a Member State, including the conditions governing 
freedom of movement and of residence in other Member States; 
(c) illegal immigration and unauthorised residence, including 
removal and repatriation of persons residing without authorisation; 




Scope and conditions behind extending the LTR Directive to beneficiaries of 
international protection 
 
It is important to understand the aim behind EU legislation granting long-term 
residence permits to TCNs (Council Directive 2003/109/EC of 25 November 2003) and 
subsequently its extension to beneficiaries of international protection (Directive 
2011/51/EU of 11 May 2011). Both directives state that for a non-EU national to be 
awarded the status of a long-term resident, the person must have resided 
continuously (i.e. uninterruptedly) for a period of five years in one of the EU’s 
member states. The granting of this status is however dependent on the following 
conditions: 
 
- a stable and regular source of income; 
- health insurance; 
- when required by the EU member state responsible for the processing of the 
 application, compliance with integration measures; and 
- the person must not constitute a threat to public security or public policy. 
 
Once met, the EU member state responsible for the application process (i.e. the 
member state hosting the third-country citizen) can issue a long-term residence 
permit granting this person the status of ‘long-term resident’. This permit is 
renewable and allows the person to enjoy the same treatment and rights as nationals 
of that EU member state, such as the right to access employment (also self-
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employment), education and vocational training, social security (protection and 
assistance) and access to goods and services, amongst others (European Commission, 
DG Home Affairs website). Most importantly, such persons, once granted long-term 
residence, may move freely within the EU with the exception of the United Kingdom 
(UK) and Ireland - which received special ‘opt-out’ arrangements52 from 
implementing the Schengen acquis when the Treaty of Amsterdam incorporated 
them into the EU Treaties.53 
 
Thus, in a nut-shell, the aim behind extending the scope of the 2003 LTR directive to 
refugees and to beneficiaries of international protection was to bestow upon this 
category of TCNs a set of rights about legal certainty and residence that would be 
equal to those availed of by other non-EU nationals and that are more or less 
comparable with those enjoyed by EU citizens. 
 
Linkage between the immigration and asylum EU policy spheres  
 
It is also important to understand the relevance behind the Commission’s intention 
to legislate in this area as part of a wider objective to link this sphere with that of 
asylum - that of implementing a Common European Asylum System (CEAS) - thus 
making this new framework as effective as possible.54 As stated, this goes back to the 
Tampere European Council of 1999 when the EU member state governments 
committed themselves to establish a common policy in the sphere of immigration 
and asylum. This meant that the extremely sensitive issue of external and internal EU 
border controls had to be settled as part of a package on a common EU policy. This 
chapter’s introduction has in fact already emphasized how interlinked immigration 
(legal and irregular) and asylum are.  
 
It is also worth expanding a little on the sub-policy sphere of asylum since the next 
sections reveal a sense of uneasiness on the part of Malta’s government in the legal 
migration domain (experienced during the legislative negotiations adopting the 2011 
amendment directive) which were linked with its difficulties as an external border of 
the EU in the asylum field. One must bear in mind that Malta together with 
Lampedusa, an Italian island southwest of Maltese territorial waters, constitute the 
first secure ports for irregular migrants/boat people to enter the EU from the African 
continent in the central Mediterranean region. 
 
This issue of border controls finds its roots back to the 1985 Schengen Agreement 
which effectively marked the beginning of efforts to remove internal border controls 
among the EU member states.55 This later spilled-over into the adoption by EU 
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governments of the Dublin Convention in 1990 and its successors - the Dublin II 
Regulation and the recast Dublin III Regulation (adopted on 26 June 2013 and 
entering into force on 19 July 2013).  
 
The Dublin regulations established rules on, amongst other things, which EU state is 
responsible for non-EU nationals entering the EU (whether this occurred by way of 
visa or permit or through which they have travelled irregularly), which EU member 
state is responsible for applications of asylum seekers (i.e. the first EU member state 
where finger prints have been stored or an asylum claim lodged) and for relocation of 
such persons. To make this effective, a host of other initiatives were eventually 
established such as the establishment of Frontex in 2005 (the EU’s external border 
agency) and a number of databases to enhance electronic controls. These included 
the Schengen Information System (SIS) in 1995 and the European dactylographic 
system (Eurodac) in 2003 (this has now been recast in 2013) to store and share 
biometric identification data.56 Today, the CEAS has been finally accomplished with 
the entry into force of a package of EU legislation.  
 
Simply put, one may trace the foundations of the gradual development of a common 
European system on asylum to the Schengen Agreement of 1985 which then 
snowballed into other initiatives. These initiatives were initially intergovernmental in 
form which later became ‘Communitarized’ via the ordinary legislative procedure and 
with QMV voting in Council. 
 
‘Distalization’ processes in the EU 
 
Another important issue concerning Malta’s difficulties as an external border of the 
EU is what Mainwaring (2012: 48-49) observes about ‘distalization’ processes, i.e. 
initiatives taken deliberately by EU governments to ‘transfer responsibility towards 
the external border’, something which the Maltese government and other external 
border EU member states (such as Italy) are trying to avert and address today. The 
stark difference here is that Malta was not yet an EU member state at the time when 
the first EU initiatives and decisions previously discussed were taken, while other 
‘Mediterranean’ states like Italy, Spain, France and Greece were. Unlike these 
countries, both Malta and Cyprus (which together constitute the EU’s southern-most 
periphery in the Mediterranean) were obliged to adopt and implement provisions 
such as those on the Dublin II Regulation (now Dublin III) as part of the pre-accession 
process whilst not having had the opportunity to participate directly in their decision-
shaping and taking processes. Moreover, unlike the UK, Ireland and Denmark, they 
could not opt-out from such agreements. This therefore is another important factor 
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to be kept in mind when focusing on the Maltese government’s position in the next 
section about its sensitivities and reservations on EU migration and asylum policies.  
 
Timeframe of the negotiations adopting Directive 2011/51/EU 
 
Figure 9.1 sets out the timeframe of the 2007-2011 negotiations adopting Directive 
2011/51/EU and gives a snapshot of the main dates and events that occurred during 
the negotiations. As with Figures 8.1 and 8.3 in chapter 8, Figure 9.1 also 
distinguishes (by means of colour shades) the stages of decision-shaping and taking 
as well as two main phases in these negotiations made up of the pre and post-Treaty 
of Lisbon phases. Thus the first phase of the negotiations began on 6 June 2007 (the 
decision-shaping stage) which progressed to the decision-taking stage on 27 
November 2008 where a unanimous vote in favour of the amendment directive was 
not achieved and where the legislative proposal could not be adopted. This phase is 
hereinafter referred to as the pre-Treaty of Lisbon phase. The Commission was 
however able to reintroduce its proposal once the Treaty came into force and the 
legal base was modified. This phase of the negotiations is referred to as the second 
phase (the post-Treaty of Lisbon phase) which re-commenced at the decision-shaping 
stage on 1 December 2009 and ended with a Council decision taken at first reading 
and by QMV on 11 April 2011. The act was adopted jointly by Council and the EP a 





















Figure 9.1 – Key dates in the 2007-2011 EU legislative negotiations to adopt Directive 
2011/51/EU    
     End of the EU decision-making process 
            - 11 May 2011 [Signature by the EP & Council] 
              - 11 April 2011 [The JHA Council approves the directive (as an ‘A’ item on the agenda) 
by QMV at first reading following negotiations with the EP (OJ L/2011/132/1)] 
              - 14 December 2010 [EP opinion at 1st reading: approval with amendments] + [CION’s 
agreement with EP amendments] 
   - 8 November 2010 [Discussion at the JHA Council (‘B’ item on the Council agenda)] 
            - 7 October 2010 [Discussion at the JHA Council (‘B’ item on the Council agenda)] 
    Re-start of the EU decision-making-process: Post-Treaty of Lisbon provisions [Ordinary  
Legislative procedure & voting in Council 
by QMV] 
1 December 2009: CION communication to the EP & Council on consequences of the entry 
into force of the Treaty of Lisbon for ongoing interinstitutional decision-making procedures 
[COM/2009/665/final] 
    End of the EU decision-making process 
            - 27 November 2008 [The Justice and Home Affairs Council does not unanimously 
agree with the draft proposal – Malta was the only EU member state that used its 
veto in this Council to block the decision] 
            - 5 June 2008 [Discussion at the Justice and Home Affairs Council (‘B’ item on the 
Council agenda)] 
             - 23 April 2008 [EP opinion at 1st reading: approval with amendments] + [CION’s 
partial agreement with EP amendments] 
            - 18 April 2008 [Discussion at the Justice and Home Affairs Council (‘B’ item on the 
Council agenda)] 
            - 12 June 2007 [Discussion at the Justice and Home Affairs Council (‘B’ item on the 
Council agenda)] 
   - 7 June 2007 [CION transmits proposal to Council & EP] 
     - 6 June 2007 [CION adopts its legislative proposal]   
   Start of the EU decision-making process: Pre-Treaty of Lisbon provisions [Consultation 
procedure & voting in Council by unanimity] 
CION: European Commission                                                - the decision-taking stage  
EP: European Parliament 
Council: Council of the European Union                               - the decision-shaping stage 
   
Source: Figure based on the PreLex database on interinstitutional procedures: 
http://ec.europa.eu/prelex/apcnet.cfm?CL=en (accessed on 20.04.2014). 
 
Complementing Figure 9.1, a list of the Council Presidencies involved in these 
negotiations is set out in Table 9.3. This table indicates the various EU Council 




Presidencies and main events occurring during particular and crucial stages in the 
negotiations on this legislative file. 
 
Table 9.3 – EU Council Presidencies involved in this process 
 
Timeline & Stages EU member state Events 
 January – June 2007 
[decision-shaping] 
Germany - European Commission Proposal on 
6 June 2007; 
- Start of decision-shaping 
negotiations with a discussion at 
the JHA Council on 12 June 2007. 
   July – December 2007 
[decision-shaping] 
Portugal None. 
January – June 2008 
[decision-shaping] 
Slovenia - Discussions at JHA Council on 18 
April 2008; 
- EP opinion on 23 April with 
CION’s partial agreement with it; 
- Discussions at JHA Council on 5 
June 2008. 
   July – December 2008 
[decision-taking] 
France JHA Council on 27 November 2008: 
Unanimity not reached because of 
Malta’s veto and hence directive 
not approved. 
   July – December 2009 
 
Sweden CION communication on the 
consequences of the entry into 
force of the Treaty of Lisbon. 
January – June 2010 Spain None. 
July – December 2010 
[decision-shaping] 
Belgium - Discussions at JHA Council on 7 
October 2010; 
- Discussions at JHA Council on 8 
November 2010; 
- EP opinion (1st reading) on 14 
December 2010. 
January – June 2011 
[decision-taking] 
Hungary - Approval of Council of Ministers 
(1st reading) on  11 April 2011; 
- Adoption of legislative act on 11 
May 2011. 
Source: Table compiled by the author. 
 
9.2  Malta's objectives in the 2007-2011 EU legislative negotiations  
 
The Maltese government’s objective in the legislative negotiations on widening the 
scope of Council Directive 2003/109/EC to beneficiaries of international protection 
was to relocate quickly the number of TCNs residing in Malta. The government 
needed to intervene to modify Article 4(1) of the 2003 Council directive about the 
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duration of residence for TCNs seeking long-term residence status in the EU. As 
stated further on and as stipulated by this legislative article, in order for TCNs to be 
eligible for long-term residence status, they needed to have resided continuously and 
uninterruptedly in an EU member state for a period of five years. This thus went 
contrary to Malta’s objectives and preferences. 
  
As previously stated and as further explained in section 9.3, during this time (i.e. of 
the Commission’s adoption of the legislative proposal) Malta was being faced with an 
influx of irregular migrants, many of whom request subsidiary protection on arrival. 
The government has on many different occasions urged the international community, 
the European Commission and the EU member states to find a solution to this 
problem and assume burden-sharing responsibilities according to previously cited EU 
Treaty articles.57 For instance, in a speech delivered during a United Nations General 
Assembly on 26 September 2007 (thus, just a few months after the Commission’s 
adoption of the proposal to amend the 2003 LTR directive), Malta’s Prime Minister, 
Lawrence Gonzi, stated the following: 
 
‘The plight of internally displaced persons and those that are 
seeking a better life elsewhere has continued to be one of the 
priority issues of the international community. Indeed, Malta has for 
some time been witnessing this tragic human migration ... resulting 
in a large influx of asylum seekers arriving irregularly on our small 
island state which, at 1,200 persons per square kilometre, has one 
of the highest densities of population in the world. 
 
I would like to reiterate the calls made by Malta in this Assembly 
last year for a concerted response from the international community 
as well as the United Nations... in addressing appropriately and 
adequately this problem... by providing particular assistance to 
those countries which, like Malta, carry a disproportionate burden in 
addressing this phenomenon... to find support in establishing a 
comprehensive institutional and holistic response to international 
migration based on solidarity, respect for human dignity and 
responsibility-sharing’.  
(Permanent Mission of Malta to the United Nations, 2007, p. 4) 
 
In a similar intervention made by Gonzi some years later in 2011 (and just before the 
adoption of the amendment LTR directive), when the immigration situation in Malta 
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had further deteriorated as a result of the outbreak of the Libyan civil war in February 
2011, he stated that: 
 
‘Malta is facing an enormous crisis which surpasses the one being 
seen in Italy’ (Times of Malta, 4 April 2011). 
 
Malta’s PM was referring to the influx of displaced TCNs who were escaping from the 
Libyan conflict and who were arriving in Malta (which was the first, safe land to 
reach) as a result of its geographic proximity to the conflict. He was also reacting to 
previous comments made (a week before) by the EU Home Affairs Commissioner, 
Cecilia Malmström, who downplayed Malta’s immigration crisis and rejected its call 
to trigger an EU-wide mechanism of obligatory solidarity found in the Temporary 
Protection Directive of 2001 (Council Directive 2001/55/EC of 20 July 2001). The 
mechanism is referred to as the ‘EU emergency mechanism’, which when triggered 
(by QMV in Council and following a proposal by the Commission) provides irregular 
migrants with a temporary protection status for up to two years enabling relocation 
to other EU member states (based on a voluntary offer from a member state and on 
the consent of the transferee).58 At the time, Malta received 820 sub-Saharan 
Africans in 24 hours which was described by Malta’s Prime Minister as a ‘red light’ 
which should have triggered the mechanism immediately: 
 
‘Malta received 820 sub-Saharan Africans in 24 hours... This may 
seem like a small number for other countries but for us it is 
enormous’ (ibid).  
 
In comments made to the Times of Malta, Gonzi explained that Italy had received 
almost 20,000 migrants since the beginning of that year (2011). But while most of the 
migrants landed on the tiny island of Lampedusa overwhelming its population, the 
Italian government began shipping large numbers of them to mainland Italy. Gonzi 
observed that: 
 
‘comparing migrant arrivals as a proportion of the population, 
Italy, which has a population of more than 60 million people, 
would have to see some 120,000 people reach their shores to be 
at a par with Malta which received 800... The European 
Commission was well aware of the situation in Libya and the 
massive potential for a biblical exodus of migrants. But she 
(Commissioner Malmström) was ‘still not realising’ that the 
problem in Malta was different from that anywhere else’ (ibid). 
226 
 
However, despite the government’s and Maltese MEPs incessant calls to activate the 
mechanism, the Commissioner insisted that: 
 
 ‘there is no consensus among EU member states on the need to 
activate an emergency directive obliging member states to show 
solidarity and resettle ‘Libyan’ asylum seekers arriving in Malta 
and Lampedusa... member states still do not feel the need that 
the time has come to trigger this mechanism’(Times of Malta, 5 
April 2011). 
 
This prompted a strong reaction from both the government (as illustrated above) and 
also Maltese MEPs. During an EP debate with the Commissioner on 5 April 2011, MEP 
Simon Busuttil (he is today leader of the Nationalist party in opposition in Malta), the 
EPP-ED Group’s spokesman for Frontex (the EU external borders agency), stated: 
 
‘Commissioner Malmström – you should show political leadership 
and propose the activation of the temporary protection directive... 
In Malta there is an emergency as 800 people arriving in 24 hours is 
the same as if 120,000 have arrived in France. The Commission 
should not base its analyses on mere numbers but in relative terms. 
On the other hand, EU member states should honour their promises 
and show real solidarity’ (ibid). 
 
Another Maltese MEP, John Attard Montalto, from the Party of European Socialists 
(PES) also intervened during this debate, inviting the Commission to outline what it 
considers to be the right number of asylum seekers reaching Europe for the 
emergency solidarity clause to be activated: 
 
‘We have an unfolding tragedy today and we need to act today. 
Let’s not be the man of yesterday’ (ibid). 
 
It is also worth mentioning some concrete initiatives taken by some member state 
governments, such as the ‘Quadro Group’ (consisting of Cyprus, Greece, Italy and 
Malta) established in November 200859 (therefore during the legislative negotiations 
on the amendment LTR directive) and ‘Operation Mare Nostrum’ (an Italian initiative 
which ended on 31 October 2014 and superseded by Frontex’s ‘Operation Triton’ 
under Italian control) to mitigate the irregular migration problem as a result of a lack 




The previous paragraphs thus indicate considerable tension in Malta on the 
immigration issue, which prevailed during the negotiations on the directive. They also 
indicate the sensitivity of the problem of ‘unwanted’ arrivals on Southern Europe’s 
shores which had been looming in the background since the turn of the millennium 
and which reached unprecedented levels by 2010-11 (especially since the outbreak of 
the Libyan civil war of 2011). Therefore, the Commission’s 2007 legislative proposal 
to extend the scope of the 2003 Council directive to TCNs who are beneficiaries of 
international protection meant that such persons would be able to request a long-
term residence permit once their situation became regularized and legal. Thus, 
Article 4(1) of this directive would have made the situation worse for countries like 
Malta, particularly because of its geographic proximity to North Africa and its 
extremely small and densely populated characteristics (discussed in chapter 7). 
Adoption of this article as proposed by the Commission would have obliged TCNs 
who had acquired refugee status or international protection to reside and stay on the 
island for a period of five years before being able to move to another EU member 
state. Article 4(1) read as follows: 
 
 ‘Article 4 
Duration of residence 
1. Member States shall grant long-term resident status to third-
country nationals who have resided legally and continuously 
within its territory for five years immediately prior to the 
submission of the relevant application.’ 
 
The Maltese government’s other, related, point of contention with the Commission’s 
proposal was that there were no guarantees that once the five years elapse and a 
long-term residence permit and status is granted to a TCN, he/she would decide to 
leave the island. Malta believed that to the contrary, once these beneficiaries 
received certain rights within a member state (aforementioned in the previous 
section (see 9.1.2)) this could effectively act as a disincentive for such persons to 
relocate to another member state.  
 
The government therefore had to ensure that this situation would not materialize. 
The Maltese government’s main preference in these legislative negotiations was to 
maintain the status quo, i.e. that Council Directive 2003/109/EC would not be 
extended to other types of migrants. It therefore needed to ‘kill’ and prevent this 
legislative proposal from being adopted. It was initially advantaged by the right to 
veto in Council, something which as aforementioned was eventually no longer 
possible with the entry into force of the Treaty of Lisbon. Notwithstanding, Malta’s 
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government perceived the ‘power of the veto’ to block the adoption of an EU 
legislative act in Council as a last resort, something which was highly  undesirable to 
deploy because of the negative connotations that vetoing bestows to a country’s 
reputation. 
 
To this end, the government eventually devised a fall-back position - that of trying to 
amend Article 4(1) to make the five year duration of residence flexible and 
cumulatively applied between two or more EU member states. Malta was thus in 
favour of allowing a refugee or beneficiary of international protection to be able to 
move around the EU ‘during’ and not ‘after’ the five year wait for a long-term 
residence application, thus avoiding TCNs getting ‘stuck’ in one EU member state. 
The result of this would be a reduction of the demographic burden for small and 
extremely high densely populated states like Malta experiencing heavy influxes of 
migrants besides a relaxation of administrative burdens such a process imposes on 
small administrations. 
 
Therefore, instead of requesting to be exempt from falling under the remit of the 
legislative act, the government’s fall-back position in these negotiations was to 
intervene on those articles about the duration of residence for TCNs requesting long-
term resident status. As discussed in the next section, this however only occurred 
late in the negotiations and only once the government apprehended that its first 
preference, that of ‘shooting down’ the proposed amendment directive, was virtually 
an impossible feat to achieve (especially once the Council’s voting procedure shifted 
to QMV). 
 
9.3  Malta's capacities and strategies during the 2007-2011 EU 
legislative negotiations 
   
9.3.1  The decision-shaping stage 
A. Malta's capacities and strategies in the Council of the European Union 
 
- Malta’s capacities (variables 1 to 3): 
 
Similarly to the Maltese government’s capacity in the previous legislative cases 
discussed in chapter 8, here too the government was rather weak in terms of the 
number of public officials working on this legislative file. In fact, there were around 
five to six officials (excluding the JHA Minister involved in the decision-taking stages) 




- Malta’s PR (who together with the minister was also involved in the 
 decision-taking stage) in Coreper II;60 
- a technical attaché at the Permanent Representation of Malta to the EU in 
 Brussels; 
- a policy officer at the EU Secretariat (at the time within the Office of the 
 Prime Minister in Malta); and 
- the Director (EU Affairs) and a national expert from the Ministry for Justice 
and Home Affairs (since 2013 it has been called the Ministry for Home 
Affairs and National Security (MHAS)). 
 
The different roles played by each of the above have already been explained in the 
previous chapter. One must note that even though chapters 8 and 9 differ in terms of 
policy sphere, the roles played by these officials are similar and will not be repeated 
here.  
 
In line with the methodology (explained in chapter 6 and also applied to the case 
studies in chapter 8), Figure 9.2 illustrates data for the government’s capacity in this 
EU legislative file (see also ‘Step 1’ of Table 10.3 in chapter 10). The variables stem 
from the quantitative design of the study’s research methodology with Figure 9.2 




Figure 9.2 illustrating data on Step 1 variables of the ‘decision weights and measures’ 
approach for the Maltese government
 
Source: Figure compiled by the author with data collected from interviews with Maltese government 
officials. 
 
Figure 9.2 thus indicates negative ratings for the government’s capacity to enter early 
in the EU decision-making process (variable 1). This aspect is expanded upon in 
subsequent paragraphs in this section. Figure 9.2 also indicates negative ratings for 
the expert and administrative capacity (variable 2). This is mainly because Council 
Directive 2003/109/EC was substantively a new type of legislative act for the Maltese 
administration to ‘download’ - it was in fact only transposed by the end of 2007, 
therefore the same year when the Commission adopted the new proposal to amend 
it.62 Thus variables 1 and 2 are below the 2.5 mean and therefore are rated as 
negative. Figure 9.2 however indicates a positive rating for the Maltese government’s 
capacity to prioritize (variable 3.1 on the salience of the policy sphere which obtained 











Variable 1 - Capacity 
to enter  early into 
the EU process 
Variable 2 - Expert & 
Administrative 
Capacity 
Variable 3 - Capacity 
to Prioritise 
1.1 - A government's capacity to 
participate effectively in the 
decision-shaping stage (swift co-
ordination) 
1.2 - The capacity to adopt an 
effective national position early 
in the process (capacity to 
interpret properly draft EU law 
and form a national position) 
2.1 - The expert capacity 
(training, work experience & 
technical knowledge in the 
particular policy sphere) 
2.2 - The administrative capacity 
(the size of a government's 
administration: in the Capital & 
at the Permanent 
Representation in Brussels) 
3.1 - Salience of the policy 
sphere for the government 
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- Malta’s strategies during the pre-Treaty of Lisbon phase of the negotiations 
(variables 4 to 6): 
 
Before the start of legislative negotiations in the Council (during the agenda-setting 
stage), the Commission held an ‘experts meeting’ in 2004 (i.e. before the adoption of 
its legislative proposal on 6 June 2007) to get feedback from the stakeholders and 
governments about its plans on extending the scope of Council Directive 
2003/109/EC to beneficiaries of international protection. As mentioned in a previous 
section in this chapter, the need for a revision to the 2003 Council directive was 
recognized in a joint declaration made by the Council and the Commission on 8 May 
2003.  
 
A Maltese government official who was following this legislative file at the Ministry 
for Justice and Home Affairs (as it was called during that time) confirmed that Malta 
did attend this meeting mainly as a means to understand what other delegations had 
to say about it (interview held in Valletta on 12 December 2013). At the time Malta 
had not yet established a position on this issue about the extension of long-term 
residence for beneficiaries of international protection. The government was fully 
occupied trying to come to terms with having just acquired EU membership and 
coping with implementing the EU’s acquis communautaire (not least, EU legislation in 
the JHA EU policy sphere which, as already stated, is extremely vast and complex). 
These were the main reasons for the government’s lack of focus on the Commission’s 
ideas about a future legislative proposal on this topic. As subsequently stated, 
Malta’s government continued to ‘ignore’ this issue (and any adverse implications it 
could have for it later with the act’s enactment) until late in the decision-making 
process (refer to previously illustrated data for sub-variable 1.2 in Figure 9.2 above).  
 
This situation continued even after the Commission’s adoption and submission of its 
proposal to the Council in June 2007. In fact, the government was quiet and seemed 
to be in agreement with the proposal deciding to fence-sit the discussions, i.e. adopt 
a ‘wait and see’ approach (variable 6). Table 9.4 and Graph 9.1 below illustrate this 
situation. According to an official from Malta’s ministry (MHAS), this strategy was not 
really contemplated:  
 
‘It came rather naturally since the government was not yet sure 
what the implications were and even once discussions in Council 
began, the government was still studying the Commission’s 
tabled proposal’ (interview in December 2013 – see also the 
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score (with accompanying justification) for sub-variable 6.1 in 
Table 9.4). 
 
The legislative negotiations in Council began on 12 June 2007 under the auspices of 
the German Presidency. This item appeared as a ‘B’ item on a Council of Minister’s 
agenda, i.e. an item requiring discussion. However, after this meeting not much 
occurred at the Council of Ministers level with this item only appearing again in a 
subsequent JHA Council meeting on 18 April 2008 (under the Slovenian Presidency).  
 
In between, however, legislative negotiations on the Commission’s proposal occurred 
at Working Group and Coreper II meetings. Here, these negotiations mainly focused 
on the crux of the matter – that is, the scope of the proposed amendment directive – 
with a majority of member states in favour of the inclusion of both refugees and 
beneficiaries of subsidiary protection falling within the scope of this directive. There 
were, moreover, some member states preferring to extend the scope even further – 
to other categories and not just to those two to include other forms of protection 
granted by the EU member states. Contrary to this position, there were delegations 
that were more in favour of diluting the scope limiting it to refugees only (which as 
illustrated further on, was similar to Malta’s position on this matter and on its specific 
amendments to Article 4(1) of the proposal; see Table 9.7). As just observed, Malta 
fence-sat the early decision-shaping stage of the discussions without sensing the 
need to participate actively, let alone exercise influence in the process. 
 
Table 9.4 - Independent Variable 6 on the fence-sitting strategy63 
Variable 6 – The Fence-sitting strategy  
Scale: [5=successful/+ve; 2.5=medium; 0=not successful/-ve] 
5 = Yes, at extremely high levels of intensity; 
4 = Yes, at high levels of intensity; 
3 = Yes, but at medium-to-high levels of intensity; 
2 = Yes, but at low-to-medium levels of intensity; 
1 = Yes, but at extremely low levels; 
0 = None. 
 
Sub-variable 6.1: Altering coalitions 
 6.1.1 – Frequency of coalition shifting                                                        
While fence-sitting the process, did the government shift coalitions between pace-
setters and foot-draggers according to how discussions developed? 
[ ]   [1]   [2]   [3]   [4]   [5] (No, it just fence-sat the process without paying much 
attention to how the discussions in Council were developing – at this stage it was 
still studying the Commission’s proposal)   
 
Sub-variable 6.2: Similar national positions 
 6.2.1 – Preferences of other governments with similar positions 
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Since the government’s preferences were being injected in the early stages of the 
process by other delegations (with similar positions), it decided to enter the 
process by adopting a fence-sitting strategy. If so and through the adoption of only 
this strategy, how much could you rate the government’s success of a favourable 
outcome in the process? 
[0]   [ ]   [2]   [3]   [4]   [5] 
 
Sub-variable 6.3: Miscalculating EU outcomes 
 6.3.1 – Making-up for a miscalculation of compliance costs 
Due to a miscalculation on the government’s part about the likely outcome of the 
negotiation, it decided to fence-sit throughout some (or most) of the process. If so, 
what score could you give to the government’s ability to influence the later stages 
of the process? 
[0]   [ ]   [2]   [3]   [4]   [5] 
 
Sub-variable 6.4: Lack of benchmarks during the implementation process  
 6.4.1 – Making-up for a lack of benchmarks on which to base a position on 
Since the government was relatively new to the EU decision-making process and 
since it might not have had any benchmarks set by the implementation process 
(when downloading EU legislation) in this same policy sphere, the government 
entered this process by adopting a fence-sitting strategy. If so, what score could 
you give to the government’s ability to influence the later stages of the process? 
[0]   [ ]   [2]   [3]   [4]   [5]  
Source: Table compiled by the author. 
 
Graph 9.1 replicates the data found in Table 9.4 presented in columns (see also ‘Step 
2’ of Table 10.3 in chapter 10). 
 
Graph 9.1 – Columns indicating the scores for Variable 6 
 
Source: Graph compiled by the author. 
 
A shifting strategy during Council negotiations: from fence-sitting to pace-setting 
  
As the decision-shaping phase was coming to an end and entering decision-taking, 
the government broke silence by placing a reserve in a Coreper II meeting on 12 

















Home Affairs, this was really unexpected and took everyone by surprise (interview 
held in Brussels on 13 January 2014). This was confirmed by an official from Malta’s 
JHA Ministry who observed that Malta never intervened in Working Group and 
Coreper II meetings up to that stage to make clear their disagreement with the 
proposal and/or suggest any amendments to legislative articles (interview held in 
Valletta on 12 December 2013). But once it realized that there was a general 
agreement to widen the scope of the directive in Council and that this would add 
more challenges to it on the irregular migration front, the Maltese government 
decided to intervene. This was mainly in reaction to the proposal having made strides 
forward with the reality of a Presidency compromise being likely. Besides, there was 
another crucial development occurring in Malta during this precise time that spurred 
the government to intervene: irregular migrant arrivals suddenly increased 
drastically.  
 
As Table 9.5 reveals, from the mid-2000s there was a shift in trend in the number of 
arrivals in Malta of irregular migrants by sea. Just before the government placed a 
reserve in the Coreper II meeting on 12 November 2008 it had new statistics about 
immigrant arrivals in Malta having occurred that summer (when most boat-crossings 
occur due to ideal maritime conditions). One may observe that in Table 9.5 and 
Figure 9.3 the statistics for the number of arrivals of irregular migrants arriving on its 
shores in 2008 greatly outnumbered those of all previous years, even though the 
figures demonstrate a constant steady increase occurring since 2002, i.e. when this 
phenomenon first surfaced. In fact the figures reveal that in 2008 alone, Malta 
experienced a 38.7% increase from the previous year with 2,775 irregular migrants 
(compared to 1,702 in 2007) arriving in Malta. The government thus suddenly 
became aware of the new situation occurring in Malta and could not remain silent 















Table 9.5 on the number of TCNs arriving illegally in Malta by boat from 2002 to 2012 
2002 – 1,686 
2003 –    502 
2004 – 1,388 
2005 – 1,822 
2006 – 1,780 
2007 – 1,702 
2008 – 2,775 
2009 – 1,475 
2010* –    47  
2011 – 1,579 
2012 – 1,890 
* 2010 experienced a sharp drop in the number of migrant arrivals as a result of Italy’s (the Berlusconi 
 government) push-back agreement with the former Muammar Gaddafi’s Libya (i.e. a year before the  
Libyan revolution broke out). 
 
Source: Police General Headquarters - Immigration Section (in National Statistics Office (NSO), News 
release, 19 June 2013, 118/2013, p. 2) 
 




Source: National Statistics Office (NSO), News release, 19 June 2013, 118/2013, p. 3. 
 
Thus, in November 2008, there was fear that these statistics would only get worse in 
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(Malta’s government circulated a statement containing its position during the 
meeting on 19 November), Malta’s government emphasized that it was experiencing 
a sudden influx of irregular migrants, something which was not occurring before on 
such a large scale. It stressed that as a result, it could not agree in principle with 
amending the scope of the 2003 Council directive, especially with extending its scope 
to cover TCNs offered subsidiary protection. 
 
This last issue is worth expanding upon in order to understand better Malta’s position 
on this point. Once irregular migrants arrive in Malta, they request asylum or 
international protection, i.e. subsidiary protection. Asylum (refugee status), must not 
be confused with the granting of international or subsidiary protection. They are 
different since the granting of international or subsidiary protection to TCNs is a 
stage in the application process which precedes that for refugee status. As may be 
observed in Table 9.6, Figure 9.4 and Chart 9.1 below, requests by TCNs for subsidiary 
protection in Malta outnumber those for refugee status. Table 9.6 and Figure 9.4 
indicate the number of applications granted subsidiary protection between 2002 and 
2012 by the Maltese government. With this scenario in mind, although Malta’s 
government was more flexible on extending the scope of long-term residence to 
TCNs who were refugees (since as being indicated by Chart 9.1, between 2002 and 
2012 they accounted for only 3% of all asylum decisions when compared to the 58% 
for subsidiary or other forms of protection), it was extremely uncompromising on 
extending these rights to beneficiaries of subsidiary or international protection, 
especially to those entering the EU irregularly.  
 
Malta’s government argued that the adoption of the amendment directive (as 
proposed by the Commission and as maintained in the Council Presidency 
compromise text presented in the Coreper II meetings mentioned earlier) would 
effectively put the status and rights for beneficiaries of subsidiary protection being 
granted a long-term residence permit on an equal footing with those of refugees 
similarly seeking long-term residence. The government argued that the two types of 










Table 9.6 on the number of TCN applications granted and rejected protection (refugee 
status and subsidiary or other forms of protection) by the Maltese authorities during 2002-
2012 
Year               Total                 Granted refugee                 Granted subsidiary/             Rejections 
                                                   status                       international protection                
                                                                                                                                        
2002            419                          22                                         111                                  286 
2003            568                          53                                         328                                  187   
2004            868                          49                                         560                                  259                                          
2005         1,102                          36                                         510                                  556 
2006         1,045                          22                                         481                                  542 
2007            959                           7                                          623                                  329  
2008         2,697                         19                                        1,397                              1,281 
2009         2,575                         20                                        1,671                                 884 
2010            348                         43                                           179                                 126 
2011         1,606                         70                                           814                                 722 
2012         1,590                         35                                        1,398                                 157 
 
Grand 
Total       13,777                       376                                        8,072                              5,329 
 
%                 100%                    2.72%                                    58.59%                           38.68% 
Source: National Statistics Office (NSO), News release, 19 June 2013, 118/2013, p. 6. 
  
       
Figure 9.4 on the number of TCNs granted subsidiary and/or international protection by 
the Maltese authorities during 2002 and 2012 
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Chart 9.1 on asylum decisions taken by the Maltese authorities during 2002-2012 
 
Source: National Statistics Office (NSO), News release, 19 June 2013, 118/2013 
 
However, this (Maltese) position on the need to differentiate between refugees and 
beneficiaries of international protection could not be accepted by the European 
Commission. 
 
Table 9.7 shows Malta’s main ‘opponents’ in these negotiations. It also shows the 
delegations which supported Malta on its stance against the non-extension of the 
2003 LTR Directive and as explained further on, on its specific requests to include 
amendments to Article 4(1) (of the 2003 LTR directive) in the draft revision directive. 
  
Table 9.7 - Overview of delegations’ positions in relation to Malta’s amendments in Council 
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1.1 The Commission’s aim was to 
add legislation to cover TCNs who 
were beneficiaries of international 
protection thus streamlining the 
situation in relation to EU long-term 
residence for refugees and those 
with subsidiary protection. Malta’s 
position therefore went against the 
Commission’s rationale. 
























































2.2 France, Greece, 























































2.1 The Commission could not 
understand Malta’s position since as 
stipulated in Article 4(1), TCNs were 
to be granted a free movement right 
after spending 5 years in one 
member state.  
2.2 Although they could generally 
agree with Malta on Article 4(1), 
they could also live with the 
Commission’s proposal to extend the 
scope of the 2003 LTR directive. 
These delegations did not veto 
(during the pre-Lisbon phase) or vote 
against the adoption under QMV 
rules (during the post-Lisbon phase).  
2.3 These delegations were more 
vociferous than other states in 
supporting Malta’s position on both 
issues (points 1 and 2 in this table). 
However, they did not veto the 
decision-taking stage during the pre-
Lisbon phase of the negotiations. 
2.4 It supported Malta against the 
Commission’s proposal to extend the 
scope of the 2003 LTR directive. 
Although it did not veto the process 
during the pre-Lisbon phase of the 
negotiations, like Malta it voted 
against approving the legislation 
when voting rules shifted to QMV (in 
the post-Lisbon phase). 
Source: Table compiled by the author with data collected from interviews with Malta government and EU 
officials. 
Note: Other delegations do not feature in this table either because: 1) they were in favour of the 
Commission’s proposal to revise the 2003 LTR Directive, or 2) they did not have a position or were against 






A former official from DG Home Affairs observed (interview held in Brussels on 13 
January 2014) that the Commission could not agree with a compromise which 
discriminated between different categories of protection. In fact, one of the main 
aims behind the Commission’s proposal was to put refugees and beneficiaries of 
subsidiary protection on an equal footing (Commission background note, DG JLS/B.2 
for the Coreper II meetings of 3 and 5 December 2008). 
 
Thus, when it realized that its preferred option of not extending the scope of the 
directive was not to be achieved, the government had to switch approach to one that 
was more proactive and direct. This marked the start of a pace-setting strategy 
(variable 4) in the little time left before the end of the negotiations in Council (in fact, 
this strategy was deployed only a fortnight before the JHA Council of 27 November 
2008 when the French Presidency was expected to request for a decision to be taken 
(see Figure 9.1 on the key dates of the 2007-2011 negotiations). 
 
A Maltese official from the JHA Ministry emphasized that Malta’s Permanent 
Representation in Brussels wasted no time in taking the lead (with approval being 
granted by the Office of the Prime Minister) to commence lobbying efforts with other 
EU member states, the Commission and the Council Presidency:  
 
‘Around the time when Malta placed a reserve in the Coreper II 
meeting in November 2008, the Permanent Representative 
recommended that the government’s structures lobby intensely’ 
(interview held in Valletta on 12 December 2013). 
 
Another Maltese official (who was at the time a technical attaché following JHA 
issues at Malta’s Permanent Representation) stated that:  
 
‘Once Malta became more confident with the text of the 
Commission’s proposal and due to influxes of irregular migrants 
starting to be perceived as a national problem with numbers 
starting to reach unprecedented levels, a letter was sent by the 
Permanent Representative of Malta to the EU to the PM 
requesting that the government immediately begins to lobby the 
EU institutions and member state governments and adopt other 
possible effective strategies in this policy sphere and in the little 
time we still had available... Time was running out and we were 




Table 9.8 and Graph 9.2 (see also ‘Step 2’ of Table 10.3 in chapter 10) give an 
indication of Malta’s lobbying efforts in this process - a medium to high level (had 
there been more time available for the government, it might have possibly registered 
even higher levels).  
 
Table 9.8 – Independent Variable 4: Sub-variable 4.1 on the pace-setting strategy64 
Sub-variable 4.1 – Pace-setting through lobbying  
Scale: [5=successful/+ve; 2.5=medium; 0=not successful/-ve] 
5 = Yes, at extremely high levels of intensity; 
4 = Yes, at high levels of intensity; 
3 = Yes, but at medium-to-high levels of intensity; 
2 = Yes, but at low-to-medium levels of intensity; 
1 = Yes, but at extremely low levels; 
0 = None. 
 
Measurable indicator 4.1.1:  Lobbying the Council 
 4.1.1.A – Lobbying the Council                                                   [0]   [1]   [2]   [ ]   [4]   [5] 
 4.1.1.B – Lobbying the Council Secretariat                              [0]   [1]   [2]   [ ]   [4]   [5] 
 
Measurable indicator 4.1.2: Lobbying the European Commission 
 4.1.2.A - Lobbying the Commissioner network                      [0]   [1]   [2]   [ ]   [4]   [5] 
 4.1.2.B - Lobbying the Commission Directorate-Generals  [0]   [1]   [2]   [ ]   [4]   [5] 
 4.1.2.C - Lobbying SNEs in the Commission                            [ ]   [1]   [2]   [3]   [4]   [5] 
 4.1.2.D - Lobbying the Commissioner responsible for the  
dossier                                                                                           [0]   [1]   [2]   [ ]   [4]   [5] 
 
Measurable indicator 4.1.3: Lobbying large state governments       [0]   [1]   [ ]   [3]   [4]   [5] 
 
Measurable indicator 4.1.4: Lobbying small state governments      [0]    [1]  [2]   [ ]   [4]   [5] 
Source: Table compiled by the author. 
 
Graph 9.2 – Columns indicating the scores for Sub-variable 4.1 
 
Source: Graph compiled by the author. 
 
Besides lobbying, the government also used other pace-setting strategies such as 
norm advocacy and effective intervention in Council meetings. The government thus 
used its diplomatic capacity, such as in the use of clear and effective language and 
style, as a tool to attract and win support for its arguments against the need to revise 
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arguments to persuade other parties to the legislative negotiations that the issues at 
stake were of fundamental importance to it.  
 
However, although Malta’s government put forward its position (in a written 
statement) in the Coreper II meeting of 19 November 2008 (in the run-up to the JHA 
Council meeting of 28 November 2008), this was too late in the negotiations with a 
compromise text having already been ‘baked’ by the Council Presidency. This is 
confirmed by data in Table 9.9 and Graph 9.3 (see also ‘Step 2’ of Table 10.3 in 
chapter 10), which reveal that although the Maltese government obtained medium 
to high scores, it was not enough in this particular case. As Grant (1993: 31-32) 
observes, once a compromise begins to emerge, working against it or attempting to 
modify it is extremely difficult. That is to say, turning round a likely decision from 
being taken in the decision-taking stage of the process is an extremely difficult task to 
achieve.  
 
Table 9.9 - Independent Variable 4: Sub-variable 4.2 on the pace-setting strategy65 
Sub-variable 4.2 – Pace-setting through norm advocacy & effective intervention in Council  
deliberations  
Scale: [5=successful/+ve; 2.5=medium; 0=not successful/-ve] 
5 = Yes, at extremely high levels of intensity; 
4 = Yes, at high levels of intensity; 
3 = Yes, but at medium-to-high levels of intensity; 
2 = Yes, but at low-to-medium levels of intensity; 
1 = Yes, but at extremely low levels; 
0 = None.  
 
Measurable indicator 4.2.1:  
 A government’s capacity to persuade through moral  
convictions                                                                                    [0]   [1]   [2]   [ ]   [4]   [5] 
 
Measurable indicator 4.2.2:  
 A government’s diplomatic leverage & capacity to engage 
 effectively                                                                                            [0]   [1]   [2]   [ ]   [4]   [5] 
Source: Table compiled by the author. 
 
Graph 9.3 – Columns indicating the scores for Sub-variable 4.2 
 







Measurable indicator 4.2.1 Measurable indicator 4.2.2 
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Aware that time was running out, Malta’s government turned its attention 
specifically to the legislative article in the proposal that caused most problems to it. 
As stated in the background section, this was Article 4(1) of Council Directive 
2003/109/EC on the duration of residence of TCNs applying for a long-term residence 
permit (see Table 9.7 for an outline of the main delegations supporting and rejecting 
Malta’s amendments to Article 4(1)). 
  
In its proposal of 7 June 2007, the Commission was not proposing to amend this 
legislative article. Having only joined the EU in 2004 (and thus not having participated 
in the adoption of the 2003 Council directive), Malta put forward a proposal during 
the Coreper II meeting of 19 November 2008 that the five year continuous and 
uninterrupted duration in one member state for the granting of long-term residence 
be amended to one that would be more flexible. In short, Malta suggested that after 
one year of residence in any EU member state, long term residence applicants should 
be able to move and reside in two or more member states during the remaining four 
year calculation period. The effect of this would be to alleviate the immigration influx 
problem being faced by peripheral EU states such as Malta. 
 
The Commission, being faced with this suggestion for the first time and at such a late 
stage in the process, disagreed with Malta’s proposal. It stated that this would go 
beyond the very principle of long-term residence that these persons would need to 
observe in one EU member state prior to the granting of the permit. The Commission 
also observed (it had already emphasized this point throughout the negotiations) that 
once granted with this permit, such persons were able to move to other EU member 
states. 
 
The government countered this last argument maintaining that the amendment 
directive would not give enough guarantees about such migrants being relocated to 
other EU member states. For instance, recital 23 of Council Directive 2003/109/EC 
(which was being maintained by the amendment directive) stated that ‘third-country 
nationals should be granted the possibility of acquiring long-term resident status in 
the Member State where they have moved ... (emphasis added in bold text)’. This 
wording (the word ‘should’ as opposed to ‘shall’) shows that it was not obligatory for 
other EU member states other than the first member state to grant this status to 
such persons. Therefore, the first EU member state responsible for the asylum seeker 
(according to the Dublin Regulations)  depends on whether a second EU member 
state allows such persons to acquire this status or not. If not, such persons remain in 
the first EU member state (usually a peripheral EU member state) - which was the 
real problem for Malta. 
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Thus, the government’s main concerns with other previously mentioned EU 
legislation –  particularly in the asylum sphere (for instance, the Dublin III legislative 
negotiations which were also occurring at this time together with other legislative 
acts forming part of the CEAS)  - about fair-sharing and solidarity to be displayed by 
other EU member states were also valid here. It was therefore adopting a national 
position reflecting this last point across the whole of the EU’s JHA policy spectrum. 
Besides, and of more relevance, the Maltese government pointed out that it was 
difficult for such persons to move away from a country in which they would have 
already received certain rights similar to those received by Maltese (EU) citizens 
(already highlighted in sub-section 8.1.2). According to the Maltese government, this 
acted as a disincentive for such persons to leave the island. 
  
A quote by a Maltese government official working at the Permanent Representation 
in Brussels when these negotiations were ongoing states the following about Malta’s 
fears: 
 
‘This Long-Term Residents Directive, which is going to be extended 
to all beneficiaries of international protection, will grant a free 
movement right to persons after five years. But what that means in 
effect is that after five years when you would have given them so 
many more rights, then they will not leave’ (Mainwaring, 2012: 58). 
 
Another Maltese government official confirms this position: 
 
‘For someone to qualify for long-term residence, so having been in 
Malta for five years, having health insurance, having employment, 
the necessary resources... if someone qualifies, if someone fulfils all 
of those criteria, then it means that they are perfectly well 
integrated. They’re not the ones who really need to move’ (ibid). 
 
These two quotes reveal the real dilemma Malta’s government had with the 
proposed amendment directive to extend the scope of the 2003 LTR Council 
directive.  
 
Shifting strategy once again in Council – from pace-setting to foot-dragging 
 
As mentioned earlier, by this time Council discussions moved from the decision-
shaping to the decision-taking stages in the first phase (the pre-Treaty of Lisbon 
phase) of these negotiations (see Figure 9.1). The fact is that although Malta’s 
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government engaged in active pace-setting strategies (exhibited in Tables 9.8 and 9.9 
above) during the last two weeks of November 2008, this was too late in the process. 
In fact, as shown in Table 9.7, with the exception of Cyprus, Italy and to a certain 
extent the Czech Republic (which had issues with other legislative articles in this 
proposal), Malta did not manage to convince successfully other delegations of the 
merits of its cause. Malta was ‘isolated’ and represented the only EU member state 
which was vociferous in Council against the Commission’s proposal. It therefore had 
no other choice but to veto the decision-taking process (this situation has been 
conceptualized in point D.3 in Table 5.1, chapter 5) in the JHA Council meeting held 
on 28 November 2008 (as mentioned previously, pre the Lisbon Treaty, voting in 
Council took place by unanimity on the issue).  
 
One must bear in mind that it was the only government to veto the proposal blocking 
its adoption. Vetoing legislative proposals in Council is a rare (but not impossible) 
occurrence, especially for Malta. Therefore, besides making this case study 
particularly interesting to research, Malta’s veto demonstrates that the stakes were 
very high for the government, ‘forcing’ it to take a drastic measure. As an EU official 
pointed out: 
 
‘It is extremely difficult for small states to adopt strategies other 
than a pace-setting one. One might expect a large state to foot-drag 
a process because it has the means and necessary resources to do 
so. But while this is true about large states, the same cannot be said 
about the smaller states’ (interview with the Head of the EP 
delegation in Malta on 22 November 2013). 
 
The quote above therefore reveals how difficult it was for a small state like Malta to 
foot-drag the final stages of the Council discussions during the pre-Treaty of Lisbon 
phase. 
 
Another issue to be borne in mind is that although the government managed to foot-
drag successfully the negotiations, it did this only in so far as the intergovernmental 
nature of the pre-Treaty of Lisbon phase in the negotiations prevailed (with Council 
voting procedures allowing it to veto the decision-taking process). This is 
demonstrated in Table 9.10 with Malta achieving a low score of ‘2’ on ‘5’. Therefore, 
although successful in blocking the adoption of the EU directive, Malta only managed 
to foot-drag and delay the adoption of the legislative proposal with great difficulty - it 




Table 9.10 - Independent Variable 5 on the foot-dragging strategy66 
Sub-variable 5.1 – Foot-dragging through delaying tactics in Council deliberations  
Scale: [5=successful/+ve; 2.5=medium; 0=not successful/-ve] 
5 = Yes, at extremely high levels of intensity; 
4 = Yes, at high levels of intensity; 
3 = Yes, but at medium-to-high levels of intensity; 
2 = Yes, but at low-to-medium levels of intensity; 
1 = Yes, but at extremely low levels; 
0 = None.  
 
Measurable indicator 5.1.2:  
 A government’s capacity to delay and/or circumvent  
an outcome through argumentation and voting             [0]   [1]   [ ]   [3]   [4]   [5] 
Source: Table compiled by the author. 
Note: This table excludes the other sub-variables and measurable indicators for Variable 5 (included in 
Box 6.5 in chapter 6) since they do not apply to Case 3. 
 
Malta’s veto could be interpreted in two main ways. First, it may be interpreted as a 
failure on the government’s part to successfully exercise influence and convince the 
Commission and other delegations in Council that it had a case that deserved being 
supported.  Second, it could nevertheless be interpreted as a success since Malta 
managed to achieve its first preference of ‘shooting-down’ and blocking the adoption 
of the legislative proposal. Whichever view is taken, the fact remains that Malta’s 
government was able to successfully block the adoption of an EU act with negative 
implications for it. As observed by a Maltese government official from the JHA 
Ministry:  
 
‘... there was hardly any point to discuss the proposed 
amendment directive article-by-article when the government’s 
preference and interest was to maintain the ‘status quo’ (i.e. the 
non-extension of long-term residence status to refugees and 
beneficiaries of international protection)...we were against it and 
did not want the proposal to see the light of day...this was our 
primary position and preference in this negotiation’ (emphasis 
added in parenthesis).  
 
The previously mentioned JHA Council meeting of 28 November 2008 did not 
however close the negotiations completely since there was an attempt by the French 
Presidency to try and find a compromise on the legislative proposal. In fact there 
were another two Coreper sessions held (on 3 and 5 December 2008) to try and lift 
the Maltese veto placed on the proposal. From Commission documents (Commission 
background note, DG JLS/B.2) prepared for these Coreper II meetings (which outline 
the Commission’s position on two Presidency compromise texts mentioned 
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hereunder), one finds that the Commission, in a spirit of compromise, was able to 
accept the Presidency’s suggestion to offer more flexibility in terms of a delay in the 
entry into force and transposition of the EU directive into Maltese and Cypriot 
national legislation. 
 
Here there were two main issues. The first involved extending the deadline for the 
transposition of this amendment directive into Maltese national law. Both the 
Presidency and Malta presented their own compromise texts on the legislative 
proposal. The first one was presented by the Presidency which suggested extending 
the maximum deadline for the entry into force of the act into Maltese and Cypriot 
law from 1 January 2011 to 1 January 2012, i.e. a one year extension to enforce the 
law. 
 
In the Coreper II meeting of 3 December 2008, the Commission stated that it could 
live with this compromise since it did not depart too much from the fixed 
transposition deadline. However, Malta voiced its disagreement with this 
compromise since it did not take into account its main concerns expressed in the 
Coreper II meeting of 19 November 2008 about the difficulties which implementation 
of this act will cause to its situation as an EU peripheral and extremely small state. 
This thus led to another Presidency compromise text presented in the next Coreper II 
meeting on 5 December 2008 which went further than the previous one in terms of 
extending further the transposition deadline for Malta and Cyprus until 1 January 
2013. The French Presidency’s aim was to make the proposed directive as digestible 
as possible for Malta and Cyprus by granting their administrations a good ‘running-in’ 
period with enough time to get accustomed to the new provisions. Thus the 
Presidency was suggesting that a new Article 2 and a recital (i.e. a new ‘Article 2A’ 
that would be added to Article 2 and a new recital found in the Commission’s 
adopted proposal for the extension of the 2003 LTR directive) to the proposed 
amendment directive would reflect this: 
 
‘Article 2A 
Malta and Cyprus, due to the fact that these Member States are 
faced with a specific and disproportionate pressure on their 
national asylum systems, shall be authorised to bring into force 
the laws, regulations and administrative provisions necessary to 
comply with this Directive by 1 January 2013 at the latest. 
Before the end of this transitional period the Commission shall 
examine whether it is justified to have it extended and may 




Malta and Cyprus, which are faced with a specific and 
disproportionate pressure on their national asylum systems due 
in particular to their geographical and demographic situation, 
their reception capacities, the important increase of asylum 
seekers in recent years and, more generally, disproportionate 
influxes of immigrants, should be allowed to benefit from a 
transitional period in order to bring into force the laws, 
regulations and administrative provisions necessary to comply 
with this Directive’. 
 
During this Coreper II meeting, Malta’s PR expressed gratitude towards the 
Presidency for its proposal which took into consideration some of Malta’s needs. 
However, the Maltese government put forward an alternative compromise text 
which extended the transposition deadline to 1 January 2015 (with a possibility to 
renew the transitional period by a renewable four year period). Besides, it also 
incorporated its position (as mentioned before, this was already circulated in Coreper 
II of 19 November 2008) on the calculation of the five year duration period thus 
amending Article 4(1) of Council Directive 2003/109/EC. Malta suggested the 
following wording for the new Article 2A and the new recital: 
 
‘New Article 2A 
 
1. Malta shall be authorized to bring into force the laws, 
regulations and administrative provisions necessary to comply 
with this Directive by 1 January 2015 at the latest. Before the end 
of this transitional period, if Malta notifies the Commission that 
in its view the objective conditions justifying this transitional 
period are still applicable, such transitional period shall be 
extended by a renewable four year period, subject to a right of 
review according to the legislative procedures applicable. 
 
2. One year after having been granted international protection  
in Malta and having stayed legally in Malta, beneficiaries of such 
protection shall be allowed to stay in another Member State 
pursuant to Chapter III of Directive 2003/109/EC, in the same 
manner as third-country nationals who have obtained a long-
term residence permit in Malta, it being understood that they 
cannot claim a more favourable treatment than the treatment 
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such other Member State is obliged to provide to beneficiaries of 




Due to the specific and disproportionate pressures on its national 
asylum system, in particular because of its geographical and 
demographic situation as well as the extremely high numbers of 
beneficiaries of international protection relative to population 
when compared to the European average, Malta requires 
assistance in fulfilling the obligations contained in this Directive. 
It should be allowed to benefit from a transitional period in order 
to bring into force the laws, regulations and administrative 
provisions necessary to comply with this Directive. This Directive 
should provide for beneficiaries of international protection in 
Malta to acquire the right to reside in the territory of other 
Member States even if they have not yet been granted long-term 
resident status in Malta. Member States are encouraged to 
facilitate the exercise of this right with a view, in particular, to 
the reallocation of such persons from Malta. ’ 
 
As stated above, the Maltese compromise text thus went far beyond the one put 
forward by the Presidency, notably by further extending the transitional period and 
by calling for assistance. Thus the wording was ‘stronger’ and used the phrase 
‘transitional period’ as a form of short-term derogation. The intention was that Malta 
could at a later stage re-negotiate this with the Commission. Moreover, Malta’s 
proposal explicitly referred to its position on the five year calculation for the long-
term residence permit in a new Article 2A(2), which would be specific to Malta’s 
needs. It was thus not trying to amend any longer Article 4(1) of Council Directive 
2003/109/EC as it suggested in a previous Coreper II meeting (on 19 November), but 
rather was intervening in this new legislative article due to the new circumstances 
prevailing (the French Presidency wanted to achieve a compromise and the 
Commission was up to a certain extent willing to concede on certain issues) which 
was being interpreted as a ‘final’ opportunity for the government so late in the 
process. 
 
As to be expected, the Commission was against both compromise texts especially the 
Maltese one. Although it was able to live with the one year extension deadline in the 
first Presidency compromise, it had previously made it clear during the Coreper II 
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meeting on 19 November that it would not accept any ‘à la carte’ solutions and 
derogations which went beyond a one year possible extension deadline. The 
Commission was adamant about this last point even though it was aware about the 
intergovernmental nature of the negotiations, having already experienced Malta’s 
veto during the JHA Council meeting and thus the ‘killing’ of its legislative proposal.  
 
Returning to the point about two main issues that were found in the French 
Presidency’s attempts to find a compromise (in the Coreper II meetings on 3 and 5 
December 2008), the second issue concerned the Commission’s awareness that if the 
Maltese compromise text was supported by a majority of other delegations, it might 
consider withdrawing its legislative proposal altogether. However, as shown in Table 
9.7, this situation did not materialize and thus the Commission’s fear on this issue 
quickly disappeared.   
 
In fact, these Coreper II sessions were not able to break the ground and reach a 
compromise with both the Maltese and Commission delegations ‘sticking to their 
guns’.  
 
- Malta’s strategies during the post-Treaty of Lisbon phase of the negotiations 
 (variable 5) 
 
The Commission had to wait for the entry into force of the Treaty of Lisbon to be able 
to re-introduce this legislative file and re-commence negotiations that is the second 
phase of the negotiations – see Figure 9.1 illustrating the different stages in the 
negotiations), though this time under a new legislative procedure: the ordinary 
legislative procedure with a shift in Council voting from unanimity to QMV. This 
prompted a Commission official to comment about Malta’s veto earlier in the process 
in 2008 that:  
 
‘Malta was shooting itself in the foot since everyone knew that a 
qualified majority was present at the time even though voting 
was by unanimity and that the blocking minority quorum was 
going to be very difficult to achieve’ (interview with the European 
Commission, Brussels, 13 January 2014).  
 
In fact, as soon as the legal base changed, the Maltese government was outvoted, 
not being able to form a blocking minority as stipulated in Article 16(4) (a minimum 
of four Council members). This situation for Malta is illustrated in Table 9.11 which 
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shows that Malta was unable to foot-drag successfully (scoring ‘0’ on ‘5’) once voting 
rules in the Council shifted from unanimity to QMV. 
 
Table 9.11 - Independent Variable 5 on the foot-dragging strategy67 
Sub-variable 5.1 – Foot-dragging through delaying tactics in Council deliberations  
Scale: [5=successful/+ve; 2.5=medium; 0=not successful/-ve] 
5 = Yes, at extremely high levels of intensity; 
4 = Yes, at high levels of intensity; 
3 = Yes, but at medium-to-high levels of intensity; 
2 = Yes, but at low-to-medium levels of intensity; 
1 = Yes, but at extremely low levels; 
0 = None. 
  
Measurable indicator 5.1.2:  
 A government’s capacity to delay and/or circumvent an  
outcome through argumentation and voting                            [ ]   [1]   [2]   [3]   [4]   [5] 
Source: Table compiled by the author. 
Note: This table excludes the other sub-variables and measurable indicators for Variable 5 (included in 
Box 6.5 in chapter 6) since they do not apply to Case 3. 
 
Despite its complaints and protestations,68 the amendment directive was adopted by 
QMV in the JHA Council of 11 and 12 April 2011 (as an ‘A’ item on the agenda) and at 
first reading (following negotiations with the EP). It was co-signed with the EP (due to 
the ordinary legislative procedure requiring both the Council and the EP to adopt EU 
legislation) and was thus adopted a month later. As indicated in Table 9.7, only Malta 
and the Czech Republic voted against its approval. 
 
So strongly did it feel on the matter that the Maltese government even contemplated 
invoking the ‘Luxembourg Compromise’, since it had been outvoted by QMV on an 
issue of fundamental and crucial importance to it.69 However, this was finally not 
resorted to although it is interesting to point out that the government did trigger this 
mechanism in respect of another negotiation in the JHA policy sphere – that of the 
Frontex guidelines which were also of fundamental importance to Malta’s interests.  
 
In response to its ‘defeat’, the Maltese government, supported by the Czech 
Republic, produced a declaration summing up its dissatisfaction with the way the 
legislative process developed. The declaration, which is reproduced in Table 9.12, 
was annexed to the JHA Council minutes of 11 and 12 April 2011 (Malta Statement in 
Council document 8881/11 ADD 1, PV CONS 22, JAI 230, COMIX 224 of 21 June 2011, 
p. 6). But even here, the government was unsuccessful because it requested that the 
annex to the Council conclusions be a Council declaration and not a Malta one. A 
Council declaration would have carried more weight ensuring that all EU member 
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states would in the future respect the contents of this declaration, most notably the 
points on solidarity and burden-sharing.  
 
Table 9.12 on the Malta Declaration  
Statement by Malta 
 
“Malta: 
 Regrets that the Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council 
amending Directive 2003/109/EC to extend its scope to beneficiaries of international 
protection does not take its difficulties into account. The Directive will render heavier the 
pressure that Malta is under due to the number of beneficiaries of international 
protection present on the island combined with Malta’s limited absorption capacity. 
 Makes particular reference to the Explanatory Statement of the Report of the European 
Parliament on this Proposal    which notes that this Proposal may have the effect of 
exacerbating the pressure to which Member States that host a disproportionate number 
of beneficiaries of international protection are subjected, due in particular to their 
geographical or demographic situation. The Explanatory Statement further stresses that 
the provisions of the Directive should be applied in such a way as to facilitate the 
exercise of the right of beneficiaries of international protection who enjoy long-term 
resident status in a Member State facing such disproportionate pressures, to reside in a 
Member State other than the one which granted them international protection. 
 Calls on the Member States to take up this recommendation and to facilitate the 
movement of beneficiaries of international protection from Malta once they have 
acquired long-term residence status there, with a view to mitigating the negative effects 
that would otherwise derive from the implementation of this Directive. 
 Reiterates its call for greater solidarity through the intra-EU relocation of beneficiaries of 
international protection, as called for by the European Pact on Immigration and Asylum 
and reaffirmed by the Council Conclusions, endorsed by the European Council, on 17 
June 2010. 
 Recalls that the European Union’s immigration and asylum policy must be governed by 
the principle of solidarity and fair sharing of responsibility in accordance with Article 80 
of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) and declares that the 
Proposal fails to incorporate measures to implement this principle, in spite of the fact 
that it is the first instrument to be adopted in the establishment of the Common 
European Asylum System (CEAS). 
 Augurs that the other instruments to be adopted in the context of the CEAS fully respect 
the principle enshrined in Article 80 TFEU, and that the qualified majority voting regime 
is applied in line with this overarching principle.” 
 
 Committee on Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs, A7-0347/2010, 1 December 2010. 
Source: Malta statement in the addendum to draft minutes of the 3081st meeting of the Council of the 
European Union (Justice and Home Affairs) held in Luxembourg on 11 and 12 April 2011. 
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B. Malta's capacities and strategies in the European Parliament 
 
As previously stated, the EP was only consulted under the pre-Treaty of Lisbon phase 
of these negotiations. The Committee on Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs 
(LIBE) which was responsible for this legislative file produced a report on 14 April 
2008 by its rapporteur, Martine Roure, on the Commission’s legislative proposal 
(COM(2007)0298 – C6-0196/2007 – 2007/0112(CNS), A6-0148/2008 of 14 April 
2008). Here one notes that none of Malta’s preferences (particularly the one on 
Article 4(1) on the duration of residence) were included in the LIBE’s amendment 
recommendations to the Council.70 
 
However, the situation changed after the June 2009 EP election, which resulted in 
one of Malta’s previously mentioned MEPs, Simon Busuttil, being appointed as a 
member of the LIBE Committee during the new EP legislative mandate (2009-2014). 
As a result and as already illustrated before, Busuttil was able to champion directly 
the Maltese government’s concerns about immigration related matters in the EP, 
especially Malta’s position on the respect of the solidarity principle and burden-
sharing in the EU. For instance, in addressing an EP plenary session in Strasbourg in 
April 2008, Busuttil stated: 
 
‘Stop the hypocrisy of being scandalised at the loss of lives in the 
Mediterranean and then leaving Southern EU countries to carry 
the burden on their own... I ask the Commission and the Council: 
What will they do this year? There is no doubt that everyone has 
an obligation to save lives. But who will assume the responsibility 
for immigrants who are saved? Is there one single country that 
should carry this on its own or is this a burden that should be 
shared by all?’ (EP Press Release, EPP-ED Group, 24 April 2008). 
 
This intervention was made as a reaction to a 2007 incident which saw immigrants, 
caught in difficulty at sea in Libya’s search and rescue maritime region, left clinging to 
a tuna-pen. In this instance, Libya did not intervene to save the immigrants while EU 
countries pointed at each other over who was to take responsibility for them. 
 
At the time, MEP Busuttil was thus in a position to intervene directly in the EP and 
clarify the negative effect this amendment directive would have on those countries 
being faced with disproportionate numbers of third-country nationals being able to 
apply for a long-term residence permit. However, this was not simple since many of 
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the provisions found in the Martine Roure report were maintained with other 
amendments being proposed by the new rapporteur, Claude Moraes. 
 
Once the Treaty of Lisbon came into force and the Commission proposal was sent 
back to the EP, this time under the ordinary legislative procedure which gives the EP 
co-decision power with the Council, the Maltese government channelled more 
attention on the EP. MEP Busuttil carried Malta’s interests during the decision-
shaping negotiations occurring in the EP between 27 April and 15 November 2010 
(the LIBE Committee discussed this matter on the following dates: 27.4.2010; 
28.9.2010; 11.10.2010; 26.10.2010; 15.11.2010; and 29.11.2010). The EP took a 
decision on the 29 November 2010 adopting its report of 1 December 2010. In the 
explanatory statement of this report, one can detect the hand of Busuttil and 
indirectly, the Maltese government punching beyond its weight. The wording 
included the following provision: 
 
‘this report notes that in view of the fact that some Member 
States host a disproportionate number of beneficiaries of 
international protection, the eligibility of such long-term resident 
status in accordance with this Directive may have the effect of 
exacerbating the pressure to which those Member States are 
subjected, due in particular to their geographical or demographic 
situation. While other measures are therefore required to 
address this undesired consequence, your rapporteur stresses 
that the provisions of this Directive should be applied in such a 
way as to facilitate the exercise of the right of beneficiaries of 
international protection who enjoy long-term resident status in a 
Member State facing such disproportionate pressures, to reside 
in a Member State other than the one which granted them 
international protection’ (Explanatory Statement of EP Report of 
1 December 2010 on the Commission’s proposal). 
 
This extract has already been discussed in the previous section when discussing the 
Maltese statement found in Table 9.12. The statement by the LIBE Committee 
stressed the need for the EU to come up with further measures to alleviate such 
burdens faced by states like Malta in line with the government’s horizontal position 
in this EU policy sphere. It was thus reproduced by the Maltese government (this 
time containing more weight as it was able to refer to the EP’s report) in the JHA 




However, the LIBE Committee’s report did not suggest amendments to Article 4(1) on 
the calculation of the duration period similar to those advanced by the Maltese 
government in Council. This was mainly because the process was really in the late 
stages, with not much support for such an amendment being shown by other MEPs in 
the committee. Having said this, one may see a stark contrast between the previous 
LIBE report of April 2008 (with none of Malta’s concerns addressed there) and the 
one of 1 December 2010 with the EP addressing and accepting the Maltese concerns. 
 
9.3.2  The decision-taking stage 
 
As discussed in the previous sub-section on the decision-shaping stages of the 
process, there were two decision-taking stages in these negotiations, reflecting the 
pre and post-Treaty of Lisbon phases. Thus, as can be seen in Figure 9.1 and as 
discussed earlier, there was a decision taken by the JHA ministers in the Council 
meeting of 27 November 2008 marking the end of the first phase of these 
negotiations with no adoption being possible. As seen, this was because of the veto 
produced by the Maltese government in the ministerial Council meeting. As stated, 
this was not easy to execute for Malta since it was the only government to veto the 
adoption of the amendment directive and was under immense pressure by the 
French Presidency to find a compromise. Up to this stage in the decision-making 
process, the EP’s role in the process was just a consultative one. 
 
However, as soon as the Treaty of Lisbon came into effect, the Commission re-started 
the process, leading to another decision-taking stage in April and May 2011 (see 
Figure 9.1). The April date corresponds to the JHA Council meeting held on 11 April 
2011 in which the Hungarian Presidency, amid Maltese protestations, was able to 
find an agreement by QMV. This was later co-signed on 11 May 2011 by the EP, 
which resulted in the adoption of Directive 2011/51/EU. 
 
9.4 Conclusion - An assessment of the outcomes for Malta in case study 3 
  
This chapter has indicated the salience held by the JHA legislative sphere for the 
Maltese government as well as the preferences and strategies used by the 
government during the two phases (the pre- and post-Treaty of Lisbon phases) of the 
legislative negotiations. 
 
Section 9.3 revealed how during the pre-Treaty of Lisbon phase, Malta managed (to a 
certain extent) to obtain a successful outcome from the process (that of maintaining 
the ‘status quo’, and hence the non-extension of Council Directive 2003/109/EC to 
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beneficiaries of international protection) which matched its preference. However, 
this outcome reflected a capacity and strategy deficit on the government’s part to 
exercise influence during decision-shaping and taking stages of the process which 
precede actual voting. This is because, the government’s result was obtained solely 
through the mechanisms afforded by the intergovernmental nature of the voting 
system (that of unanimity) and certainly not through a manifestation of its influence 
in the decision-making process. In other words, the outcome was not so much a 
consequence of Malta exercising influence in the process as it was of it being able to 
resort to the ‘power’ of the veto to block the adoption of the amendment directive. 
 
As seen, this lack of influence could be mainly attributed to the fact that the 
government’s pace-setting strategy was adopted very late in the process and because 
of a general unwillingness on the part of other EU member state governments to 
accept Malta’s justifications about its concerns with the Commission’s legislative 
proposal. In this case therefore, the government’s veto reflected negatively on its 
influence levels in the process.  
 
Section 9.3 confirmed that the government lost most of what influence it did have 
once the legislative process and voting procedure changed with the entry into force 
of the Treaty of Lisbon. The adoption by QMV of the amendment directive in May 
2011 represented a general failure for the government (in terms of not having 
managed to influence the process) to ‘brake and break’ the decision-making process, 
thus leading to a negative outcome for it.  
 
Overall, chapter 9 has shown that even though Malta’s government was proactive 
through the adoption of a pace-setting strategy in the later stages of the 
negotiations, it was unsuccessful and failed to exercise enough influence to amend 
the Commission’s proposal in line with its preferences. This case study reveals that 
the government was extremely inflexible due to the sensitivity of this subject matter 
and because it was adopting a similar policy line in all remaining and ongoing 
legislative negotiations in EU immigration. In short, the government was pushing for 
the principle of solidarity and a fair sharing and distribution of responsibility (burden-
sharing) to be respected in the EU (in accordance with Articles 78(3) and 80 TFEU), 
especially because certain EU Mediterranean states were being hit hardest by the 
growing phenomenon of immigrants reaching their borders. 
 
As observed by a former Maltese government official taking part in these legislative 
negotiations, ‘we stuck to our guns at all times’ (interview held in Malta on 12 
December 2013). Thus, Malta ‘fought’ for its interests as a self-interested and 
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strategically calculating actor. In the words of rational choice theory, it acted as a 
rational player in the EU decision-making contest.  
 
However, Malta was not able to strike a balance between its interests and the 
negotiation dynamics set by the institutional framework in a similar fashion as in 
Cases 1 and 2 on the fireworks directives. In fact, Malta’s interests (and suggested 
amendments) went contrary to those held by the Commission and other EU member 
states - particularly those in central and northern Europe, i.e.  non-peripheral EU 
member states – the latter having interests to prolong the timeframe of a long-term 
residence application permit in peripheral countries such as Malta. This last point 
about ‘distalization’ processes in the EU was examined in the background section of 
this chapter. As aforementioned, Malta emerged as a ‘loser’ from these negotiations 
in accordance with the views held by the MLG approach about limitations on 
individual governments to control EU decision-making (especially when Council votes 
are taken by QMV) which inevitably consists of a zero-sum conception: if one actor 
gains power, another loses it (see sections 4.2 and 5.1, chapters 4 and 5 respectively). 
In this case, Malta did its outmost (albeit during relatively late stages in the process) 
to divert the outcome. For instance, as established earlier in the chapter, it attached 
a declaration to JHA Council conclusions in June 2011 in which it expressed its 
disappointment on how the decision to enforce the amendment directive was taken 
(as observed, Malta was even thinking about invoking the ‘Luxembourg Compromise’ 
which, however, according to the MLG approach, does little to justify the views of a 
state-centrist approach that such a mechanism allows EU member state governments 
to posses absolute control of EU legislative decision-making processes in Council – 
see Hooghe and Marks, 2001: 18-19). Through the declaration, Malta also reminded 
other EU governments and the EU institutions (notably the Commission) about their 
EU Treaty obligations to respect Articles 78(3) and 80 TFEU on fair sharing of 
responsibility and solidarity. 
 
In other words, this legislative case reveals that in these negotiations there was no 
room for a compromise between opposing stands on what is an extremely sensitive 
topic in the EU (particularly at the time of the writing of this thesis with an incessant 
exodus of irregular migrants reaching biblical proportions in April 2015, with the 
result that more deaths are being registered in the Mediterranean). As observed, 
Malta was the most vociferous peripheral EU member state requesting more 
flexibility to Article 4(1), with the Commission and other non-peripheral EU 




Therefore, one may conclude that in such circumstances, the MLG approach is most 
useful to explain limits of individual member state governments to control decision-
making processes at EU level. Ultimately a ‘win-lose’ relationship emerged as an 
outcome. In this case, Malta and the Czech Republic, two small states (even though 
Cyprus and some other EU Mediterranean states – notably Italy - favoured Malta’s 
position on this point), were the real ‘losers’, having voted against the adoption of 
this act under the QMV procedure. 
 
One last observation worth making concerns the analysis of the factors explaining the 
Maltese government’s failure in these specific EU legislative negotiations on legal 
migration. In a similar manner as in Cases 1 and 2, this chapter has outlined and 
provided an analysis on several factors in section 9.3 (divided between governmental 
capacities and strategies in line with the thesis’s methodology). These factors are 
further elaborated upon in chapter 10 which provides a cross-examination and 





























Chapter 10 continues the empirical analysis of the case studies presented in chapters 
8 and 9 by producing a comparative analysis. It also serves to conclude and tie 
together the empirical parts of this research on Malta’s capacities and strategies to 
influence EU legislative decision-making processes. 
  
Chapters 8 and 9 have already discussed and examined the factors (i.e. the 
independent variables of the thesis presented in chapter 6) that provide explanatory 
value for the exercise (or lack) of influence in the three EU legislative case studies 
presented in these chapters. Chapter 10 thus carries forward this discussion and 
cross-examines these factors, something which the preceding chapters have not 
done given that their focus was placed on studying separately the legislative cases.  
 
Chapter 10 is structured in the following manner: Section 10.1 briefly reminds the 
reader about the outcomes of the three cases (already examined in chapters 8 and 9) 
for the Maltese government. This is followed by section 10.2 which presents both a 
qualitative and quantitative comparative analysis to cross-examine the explanatory 
factors. Lastly, section 10.3 provides a summation of the main findings arising from 
the analysis.  
 
10.1  Re-visiting the outcomes for the Maltese government in the three 
EU legislative cases presented by this research 
 
Chapter 8 dealt with two separate sets of EU legislative negotiations about the 
placing on the EU market of pyrotechnic articles – those occurring between 2005 and 
2007 (Case 1) and those between 2011 and 2013 (Case 2). The chapter concluded 
that Malta’s government emerged successful having achieved positive outcomes in 
both cases. The bare fact that there are clauses in the pyrotechnic directives of 2007 
and 2013 known as ‘Malta clauses’ is by itself testimony of the government having 
exercised influence in those EU legislative decision-making processes. As previously 
stated, there are a number of explanatory factors for the success achieved by the 
government in influencing these outcomes. These factors are further elaborated 
upon and comparatively analyzed in section 10.2. 
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Chapter 9 – on legal migration (Case 3) – examined the same explanatory factors as 
those found in the fireworks cases. When compared to Cases 1 and 2, Case 3 
revealed a lack of influence on the part of Malta’s government in the legislative 
negotiations on extending the scope of the 2003 LTR directive on EU long-term 
residence to beneficiaries of international protection. This case therefore represents 
a negative one for the Maltese government. The factors explaining Malta’s lack of 
influence in Case 3 are re-visited in the next section of this chapter. 
 
It is relevant to reiterate that in all the cases, all parties to the negotiations had deep 
and conflicting interests. This issue is relevant and is being emphasized so as to avoid 
any assumption that Malta may have exerted influence and emerged successful in 
the first two cases (contrary to the outcome in the third case) because it was easier 
to do so. One might think that there were delegations with a lack of interest in these 
spheres. Indeed, this was not the case.  
 
10.2  A comparative analysis of the main factors for Malta’s influence 
and/or non-influence in the negotiations of the adopted directives 
 
This section is divided into two main parts. Sub-section 10.2.1 provides a qualitative 
comparative analysis of the three cases presented in chapters 8 and 9 while sub-
section 10.2.2 provides a quantitative one. 
 
Before delving into the comparative analysis, it is relevant to produce the following 
questions which stem from the thesis’s main research questions (specified in chapter 
6) and which are being refined to bring them closer to the empirical research found 
in chapters 8 and 9. These questions therefore represent a key element on which the 
following comparative analysis has been built: 
 
- Through the cases previously studied, is one able to infer that a small EU 
member state the size of Malta (and indeed, the smallest EU state) is capable of 
influencing the EU decision-making process when specific strategies are 
adopted and certain factors are manifest and present in this process? 
  
- If influence was manifested, why, how and at which stage did Malta’s 
government manage to influence the two EU decision-making processes on the 
adoption of EU directives on pyrotechnic articles? And why did it fail to 




- What were the main differences emerging from these cases that are able to 
explain this discrepancy in the government’s capacity to manifest influence in 
EU decision-making? 
 
The three case studies presented in the previous chapters outline a number of ways 
by which influence was exercised and not exercised through explanatory factors 
divided between governmental capacities (independent variables 1 to 3) and 
strategies (independent variables 4 to 6). 
 
Governmental capacities: 
variable 1 - the capacity to enter the EU legislative process as early as possible; 
variable 2 - the expert and administrative capacity; 
variable 3 - the capacity to prioritize. 
 
Governmental strategies: 
variable 4 - pace-setting the process; 
variable 5 – foot-dragging the process; 
variable 6 – fence-sitting the process.  
 
10.2.1  A qualitative comparative analysis 
 
This sub-section cross-examines the independent variables belonging to the 
government’s capacities and strategies in these cases. 
 
1. Malta’s capacities in the three case studies: 
 
Variable 1 - the capacity to enter the EU legislative process early 
 
One of the main factors for a government’s success to influence EU decision-making 
processes is its capacity to enter into such processes as early as possible. As 
empirically tested in these chapters, this is particularly relevant for small states 
which, as maintained by literature on the subject (see chapter 2), perceive small 
states at a disadvantage when compared to their larger counterparts which generally 
have large administrations and more expertise.  
 
In relation to Case 1, section 8.1 reveals how Malta’s government managed to upload 
its preferences (on wording about the use of pyrotechnic articles for religious and 
traditional purposes) into a Commission impact assessment report during the 
agenda-setting stage of the process, i.e. prior to the Commission’s adoption of its 
legislative proposal (in October 2005) which was based on this report. For instance, 
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one is able to cite recital 7 of the Commission’s proposal which was in line with the 
government’s position on maintaining differences of cultural and religious customs 
and traditions in EU member states (thus moving away from a ‘one size fits all’ 
approach). This eased the way for the government to be able to intervene strongly at 
the start of Council negotiations in 2005, with its position about the local fireworks 
industry and its importance for religious, traditional and cultural activities in Malta 
having already been partially uploaded in the text of the proposed EU legislation. As 
analyzed, the Maltese government’s argument was eventually accepted and adopted 
in separate paragraphs to Article 2 (paragraphs 2 and 6) of Directive 2007/23/EC by 
the Commission, the EU governments (in Council) and the EP. As stated, these 
paragraphs are still known today as the Malta clauses which, as observed in chapter 
8, maintain explanatory value about Malta’s exercise of influence in this process.  
 
However, the same cannot be said about Case 2 concerning the recast EU legislative 
negotiations of 2011-2013. In these negotiations, the Maltese government found 
itself in a different situation than the previous round due to the fact that the ‘Malta 
clauses’ already formed part of the Commission’s proposal of 21 November 2011. 
Thus, the government’s main preferences were already uploaded into the draft 
proposal. In consequence, the government adopted a defensive strategy which, 
however, switched to a pace-setting and proactive one once French opposition to a 
new Article 2(2)(g) on ‘scope’ (the former Article 2(2) of Directive 2007/23/EC and 
therefore the main ‘Malta clause’ as illustrated in section 8.2) started to emerge in 
Council Working Group meetings. Therefore, although the government became 
active at a later stage than its interventions in Case 1, it still managed to enter the 
process relatively early with discussions having just started in the Council Working 
Group (the discussions were still at an early phase in the decision-shaping stage). But 
as in the 2005-2007 negotiations, Malta voiced its concerns equally strongly. 
 
All this means that Cases 1 and 2 presented different scenarios for the government 
with this factor on early and timely interventions being necessary to influence both 
EU decision-making processes. 
 
However, there is a stark contrast with this factor between Cases 1 and 2 on the one 
hand, and Case 3 on the other (on legal migration). In this last case, the government 
adopted a wait and see approach in the initial stages of the negotiations (both during 
agenda-setting and decision-shaping once negotiations in Council began). As 
observed, the government’s non-intervention in the Council Working Group during 
these stages of the process wasted precious time for it. The government only shifted 
strategy to one which was more proactive and necessary to address and upload its 
263 
 
preferences during the decision-taking stage. This proved too late for Malta to 
propose amendments to a Council Presidency compromise text which, as shown in 
chapter 9, had already surfaced by this time. It was thus compelled to block the 
adoption of the directive by exercising a veto when the process was still governed by 
pre-Treaty of Lisbon provisions (see chapter 9). However, Malta could not rely on the 
veto once the Treaty of Lisbon entered into force and the legislative and voting 
procedures changed (i.e. from consultation to the ordinary legislative procedure and 
from unanimity to QMV in Council). Even though the government’s late efforts to 
lobby intensely did materialize, it was unable to influence the outcome at such a late 
stage in the process, when a Council compromise was already formed. This was one 
of the main explanatory factors for the lack of influence Malta’s government 
experienced during this particular EU decision-making process.  
 
In short, the three empirical cases demonstrate that the government was faced with 
different scenarios presented by these EU legislative decision-making processes, but 
with a common factor on early and timely interventions being necessary to influence 
such processes. The differences thus found in these cases in relation to this factor 
alone already hold relevant explanatory value for Malta’s influence or lack of 
influence in the outcome of the three processes. 
 
Variable 2 - the expert and administrative capacity 
 
Cases 1 and 2 reveal high levels of expert capacity (sub-variable 2.1), i.e. the training, 
work experience and technical knowledge of the government’s officials in the 
particular policy sphere dealing with the pyrotechnic industry. One must remember 
that as observed in chapter 8 (see sub-section 8.1.2), Malta unlike other EU member 
states, had longstanding national legislation in force (the ‘Explosives Ordinance’ of 15 
July 1904 as successively amended throughout the years) that already regulated the 
local pyrotechnic industry. The administration was therefore already knowledgeable 
on this subject matter.  
 
Notwithstanding the above, Malta’s government wanted to ensure that the 
Commission’s proposal of October 2005 for a first and new directive in this field 
would not dilute national legislation. As discussed, Malta had to strive during the 
negotiations to maintain the ‘status quo’ in the local market. Therefore, due to its 
expertise in this policy sphere, the government was able to participate actively and 
produce valid arguments. This contributed very much to the successes achieved in 
both processes (cases 1 and 2) in protecting its local industry from falling under the 
approved directives which would have lead to the cessation of fireworks production 
in Malta in the long-term. Figure 8.2 in fact indicates positive ratings for this sub-
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variable for Cases 1 and 2. This Figure however also indicates a negative rating for the 
government’s administrative capacity (sub-variable 2.2) in both cases.  
 
However, the fact that the government is made up of a very small administration did 
not impede it from exercising influence and ‘punching above its weight’ thus 
achieving positive outcomes in both cases.  This has been confirmed by research 
participants who were interviewed and who do not work for Malta’s government 
(officials from the Commission and the Council Secretariat) who participated in these 
discussions in Council and who witnessed first-hand Malta’s interventions. They 
observed that Malta must have held the necessary expertise to have understood the 
situation that was unwinding at various stages in the negotiations. Indeed, the 
government’s administrative co-ordination system, described at length in chapter 7, 
succeeded in providing representatives with timely instructions to be adopted in 
Council meetings at the stages of decision-shaping (technical level) and decision-
taking (political level). Chapter 8 has recorded the footnotes of Malta’s interventions 
found in some of these Council working documents (particularly those belonging to 
the recast negotiations). 
 
As observed in chapter 9 and unlike EU legislation on the placing on the market of 
pyrotechnics, the legal migration negotiations were novel to the government’s 
administration. Unlike Cases 1 and 2, Case 3 on amending Council Directive 
2003/109/EC to extend it to beneficiaries of international protection evidenced a lack 
of expertise by the Maltese administration in this particular sub-policy sphere.  As 
previously explained in section 9.3 (see also Figure 9.2 which indicates an average 
score of ‘2’ on ‘5’ for this variable), this was mainly due to the fact that the 2003 
Council Directive was a substantially new legislation for the Maltese administration to 
download (implement). Besides, this directive was enforced into Maltese national 
law in 2007, i.e. the same year as the Commission’s adoption of its new legislative 
proposal. Therefore, there was not enough time available for the Maltese 
administration to study well this legislation in the downloading process. This would 
have acted as a type of benchmark assisting the government when formulating its 
national position, enabling it to acquire the relevant expertise to be able to ‘punch 
above its weight’ once more.  
 
Variable 3 - the capacity to prioritize 
 
All three cases reveal that once Malta’s government recognizes issues with important 
and direct consequences for it emerging from particular EU legislative processes, it 
focuses on them by prioritizing and mobilizing administrative resources. The 
265 
 
pyrotechnic and long-term residence (LTR) legislative cases demonstrate this - even 
though the government only turned its focus on the latter case at a late stage in the 
legislative process. Figures 8.2 and 9.2 illustrate a very high positive rating for all 
three cases in relation to this variable. 
  
Chapter 8 reveals that in Cases 1 and 2 the government identified very clear 
objectives to be attained from these negotiations and ably framed its preferences (in 
the form of legislative amendments) in such a way as to make them acceptable to the 
majority (i.e. the other EU member state governments together with the Commission 
and the EP). As aforementioned, this variable on the capacity to prioritize achieved 
the highest score possible in Figure 8.2, which maintains a lot of explanatory value 
about the government’s skills to co-ordinate efficiently its national position and 
prepare itself well for negotiations. Without doubt, this helped the government to 
exercise influence in these two cases.   
 
With regard to the third case study, although the Maltese government’s capacity to 
prioritize was also steadfast and reliable in the latter stages of the decision-making 
process (Figure 9.2 provides a positive rating of ‘5’ on ‘5’ for this governmental 
capacity), this factor did little on its own to stop a negative outcome from being 
achieved by the government. As stated, the government only came up with a clear 
national position fairly late in the process. This therefore goes contrary to the 
analysis for variable 1, i.e. the capacity to enter early into the process which as just 
stated, did not materialize in Case 3. Thus, the importance of participating actively 
during the decision-shaping stages (when positions are still being formulated early in 
the process) is demonstrated by Malta’s lack of influence in the legal migration case. 
 
2. Malta’s strategies in the three case studies: 
 
Variable 4 - pace-setting the process 
 
In the three cases presented in the thesis, one finds that the Maltese government 
adopted two types of pace-setting strategies: lobbying and intervening in Council 
with convincing arguments and diplomatic leverage. Both types of pace-setting are 
dealt with separately in the following paragraphs. 
 
i. Pace-setting through the delivery of convincing arguments and the use of 
diplomatic leverage 
 
As already discussed in chapter 8, the negotiations in Case 1 were characterized by 
Malta’s government pace-setting the discussions in Council. It did this throughout the 
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whole process, i.e. from the very early stages of decision-shaping to decision-taking. 
When compared with the recast negotiations held a few years later (Case 2), Malta 
started to participate actively as soon as the Working Group meetings began in 
Council. In Case 2, Malta’s government began the negotiations differently and on a 
defensive path since its preferences were already integrated in the Commission’s 
proposal. This was similar to a cautious ‘wait and see’ approach whereby the 
government was studying other delegations’ interests all the while ensuring that its 
interests were not to be left out from the proposal. However, once the Commission’s 
proposal started to be ‘torn apart’ in Council - with the danger that Malta’s clauses 
could be amended, or worse still, deleted - there was no other option than for the 
government to intervene and defend its interests directly. Therefore, after a ‘slow’ 
start in the recast negotiations, the government shifted towards a pace-setting 
strategy.  
 
As observed in chapter 8, various parties involved in the recast negotiations 
confirmed (in interviews conducted with them) that Malta rapidly shifted to an active 
role, intervening more constantly in Council Working Group meetings and thereby 
reaching levels of influence previously experienced in the 2005-2007 negotiations. It 
thus re-produced convincing arguments and managed to persuade other delegations 
through Council interventions (particularly the Spanish delegation and the Cypriot 
Council Presidency) about the necessity for its interests to be included in the final 
compromise for adoption. For instance, in the first case (the 2005-2007 negotiations) 
it persuaded the Commission over the proper definition of a ‘manufacturer’ and on 
‘the placing on the market’ of such articles – Article 2(6) and (2) of Directive 
2007/23/EC. Likewise, in the second case (the 2011-2013 negotiations), Malta 
managed to persuade the rotating Council Presidencies (see Table 8.5) and other 
delegations to maintain the extension granted to the ‘scope’ article (Article 2(2)(g) of 
Directive 2013/29/EU) as originally proposed by the Commission. 
 
Crucially, the Maltese government also managed to win favourable outcomes by 
convincing other delegations in Council through diplomatic leverage, i.e. through the 
use of clear and effective interventions linking issues together.  
 
This last point holds true of the 2005-2007 negotiations when Malta requested to 
amend existing paragraphs rather than suggesting new ones. To be precise, the 2005-
2007 case study showed that Malta did request a new paragraph to be included 
under the exemptions article (Article 1(4) of Directive 2007/23/EC), the effect of 
which was to exempt outright its local industry from falling within the scope of the 
directive. As seen, this was not met with much enthusiasm by the Commission (as the 
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author of the legislative text it does not favour an ‘unraveling’ of the text). So Malta’s 
government reverted to other subtler ways of how to exempt its industry – through 
the ‘Malta clauses’ mentioned earlier – making its suggestions for amendments to 
the texts more ‘digestible’.  
 
Interestingly, this contrasts starkly with the lack of success that the Maltese 
government experienced during EU legislative negotiations amending the ‘Birds 
Directive’ (Directive 2009/147/EC of 30 November 2009 - this directive is the 
successor of Directive 79/409/EEC), another crucial legislative file for Malta. A 
Maltese government official (interview held in Valletta on 13 November 2013) 
observed that had the government acted in a similar manner to the one on the 
pyrotechnic articles by attempting to propose amendments to the legislative text 
rather than requesting outright exemptions or derogations from the scope of such 
legislation, the government might have been equally successful in influencing the 
process and thus achieving a positive result. Instead the government ‘buried its head 
in the sand and stamped its feet that anything that is not equivalent to a derogation 
would not be acceptable’. As history reveals, the government in this case did not 
attain much and worse still, ended up with having to implement an unclear piece of 
EU legislation which has landed it into trouble. Indeed, the government is currently 
interpreting the Birds Directive differently from the Commission. As a result, this 
dispute has appeared in front of the Court of Justice of the EU.71 In short, had the 
government acted in a similar manner as in the negotiation on fireworks, the ‘Birds 
Directive’ might have included some similar wording to the ‘Malta clauses’ which 
effectively exempted the local industry and its interested stakeholders. This official 
disclosed that:  
 
‘There are members of the hunting community and in government 
that look at the fireworks industry and the ‘exemptions’ it managed 
to achieve in this directive in a ‘jealous manner’ for not having 
applied similar strategies to those employed in the pyrotechnic 
articles negotiation’. 
 
Therefore, in Case 2 the government’s use of clear, brief and effective interventions 
were a recipe for success for such a small EU state. 
 
However, this was not the case in the legal migration negotiations. As revealed in 
chapter 9 (and as reiterated further on in this chapter), Malta’s government fence-sat 
the decision-shaping stages of this process and was late to adopt a pace-setting 
strategy, by which time the process had already entered the decision-taking stage of 
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decision-making. Chapter 9 reveals that although the government initially tried to 
adopt an aggressive pace-setting strategy reverting to a foot-dragging one later, this 
shift in strategies did not produce any tangible results other than the placing of a 
veto (without support from any other member state) when the voting procedure was 
still by unanimity. But once the Treaty of Lisbon came into force, thereby switching 
voting to QMV, there was little the government could do (other than placing a 
‘conciliatory’ statement attached to the JHA Council minutes) to break the process.  
 
Thus even though Malta attempted to pace-set discussions in Coreper II by producing 
convincing arguments and diplomatic leverage to justify its requests for amendments 
to be made to the draft EU law (see Table 9.9 and Graph 9.3 in chapter 9), this was 
too late with a Council Presidency compromise already formed. Therefore, as may be 
seen in Table 9.7, even though it managed to persuade and receive support from 
some of the EU member states, Malta’s government did not convince the majority of 
the parties to the negotiations. Case 3 thus reveals that Malta’s late diplomatic 
persuading efforts in Council were in vain, which maintains explanatory value for the 
importance that countries, especially small states, must pace-set discussions in areas 
of particular interest to them from the very start. Anything contrary to this is a 
mistake, which small states in particular cannot afford and which can only result in 
negative outcomes for them in EU decision-making processes. 
 
ii. Pace-setting through lobbying 
 
Case 1 reveals the relevance of lobbying other parties to the negotiations. Sub-
section 8.1.3 shows that Malta lobbied the Commission and the EP throughout the 
process and that lobbying was a crucial channel of influence to achieve success in EU 
decision-making. It also reveals the importance for a small state government to take 
advantage of and lobby the Council Presidency as a means to channel influence, 
especially when this is held by another small state. In fact Cases 1 and 2 expose how 
the Finnish (in Case 1) and Cypriot (in Case 2) Presidencies were able to 
accommodate the Maltese government’s cultural, traditional and religious concerns.  
 
As a side note to this last point about lobbying, it is interesting to note that informal 
ways of lobbying such EU institutions are equally effective when it comes to 
persuasion. In the run-up to the 2007 directive, the government’s representatives 
adopted a ‘hands-on approach’ by inviting European Commission and EP officials to 
Malta during the fireworks festival period which is an annual occurrence every May. 




‘...inviting them to Malta made them aware and able to understand 
more what we (Malta) were really talking about in Brussels ... that 
this kind of local activity was small when compared with other 
industries in markets elsewhere in Europe... they got a direct sense 
that fireworks in Malta are produced locally for traditional and not 
commercial purposes and that this should therefore not pose a 
problem if it were to be exempt from falling within the scope of the 
proposed EU directive...’ (interview held in November 2013 ). 
 
Besides lobbying the EU legislative institutions, it is also vital to lobby other EU 
governments. With particular reference to the first case, section 8.1 has shown that 
although other EU member state governments were sympathetic with Malta’s 
position, the government was isolated in this particular negotiation with no other 
government intervening similarly in the Council. However, as just stated above, one 
of the positive aspects for the government in these (2005-2007) negotiations was 
that technical discussions (in Working Group meetings) at the decision-shaping stage 
of the process were being held under the Finnish Presidency, i.e. another small state.  
 
One may have thought that Spain, a large country with an excellent track record 
about exercising influence and achieving successes in various fora and policy spheres 
in EU decision-making processes, would have supported Malta (something it did later 
in the more recent 2011-2013 negotiations) for obvious reasons - it is a 
Mediterranean country sharing similar traditions to those found in Malta and has a 
strong fireworks industry in some of its regions - particularly in the south. However, a 
European Commission official involved directly in the 2005-2007 negotiations 
confirmed that Spain was a silent player and completely overlooked these cultural 
concerns. It only recognized the potential that the ‘Malta clauses’ could hold for its 
pyrotechnic industry once the process was over, i.e. after the adoption of the EU 
directive by the Council and the EP. 
 
‘Spain could only thank Malta about these amendments. But 
obviously Spain, a heavyweight in the EU decision-making process, 
would have helped Malta’s cause tremendously by easing Malta’s 
way and adding weight to its arguments during the course of the 
negotiations’ (interview in Brussels, January 2014).  
 
Interestingly and according to this same official, Spanish regional authorities from the 
south, namely Valencia, Catalonia and the Balearics, held bilateral talks with the 
Commission’s DG Enterprise and Industry once the decision-making process ended:  
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‘They came here and said that we now have a big problem with 
(implementing) this legislation’.  
 
This is because traditional festivities using large pyrotechnics (unlike those found in 
Maltese feasts) take place in these regions. They therefore tried to examine with the 
Commission how the ‘Malta clauses’ on definitions (Article 2(2) and (6) of the 2007 
Directive) could apply to their situation. They were therefore trying to justify these 
types of fireworks for use in traditional festivities particular to their regions (for 
instance, the popular ‘patum de berga’ festivity72 in which a large crowd of people 
light-up hand-held pyrotechnics such as sparklers) and to exclude them from falling 
within the scope of this EU legislation. However, the European Commission official 
observed that these types of pyrotechnics (mainly hand-held sparklers) are quite 
large and that they infringe safety requirements on minimum safety distances:  
 
‘... the regional authorities and festivity organizers realized that they 
may have a big problem now because if you have one of these giant 
sparklers then the minimum safety distance should be 8 meters’. 
 
The substance of all this is that Malta’s government could have had a strong ally in 
Spain during discussions leading to the adoption of the 2007 EU directive but, most 
probably because of the lack of resources commensurate to a small state and 
therefore a low capacity to lobby a vast array of players other than the main ones - 
the Commission, Council Presidency and the EP - this did not happen (see Table 8.3 
on Malta’s lobbying efforts). Therefore, the Maltese government had to push 
singlehandedly for its position to be accepted during the 2005-2007 negotiations, 
which makes the result achieved by the government even more extraordinary. 
 
Case 2 about the 2011-2013 recast negotiations offers a different dynamic to the 
previous one, with Spain and the European Commission being Malta’s strong allies 
throughout this process. Once again, the fact that another small state (Cyprus) was 
hosting the Council Presidency at a crucial stage in the process was a bonus for 
Malta, one not to be taken lightly when reviewing the government’s successful 
outcome in the recast negotiations.  As stated in section 8.2 of chapter 8, all these 
factors (besides the EP as another crucial channel of influence) facilitated Malta’s 
government to suppress French attempts to drop the ‘Malta clauses’ from the 
compromise proposal, something which as explained did not materialize. Thus, the 
government’s main objective in the recast negotiations – that of maintaining the 
‘Malta clauses’ in the legislative alignment exercise of EU legislation (through the 
271 
 
recast technique) to continue to exempt the local pyrotechnic industry from falling 
within the scope of this EU directive – was achieved. 
 
On the other hand, Case 3 illustrates that even though Malta pace-set late in the 
process, the government still lobbied various key parties to the negotiations. 
However, mainly due to the lack of political will on the part of other EU member 
states (with the exception of a few EU Mediterranean states, as shown in Table 9.7) 
and because of the late nature of its interventions and lobbying efforts in these 
negotiations, Malta could do little to overturn a majority rule which went contrary to 
its preferences. This is confirmed by the data found in chapter 9 (see Tables 9.8 and 
9.9 and Graphs 9.2 and 9.3) which reveals that although Malta’s government 
obtained relatively high scores (medium to high levels of intensity) in the adoption of 
the pace-setting strategy in these negotiations, this was not sufficient. 
 
Variable 5 - foot-dragging the process 
 
As observed in chapter 9, the foot-dragging strategy was adopted by Malta’s 
government only in the case on legal migration. Chapter 9 revealed how during and 
up to the pre-Treaty of Lisbon phase of the EU decision-making process, Malta 
managed to obtain a successful outcome from the process - that of blocking the 
extension of the 2003 LTR Directive to beneficiaries of international protection. As 
discussed earlier, this result was only obtained because of Council voting mechanisms 
which allowed it to veto the process. Therefore success during the pre-Lisbon Treaty 
phase in these negotiations was not achieved through a manifestation of its influence 
in the process but rather by its right to simply resort to the ‘power’ of the veto to 
block the adoption of the amendment directive. This is demonstrated in Table 9.10 
which explains why although successfully blocking the adoption of the legislation on 
its own, Malta only managed to foot-drag and delay the adoption of the legislative 
proposal at extremely low levels. It was not being able to persuade other delegations 
to also veto the proposal. As emphasized in section 9.3, it was the only member state 
to veto the decision-taking stage. 
 
As shown in chapter 9, this lack of influence could be mainly attributed to the fact 
that the government’s pace-setting strategy was adopted very late in the process and 
because of a general unwillingness on the part of other EU member state 
governments to accept Malta’s justifications about its concerns with the draft 
amending directive. In this case therefore, the government’s veto reflected 




Chapter 9 also revealed that the government lost most of what influence it did have 
(by simply vetoing the decision) once the legislative process and voting procedure 
changed with the entry into force of the Treaty of Lisbon. As explained, the adoption 
by QMV of the amendment directive in May 2011 represented a general failure for 
the government’s foot-dragging strategy (see Table 9.11) to ‘brake and break’ the 
decision-making process thus leading to a negative outcome for it.  
 
Variable 6 - fence-sitting the process 
 
The fence-sitting strategy was not adopted by Malta’s government during the 
negotiations in Cases 1 and 2, although it did so in Case 3. Chapter 9 reveals that the 
government fence-sat the early stages of the negotiations. Indeed, it practically 
fence-sat throughout all the decision-shaping stages of the negotiations when the 
pre-Treaty of Lisbon provisions were still in force. As discussed in chapter 9 (see 
section 9.3), during this time Malta’s administration was busy implementing much of 
the EU’s JHA legal framework having just obtained EU membership in 2004. Besides, 
as confirmed by a ministry official (interview held in Valletta, December 2013), the 
government at first seemed to be in agreement with the Commission’s proposal. 
These facts together with the reality of its extremely small administrative size partly 
explain the adoption of a fence-sitting strategy.  
 
However, as explained, matters changed once the dangers of the Commission’s 
proposal were identified by the government and once immigration in Malta quickly 
became a sensitive issue of national and grave importance upon achieving EU 
membership (with massive arrivals of immigrants arriving at its shores). It thus 
needed to shift strategy to one that was more proactive (see point D.3 in Table 5.1, 
chapter 5). However, as aforementioned, although Malta stopped fence-sitting in 
Council, this occurred too late in the process for the government to make amends 
and exercise influence.  
 
Table 9.4 in chapter 9 furnishes scored indicators for this variable. One finds that the 
frequency of coalition shifting (between pace-setters and foot-draggers), the 
similarity of other government positions with that of its own, the miscalculation of 
the outcome, and the lack of benchmarks afforded by the implementation phase 
have all produced some explanatory value on the government’s adoption of this 






10.2.2  A quantitative comparative analysis 
 
This sub-section derives from the quantitative sections in the method of data 
collection discussed in chapter 6. That chapter hypothesized that the higher the 
levels and scores for each of the independent variables discussed above, the higher 
the probability that the government would exercise influence and be successful in EU 
decision-making processes.73 This sub-section tests this by providing a quantitative 
comparative analysis of the three empirical cases presented in the previous two 
chapters. More precisely, it provides an analysis for each of the cases by establishing 
the third step of the decision weights and measures scoreboard (the approach 
consisting of a three-step method as explained in section 6.5 on methods of data 
collection) after which the results of the three cases are compared. 
 
Step-3 in the decision weights and measures approach is required to add up, 
compare and test quantitatively the data achieved in the previous two steps of the 
scoreboard. This will bestow a picture of whether steps-1 and 2 correspond with each 
other, determining whether Malta’s government possessed enough capacities (the 
step-1 variables: variables 1 to 3) to be able to influence a process through the 
adoption of precise strategies during EU legislative negotiations (the step-2 variables: 
variables 4 to 6). It thus tests quantitatively whether a causal link exists between 
these variables in the cases previously analyzed. For instance, whether high scores 
inputted for step-1 variables are compatible with high scores for step-2 variables. If 
so, the overall result for the cases should be a positive one indicating that the 
government held the capacity and adopted an appropriate strategy to be able to 
manifest influence in these negotiations. 
 
As already indicated in chapter 6, the data in the tables found in this sub-section have 
been inputted by using the following scale with the ranges of 0 to 2.5 indicating a 
negative marking and 2.5 to 5 a positive one: 
 
Extremely High =  5  
High =   4  
Medium to High =  3 
Medium =   2.5  [Positive] 
Low to Medium =  2   
Low =    1  







As in Figure 8.2 and Tables 8.3 and 8.4 in chapter 8, Table 10.1 below reproduces the 
data for steps-1 (data in relation to variables 1-3 on governmental capacities) and 2 
(data for variable 4 on governmental strategies – as previously observed, variables 5 
and 6 did not apply to this case) of the decisions weights and measures scoreboard 
for Case 1 (on the adoption of Directive 2007/23/EC of 23 May 2007). However, this 
table goes one step further from the Figure and Tables found in chapter 8 by also 
presenting the data for step-3 of the approach.  
 
Table 10.1 – the decision weights and measures scoreboard for Case 1 
STEP 1 
(data extracted from Figure 8.2) 
 
 Variable 1 
 Sub-variable 1.1 = 4 on 5 
 Sub-variable 1.2 = 3 on 5 
 
 Variable 2 
 Sub-variable 2.1 = 4 on 5 
 Sub-variable 2.2 = 1 on 5 
 
 Variable 3 
 Sub-variable 3.1 = 5 on 5 
 
 






                                     TOTAL = 17 (on 25)* 
STEP 2 
(data extracted from Tables 8.3 & 8.4) 
 
 Variable 4 
 Sub-variable 4.1 – Pace-setting through 
lobbying 
 4.1.1.A = 3 on 5 
 4.1.1.B = 2 on 5 
 4.1.2.A = 4 on 5 
 4.1.2.B = 5 on 5 
 4.1.2.C = 0 on 5 
 4.1.2.D = 5 on 5 
 4.1.3 = 0 on 5 
 4.1.4 = 0 on 5 
 
 Sub-variable 4.2 – Pace-setting through norm 
advocacy & effective intervention in Council 
deliberations 
 4.2.1 = 3 on 5 
 4.2.2 = 4 on 5 
 
                                     TOTAL = 26 (on 50)** 
STEP 3 
 Total average score for Step 1 = 3.4 out of 5 [(17x5) ÷ 25 = 3.4] (a +ve result according to the 0 to 5 scale) 
 Total average score for Step 2 = 2.6 out of 5 [(19x5) ÷ 50 = 2.6] (a +ve result according to the 0 to 5 scale) 
 Total net weight for Steps 1 and 2 = 6 out of 10 [3.4+2.6 = 6] 
 TOTAL net average weight for Steps 1 & 2 = 3 [(6x5) ÷ 10 = 3] 
 
 Result:  Demonstration levels of Medium to High influence (3 out of 5) in this EU decision-
making process. 
(+ve indication of influence capacity in step 1 has been confirmed by actual levels of influence manifestation 
emerging from step 2) 
* 5 sub-variables each scored out of 5  
** 10 indicators each scored out of 5 
 
Source: This table has been compiled by the author with data collected from interviews with Maltese 




Table 10.1 thus presents the following results: 
 
- a total average score of ‘3.4’ on ‘5’ for step-1 (a medium to high influence 
 category and therefore a positive rating in the scale outlined above);  
- a total average score of ‘2.6’ on ‘5’ for step-2 (a medium level and hence a 
 positive rating); and 
- a total net average weight of ‘3’ on ‘5’ (a medium to high category) in step-3 
and therefore a positive overall result for Malta’s government in Case 1. 
 
One may see that the positive result attained for the step-1 variables has also been 
registered in step-2. This suggests continuity. It also suggests that the government’s 
possession of a medium to high level (‘3.4’ on ‘5’ for step-1) of capacities necessary 
to influence the process actually led the government to adopt a proper strategy to 
influence EU decision-making. As seen, Malta’s government adopted an active pace-
setting strategy throughout the process achieving a ‘2.6’ on ‘5’ (in step-2) and thus, a 
medium level.  
 
Therefore, this case presents a positive result (‘3’ on ‘5’ in step-3 and therefore a 
medium to high category) demonstrating that Malta’s government did indeed 
























Similar to Figure 8.2 and Tables 8.7 and 8.8 in chapter 8, Table 10.2 below reproduces 
the data for steps-1 and 2 of the decisions weights and measures scoreboard for Case 
2 (on EU recast Directive 2013/29/EU of 12 June 2013). As with Table 10.1, Table 10.2 
also presents the data for step-3 of the scoreboard.  
 
Table 10.2 – the decision weights and measures scoreboard for Case 2 
STEP 1 
(data extracted from Figure 8.2) 
 
 Variable 1 
 Sub-variable 1.1 = 4 on 5 
 Sub-variable 1.2 = 3 on 5 
 
 Variable 2 
 Sub-variable 2.1 = 4 on 5 
 Sub-variable 2.2 = 1 on 5 
 
 Variable 3 
 Sub-variable 3.1 = 5 on 5 
 
 






                                     TOTAL = 17 (on 25)* 
 
STEP 2 
(data extracted from Tables 8.7 & 8.8) 
 
 Variable 4 
 Sub-variable 4.1 – Pace-setting through 
lobbying 
 4.1.1.A = 4 on 5 
 4.1.1.B = 4 on 5 
 4.1.2.A = 3 on 5 
 4.1.2.B = 3 on 5 
 4.1.2.C = 0 on 5 
 4.1.2.D = 3 on 5 
 4.1.3 = 2 on 5 
 4.1.4 = 2 on 5 
 
 Sub-variable 4.2 – Pace-setting through norm 
advocacy & effective intervention in Council 
deliberations 
 4.2.1 = 3 on 5 
 4.2.2 = 4 on 5 
 




 Total average score for Step 1 = 3.4 out of 5 [(17x5) ÷ 25 = 3.4] (a +ve result according to the 0 to 5 scale) 
 Total average score for Step 2 = 2.8 out of 5 [(28x5) ÷ 50 = 2.8] (a +ve result according to the 0 to 5 scale) 
 Total net weight for Steps 1 and 2 = 6.2 out of 10 [3.4+2.8 = 6.2] 
 TOTAL net average weight for Steps 1 & 2 = 3.1 [(6.2x5) ÷ 10 = 3.1] 
 
 Result: Demonstration levels of Medium to High influence (3.1 out of 5) in this EU decision-
making process. 
(+ve indication of influence capacity in step 1 has been confirmed by actual levels of influence 
manifestation emerging from step 2) 
 
* 5 sub-variables each scored out of 5  
** 10 indicators each scored out of 5 
 
Source: This table has been compiled by the author with data collected from interviews with Maltese 





Table 10.2 thus presents the following results: 
 
- a total average score of ‘3.4’ on ‘5’ for step-1 (a medium to high influence 
 category and therefore a positive rating in the scale outlined above);  
- a total average score of ‘2.8’ on ‘5’ for step-2 (a medium level and hence a 
 positive rating); and 
- a total net average weight of ‘3.1’ on ‘5’ (a medium to high category) in step-3 
 and therefore a positive overall result for Malta’s government in Case 2.   
 
When compared with Case 1, Case 2 also clearly holds explanatory value about the 
causal link existing between the step-1 and 2 variables leading to an overall positive 
result (‘3.1’ on ‘5’ in step-3 and therefore a medium to high category) in terms of 































The data found in Figure 9.2, Table 9.4 and Tables 9.8 to 9.11 in chapter 9 are hereby 
re-inputted in the table below. 
 
Table 10.3 – the decision weights and measures scoreboard for Case 3 
STEP 1 
(data extracted from Figure 9.2) 
 
 Variable 1 
 Sub-variable 1.1 = 2 on 5 
 Sub-variable 1.2 = 1 on 5 
 
 Variable 2 
 Sub-variable 2.1 = 2 on 5 
 Sub-variable 2.2 = 2 on 5 
 
 Variable 3 

















               TOTAL = 12 (on25)* 
STEP 2 
(data extracted from Tables 9.4,and 9.8 - 9.11) 
 
 Variable 4 
 Sub-variable 4.1 – Pace-setting through lobbying 
 4.1.1.A = 3 on 5 
 4.1.1.B = 3 on 5 
 4.1.2.A = 3 on 5 
 4.1.2.B = 3 on 5 
 4.1.2.C = 0 on 5 
 4.1.2.D = 3 on 5 
 4.1.3 = 2 on 5 
 4.1.4 = 3 on 5 
 Sub-variable 4.2 – Pace-setting through norm 
advocacy & effective intervention in Council 
deliberations 
 4.2.1 = 3 on 5 
 4.2.2 = 3 on 5 
 Variable 5 
  Sub-variable 5.1 – Foot-dragging through delaying 
tactics in Council 
 5.1.2 = 2 on 5 [pre-Lisbon phase] 
 5.1.2 = 0 on 5 [post-Lisbon phase] 
 Variable 6 
 Sub-variable 6.1 = 0 on 5 
 Sub-variable 6.2 = 1 on 5 
 Sub-variable 6.3 = 1 on 5 
 Sub-variable 6.4 = 1 on 5           
                 
TOTAL = 31 (on 80)** 
STEP 3 
 Total average score for Step 1 = 2.4 out of 5 [(12x5) ÷ 25 = 2.4] (a -ve result according to the 0 to 5 scale) 
 Total average score for Step 2 = 1.93 out of 5 [(31x5) ÷ 80 = 1.93] (a -ve result according to the 0 to 5 scale) 
 Total net weight for Steps 1 and 2 = 4.33 out of 10 [2.4+1.93 = 4.33] 
 TOTAL net average weight for Steps 1 & 2 = 2.16 [(4.33x5) ÷ 10 = 2.16] 
 
 Result: Demonstration levels of Low to Medium influence (2.16 out of 5) in this EU decision-
making process. 
(-ve indication of influence capacity in step 1 has been confirmed by low levels of influence manifestation in 
step 2) 
* 5 sub-variables each scored out of 5  
** 12 indicators and 4 sub-variables each scored out of 5 
 
Source: This table has been compiled by the author with data collected from interviews with Maltese 
public officials and members of the Commission and Council Secretariat. 
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 Table 10.3 thus presents the following results: 
 
- a total average score of ‘2.4’ on ‘5’ for step-1 (a low to medium influence 
 category and therefore a negative rating in the scale outlined before);  
- a total average score of ‘1.93’ on ‘5’ for step-2 (a low to medium level and 
hence a negative rating); and 
- a total net average weight of ‘2.16’ on ‘5’ (a low to medium category) in step-3 
 and therefore a negative overall result for Malta’s government in Case 3. 
   
Section 10.1 has already maintained qualitatively that unlike the fireworks cases 
presented in chapter 8, the third case on EU immigration was negative in terms of 
Malta’s influence in the negotiations. Table 10.3 also confirms this finding from a 
quantitative angle. It confirms once again a causal link existing between the step-1 
and 2 variables, this time producing a negative overall result in the third step of the 
decision weights and measures scoreboard. The reasons for this have already been 
outlined in section 10.1 in the qualitative section of this chapter and are thus not 
repeated here.  
 
Therefore, when compared with Cases 1 and 2, Table 10.3 produces data 
demonstrating negative capacities and strategies as reasons for the government’s 
failure to exercise influence in this case. 
 
10.3 Conclusion - a review of the main empirical findings  
 
The main finding emerging from the thesis’s empirical research concerns the 
importance of timely interventions in EU legislative decision-making processes, an 
issue of particular importance for small state governments to exercise influence and 
yield positive outcomes from such processes. As empirically examined, it is necessary 
that states adopt appropriate strategies early in EU decision-making processes if they 
are to exercise influence. The analyses in chapters 8 and 9 reveal how the three cases 
produced two positive and a negative result for Malta’s government. Table 10.4 
below illustrates this last point. 
 
Chapter 8 on Cases 1 and 2 disclose that Malta held positive capacities (variables 1 to 
3) and adopted a ‘winning’ pace-setting strategy (variable 4) throughout both EU 
processes. This enabled the government to produce positive outcomes for itself in 
these legislative decision-making processes, i.e. being able to exempt the local 
fireworks industry from falling within the remit and scope of the adopted EU 
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directives (which as seen represented the government’s main preference in these 
negotiations).  
 
However, the third case in chapter 9 reveals how a lack of governmental capacities 
together with the adoption of an inappropriate fence-sitting strategy in the early 
phases of the EU decision-making process negatively affected the legislative outcome 
for the government. In fact this chapter re-emphasizes what has already been 
stressed in chapter 9 - that although Malta shifted strategy to a pace-setting one 
(which in light of the sensitivity of the negotiations and the policy sphere, was the 
strategy most likely required to influence the process), this occurred too late in the 
process. This resulted in the government’s failure to successfully foot-drag and 
influence the process to stop a negative outcome from being taken.  
 
Table 10.4 – An overall view of the facts and results for all three case studies 
Cases 1 & 2 
 




Outcome for Malta’s government =  
POSITIVE 
 
Strategy/ies used:  








Legislative procedure & voting:  
OLP & QMV 
Case 3 
 




Outcome for Malta’s government = 
NEGATIVE 
 
Strategy/ies used:  
At first fence-sitting shifting to pace-setting and 
foot-dragging towards the final stages of the 
process 
 
Nature of EU negotiations: Intergovernmental 
(pre-Treaty of Lisbon phase); 
 Supranational (post-Treaty of Lisbon phase) 
 
Legislative procedure & voting:  
Consultation & unanimity (pre-Treaty of Lisbon 
phase);  
OLP & QMV(post-Treaty of Lisbon phase) 
Source: Table compiled by the author. 
 
These findings are further re-examined in the thesis’s overall conclusions in chapter 







In addition to outlining the main findings of the research, chapter 11 ties together 
Parts I and II of the thesis.  
 
Section 11.1 refreshes the reader’s memory as to the foundations of the study which 
were mainly addressed in literature review chapters (chapters 2 and 3) and 
theoretical/conceptual chapters (chapters 4 and 5). Section 11.2 then re-visits the 
methodology used in the thesis. These sections close the conceptual framework of 
the research. While section 11.3 re-visits the thesis’s findings emerging from the 
empirical discussions in chapters 8 to 10, section 11.4 brings the thesis to an end by 
paving the path for future research to be conducted in the sphere of small state 
studies. 
 
11.1 Re-visiting the fundamentals of the thesis: three theoretical 
approaches to understanding EU small state governmental influence in 
decision-making processes 
 
The central theoretical puzzle of the thesis concerned the ways by which influence in 
EU decision-making processes is exercised by EU small member state governments. 
One may observe that the main theoretical and conceptual discussion in the thesis 
(mainly produced in chapters 2, 4 and 5) rotates around the ways by which differing 
theoretical approaches for small states in the EU and its decision-making processes 
are applied to furnish a realistic imprint of how multi-players (especially EU 
governments in the Council) with different influence levels upload their interests into 
such processes. As seen, the thesis focuses on Malta’s government as the smallest EU 
member state to test its influence in specifically selected EU legislative proposals 
(those on the pyrotechnic articles and on extending long-term residence to 
beneficiaries of international protection).  
 
As various authors such as Panke (2010) observe, ‘first generation’ (mainly 
federalism, functionalism and intergovernmentalism) and ‘second generation’ (such 
as neo-functionalism, liberal intergovernmentalism and supranationalism) theories 
have either neglected country size as an explanatory variable for EU decision-making 
dynamics and outcomes or do not address precisely the core issue:  
 
‘on the role of and conditions for the effectiveness of arguing, 
bargaining, problem-solving, framing, neutral mediation, lobbying 
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and for coalitions for small states in EU negotiations’ (Panke, 2010: 
117).  
 
In other words, today there is no approach capable of singlehandedly fully grasping 
the thesis’s main area of study. There is thus ‘theoretical indigence’ for research on 
small state governments and their exercise of influence in EU decision-making 
processes. 
 
Having said this, it is also extremely difficult to attribute a single approach to the 
understanding of such a complex process. Rather, it is more adept to try and 
understand EU decision-making and the many factors composing it by applying 
various approaches, each having something important to contribute to this cause. 
This is because when applied separately, theoretical approaches on this subject have 
their limitations in not being able to directly address differences in ‘levels of capacity’ 
of the member states engaged in an EU decision-making negotiation. As was 
emphasized in chapter 4, they simply do not delve deep enough to bestow an 
accurate and vivid picture about differences in member state influence in EU 
decision-making.  
 
Thus, this thesis advances the argument that different theoretical approaches should 
be looked at as potentially complimentary to one another. They can assist each other 
to come to terms with highly demanding and complex aspects about governmental 
influence in EU decision-making processes. Therefore, differing theoretical 
approaches must be applied to the study of the influence of small states in the EU. 
 
Chapter 2 revealed how research on small states is entrenched in and began with the 
development of three main strands in IR theory - realism (and neo-realism), 
liberalism (and neoliberal institutionalism) and social constructivism. However, the 
evolution in IR theory spilled-over to the study of small states in another theoretical 
setting which was concerned more with their role in the contemporary EU. In fact, 
chapter 4 positioned the reader in this latter framework focusing mainly on three 
main approaches that may be applied to the EU decision-making process and its sub-
stages of decision-shaping and taking: 
 
 1. Rational Choice Theory; 
 2. New institutionalism (NI); 




Although these approaches were discussed separately in detail in chapter 4 (see 
section 4.2), the next paragraphs revisit briefly their main contribution to the subject 
matter of this thesis. As discussed in the remainder of this section, together they help 
to promote a very useful framework for understanding how decision-making occurs 
in the EU.  
 
11.1.1 Rational choice theory 
 
As observed in chapter 4 (see 4.2.1), this approach focuses on the interests and 
preferences of self-minded policy players who take part in negotiations with the sole 
objective of prevailing in uploading their interests onto the EU process (see Edwards, 
1954: 380-417; Moravcsik, 1998; and Moravcsik and Nicolaidis, 1999). This very much 
sums up the daily workings of governments involved in legislative negotiations in the 
Council at multi-levels, i.e. Working Group, Coreper and Council of Ministers 
(discussed in chapter 3). 
 
Rational choice theory perceives EU decision-making as a process whereby problems 
are identified, solutions and alternatives found, and predictions of each alternative 
and their probable consequences approximated. This model thus perceives decision-
making as a sequential and neat process in which every variable of a decision is to be 
calculated finely. However, this contrasts with other approaches. For instance, as 
explained in chapter 4 (see 4.1.2), Lindblom (1959) and his contemporaries were 
more in favour of an approach which perceived decision-making occurring in an 
incremental manner and therefore ‘irrationally’ with decisions spilling-over to other 
future decisions. Besides this ‘irrational’ approach, other approaches criticizing 
rational choice include the ‘garbage-can’ process (see Cohen, March and Olsen, 1972: 
1-25) which perceives decision-making as a process involving a degree of 
improvisation on the part of the policy players. Contrary to the rational view, the 
‘garbage-can’ process put forward the argument that when problems or issues arise, 
there is not much time for proper reflection. Hence improvisation sets in with 
decisions taken on an ad hoc basis.  
 
However, the empirical analysis in chapters 8 and 9 has shown rational member state 
governments bargain over issues through pre-set preferences which, during the 
formation phase of EU legislative negotiations, begin to perceive positive end games 
for themselves. The empirical discussion on Malta’s cases, particularly those on the 
pyrotechnic articles, demonstrates this. In these cases, the Maltese government’s 
behaviour reflected an exact and rational course of action of which capacities and 
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strategies to adopt when making choices and taking decisions. As seen, this led to 
positive outcomes in Cases 1 and 2. 
  
Therefore, a rationalist account of the empirical case studies presented in chapters 8 
and 9 has placed EU member state governments, particularly Malta’s government 
(since it constitutes the focus of the thesis), as the central pieces of EU decision-
making with little, or no scope (and influence), for other policy players such as the EU 
institutions in such processes. In simpler words, rational choice theory is a state-
centrist approach which maintains that there is minimal room for institutional 
impacts to occur to a process in which governments are by far the main actors in EU 
decision-making. However, this last argument is countered by the discussion in the 
next sub-sections on the relevance of EU institutions in EU decision-making processes 
functioning in a multi-level governance system. Therefore, although rational choice 
theory is a significant approach, the thesis could not rest simply on it when theorizing 
the empirical case studies. It had to take into consideration other approaches too. 
 
11.1.2 New institutionalism (NI)  
 
As seen in the case studies, EU legislative negotiations occur in precise institutional 
settings. It is thus necessary to conceptualize the important role that EU institutions 
have as venues in which legislative negotiations occur. Therefore, an approach which 
adapts itself better than the rationalist one to this scenario is new institutionalism 
(NI) (see Armstrong and Bulmer, 1998; and Stone Sweet and Sandholtz, 1998: 1-26). 
As the empirical discussion has shown, NI addresses such issues as informality 
existing in EU decision-making processes, voting procedures in Council at multi-levels 
and other institutional dynamics which set the rhythm for compromises to be 
reached in the EU. It therefore caters for institutional dynamics existing at both 
intergovernmental and supranational levels which impact the influence of the 
member states in EU decision-making processes.  
 
As may be seen in chapters 8 and 9, this last argument is particularly true. Malta’s 
government, aware of the potential opportunities that could be obtained from 
institutional impacts on the processes, lobbied the Commission and the EP. They 
were perceived as channels of influence for the government to achieve positive end 
games from the negotiations. Besides, as may be determined from the case study 
analyses on the fireworks legislative files, this last point is particularly important for 
smaller states such as Malta that recognize the importance of lobbying EU 
institutions, such as the Commission and the EP, early in the process. As seen in the 
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fireworks cases, this last factor played an important role in the Maltese government’s 
influence and success in the negotiations.  
 
As observed in chapter 4 (see 4.2.2), institutions also involve the use of rules, norms 
and practices that influence the behaviour of policy players in EU decision-making 
processes. For instance, Case 3 demonstrated how a shift in the Council’s voting 
procedure from unanimous voting to QMV, negatively impacted upon Malta’s 
outcome in the legal migration legislative negotiations. This means that an EU 
institution’s rules impact directly on EU decision-making processes. The gist here is 
that member state governments in Council are aware that such institutional rules 
bear directly on their strategic behaviour during negotiations. This has been 
demonstrated by the Maltese cases presented in Part II of the thesis. 
 
In short, NI draws our attention to the wider institutional context of EU decision-
making and more particularly for our purposes of how legislative negotiations occur 
in Council (and the EP) and between the EU institutions themselves. Crucially 
therefore, institutions - and not only one-sided, rational and self interested 
governments - also matter and must be factored in as important players in EU 
decision-making. The application of this approach to the thesis’s empirical work was 
therefore crucial.  
 
11.1.3 Multi-level governance (MLG) 
 
Besides the two previous approaches dealt with above, the MLG approach completes 
the picture about the fundamentals of the study of EU decision-making. It does this 
because it advances the notion that EU processes consist not only of multi-players 
(i.e. the governments as rational players and the EU institutions) but, more 
importantly, of a mode of governance at different or multi-levels. As discussed in 
chapters 3 and 4, MLG perceives EU decision-making processes as functioning in a 
complex web of interconnected institutions at the supranational, national, and sub 
national levels of government (see Hooghe and Marks, 2001; Pagoulatos and 
Tsoukalis, 2012: 62-75; and Stephenson, 2014: 817-837).  
 
In simpler words and contrary to state-centrist approaches, the MLG approach 
suggests that although national governments are and remain important pieces of the 
European puzzle, one must also factor in other players (and not only national 
governments) as being equally important in EU legislative decision-making processes. 
For instance, the MLG approach opens the door for public and private interests (and 
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therefore more players than perceived by the rational choice and new institutional 
approaches) to enter EU decision-making processes (see Hooghe and Marks, 2001). 
 
As observed in chapter 4, although the thesis focuses largely on the influence of small 
EU state governments (particularly, that of the Maltese government) in EU decision-
making processes, one must bear in mind that other players having their own 
agendas may also attempt to influence such processes. However, since the empirical 
framework of the thesis is focused primarily on the EU level, especially on legislative 
discussions occurring in the Council of the EU, it is the member state governments 
together with the Commission that participate exclusively in this venue (since they 
are the parties to negotiations occurring in the Council). This makes accessibility for 
other players to enter the process extremely difficult which, as emphasized in 
chapter 4 (see sub-section 4.2.3), justifies why the empirical case studies in this thesis 
are fully immersed on examining the influence of governments, and more precisely, 
that of Malta’s government, at different stages of the decision-making process, i.e. at 
the decision-shaping and decision-taking stages.  
 
11.1.4 Comparing the usefulness of the three approaches 
 
As seen, the theoretical thrust of the thesis is that European studies on theorizing EU 
decision-making belongs to the two conflicting worlds of intergovernmentalism and 
supranationalism. Even though it was not the intention to replicate the ideology of 
any particular author about theoretical foundations of European integration (which 
as illustrated in chapter 4, have been elaborated in different ways and forms by 
various authors), it was still crucial for the thesis to draw on those models when 
providing explanatory value on how EU small state governments influence EU 
decision-making processes. Here, there are a number of factors that need 
clarification and which are dealt with in the next paragraphs. 
 
The first observation deals with the world of intergovernmentalism, or better the 
state-centric model. This model consists of central players - EU governments - who 
decision-shape and take EU outcomes. In those EU policy spheres that have not yet 
been ‘Communitarized’ (a process by which policy spheres are shifted away from 
national to EU competence – see Title I of the TFEU on categories and areas of Union 
competence), national institutions are the primary sites of EU decision-making. 
Under these conditions, decision-making may be comfortably viewed under a 
rationalist lens (described earlier) of strategically-calculating government actors to 
achieve positive outcomes for themselves. The case on legal migration in chapter 9 
reveals how this particular policy sphere was ruled by an intergovernmental method 
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prior to the entry into force of the Treaty of Lisbon and that the interests of the 
Maltese government of not extending long-term residence rights to TCNs of 
international or subsidiary protection were upheld in such a setting. However, the 
government’s interests were quickly lost in a supranational setting once the Treaty of 
Lisbon entered into force. This last scenario is arguably best explained by taking an 
MLG approach, which emphasizes the limits of individual national government 
control over EU decision-making when voting in Council is by QMV and when the 
legislative procedure requires the approval of EU law by another (supranational) 
player – the EP.  
 
This leads to the second observation. In those policy spheres in which the transfer of 
power from national to supranational domains has occurred, EU decision-making is 
set in a supranational institutional framework where multi-level governance reigns 
supreme. Even though, as Hooghe and Marks (2001: 3) observe, the multi-level 
governance model does not reject the view that national governments are important 
EU decision-making players in the system, the supranational context relegates the 
sovereignty (and hence power) of national governments in favour of a very different 
polity – that of the EU functioning at a supranational and multi-level governance 
form. As just emphasized in the preceding paragraph, it is crucial to remember that in 
such a scenario, the EP also plays an important legislative role as much as that of the 
Council.  
 
The empirical examination of the three cases in chapters 8 to 10 reveals that small EU 
states (in this case Malta) cannot rely on the power of the veto as a tool to influence 
a process in a supranational setting with decisions taken by majority voting (even 
though the Luxembourg compromise could be invoked by governments which are 
outvoted in Council – as previously stated in chapter 4, this however does not 
guarantee that other governments will accept its use on a particular issue). Cases 1 
and 2 reveal that the fact that Malta’s government managed to exercise influence in 
a supranational decision-making process is proof of its ability to punch much beyond 
its weight.  
 
Thus, one is able to conclude that in Cases 1 and 2, Malta was successful in ‘fighting’ 
for its interests as a rational, self-interested and strategically calculating actor in 
these EU processes. However, as observed in chapter 8, the fact that it managed to 
achieve a successful outcome from these processes in a supranational setting cannot 
be solely attributed to its capacity as a rational player. Reasons for its success must 
also point at Malta’s capacity to exploit opportunities (to channel influence) deriving 
from the supranational and multi-level governance context and hence, the EU 
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institutional legislative framework made up primarily of the Commission, the Council 
(where it voiced its concerns directly) and the EP (where it channeled its influence 
through Maltese MEPs). Cases 1 and 2 reveal how Malta’s government was capable 
of striking a balance between its interests and the opportunities afforded by the EU 
institutions in EU decision-making processes. This was a ‘win-win’ outcome for 
everyone. 
 
In relation to Case 3 however, chapter 9 reveals that the government first, being 
aware that it possessed a veto in an intergovernmental process (which meant that it 
was able to block a decision if necessary), adopted a fence-sitting strategy. However, 
as soon as legislative negotiations on amending the LTR directive moved to a 
supranational venue, the government had to ‘stick out its neck’ at a late stage in the 
process and without success. Due to the lack of time available to it and because it 
was isolated in the negotiations (as seen, it was adopting a horizontal position in JHA 
discussions about the necessity for EU governments to respect Article 80 TFEU on 
solidarity and burden-sharing), Malta could not exploit properly opportunities 
deriving from the multi-level and supranational institutional setting.  
 
Thus, Malta ‘fought’ for its interests solely as a rational player which, as empirically 
tested, differs from its approach in the fireworks cases. As a result, Malta emerged 
badly damaged from these negotiations (as shown in chapter 9, it went as far as 
attaching a declaration to the Council conclusions of 21 June 2011 revealing its 
regrets and protestations with the decision taken and seriously considering invoking 
the ‘Luxembourg Compromise’). In other words, this legislative case study reveals 
that there was no room for manoeuvre for a compromise to be sought with the 
rationalist approach prevailing and with ultimately a ‘win-lose’ outcome being 
achieved in a supranational, multi-level setting. As previously stated, this last 
scenario is best explained by the views held by the MLG approach about limits on 
individual national government control over decision-making processes at EU level. In 
this case, the two small states of Malta and the Czech Republic (even though Cyprus 
and some other EU Mediterranean states had more or less the same position - see 
Table 9.7), were the only states to formally vote against the adoption of the act 
under the QMV procedure. However, as seen, this proved futile for Malta’s 
government being unable to obtain a blocking minority under QMV voting. 
 
Thus, depending on the EU policy sphere under scrutiny, the approaches listed earlier 
represent different pieces of the theoretical puzzle. Together they bestow a holistic 
and ‘close to true’ representation about small states and their influence in EU 
decision-making. Therefore, a rationalist account about different governmental 
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representatives depicted as self-interested, strategically calculating actors in Council 
together with new institutional and multi-level governance approaches, provide a 
clear picture of what EU decision-making processes involve and of how they function. 
 
11.2 Re-visiting the methodology used in the thesis 
 
As observed in chapters 1 and 6, the thesis made use of both qualitative (case study 
and comparative designs) and quantitative approaches (descriptive statistics with 
levels of measurement and spread) to bestow a holistic methodological design. These 
approaches provided a method of how to measure Malta’s influence in the three EU 
case studies that were analyzed in part II of the thesis.  
 
As stated in chapter 6, data was collected through the process-tracing technique. This 
consisted mainly of documentary analysis of Maltese government, Council, 
Commission and EP working documents. Process-tracing was complimented through 
interviews with members of Malta’s public service and EU officials (primarily from the 
European Commission and the Council Secretariat) who were the main players 
directly involved in the legislative negotiations examined by this thesis. Data was also 
collected by means of the ‘decision weights and measures’ approach - a quantitative 
approach involving the compilation of a scoreboard. Interview participants were thus 
able to score the thesis’s variables (in relation to Malta’s capacities and strategies in 
the three cases studied) by means of this scoreboard. 
 
Another methodological factor concerned the potential usefulness of the thesis’s 
methodology for future studies of small state influence in EU decision-making 
processes. Previous chapters have stressed that it is extremely difficult to extract 
findings about a specific government’s influence in EU decision-making processes. 
Chapter 3 defined and described EU decision-making as a slippery process involving 
many players and with policy goal-posts continuously shifting. But as seen from the 
empirical chapters, even though the research had to face such challenges, the 
thesis’s inter-disciplinary approach of qualitative and quantitative methods 
complemented each other to produce findings about the legislative cases. In other 
words, the mixture of the qualitative process-tracing and elite interviewing 
techniques with the quantitative ‘decision weights and measures’ approach proved 
to be extremely useful and rigorous tools to achieve findings about the Maltese 
government’s exercise (Cases 1 and 2) and non-exercise (Case 3) of influence in the 




Therefore, besides being useful to academic communities, this methodology could 
also prove valuable to EU small state administrations when selecting strategies to 
influence uploading processes in any EU policy sphere. 
 
11.3  Re-visiting the variables about Malta’s capacities and strategies in 
EU decision-making: the main empirical findings  
 
It is appropriate to revisit the research questions and ask at this stage of the thesis 
whether one is able to determine if an EU small state like Malta is able to influence 
EU decision-making processes. In simpler words, does the evidence from the Maltese 
cases suggest that Malta’s government did exercise influence in the three cases 
examined in chapters 8 and 9 and if so, how and at which stage of the processes did 
it do this? In part, these questions have already been answered in the earlier section 
of this conclusion focusing on theorizing the empirical findings. However, it is suitable 
to re-visit the main empirical findings of the research as part of a more general 
conclusion on the variables concerning a small state’s capacities and strategies in EU 
legislative processes.  
 
The empirical research has shown that when Malta exercised influence (Cases 1 and 
2 on pyrotechnic articles), it did this in the initial stages of the processes. Even though 
in the particular case of the 2011-2013 EU negotiations (Case 2 on the EU recast 
directive), when Malta’s government started to intervene and pace-set the 
discussions at a later stage than in that of Case 1, the government still entered 
relatively early into the process unlike that in Case 3. Sections 10.2 and 10.3 in 
chapter 10 discuss this last point revealing that the stage at which a government 
intervenes in an EU decision-making process is a matter of fundamental importance if 
it is to influence the process and emerge successful from it.  
 
The empirical research has also demonstrated that there is a causal link between a 
government’s capacities and strategies and that it is difficult for a government to 
successfully upload a legislative process without both being actively present. In other 
words, a government’s capacities complement the adoption of its strategies in an EU 
decision-making process and vice-versa. 
  
In brief, a government’s capacities and strategies are interlinked. The empirical 
analyses demonstrate that Malta’s government was aware of this in Cases 1 and 2 
but not in Case 3. In fact, chapter 8 on the pyrotechnic article directives reveals that 
the government was conscious of the fact that in order to make up for its limited 
expertise and administrative capacities (variable 2), the government had to intervene 
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very early in the process (variable 1) to influence the decision-shaping stages. It was 
also aware that it needed to shift its attention on an EU process (variable 3 on the 
capacity to prioritize) which could have otherwise introduced EU legislation which 
went contrary to the interests of the Maltese pyrotechnic industry. As seen in Cases 1 
and 2, Malta put together these capacities, enabling it to adopt a pace-setting 
strategy during the decision-shaping stage of the negotiations (variable 4). This 
eventually proved successful for Malta’s government with it having achieved a 
positive outcome in the decision-taking stage of the process. However, the same 
cannot be said about Case 3 where, at first, a fence-sitting strategy (variable 6) was 
preferred by Malta’s government to a pace-setting one (variable 4), but without 
success. As seen, Malta’s government shifted strategy three times during these 
negotiations (this kind of shift in governmental strategies was conceptualized in 
chapter 5 – see point D.3 in Table 5.1). At the end, it resorted to an unsuccessful foot-
dragging strategy (variable 5) which was adopted too late in the process. This 
demonstrates that entering early (variable 1) and actively in the process is crucial, 
particularly for small states with limited administrative resources. 
 
In short, the adoption of pace-setting strategies from the very start of the process - 
when negotiations are still at the decision-shaping stages (and as examined in the 
first case, even at the preceding stage of agenda-setting) - is ideal for a small EU state 
like Malta to influence EU decision-making and achieve positive results in the final 
decision-taking stages. 
 
As to possible further questions that could be asked about whether some EU state 
governments are more influential than others, the evidence from the Malta cases 
examined seems to suggest that this largely depends on whether a state has the right 
capacities and strategies to influence an EU decision-making process. Cases 1 and 2 
reveal that Malta was still able to influence these processes for the reasons explained 
in chapters 8 and 10. With particular reference to the first case, Malta’s government, 
even though isolated in the Council and with the Commission being a main opponent 
in the negotiations, was still able to influence this process and achieve an astonishing 
result by uploading the Malta clauses into the system. The same cannot be said about 
Case 3. This means that when Malta’s government had appropriate capacities and 
strategies, it managed to influence EU decision-making favourably and was ultimately 
successful (Cases 1 and 2). But when it did not, it was not able to influence the EU 
process and failed in its objectives (Case 3).  
 
In sum, differences in influence levels between EU governments may be attributed 
less to a state’s size and more to factors that have to do with a state’s governmental 
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capacities and strategies deployed in EU decision-making processes. Consequently, 
one may conclude that those member state governments that hold a considerable 
degree of influence in the shaping and taking stages of the EU policy process are 
those that succeed in linking the engagement of good capacities with correct 
strategies. Tiny Malta proves this last point in the cases empirically researched and 
studied in this thesis. 
 
11.4 Paving the path for future research in this study area 
 
Even though, as observed in chapter 2, small states have been the subject of 
substantial research over the years, there are many researchers and authors who 
believe that this subject still offers considerable opportunities for future research to 
be conducted. For instance, Neumann and Gstöhl (2006: 16) maintain that such 
studies could offer insights to the broader discipline of IR by focusing on individual 
small states and on theoretical aspects relevant to IR. As one may observe, this thesis 
drew upon this last issue offering a case study of Malta as a small and new EU state in 
the context of its influence in differing EU legislative policy spheres. However, as with 
all studies, there are multiple aspects to this topic that were beyond the scope of the 
thesis and which could be fruitfully dealt with in the future. This section highlights 
some of these aspects, by identifying four areas of study that would have the 
prospect of being potentially insightful.  
 
First, there is a need for future research to develop further knowledge on EU 
decision-making, particularly legislative decision-making processes. This could be 
approached either as a separate study on EU decision-making processes (for instance, 
there is still a general lack of knowledge on what occurs, in a practical sense, in 
Council Working Group and Coreper meetings during such processes), or in 
conjunction with studying small state influence in a similar manner as in this thesis.  
 
In relation to this last point, additional studies could also focus on the application of 
more theoretical approaches to the studies of small state behaviour (capacities and 
strategies) in EU decision-making. For instance, the social constructivist approach 
could be applied to such a study with the main focus being given to the relevance of 
social norms and values as important explanatory factors for a small state’s influence 
in EU decision-making. Alternatively, future research could examine whether and 
how the same theoretical approaches used by this thesis could be applied in a 
different manner. For instance, the MLG approach could be applied differently by 
taking into account not only small EU member state governments, but also other 
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policy players such as sub-national, local and regional players that could also impact 
on EU decision-making. 
 
Second, different and more EU member states could be examined. There is indeed 
relatively little knowledge on the ‘newer’ small EU member states (that have acceded 
into the EU post-2004) and whether they influence EU legislative decision-making 
processes. Therefore, adopting more comparative research on this subject matter 
opens the way for a deeper understanding of EU small state governmental capacities 
and strategies to influence EU decision-making.  
 
Third, and similarly to the previous point, more studies that focus on a broader 
spectrum of EU policy/legislative spheres would be useful. As seen, this thesis covers 
two main policy areas. Therefore, more EU policy spheres and their relevance for 
small EU states (for instance, the relevance of financial services and the e-gaming 
sector for Luxembourg, Cyprus and Malta; agricultural policy for small EU central and 
eastern states; environmental policy for small EU Nordic states; amongst others) 
would form an interesting framework for future studies to embark on. This would 
permit a fuller understanding of EU small state influence across a wider selection of 
EU decision-making processes.  
 
A final recommendation concerns the need for literature to further knowledge on 
small states in the particular EU policy sphere of immigration. There are, of course, 
many different aspects in this research area which could go beyond the focus of 
chapter 9 of the thesis. As previously stated, immigration (notably irregular 
migration) is a recent and very delicate phenomenon occurring in Malta (and in other 
states, particularly those located centrally in the Mediterranean) especially since 
acceding into the EU in 2004. Due to its critical geographical location on the irregular 
migration front, the Maltese government has been almost overwhelmed by this 
process. But it often has had to struggle to convince the Commission and other EU 
member state governments to solve this problem together (i.e. through concrete 
interventions and not solely through financial hand-outs). Therefore, future research 
could focus on the extremely relevant subject matter of how the EU is to fulfill and 
apply burden-sharing responsibilities in line with Articles 78(3) and 80 TFEU. It is 
worth noting that at the time of concluding this thesis, the irregular migration 
problem has drastically intensified in the central Mediterranean.74  
 
This immigration problem illustrates just one of the ways in which there is a real need 
for studies to be produced on the influence of small state governmental capacities 






1 The term ‘small state governments’ is used throughout the thesis. 
 
2 One may recall extremely long European Council meetings such as the one in Nice in 
December 2000. That European Council allocated Council votes and the number of EP 
seats and Commissioners (the so called ‘Amsterdam left-overs’) to the EU candidate 
countries of the time (i.e. before their entry into the EU in 2004 and 2007) according 
to their respective population sizes. 
 
3 New EU Treaty provisions have somewhat diluted this power for the Commission by 
strengthening the EP’s power of initiative through Article 225 TFEU: the EP may, 
acting by a majority of its component members, request the Commission to submit a 
proposal on matters on which it considers that a Union act is required. 
 
4 The Commission also participates in the EU decision-making processes. The 
Commission is present around the negotiation table in Council however without the 
possibility to vote (it is not represented under the system of Qualified Majority 
Voting). Nevertheless, it may still voice its concerns and has immeasurable clout in 
influencing Council negotiations. 
 
5 Similarly to the Council, the EP is made up of a multi-level system of committees 
whereby MEPs (meeting in Brussels) discuss EU draft legislation. A report drawn up 
by a rapporteur is then presented and decided upon by all MEPs in plenary in 
Strasbourg. 
 
6 Both the Council and EP must agree on a draft legislative proposal before it enters 
into force. If agreement cannot be reached, a conciliation committee (at third reading 
of the legislative procedure) made up of members of both EU institutions (the 
Commission also attends as moderator) is established to reach a compromise. If none 
is sought, the proposed act cannot be adopted. Although rarely used, there have 
been a number of cases when this has occurred such as in the case of the revision of 
the Working Time Directive (2003/88/EC) when no agreement was sought in 
conciliation and with the status quo prevailing. 
 
7 Besides this fundamental difference in the EU legislative process, the Treaty of 
Lisbon for the first time in EU history has neatly separated these two EU institutions 
making the European Council a formal and separate EU institution. 
 
8 This quote is meaningful to understand the magnitude by which the phases of 
shaping and taking dynamics in EU decision-making are intertwined which, as already 
emphasized in chapter 3, makes them very difficult to separate meaningfully. 
 
9 EC Regulation No. 1907/2006 of the EP and the Council of 18 December 2006 (OJL 
396 Final 30.12.2006). REACH is the EU Regulation on chemicals and their safe use 
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which entered into force on 1 June 2007. It stands for Registration, Evaluation, 
Authorisation and restriction of Chemical Substances. 
 
10 As also clarified in chapter 6, this too features as a sub-variable of variable 4 on 
pace-setting in the thesis. 
 
11 The NP won the absolute majority of votes in 1981 (not elected to office), 1987, 
1992, 1998, 2003. It has also won a relative majority of votes in 1966 and 2008. The 
LP won the general elections of 1971, 1976, 1981 (it won a parliamentary majority 
and not a majority of the votes), 1996 and 2013. 
  
12 The first association agreements were signed with Greece in 1961 and with Turkey 
in 1963. Immediately following the one signed with Malta, the EEC signed association 
agreements with Cyprus in 1972 and with Spain and Portugal in 1985. 
 
13 The 2004 EP elections saw the LP win 3 out of the 5 seats available for Maltese 
MEPs while the 2009 elections saw the LP maintain the majority of seats, i.e. 4 of the 
6 EP seats allocated to Malta once EP seat allocations were revised by the entry into 
force of the Treaty of Lisbon. The last EP election of 24 May 2014 resulted in a draw 
of 3 seats each held by the NP and LP. 
  
14 One must not forget that before 1 May 2004, Malta and the other EU candidate 
states were only given observer status in the EU decision-making institutions and 
were not able to participate directly.  
 
15 This situation changed as a result of a new Permanent Representative, Marlene 
Bonnici, who did not continue to carry the role of chairing the IMC.  
 
16 From 1530, when Charles V of Spain conferred Malta to the Order, until Napoleon 
Bonaparte’s capture of the island in 1798 during his advance towards Egypt. During 
this period, the Order, which was aristocratic and military, used to stage pyrotechnic 
displays to celebrate some occasion of grand importance such as the election of a 
Grand Master or a Pope.   
 
17 In Malta, there are about thirty-five fireworks factories and double that number of 
towns and villages which celebrate the feast of their patron saints and during which 
pyrotechnic displays are part and parcel of these traditional and religious 
celebrations. This is quite a number for a territory the size of Malta. 
 
18 EU Directive 2013/29/EU repeals Directive 2007/23/EC with effect from 1 July 2015 
(Article 48 of Directive 2013/29/EU, OJ L 178 of 28.6.2013, p. 46). 
 
19 As explained in chapter 3, it is the Commission that starts the legislative process by 
proposing draft legislation. 
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20 The market in pyrotechnic equipment in fireworks was estimated at €1,400 million 
in 2006 with 96% of fireworks on the market imported from China – EP Report 
2005/0194 (COD) of 19.9.2006, p. 37.  
 
21 Pyrotechnic articles in the automotive industry are used for vehicle safety. 
Equipment using pyrotechnic technology are mainly gas generators used in airbags 
and in seatbelt pretensioners. The market in pyrotechnic equipment in vehicle safety 
was estimated at €5,500 million in 2006 - EP Report 2005/0194 (COD) of 19.9.2006, 
p. 37.  
 
22 EC Directive 2007/23/EC and EU Directive 2013/29/EU (recast) have followed the 
new approach to technical harmonization and standards as laid down in Council 
Resolution of 7 May 1985, OJ C136 of 7 May 1985. This was necessary since EU 
member states, having legitimate health and safety interests at stake, might impede 
intra-EU trade. Nevertheless, the harmonized measures brought about by these EU 
directives are not exhaustive and hence set out minimum harmonized standards on a 
number of issues such as “CE” marking, labelling, market surveillance, conformity 
assessment, and obligations of the manufacturer, importer and distributor. 
 
23 It is Council practice to refer to the Commission in this manner. This abbreviation is 
thus found in Council working documents, such as Council Working Group and 
Coreper documents. 
 
24 Maltese fireworks production is held in factories mainly owned by band and feast 
clubs (każini in Maltese) spread around Malta’s villages. 
 
25 Fireworks displays dominate Maltese religious feasts. In Malta, imagining such 
religious and traditional feasts without the amusement, delight and colour brought 
about by fireworks is unthinkable. Besides, various fireworks competitions and 
festivals take place in Malta such as the ‘Malta International Fireworks Festival’ held 
in spring each year. Some local producers, who are internationally acclaimed having 
won international prizes, take part in these festivals. 
 
26 Mainly, this refers to the government’s approved instruction notes that need to be 
sent to government representatives in Brussels for Council meetings at multi-levels, 
i.e. whether at Working Group, Coreper and/or Ministerial level. Once the meetings 
end, representatives must send reports on the outcomes of such meetings to the 
relevant ministry. 
 
27 Since this particular legislative file fell under more than one EU policy sphere (with 
issues of equal relevance to consumer protection, competition and industry), larger 




28 As illustrated in chapter 6 (see Table 6.1 and Boxes 6.1 to 6.3 on ‘Governmental 
Capacities’), each of these variables are in turn sub-divided into sub-variables. The 
sub-variables are also illustrated in Figure 8.2. 
 
29 The vertical axis of this figure represents positive and/or negative ratings for each 
of the sub-variables on governmental capacities to be found in the horizontal axis. 
 
30 According to a Commission official from DG Enterprise and Industry interviewed in 
Brussels on 13 January 2014, Malta, even though still not an EU member state at the 
time, was still invited to participate as an ‘observer’ state in the consultation process, 
something which for some reason, it did not do. 
 
31 As illustrated in Table 8.1, the Austrian Presidency did not place this dossier as one 
of its Council Presidency priorities and thus legislative negotiations in Council only 
commenced afterwards during the Finnish Presidency. 
 
32 Data for this table has been collected through interviews with Maltese 
government, Commission and Council Secretariat officials with results representing 
an overall average. The method and the individual components found in this table 
have been discussed at length in chapter 6. 
 
33 Meeting between Michael Frendo, Malta’s Minister of Foreign Affairs and Gunther 
Verheugen, European Commissioner for Enterprise and Industry held in Brussels on 
30 January 2006 - at this stage, Council negotiations at Working Group level had not 
yet commenced. 
 
34 The government’s delegation consisted in a national expert and the technical 
attaché at Malta’s Permanent Representation in Brussels whereas the Commission 
was represented by an expert from DG Enterprise and Industry. This meeting was 
held subsequent to the political bilateral meeting but still during the early stages of 
this decision-making process. 
 
35 Ironically the Guide was issued by the Commission itself and is used as a guide to 
better understand internal market legislation on industrial products. It is therefore a 
Guide to assist in the implementation of EU directives based on the ‘New Approach’ 
and the ‘Global Approach’ about European standardization in the removal of  
technical barriers to trade. These approaches have thus contributed significantly to 
the development of the Internal Market and to ensuring free movement of goods 
between EU member states.  
 
36 In an interview, a government official stated that the only category of local 
fireworks factories that still fell within the scope of the directive, once Malta’s 
amendments to paragraph 5 of this article were adopted, were those selling their 
products to third parties and thus factories operating commercially. For such 
factories to have also benefited from an exclusion from the EU directive (such 
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factories are in an absolute minority in Malta), Malta’s wording to Article 1(4) needed 
to be adopted too.  
 
37 See footnote 32. 
 
38 According to rule 187 of the EP’s rules of procedure on substitutes, such MEPs 
‘shall be entitled to attend and speak at committee meetings and, if the full member 
is absent, to take part in the vote.’  
(http://www.europarl.europa.eu/slides/getDoc.do?pubRef=-//EP//TEXT+RULES-
EP+20140310+RULE-187+DOC+XML+VO//EN&language=EN&navigationBar=YES) 
(accessed on 24 March 2014) 
 
39 The recast legislative technique first amends a piece of EU legislation and then 
repeals it replacing it with the consolidated text including the amendments.  
 
40 The other being Article 2(6) of the 2007 directive which was largely untouched by 
the Commission’s proposal for a recast directive and which did not face any new 
opposition in the recast negotiation in Council and the EP. 
 
41 Although there was a change in the legislature (the eleventh legislature in Malta’s 
history), the governing party remained the Nationalist Party (NP). Refer to chapter 7 
on Malta’s administrative and political structures. 
 
42 These changes were made because of the previous representatives having taken 
up posts elsewhere. 
 
43 Like Tables 8.3 and 8.4, data for this table has been collected through interviews 
with Maltese government, Commission and Council Secretariat officials with results 




45 There were in fact four vice-chairs in this group. See the following website to have 
a list of all the members of the IMCO committee during that period: 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/document/activities/cont/201203/20120327ATT419
50/20120327ATT41950EN.pdf (accessed on 18 March 2014). 
 
46 In France Nicolas Sarkozy’s presidency (the conservative Union for a Popular 
Movement (UMP)) was in power whereas in Malta, Lawrence Gonzi was Prime 
Minister of a Nationalist government. 
 
47 As previously stated, during this time (2001-2003) Malta was not yet an EU 
member state and did not participate in the Council legislative negotiations on these 
two proposals. As a result, Malta was unable to influence the legislative negotiations, 
particularly those regarding Article 4 of Council Directive 2003/109/EC (the LTR 
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directive) on the five year duration of residence which TCNs are required to meet to 
be granted long-term resident status. As illustrated in the next sections of this 
chapter, this alone caused some problems for the Maltese government during the 
legislative negotiations of 2007-2011 amending this directive. 
 
48 The Hague Programme of 2004 shifted all JHA voting (with the exception of legal 
migration legislation) to QMV and established the co-decision procedure (now 
referred to as the ordinary legislative procedure) as the standard procedure to be 
followed thus granting more weight to the EP in EU JHA decision-making processes.  
 
49 During this time, the Council was however able to agree on other Commission 
legislative proposals on legal migration such as Council Directive 2009/50/EC of 25 
May 2009 on the conditions of entry and residence of TCNs for the purposes of highly 
qualified employment, the so-called ‘Blue Card’ Directive. 
 
50 This is because of the abolition of the penultimate paragraph of the previous 
Article 63 TEC by the Treaty of Lisbon. 
 
51 COM(2009) 665 final of 1 December 2009. 
 
52 Besides the opt-outs that the UK and Ireland have with regard to the adoption of 
the Schengen acquis, these two EU member states together with Denmark have opt-
outs in the whole Title V of the TFEU, i.e. the area of freedom, security and justice. 
These were obtained in the IGC adopting the Treaty of Amsterdam (for the UK and 
Ireland) and the Edinburgh Agreement of 1992 (for Denmark) and were retained in 
the Treaty of Lisbon.  
 
53 One must keep in mind that the new EU member states (those having acceded the 
EU as from 2004) did not have the possibility to opt-out from any of the EU’s acquis 
communautaire during their EU pre-accession negotiations.   
 
54 Ever since the Tampere European Council, EU member state governments 
committed themselves to establish the CEAS, a goal which has been reconfirmed on 
various occasions over the years (the last time with the adoption of the Stockholm 
programme in 2009) and which has only been adopted in 2013. The CEAS is made up 
of a package of five legislative acts which have all been recast into newer legislative 
acts on the same date (with the exception of the Qualification Directive): the 
Reception Directive (recast Directive 2013/33/EU of 26 June 2013); Eurodac 
Regulation (recast Regulation (EU) No 603/2013 of 26 June 2013); Dublin III 
Regulation (recast Regulation (EU) No 604/2013 of 26 June 2013); the Procedures 
Directive (recast Directive 2013/32/EU of 26 June 2013); and the Qualification 
Directive (recast Directive 2011/95/EU of 13 December 2011).  
 
55  This agreement was signed in 1985 between five of the ten EU member states – 
Belgium, the Netherlands, Luxembourg, France and West Germany – with the aim of 
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gradually abolishing internal border checks. In 1990 the Agreement was 
supplemented by the Schengen Convention which proposed the abolition of internal 
border controls and a common visa policy. Later the Treaty of Amsterdam 
incorporated the Schengen acquis into the main body of EU law together with the 
opt-outs for Ireland and the United Kingdom. Today Schengen is a core part of EU law 
and all EU member states (without an opt-out and which have not yet joined the 
Schengen Area) are legally obliged to enforce it. 
 
56 Eurodac was mainly devised so as to avoid ‘refoulment’ by migrants, i.e. 
applications for certain rights being filed in more than one EU member state. 
 
57 When the Dublin II Regulation was recast into the Dublin III Regulation (EU 
Regulation 604/2013 of 26 June 2013), Malta was unable to influence the outcome to 
change the situation that would allow for more than one EU member state to be 
responsible for asylum seeking applications. This would have alleviated the burden 
for it and other EU member states at the periphery faced with an influx of migrants.   
 
58 The EU emergency mechanism can only be triggered in exceptional circumstances 
and in case of a mass influx of displaced TCNs. To date, it has never been activated. 
 
59 The Quadro Group is a group of four EU member states (Cyprus, Greece, Italy, and 
Malta) established in November 2008 at the ministerial level at the initiative of 
Malta. In the EU, this group pushes mainly for relocation of migrants to other EU 
member states, procurement of travel documents and the organization of joint 
flights, and the reinforcement of Frontex amongst other matters. 
 
60 Unlike the policy sphere treated in chapter 8, the EU’s JHA policy falls within the 
remit of Coreper II (at Permanent Representatives level) and not Coreper I (deputy 
Permanent Representatives). 
 
61 As discussed at length in chapter 6 (see section 6.2), these variables are rated 
according to a 0 to 5 scale with 0 to 2.5 representing a negative rating and 2.5 to 5 
representing a positive one.  
 
62 As stipulated in Article 26 of the 2003 LTR directive, member states were obliged to 
comply with it by 23 January 2006. This did not occur. Therefore in 2007, the 
Commission initiated infringement proceedings against Malta and another 19 EU 
member states (all member states except Austria, Slovenia, Slovakia, and Poland) 
under Article 258 (TFEU) for not having implemented the directive in time or for not 
having properly informed the Commission of the adoption of national legislation 
implementing the directive. However since then, all member states have complied. 
 
63 See footnote 32. 
  









68 Malta protested during Coreper II and JHA meetings held during the Autumn of 
2010 (October to December 2010 during the Belgian Presidency) during the decision-
shaping stages of this new phase of the negotiations (see Figure 9.1). 
 
69 As a result of the ‘Empty Chair Crisis’ of July 1965 brought about by Charles de 
Gaulle (the President of the French Republic) over the Commission’s attempt to 
supranationalize the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP), a compromise was reached 
during the Luxembourg Presidency in January 1966 whereby a de facto veto power 
was given to every state on topics that held ‘very important’ national interests at 
stake. The compromise consisted in that should a topic of concern arise, Council 
members would seek to create a solution that could be unanimously agreed to by all, 
regardless of whether or not the treaty required only a majority. 
 
70 As observed in chapter 8, one must bear in mind that Malta has a total number of 6 
seats in the EP but that during this time, Malta as the smallest EU member state, had 
a total allocation of 5 seats under the pre-Treaty of Lisbon provisions. 
 
71 In this case, the Commission opened an infringement procedure against Malta 
under Article 258 TFEU (ex Article 226 TEC) for failure to comply with this directive 
protecting wild birds. In a ruling on 10 September 2009 (IP/09/1301), the Court of 
Justice of the EU clarified that Malta’s spring hunting season (until 2008, Malta 
allowed the hunting of quails and turtle doves during spring which is a key period of 
bird migration and breeding) resulted in bird mortality rates for that period being 
around three times higher for quails and eight times higher for turtle doves than for 
the autumn hunting season and which thus did not constitute an adequate solution 
strictly proportionate to the aim of conserving bird species. However, in this instance, 
Malta still managed to maintain a restrictive season thus permitting a shorter spring 
hunting season.  
See: http://www.timesofmalta.com/articles/view/20120412/local/Malta-among-
most-correct-EU-states.415059 (accessed on 24 March 2014). 
 
In a more recent case, the Commission has sent a Reasoned Opinion (RO) on 27 
February 2012 (IP/12/171) to the Maltese government to correctly implement the 
‘Birds Directive’ in relation to the incorrect application of derogations allowing bird 
trapping in autumn. 
See:  http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-12-171_en.htm?locale=en (accessed 




72 It is a traditional festival celebrated each year in the Catalan city of Berga during 
the feast of Corpus Christi. See parts of this festivity on: 
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=3IflVOChmZE 
 
73 Chapter 6 maintained that together these variables are necessary and need to be 
present if governments are to exercise influence and affect EU outcomes. 
 
74 The immigration situation in the central Mediterranean has led EU foreign and 
defence ministers to agree on a naval plan (on 15 May 2015 in Brussels) to destroy 
boats used by traffickers operating mainly from Libya and who smuggle irregular 
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Annex 1: Sample of Questionnaire 
 
TO BE COMPLETED BY OFFICIALS FROM THE GOVERNMENT OF MALTA 
 
CASE STUDY:  
MALTA’S INFLUENCE IN THE NEGOTIATIONS ON DIRECTIVE 2007/23/EC OF 23 MAY 
2007 OF THE EP AND THE COUNCIL ON THE PLACING ON THE MARKET OF 
PYROTECHNIC ARTICLES 
 
I GOVERNMENTAL CAPACITIES 
 
1. Please score the following questions on 3 governmental capacities by ticking [√] in 
the relevant box and according to this scale: 
Yes at extremely high levels of intensity =   5 
Yes at high levels of intensity =    4 
Yes at medium-to-high levels of intensity =   3 
Yes but at low-to-medium levels of intensity = 2 
Yes but at extremely low levels of intensity = 1 
No (none what so ever) =    0 
 
Capacity 1: The capacity to enter early in the process   
i. The government’s capacity to participate effectively in EU decision-shaping: 
- In these negotiations, did the government co-ordinate swiftly and efficiently its 
preferences when forming its national position? 
[  0  ]          [  1  ]          [  2  ]          [  3  ]          [  4   ]          [  5  ]  
 
ii.  The government’s capacity to adopt a national position early in the process 
- Did the government possess the capacity to fully understand and grasp the 
subtleties existing in the Commission’s draft legislative proposal? 
[  0  ]          [  1  ]          [  2  ]          [  3  ]          [  4   ]          [  5  ]  
 
Capacity 2: The expert & administrative capacity 
iii. The government’s expertise: 
 
- Did the government possess enough technical knowledge (expertise) and 
experience (for instance, trained personnel) in this particular policy sphere? 
[  0  ]          [  1  ]          [  2  ]          [  3  ]          [  4   ]          [  5  ]  
 
- How are you able to score the government’s implementation (compliance) levels 
of EU projects and/or EU legislation in this particular policy sphere?  
[  0  ]          [  1  ]          [  2  ]          [  3  ]          [  4   ]          [  5  ]  
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iv. The government’s administrative size: 
- Did instructions arrive (from the Capital) to the technical attaché in Brussels 
quickly enough (containing the necessary detail) to be effective in EU 
negotiations? 
[  0  ]          [  1  ]          [  2  ]          [  3  ]          [  4   ]          [  5  ] 
 
- Given the size of the government’s administration, did is still manage to play a 
proper role in the EU negotiations in Brussels (for instance, when compared to 
larger delegations)? 
[  0  ]          [  1  ]          [  2  ]          [  3  ]          [  4   ]          [  5  ]  
 
Capacity 3: Capacity to prioritize 
v. The relevance of the legislative EU sphere to the administration: 
- Were these EU legislative negotiations relevant to the government? 
 [  0  ]          [  1  ]          [  2  ]          [  3  ]          [  4   ]          [  5  ] 
 
- If yes, did the government place this legislative file among the first on its priority 
list to be able to participate actively in the EU decision-making process? 
[  0  ]          [  1  ]          [  2  ]          [  3  ]          [  4   ]          [  5  ] 
 
2. Now that you have scored the government’s capacities, would you be able to 
 conclude that together they determined and indicated, prior to the start of 
 negotiations in the various structures in Council (i.e. Working Group, Coreper &
 Council of Ministers) whether Malta’s government was capable to exercise 
 influence in these EU legislative negotiations? Please specify and add any 




II GOVERNMENTAL STRATEGIES 
 
In order to help you understand the questions, the following 3 governmental 
strategies are defined as follows: 
 
1. The ‘pace-setting’ strategy: It is used by a government to engage effectively with 
other players involved in the decision-making process through lobbying, 
persuasion, etc. 
 
2. The ‘foot-dragging’ strategy: It is used by a government to delay and slow down 
the decision-making process. It therefore tries to exercise influence to add 




3. The ‘fence-sitting’ strategy: It is a wait-and-see approach used by a government 
in the process. 
  
It is important to understand that strategies 1 (pace-setting) and 2 (foot-dragging) 
are mutually exclusive with a government opting for either one of the two (i.e. not 
for both). Strategy 3 (fence-sitting) is usually adopted by a government as a stand-
alone strategy or as one supplementing strategies 1 or 2.  
 
You are therefore kindly asked to answer the questions for strategy 1 or 2 depending 
on which one Malta adopted in the legislative negotiation under scrutiny and/or the 
questions for strategy 3 (depending whether Malta adopted this strategy in this 
legislative negotiation). 
 
In case the government did not adopt any of these three strategies, please specify 




Strategy 1: The pace-setting strategy 
If you think Malta adopted this strategy, please score the following questions by 
ticking [√] in the relevant box and according to this scale: 
Yes at extremely high levels of intensity =   5 
Yes at high levels of intensity =    4 
Yes at medium-to-high levels of intensity =   3 
Yes but at low-to-medium levels of intensity = 2 
Yes but at extremely low levels of intensity = 1 
No (none what so ever) =    0 
 
i. Pace-setting through lobbying:  
- Did the government lobby the Council Presidency?  
[  0  ]          [  1  ]          [  2  ]          [  3  ]          [  4   ]          [  5  ]  
 
- Did the government lobby the Council Secretariat? 
[  0  ]          [  1  ]          [  2  ]          [  3  ]          [  4   ]          [  5  ]  
 
- Did the government lobby ‘its’ Commissioner network (mainly the 
Commissioner’s cabinet)? 
[  0  ]          [  1  ]          [  2  ]          [  3  ]          [  4   ]          [  5  ]  
 
- Did the government lobby the relevant Commission Directorate General? 
[  0  ]          [  1  ]          [  2  ]          [  3  ]          [  4   ]          [  5  ]  
 
- Did the government lobby its seconded national experts (SNEs) to the 
Commission to spread argumentation (uploading of its preferences)? 
[  0  ]          [  1  ]          [  2  ]          [  3  ]          [  4   ]          [  5  ] 
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- Did the government lobby the Commission at the highest political - a bilateral 
meeting between Malta’s minister and the Commissioner responsible for this 
dossier? 
[  0  ]          [  1  ]          [  2  ]          [  3  ]          [  4   ]          [  5  ] 
 
- Did the government lobby other large state governments (a heterogeneous 
relationship) holding similar interests and/or historic relations with Malta??  
[  0  ]          [  1  ]          [  2  ]          [  3  ]          [  4   ]          [  5  ] 
 
- Did the government lobby other small state governments (a homogenous 
relationship) holding similar interests and/or historic relations with Malta? 
[  0  ]          [  1  ]          [  2  ]          [  3  ]          [  4   ]          [  5  ] 
 
- At which stage of the decision-making process do you think the above took place 
mostly?  
Decision-shaping [    ]           Decision-taking [    ]           Throughout [    ] 
 
ii. Pace-setting through norm advocacy: 
- Did the government manage to persuade other policy players in the decision-
 making process through moral convictions and therefore through persuasive 
 argumentation? 
[  0  ]          [  1  ]          [  2  ]          [  3  ]          [  4   ]          [  5  ] 
 
- If yes, at which stage?  
Decision-shaping [    ]           Decision-taking [    ]           Throughout [    ] 
 
iii. Pace-setting through effective intervention in Council deliberations: 
- Did the government manage to influence other policy players in the decision-
making process through its diplomatic capacity to engage effectively, i.e. clear 
and effective use of language and style as a tool to attract and win support for its 
arguments? 
[  0  ]          [  1  ]          [  2  ]          [  3  ]          [  4   ]          [  5  ] 
 
- Did the government manage to influence other policy players in the decision-
 making process through its diplomatic capacity of persuasion (diplomatic 
 leverage), i.e. persuading other delegations that because the issue at stake is of 
 crucial and fundamental importance to it, it will adopt an extremely inflexible 
 approach to any compromise which moves away from its preferences? 
[  0  ]          [  1  ]          [  2  ]          [  3  ]          [  4   ]          [  5  ] 
 
- At which stage?  






Strategy 2: The foot-dragging strategy 
 
If you think Malta adopted this strategy, please score the following questions by 
ticking [√] in the relevant box and according to this scale: 
 
Yes, this was exactly the case =       5 
Yes, this was very much the case =      4 
Yes, this was the case =        3 
Yes, but for only some of the reasons found in the question =   2 
Yes, but not for the reasons found in the question =   1  
No =          0 
 
i. Foot-dragging through delaying tactics: 
- Did the government lack initiative (for instance, it did not present its proposal/s 
 in the negotiation) in the decision-making process because its preferences and 
 needs were very similar to other active and influential delegations in the 
 process? Therefore, its position was being covered in the process by other 
 delegations which the government only needed to support and intervene 
 occasionally and when necessary (therefore minimal interventions in Council 
 deliberations)? 
[  0  ]          [  1  ]          [  2  ]          [  3  ]          [  4   ]          [  5  ] 
 
- Did the government succeed in delaying the process through argumentation 
 (persuasion) during decision-shaping, and/or in the way it voted during 
decision-taking, aware that the compromise being formed at this stage was not 
in its best interest? For instance, by vetoing (if voting is by unanimity in Council) 
or by forming a blocking minority (if voting is by QMV in Council) at the 
decision-taking stage? 
[  0  ]          [  1  ]          [  2  ]          [  3  ]          [  4   ]          [  5  ] 
 
- If yes, at which stage?  
Decision-shaping [    ]           Decision-taking [    ]         Throughout [    ] 
 
ii. Foot-dragging to request for compensation: 
- As soon as the government realized that the compromise being reached in the 
 latter stages of process was not going to be a favourable outcome for it and 
 given that it was not managing to influence the process, did it consider 
 requesting for compensation in the form of a temporary exemption and/or 
 derogation from this EU legislation? 
 [  0  ]          [  1  ]          [  2  ]          [  3  ]          [  4   ]          [  5  ] 
 
- Same question as above but instead it asked for financial compensation in the 
 form of side-payments and/or financial top-ups? 




- Same question as above but instead it asked for legislative concessions in other 
 policy spheres? 
 [  0  ]          [  1  ]          [  2  ]          [  3  ]          [  4   ]          [  5  ] 
 
iii.     Foot-dragging due to low levels of compliance: 
- Same question as (ii) but this time because the government was aware that it 
 would face eventual problems in the ‘downloading’ process (implementation) 
 with the adoption and the coming into force of this Act (mainly adaptation 
 costs), did it adopt a delaying strategy during the negotiations with the hope 
 that a compromise will not be found with the maintaining of the ‘status quo’ in 
 this policy sphere? 
 [  0  ]          [  1  ]          [  2  ]          [  3  ]          [  4   ]          [  5  ] 
 
Strategy 3: The fence-sitting strategy 
 
If you think Malta adopted this strategy, please score the following questions by 
ticking [√] in the relevant box and according to this scale: 
 
Yes, this was exactly the case =      5 
Yes, this was very much the case =     4 
Yes, this was the case =       3 
Yes, but for only some of the reasons found in the question =  2 
Yes, but not for the reasons found in the question =  1  
No =         0 
 
i.   Fence-sitting by means of shifting coalitions: 
- Due to constant changes in the negotiations (which is typical of EU decision-
 making), did the government decide to adopt a ‘wait and see’ approach in the 
 negotiation successfully shifting coalitions between pace-setters and foot-
 draggers according to how things develop? 
[  0  ]          [  1  ]          [  2  ]          [  3  ]          [  4   ]          [  5  ] 
 
- At which stage did it do this? 
Decision-shaping [    ]           Decision-taking [    ]           Throughout [    ] 
 
ii. Fence-sitting because of similar national positions held by other delegations: 
- Since the government’s preferences were being injected into the process by 
 other delegations (because of similar positions being held) it decided to adopt a 
 wait-and-see approach. However, did the government manage successfully to 
 shift its approach as soon as the situation changed becoming suddenly 
 marginalized which required it to intervene to exercise influence in the 
 negotiation? (In other words, it could no longer depend on other delegations’ 
 intervening with similar positions to it) 




- At which stage did it do this? 
Decision-shaping [    ]           Decision-taking [    ]           Throughout [    ] 
 
iii. Fence-sitting through a miscalculation of the outcome: 
- Due to a miscalculation on the government’s part about the outcome of the 
 negotiation, it decided to fence-sit throughout the process. However, did it 
after all manage to make amends for this situation with the government still 
being satisfied with the outcome? 
[  0  ]          [  1  ]          [  2  ]          [  3  ]          [  4   ]          [  5  ] 
 
- At which stage did it do this? 
Decision-shaping [    ]           Decision-taking [    ]           Throughout [    ] 
 
iv. Fence-sitting because of a lack of benchmarks during implementation:  
- Because the government is relatively new to the EU decision-making process (it 
 logically lacks experience when compared to other EU states who have been 
 members of the EU for some time), it might have opted for this approach due 
to a lack of benchmarks set by the implementation process of similar EU 
legislation in the same policy sphere and which was adopted in the past. Given 
that the government did not have any benchmarks in this area to work on, do 
you think that the government still succeeded in the negotiation?  
[  0  ]          [  1  ]          [  2  ]          [  3  ]          [  4   ]          [  5  ] 
 
- At which stage did it do this? 
Decision-shaping [    ]           Decision-taking [    ]           Throughout [    ] 
 
Now that you have scored the government’s strategies, would you be able to 
conclude that together they were indeed explanatory factors for Malta’s 
influence (or no influence) in the process? 
 
- Are you able to point out any of these strategies that proved to be extremely 
 fundamental for Malta in this case? Which in your opinion were the key success 
 factors for Malta to gain influence over the outcome? Please specify and add 
any comments you may wish to put down in this box: 
 
 
 Are you able to mention any other strategy Malta used in the process not 
 mentioned above?  
 For instance, did Malta use ‘its’ MEP network in this negotiation? And if so, do 
 you think this was an important channel of influence in this case? Please 







Annex 2: Sample of Interview Questions with EU Officials 
 
Case studies: Directives 2007/23/EC of 23 May 2007 & 2013/29/EU (recast) of 12 
June 2013 
 
I – BACKGROUND QUESTION(S) TO BOTH CASES 
 
1. In your view, why do you think the Commission felt it was necessary to 
harmonize this EU policy/legislative sphere? 
 
II – NATIONAL POTION AND PREFERENCES DURING THE EARLY STAGES OF THE 
DECISION-MAKING PROCESSES 
 
2. Do you think that the Commission’s draft proposals represented an area of 
salience for Malta? 
 
3. After having held interviews with the relevant government officials who 
participated in these negotiations, it seems that MT was a very active policy 
player from a relatively early phase in the processes. 
- Do you recall it intervening at the early stages of the processes? 
- Do you recall what Malta’s main preferences were? 
 
4. At the very early stages in the processes, what was the overall reaction by the 
member states to the Commission’s proposals & were you able to foresee 
whether they were going to be difficult negotiations to come up with 
compromises? 
 
III – NATIONAL POSITION AND PREFERENCES DURING DECISION-TAKING 
 
5. During decision-shaping (technical level), MT was a very active player. Was this 
also the case during decision-taking, i.e. Coreper and Ministerial level? 
 
6. Are you aware whether Maltese government officials lobbied your service? And 
if so, at which stage of the process? 
 
7. Was there information available to the governments about the concerns, 
interests and needs of the other delegations at the start of these EU legislative 
negotiations? 
 
8. Were there any unexpected shifts in these negotiations? For instance, were 
there any new fundamental issues raised half-way through the processes? And if 
so, how did this affect the general way forward (possible compromise)? Did it 




9. Are you able to indicate which of the following strategies the Maltese 
government adopted during the negotiations? 
- A pace-setting strategy: used by a government to engage effectively with 
other players in the process through lobbying, persuasion, etc.; 
- A foot-dragging strategy: used by a government to delay and slow down the 
process; 
- A fence-sitting strategy: a wait-and-see approach. 
 
10. Once the Commission adopts its proposal, requesting for major changes to it 
during the decision-making process in Council and the EP is extremely difficult to 
achieve for any government (particularly small states). Malta’s government was 
aware that this was going to be the case in the particular negotiations of these 
Directives. Do you think that Malta was well prepared for this scenario? Are you 
aware whether it tried to influence the process before the Commission adopted 
its proposals (agenda-setting stage)? And when in your view did Malta start 
intervening in Council meetings (at which stages of the processes, i.e. decision-
shaping (technical level) and/or decision-taking (political level)?  
 
11. When did Malta’s requests about exemption of its fireworks manufacturing 
industry from the scope of this Directive – the so called Malta clauses vis-à-vis 
Article 2(2) in the adopted act (Directive 2007/23/EC) - start appearing in the 
general compromise? 
- In Council, was Malta’s position immediately met by the Presidency? And 
were there any other delegations that supported Malta on this issue? Are 
you able to name them? Or was Malta’s government (in terms of its 
preferences and needs) isolated in this negotiation? 
 
12. At the decision-taking stage, did the Minister need to intervene strongly during 
Competitiveness Council meetings? and  
 
13. How did MT compare with other delegations especially the small states that had 
similar concerns to those held by MT? 
 
14. Did the government hold bilateral meetings with the Commission? If so, at what 
level (technical, political, or both?) 
 
15.  Are you aware whether the government lobbied the EP on this issue? And if so, 
at which stage in the process? 
 
IV – ASSESSMENT OF MALTA’S SUCCESSES AND/OR FAILURES 
 
16. In your view, did the government manage to exercise influence in these EU 
decision-making processes? 
- At which stages in the processes do you think this happened?  
- How did it do this? 
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- What made it more influential than others? (Was it more influential than 
others?) 
 
17. Do you think that the Maltese government’s arguments may have been more 
successful had an alternative means of negotiation been adopted by the Maltese 
officials? 
 
18. Did the outcomes match the government’s interests and preferences adopted 
during the negotiations? 
- To what extent was the government successful in uploading its preferences into 
the processes? For instance, did it manage to amend the wording to the text in 
those articles of the draft proposals that were of main concern to the 
government? Are you able to disclose some of these Council documents 
(Working Group or Coreper docs) showing Malta’s footnotes so as to study 
better the outcome please? 
- If successful, what in your opinion made the government ‘punch beyond its 
weight’? Could you identify this with any of the aforementioned explanatory 
variables (strategies) mentioned in question III.4? 
- Are there any other factors which you think brought about the overall results?  
- How did it fare overall compared with other delegations? 
 
19. In case of failure only: what reasons do you think determined this (i.e. lack of 
exercise to positively influence the outcome)? For instance, was the government 
inactive throughout the negotiations? Did it start lobbying too late in the 
processes? A lack of support? What other reasons can you think of for failure to 
influence the outcomes? 
 
V – GENERAL QUESTIONS OF INTEREST 
 
20. In your opinion, what would you consider to be the most successful 
tool/strategy(ies) that can be adopted by a government (especially that of a 














Annex 3: Sample of Interview Questions with Maltese Public Officials 
 
Case studies: Directives 2007/23/EC of 23 May 2007 & 2013/29/EU (recast) on 12 
June 2013 – Pyrotechnic Articles 
 
I – BACKGROUND QUESTION(S) TO THE CASES 
 
1. In your view, why do you think the Commission felt it was necessary to 
harmonize this EU policy/legislative sphere? 
 
II – NATIONAL POSITION AND PREFERENCES AT THE EARLY STAGES OF THE 
DECISION-MAKING PROCESS 
 
2. Did the Commission’s draft proposal represent an area of salience for Malta? 
3. What was Malta’s overall position on the draft Commission proposals? Did you 
agree with it? 
 If not, what were your problems and concerns with the legislative proposals? 
 What was the government’s overall objective that needed to be achieved from 
the negotiations?  
 Were you in favour or not of this policy area being harmonized by the EU? 
 
4. At the initial stages in the processes (i.e. subsequent to the Commission’s 
adoption of the proposals), did the government envisage which capacities and 
strategies it needed to maintain to deal effectively with negotiations in Brussels?  
 
5.  Would you describe your initial analysis about the Commission’s draft proposals 
and its likely effect(s) on the local market as being quite complete at this stage? 
In other words, could you at the early stages of the decision-making processes 
(decision-shaping stages) already distinguish: 
- What Malta’s main preferences were? 
- What likely action needed to be taken on the government’s end to influence 
the processes (for example, any wording that needed to be proposed in Council 
meetings)? Are you able to disclose what Malta’s request(s) for changes to the 
wording of the texts were (which articles in the draft proposal)? 
 
6. How fast was the government’s co-ordination system to come up with an 
approved national position? 
- Was the government’s representative provided with an approved instruction 
note prior to the first Council working group meeting? 
 
7. What sort of internal procedure (or process) does the government adopt for this 
type of EU decision (a Directive in this case)? Does the government use differing 
procedures in the formation of different types of EU legislative instruments, for 




8. At the very early stages in the processes, could Malta identify which other 
member states had similar national positions to it and were there particular 
member states with Malta’s same position? Or was Malta’s government 
isolated? 
- Initially, what was the overall reaction by the member states to the 
Commission’s proposals? 
- Initially, were you able to foresee whether they were going to be difficult 
negotiations? 
- Initially, were you able to foresee whether the EP could possibly support Malta’s 
concerns and needs?  
 
III – NATIONAL CAPACITIES AND STRATEGIES DURING THE DECISION-MAKING 
PROCESSES 
 
9. Why did you want (a, b, c...) in these negotiations? Would you be able to 
mention why this was of particular salience to the government? 
 
10. Was there information available to the government about the concerns, 
interests and needs of other delegations at the start of negotiations? 
 
11. Were there any unexpected shifts in the negotiations? For instance, were there 
some new issues raised half-way through the processes? And if so, how did you 
adapt to such situations? Did it affect your position in any way? 
 
12. Did your national position stay constant throughout? And were there any 
opposing arguments that harmed your position? If so, was the opposing camp 
in a majority? 
 
13. Are you able to indicate any of the following capacities the government 
maintained during negotiations in Council? 
- A high level of expertise (comparable to that of other member states); 
- A good level of administrative co-ordination together with an adequate number 
of human resources to deal with amongst other things the formation of the 
government’s national position in relation to the legislative proposals; 
- Prioritization by either efficient use and mobilization of available human 
resource base and/or by investing in new administration. 
- Did the government think of adopting any other governmental capacity not listed 
above? If so, which? 
 
14. Are you able to indicate any of the following strategies the government 
employed during the negotiations? 
- A pace-setting strategy: used by a government to engage effectively with other 
players in the process through lobbying, persuasion, etc.; 




- A fence-sitting strategy: a wait-and-see approach. 
 
15. Once the Commission decides to legislate and harmonize legislation in a policy 
sphere, requesting to be exempt from it is extremely difficult to achieve. Malta’s 
government was aware that this was going to be the case in these negotiations 
on pyrotechnic articles. So how did you prepare yourselves for this? And how 
and when did the government start intervening in Council meetings? 
 
16. Did the government hold bilateral meetings with the Commission? 
 
17. In Council, was Malta’s position immediately met by the Presidency? And were 
there any other delegations that supported Malta on this issue? Are you able to 
name them? 
- For instance, did Italy, Greece, Portugal and Spain, which also traditionally 
manufacture fireworks which are used in religious, cultural and traditional 
festivities, intervene in a similar manner in the negotiations? 
 
IV – ASSESSMENT OF MALTA’S SUCCESSES AND/OR FAILURES 
 
18. In your view, did the government manage to exercise influence in these EU 
decision-making processes and was it satisfied with the outcomes? 
 
19. Did the outcomes match the government’s interests and preferences? 
- To what extent was the government successful to upload its preferences into the 
processes? For instance, did it manage to amend the wording of those articles in 
the draft proposal that were of main concern to the government? Are you able 
to disclose some of these Council documents (Working group or Coreper docs) 
showing Malta’s footnotes please so as to study better the outcome? 
- If successful, what in your opinion made the government ‘punch beyond its 
weight’? Could you identify this with any of the aforementioned explanatory 
variables mentioned in questions III.5 and III.6? Or any other reasons not 
mentioned above? 
- How did it fare overall compared with other delegations? 
 
20. In case of failure only: what reasons do you think determined this (i.e. lack of 
exercise to positively influence the outcome)? For instance, was the government 
inactive throughout the negotiations? Did it start lobbying too late in the 
processes? What other reasons can you think of for failure to influence the 
outcomes?  
                                                             
 
